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Sharma v University of Nottingham

Smart Summary

Summary of Judgment (Anonymized)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the Appellant against an order of Judge Beard in the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) refusing an application for adjustments to the EAT's usual procedure to accommodate the Appellant's disabilities. The Appellant, who represented himself in this court, had previously brought multiple claims in the Employment Tribunal against the Respondent, The University, including unfair dismissal and various discrimination and contract-related claims. Employment Judge Broughton struck out the surviving claims by a judgment dated 29 August 2024 on the basis that the Appellant had conducted the proceedings unreasonably and was no longer actively pursuing his claims. The Appellant filed a notice of appeal on 17 October 2024 against that striking-out decision.

On 3 February 2025 the EAT ordered that the appeal be listed for a full hearing with a one-day time estimate (including time for judgment). Employment Judge Walker considered that procedural unfairness might be arguable because not all the Appellant's points had been addressed. The EAT hearing is due in September 2026. The only question before this court was whether an order should now be made for various adjustments to the EAT's usual procedures in light of the Appellant's disabilities.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the EAT (and Judge Beard in deciding the application) was obliged to make the extensive list of reasonable adjustments sought by the Appellant at this stage, or whether it was appropriate to leave consideration of such adjustments to the EAT when the hearing approaches.
  2. Whether the Equality Act 2010's duty to make reasonable adjustments applies to judicial functions exercised by courts and tribunals, and if not, whether the common law duty of fairness requires consideration of disability-related disadvantage in the exercise of judicial discretion.
  3. Whether the refusal of the requested adjustments amounted to a breach of the Appellant's rights under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to a fair trial) or otherwise failed to give effect to equal treatment guidance.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Appellant explained he suffers from multiple chronic physical and mental conditions (including cardiac disease, chronic pain, severe stress/anxiety/depression, obstructive sleep apnoea, racial trauma/PTSD, recent cataract operations, and an imperfect command of English) and that these disabilities substantially affect his ability to participate in proceedings.
  • On that basis he sought an extensive set of adjustments, including substantial additional time for preparation and responses, changes to the hearing format and daily schedule, frequent short breaks and a quiet waiting area, permission to use pre-prepared responses and notes, permission for a carer/family members to attend and assist (including translation), access to assistive technology (speech-to-text, screen readers), the appointment of a tribunal case officer, and restrictions on cross-examination and questioning (including tight time limits and intervention where questioning became aggressive).
  • The Appellant relied on medical evidence in the form of letters from Attorney Addis and Attorney Taylor (provided initially for the Employment Tribunal hearing) in support of his requests.
  • On appeal he submitted the EAT had failed to discharge obligations under sections 20 and 21 of the Equality Act 2010, had mischaracterised disability-related impairments as language issues, had infringed Article 6 ECHR, had placed excessive emphasis on administrative convenience, and had failed to follow the Judicial College Equal Treatment Bench Book 2024.

Respondent's Position

  • The University adopted a neutral position on whether the adjustments should be made, both before the EAT and before this court, leaving the issue to the tribunal/court to decide.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Case A v Case B [2019] EWCA Civ 5 Established that the Equality Act duty in section 29 does not apply to judicial functions, but confirmed that judicial exercise of discretion must take into account relevant considerations including a party's disability. The court relied on this authority to explain that although the statutory duty to make reasonable adjustments does not apply to judicial functions, the common law duty of fairness requires consideration of disability when exercising judicial discretion.
Case C v The University [2020] ICR 1294 Recognition by the EAT that judicial functions are not subject to section 29 but that the common law duty of fairness includes consideration of disability. The court cited this decision to show the EAT itself accepted the common law duty to consider disability in the exercise of judicial discretion.
Case D v Company A [2015] UKEAT/0110/15/LA Authority where the EAT indicated that a tribunal, as an organ of the state/public body, has a duty to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate claimants' disabilities. The court referred to a passage from this decision recognising the tribunal's duty as an organ of state to make reasonable adjustments, supporting the proposition that disability-related needs must be considered.
Case E v Company B [2016] NICA 25 Consideration of the relationship between ECHR Articles 6 and 14 and the common law duty of fairness in the context of disability adjustments. The court cited this authority to support the view that Articles 6 and 14 do not add materially to what the common law duty of fairness already requires in relation to disability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded from a factual and procedural assessment of what the upcoming EAT hearing will involve, and from a legal analysis about what duty (statutory or common law) applies to judicial decisions about adjustments.

