Serious Historic Convictions and the “Good Character” Test in Naturalisation: Commentary on Akande v Minister for Justice and Equality [2025] IEHC 679

Serious Historic Convictions and the “Good Character” Requirement in Naturalisation: Akande v Minister for Justice and Equality [2025] IEHC 679

1. Introduction

This commentary analyses the judgment of Ferriter J in Akande v The Minister for Justice and Equality [2025] IEHC 679, a judicial review challenge to the refusal of an application for Irish citizenship by naturalisation. At the core of the case lies the meaning and application of the “good character” requirement in s.15(1)(b) of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (“the 1956 Act”) where an applicant has a serious historic criminal conviction but an extensive subsequent period of exemplary behaviour.

The case is significant because it reinforces, and slightly sharpens, a line of authority that:

  • criminal convictions remain potentially decisive in the “good character” assessment even after a long, incident-free interval; and
  • rehabilitation, early release and impeccable conduct over a decade can still be rationally regarded as insufficient to outweigh a single grave conviction, particularly in the context of serious drug trafficking.

The judgment consolidates and applies principles from MNN v Minister for Justice [2020] IECA 187, Talla v Minister for Justice and Equality [2020] IECA 135, and Ahmed v Minister for Justice [2024] IEHC 661, while dealing with arguments centred on rehabilitation, the Community Return Scheme and the passage of time.

2. Background and Facts

2.1 Parties

  • Applicant: Mr Olayiwola Saheed Akande, a Nigerian national born in 1985, long resident in Ireland, married to an Irish citizen, employed on a stable, full-time basis from 2016, with long-standing lawful residence (Stamp 4).
  • Respondent: The Minister for Justice and Equality (“the Minister”), exercising statutory functions in relation to naturalisation under the 1956 Act.

2.2 Immigration history

  • Arrived in Ireland in 2000 as a minor with his father.
  • Early application for permission to remain (as part of his father’s family unit) refused in 2004; proposal to deport followed.
  • Married an Irish national in 2005; granted Stamp 4 permission in 2006 on that basis.
  • Permission later lapsed, a deportation process was initiated, but following representations he obtained renewed permission and ultimately a series of Stamp 4 permissions, the current one valid to November 2026.

2.3 Criminal conviction and rehabilitation

  • On 23 September 2010, he was charged with possession of drugs for sale or supply with a market value of €13,000 or more, contrary to s.15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 (as amended).
  • That offence attracted a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years imprisonment unless “exceptional and specific circumstances” justified a lesser sentence (s.27(3D)(b) of the 1977 Act).
  • On 14 December 2011, Dublin Circuit Court, on a guilty plea, imposed 7 years’ imprisonment with 3 years suspended, with associated lesser offences taken into consideration.
  • He was transferred to Shelton Abbey open prison (December 2012), had substantial temporary release, and on 9 January 2014 was released on the Community Return Scheme, having served 2 years and 27 days in custody.
  • He successfully completed 22 weeks of community work under the Scheme by June 2014 with positive reports and no warnings; his probation case was then closed and never re-opened.

2.4 Naturalisation applications

  • First application (2008) – refused in 2013 for failure to meet the “good character” requirement, at a time when he was in prison and lacked valid permission to remain.
  • Second application (2021) – fully disclosed his 2011 conviction, appended a positive Probation Service letter regarding the Community Return Scheme, and included a detailed personal statement explaining:
    • family pressures following his father’s cancer diagnosis and death;
    • financial responsibility for siblings in Nigeria;
    • loss of employment to provide care; and
    • his subsequent remorse, rehabilitation, and unblemished conduct since release.
  • His solicitors made submissions emphasising:
    • the once-off nature of the offence;
    • the long passage of time (over a decade) without reoffending;
    • stable marriage to an Irish citizen and long-term employment; and
    • the need to evaluate his character “in the round”, relying on Talla and Hiri.

2.5 The impugned decision (February 2024)

On 19 February 2024 officials recommended refusal of naturalisation under s.15 of the 1956 Act on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy the “good character” criterion in s.15(1)(b). The Minister adopted that recommendation.

