Sharma v University of Nottingham: Common‑law Fairness, Not the Equality Act, Governs Disability Adjustments in Judicial Proceedings, and Adjustments Should Be Determined Proximately to the Hearing

Introduction

In Sharma v University of Nottingham [2025] EWCA Civ 1457, the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) dismissed an appeal from an Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) case management decision refusing a suite of “reasonable adjustments” sought by a disabled litigant in person for an upcoming appeal hearing. Mr Rohit Sharma, formerly a Contract and Supplier Manager at the University of Nottingham, had brought wide‑ranging Employment Tribunal (ET) claims (unfair dismissal, discrimination, breach of contract, unauthorised deductions, and victimisation). Those claims were struck out by the ET on 29 August 2024 for unreasonable conduct and lack of active pursuit, prompting an appeal to the EAT. While the merits of that appeal remain pending, Mr Sharma asked the EAT in February 2025 to order extensive procedural adjustments in advance of the EAT hearing, scheduled for September 2026.

The EAT (HHJ Beard) refused, holding that many requests were premised on a misunderstanding of the appellate process. The Court of Appeal (Males LJ, with Warby and Bean LJJ agreeing) has now affirmed that refusal. This judgment restates, with emphasis and practical clarity, the governing legal framework: the Equality Act 2010’s service‑provider duty to make reasonable adjustments does not apply to the exercise of a judicial function; the relevant obligation arises instead from the common law duty of fairness, informed but not determined by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Equal Treatment Bench Book. Crucially, the Court underscores that granular or blanket adjustments sought months in advance are often inappropriate; rather, adjustments should be calibrated by the tribunal at or near the hearing, in context, and only insofar as they are reasonable and necessary.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Sharma’s appeal against the EAT’s refusal to order a broad range of procedural adjustments. Males LJ held:

The Equality Act 2010 duty under sections 20–21 read with section 29 does not apply to judicial functions because Schedule 3, paragraph 3 excludes them (paras 14–15).
Nevertheless, courts and tribunals must consider disability in exercising judicial discretion under the common law duty of fairness; Articles 6 and 14 ECHR add nothing of substance beyond that (paras 16–18).
Many of the requested adjustments were founded on a misunderstanding of an EAT appeal (no live evidence, no cross‑examination, no jury; typically a short, submissions‑only hearing) and others were premature (paras 19–23).
While certain pragmatic accommodations can ordinarily be made (breaks, reading from notes, presence of family support or a McKenzie friend), there was no basis to order them far in advance (paras 23–24).
Requests for assistive transcription technology were unsupported on the evidence at this stage; permission could be sought later and, if necessary, managed compatibly with section 9 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 through undertakings and without public expense (paras 25–26).
The appeal was dismissed (para 27), with Warby and Bean LJJ agreeing (paras 28–29).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

J v K (EHRC intervening) [2019] EWCA Civ 5: The Court of Appeal previously held that the Equality Act 2010’s service‑provider duties do not apply to the exercise of a judicial function, but that judges must still take disability into account under the general law when exercising discretion (paras 15–17). Sharma reaffirms this boundary and applies it in the appellate tribunal context.
Heal v University of Oxford [2020] ICR 1294 (EAT): The EAT recognised that the common law duty of fairness requires taking disability into account and that ECHR rights do not materially add to that duty (paras 15, 17). Sharma adopts and endorses this position.
Rackham v NHS Professionals Ltd [2015] UKEAT/0110/15/LA: Langstaff J said a tribunal, as an organ of the state, has a duty to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate disabilities (para 16). Sharma situates this proposition within the common law fairness framework rather than Equality Act service‑provider duties.
Galo v Bombardier Aerospace UK [2016] NICA 25: The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal reasoned similarly on the limited additional role of Articles 6 and 14 ECHR where common law fairness already governs (para 17). Sharma aligns with that analysis.