Legally, the court explained that sections 20 and 21 of the Equality Act 2010 define the duty to make reasonable adjustments and the failure to comply, but do not specify who owes the duty; section 29 imposes the duty on persons providing services. Schedule 3, paragraph 3 excludes judicial functions from section 29. Therefore the statutory duty under section 29 does not apply to judicial functions. However, authorities (including Case A v Case B and the cited EAT decision) mean that the exercise of judicial discretion must take into account relevant considerations such as disability, so the common law duty of fairness requires consideration of disability-related disadvantage.

Applying these legal principles to the facts, the court concluded that many of the Appellant's requested adjustments flowed from a misunderstanding of the nature of the appeal hearing. Judge Beard had correctly described the appeal as a one-day hearing before the specialist tribunal, concerned with whether the Employment Tribunal was wrong to strike out the claims. The appeal hearing was not intended to be a multi-day trial with live evidence or cross-examination; rather it would involve submissions based on the existing documents in the bundle and, in practice, submissions lasting around three hours with time reserved for judgment.

On that basis the court addressed the specific categories of requests:

  • Extended additional time for preparation and responses: unnecessary given the long lead time to the hearing (approximately ten months) and existing EAT timetabling directions.
  • Adjustments to the overall hearing format (multiple days, late start times, multi-day gaps): unnecessary because the appeal was listed for a single day and the tribunal should be trusted to manage timing; a later start might be requested nearer the time but should not be ordered now.
  • Breaks and quiet waiting area: the court considered it premature to specify detailed break schedules, but observed that the EAT members' good sense could accommodate breaks and provide access to a quiet area if needed.
  • Requests related to cross-examination and advocacy: many such requests were inapplicable because there would be no live evidence or cross-examination; the Appellant could read from pre-prepared notes, make notes during the respondent's submissions, and be supported by family or a McKenzie Friend without a formal order.
  • Requests for speech-to-text transcription and assistive technology: the court found no clear explanation in the application why these were necessary for the hearing as listed; accordingly the refusal could not be faulted. However, the court observed that if a genuine need were demonstrated later, the Appellant could seek permission to use such technology at the time of the hearing, and the Appellant had indicated a willingness to offer a limited undertaking about use and deletion of any live transcription.
  • Requests for the tribunal composition or ethnicity of tribunal members were rejected as inappropriate; the Appellant cannot choose the tribunal or its members.

In short, the court treated many requests as either inappropriate given the nature of an appellate hearing, premature because they sought specific directions many months in advance, or unsupported by sufficient explanation as to why they were necessary to alleviate a disability-related disadvantage in the specific context of this appeal.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court dismissed the appeal and upheld Judge Beard's refusal to make the extensive orders for procedural adjustments sought by the Appellant.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that no advance order for the broad set of adjustments requested is made; the EAT's order that the appeal be listed for a one-day hearing (with its existing timetabling directions) stands.
  • The court emphasised that while the statutory duty under section 29 of the Equality Act 2010 does not apply to judicial functions, the common law duty of fairness requires courts and tribunals to take disability-related disadvantage into account when exercising judicial discretion. The decision applied those principles to the facts and concluded that detailed prospective directions were unnecessary or premature in this case.
  • No new legal precedent was established; the court applied existing authorities and confirmed the appropriate approach is to leave specific adjustments to the tribunal conducting the hearing unless particular needs are shown to require orders in advance.

Disposition

The appeal is dismissed.

Sources of Evidence Referenced in the Opinion

  • Medical letters relied on by the Appellant: letters from Attorney Addis and Attorney Taylor dated 1 July 2024 and 5 August 2024 respectively (originally provided for the Employment Tribunal hearing).
  • Employment Tribunal judgment of Judge Broughton dated 29 August 2024 (striking out the Appellant's surviving claims).
  • EAT order of 3 February 2025 listing the appeal for a full hearing with a one-day estimate and the reasons given by Employment Judge Walker.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and has been anonymized in accordance with the instructions accompanying the task.

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Sharma v University of Nottingham

Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.

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Sharma v University of Nottingham
(Nov 14, 2025)