The decision:

  • explicitly set out the applicant’s personal statement and mitigating circumstances;
  • acknowledged:
    • his full disclosure of the offence;
    • his cooperation and forthrightness;
    • the positive Probation Service reports and successful Community Return Scheme;
    • his stable employment and integration; and
    • submissions that he was reformed and had “paid his debt to society”.
  • nonetheless treated the drug trafficking offence as a “very serious matter” reflecting adversely on character and gave it determinative weight, stating that:
    “The vintage of the offence is very much outweighed by the serious sanction of the conviction.”

In that context, the decision stated that prisoners may be released early for reasons including good behaviour and prison capacity, and concluded that the applicant did not meet the s.15(1)(b) “good character” requirement.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court refused the application for judicial review and upheld the Minister’s decision.

3.1 Issues before the Court

The judicial review did not involve an appeal on the merits but challenged the lawfulness of the Minister’s decision on the basis that it was:

  • irrational (in the sense of Wednesbury unreasonableness);
  • vitiated by a failure to take relevant considerations into account and/or reliance on irrelevant considerations, particularly:
    • failure to properly weigh the long period (c. 10 years) of exemplary behaviour and rehabilitation; and
    • mischaracterisation of his early release and Community Return Scheme participation (e.g. the reference to prison overcrowding).

3.2 Court’s holding

Ferriter J held that:

  • The Minister:
    • had regard to all relevant material before her, including mitigating circumstances, rehabilitation, and the passage of time;
    • accurately recorded and considered that material; and
    • made a comprehensive, holistic assessment of the applicant’s character, consistent with the principles outlined in MNN and Talla.
  • The Minister was entitled, within the range of reasonable decisions, to conclude that:
    • the seriousness of the drug trafficking conviction, and the gravity of the underlying criminality, continued to weigh heavily against the applicant’s character assessment;
    • that negative weight could rationally outweigh the positive factors of:
      • successful rehabilitation;
      • long-term non-reoffending;
      • stable family and employment; and
      • cooperation with the authorities.
  • The stray reference to prisoners being released early “for a number of reasons, including…capacity limits” did not amount to:
    • a material error of fact; or
    • reliance on an irrelevant consideration sufficient to vitiate the decision,
    in light of the decision read as a whole, which clearly credited the Community Return Scheme and good behaviour.
  • The case fell far short of the high threshold for judicial intervention on the ground of irrationality; the court could not re-weigh the factors or substitute its own view of the merits.

The application for an order of certiorari quashing the refusal of naturalisation was therefore refused.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Statutory framework: s.15 of the 1956 Act

Section 15(1) of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 provides that:

“Upon receipt of an application for a certificate of naturalisation, the Minister may in his absolute discretion, grant the application, if satisfied that the applicant is … (b) of good character”.

Key elements:

  • Naturalisation is discretionary (“may…grant the application”).
  • The discretion is described as “absolute”, underscoring that naturalisation is a privilege, not a right, although that does not remove the duty to act within the rule of law and in accordance with fair procedures.
  • The Minister’s discretion to grant arises only if she is satisfied that the statutory conditions, including “good character”, are met.

The question for the court was not whether it agreed with the Minister’s assessment on the merits, but whether the process and reasoning met public law standards of legality, reasonableness and fairness.

4.2 Precedents and their Influence

4.2.1 MNN v Minister for Justice [2020] IECA 187

Power J in the Court of Appeal distilled a series of principles about “good character” in the naturalisation context, which Ferriter J recited and applied. Those principles include:

  • “Absolute” discretion emphasises that naturalisation is the conferral of a privilege, not an entitlement.
  • Nonetheless, applicants enjoy ordinary legal protection; the Minister must act within the rule of law and is amenable to judicial review.
  • “Good character” must be assessed by reference to reasonable standards of civic responsibility, judged according to contemporary values.
  • The Minister must have all relevant information, including context and mitigating factors, where criminality is involved.
  • Information put before the Minister must be accurately recorded, seen in context, and considered in full before a decision is made.
  • There must be a comprehensive, individualised assessment of the applicant, considering “all aspects of character”.