Taken together, these authorities confirm a two‑stage approach: the Equality Act’s adjustment duty does not bind judges when exercising judicial functions, but the common law fairness duty requires judicial consideration of disability‑related disadvantage and proportionate, reasonable steps to alleviate it. Sharma adds practical guidance on timing, calibration, and the nature of adjustments in appellate proceedings.

Legal Reasoning: The Framework Applied

Equality Act Inapplicable to Judicial Functions: Section 29 imposes duties on service providers but Schedule 3, paragraph 3 carves out “a judicial function.” Both the EAT’s case management decision and any conduct of the appeal fall within that carve‑out (paras 14–15).
Common Law Duty of Fairness Governs: Even without Equality Act duties, tribunals must exercise discretion fairly, taking into account disability‑related disadvantage and adopting reasonable measures to secure effective participation (paras 16, 18).
ECHR Adds Nothing Material: Articles 6 and 14 do not expand upon what fairness already requires in this context (para 17).
Reasonableness Is Context‑Sensitive: What is reasonable depends on the nature of the hearing. EAT appeals are typically short, submissions‑only, paper‑led and determined by specialist judges. Measures appropriate for a contested trial with live evidence may be unnecessary or disproportionate at an appellate hearing (paras 19–23).
Timing Matters: Courts should avoid imposing detailed advance regimes for adjustments months before a hearing. The proper course is to leave matters to the tribunal’s “good sense” at or near the hearing, when the actual circumstances and needs are known (para 4; see also paras 22–23, 26).

How the Court Applied the Framework to the Specific Requests

Extended time for preparation and responses: Unnecessary given the long lead‑time and existing EAT directions (para 21).
Hearing format changes (multi‑day listing; late starts; short daily sessions; long gaps): Misconceived for a one‑day, submissions‑only appeal. A request for a somewhat later start may be entertained, but no blanket order is appropriate now (paras 19, 22).
Breaks and quiet waiting area: Reasonable in principle but premature to micro‑manage; the tribunal can provide breaks and space as needed on the day (para 23).
Composition of the tribunal: Litigants cannot choose the ethnicity of judicial members; the EAT is a specialist tribunal experienced with litigants in person, including those with English as an additional language (para 23).
Cross‑examination and advocacy adjustments: Inapplicable because there will be no oral evidence or cross‑examination. The appellant may read from notes, make notes, and be supported by family or a McKenzie friend (para 24).
Interpreter: Not ordered; based on the Court’s observation of the appellant’s fluent English, an interpreter appears unnecessary, though ordinary assistance from family is permitted (para 24).
Assistive technology (speech‑to‑text, screen readers, magnification): Not justified on the current evidence. Permission can be sought closer to the hearing, and any recording issues can be managed with undertakings consistent with section 9 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981; no requirement for public funding (paras 25–26).

Key Doctrinal Points Consolidated

Equality Act carve‑out: Adjustments in judicial decision‑making are not governed by Equality Act section 29 due to Schedule 3, paragraph 3.
Fairness duty as source of obligation: Courts/tribunals must consider disability and make reasonable, proportionate adjustments to facilitate effective participation.
Pragmatism and proximity: Adjustments should be decided as close as practicable to the hearing to reflect actual needs and avoid unnecessary disruption.
Nature of the forum matters: Appellate hearings (short, submissions‑only) rarely require trial‑style accommodations.
Technology can be accommodated: Real‑time transcription may be permitted with safeguards under the Contempt of Court Act 1981; no entitlement that the court provides technology at public expense absent necessity.

Impact and Future Significance

Sharma will likely shape case management in appellate tribunals and beyond:

Procedural discipline: Tribunals will feel reinforced in declining broad, pre‑emptive adjustment orders made months in advance, and in preferring flexible, on‑the‑day case management aligned with the common law duty of fairness.
Sharper tailoring of requests: Parties seeking adjustments should identify the functional impairment and explain how a proposed measure alleviates a concrete disadvantage in the specific hearing envisaged. Trial‑oriented measures (e.g., cross‑examination limits) will not be granted for submissions‑only appeals.
Boundary clarity: The judgment reaffirms that grievances about the conduct of judicial proceedings cannot be framed as Equality Act service‑provider claims. The relevant test is fairness and reasonableness within judicial discretion.
Assistive technology practice: The Court’s explicit acknowledgment that live transcription can be permitted with undertakings provides practical guidance for accommodating disabilities while respecting section 9 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.
Benchmark for ECHR arguments: Litigants relying on Articles 6/14 should expect courts to treat those rights as coextensive with the common law fairness duty in this area.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Judicial function (Equality Act 2010): When judges or tribunals are deciding cases or making case‑management decisions, they are exercising a “judicial function.” The Equality Act’s duties on service providers (section 29) do not apply to these functions (Schedule 3, para 3).
Common law duty of fairness: A foundational principle requiring courts and tribunals to conduct proceedings justly. It includes ensuring disabled parties can effectively participate, through reasonable and proportionate steps.
Reasonable adjustments (in judicial context): Practical measures (breaks, flexible start times, allowing notes, support persons, use of simple language, etc.) adopted to mitigate disability‑related disadvantage. They must be reasonable in scope and necessary for the particular hearing.
Overriding objective: Procedural rules require tribunals to handle cases justly and at proportionate cost. This includes avoiding unnecessary delay and expense and allocating resources fairly among cases.
McKenzie friend: A non‑lawyer who may sit with a litigant in person in court to provide quiet assistance (note‑taking, moral support, organizing papers). They do not have a right of audience without permission.
Section 9, Contempt of Court Act 1981: Sound recordings of court proceedings are prohibited without permission. Courts can permit limited recording (e.g., for real‑time transcription) with safeguards, such as undertakings to delete recordings immediately after the hearing.
EAT appellate process vs ET trial: An EAT appeal typically involves legal submissions based on documents; it does not involve witnesses or cross‑examination. Adjustments suited to trials will often be unnecessary at the EAT stage.

Additional Observations and Practical Pointers

Match requests to the proceeding: Identify how the format of the particular hearing (submissions‑only vs evidential) creates a barrier, and propose a proportionate measure to remove it.
Evidence linkage: Provide concise medical or occupational evidence that links a diagnosed condition to functional limitations relevant to the hearing (e.g., concentration limits justifying planned breaks).
Timing strategy: Use a light‑touch approach far in advance (flagging likely needs) and make, or refine, specific requests shortly before or at the hearing when demands can be appropriately calibrated.
Panel composition: Requests to select judicial members by reference to ethnicity or other protected characteristics will not be entertained; fairness does not extend to constituting the tribunal by preference.
Technology with safeguards: Where real‑time transcription is genuinely needed, seek permission with proposed undertakings addressing section 9 of the 1981 Act and clarify that equipment is privately sourced unless the court directs otherwise.

Conclusion

Sharma v University of Nottingham is a careful restatement and practical refinement of the law on disability‑related adjustments in judicial proceedings. It confirms that:

Equality Act service‑provider duties do not apply to judicial functions, but courts and tribunals remain obliged, as a matter of common law fairness, to take disability into account and make reasonable adjustments.
The “reasonableness” of any adjustment is inseparable from the context and nature of the hearing; appellate proceedings will rarely warrant trial‑style measures.
Detailed advance orders are generally inappropriate; adjustments should be left to the tribunal’s good sense at or near the time of the hearing when needs and logistics are concrete.
Assistive technologies can be permitted with safeguards, including undertakings consistent with section 9 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, and need not be publicly funded absent necessity.

The judgment offers clear, workable guidance to tribunals and litigants alike: focus on effective participation through proportionate, context‑specific measures determined at the right time. In doing so, it narrows the space for overbroad or premature adjustment requests while strengthening the principled application of fairness for disabled participants in the justice system.