In Akande, these principles formed the structure of the court’s review: Ferriter J examined whether the Minister had:

  • gathered and considered all relevant material;
  • correctly understood and recorded it; and
  • conducted a holistic “in the round” character assessment.

He answered each question in the affirmative, and that was central to upholding the decision.

4.2.2 Talla v Minister for Justice and Equality [2020] IECA 135 and Hiri v SSHD [2014] EWHC 254 (Admin)

In Talla, Haughton J adopted the approach of Lang J in Hiri v Secretary of State for the Home Department in relation to “good character” under the British Nationality Act 1981. The key aspects of that test, emphasised again in Akande, are:

  • The statutory test is “good character” as a whole, not “absence of criminal convictions”.
  • An applicant with a conviction may still be found to be of good character, and conversely a person with no convictions may fail that test.
  • Criminal convictions are relevant but not dispositive; their weight depends on:
    • the nature and gravity of the offence;
    • the severity of the sentence (as a proxy for gravity in the eyes of the sentencing court);
    • the time elapsed since the offence; and
    • any pattern of repeat offending.
  • A proper assessment requires the Minister to consider:
    • outline facts of the offence; and
    • mitigating factors and context.

In Akande, the applicant’s solicitors had expressly cited this passage from Hiri/Talla. Ferriter J recognised that the Minister did, in fact, follow that approach:

  • She considered the mitigating family and financial circumstances.
  • She had regard to the non-repetition of offending over a decade.
  • She was conscious of the severity of the sentence and, importantly, the statutory mandatory minimum of 10 years, from which the sentencing court had departed only after identifying mitigating circumstances.

What Akande adds is not a new test, but an application of the Talla/Hiri framework to a case involving serious drug trafficking. It demonstrates that, even when all the Hiri factors are properly taken into account, a rational decision-maker may still give paramount weight to the seriousness of the original offence.

4.2.3 Ahmed v Minister for Justice [2024] IEHC 661

In Ahmed, Phelan J considered whether historical misconduct—including lying about identity in the asylum process some 14 years previously, and various road traffic offences with 9 years’ non-reoffending—could still legitimately weigh against an applicant’s “good character”.

Phelan J held that:

  • Use of a false identity, even long ago, impacted on honesty and integrity, which are central to good character.
  • Although the weight of misconduct may diminish with time, that does not mean it ceases to be material:
    “the fact that the weight attaching to prior misconduct may diminish with time does not mean that the misconduct in question may not be so serious on the particular facts of a case that the Minister considers that it continues to justify the refusal of citizenship.”

Ferriter J expressly agreed with this statement, and Akande can be seen as a concrete application of it to a serious drug trafficking conviction: even after a long period without offending, the Minister remains entitled to regard such an offence as bearing significant, indeed determinative, negative weight.

4.2.4 PSM v Minister for Justice [2016] IEHC 474

The applicant relied on PSM, where Humphreys J described as an “odd feature” the State granting enhanced remission for an offender—suggesting a lower risk of reoffending—while simultaneously pursuing deportation based on risk of reoffending. However, the deportation order was ultimately upheld.

Ferriter J distinguished PSM on a critical point:

  • PSM involved an express assessment of risk of reoffending for deportation purposes.
  • Akande concerned a different statutory question: whether the applicant is “of good character” for naturalisation.

The Minister in Akande did not base her decision on any risk of reoffending; she accepted rehabilitation and good behaviour, but nonetheless took the view that the seriousness of the past conduct was inconsistent with a favourable “good character” assessment at this point in time. Thus, PSM did not assist the applicant.

4.2.5 M. v Minister for Justice [2025] IECA 1

Although not analysed in detail, Ferriter J noted Hyland J’s dictum in M that traditional proportionality review does not apply in the same way to decisions on naturalisation, as citizenship is a privilege, not a right. Here, the applicant repositioned proportionality as an aspect of irrationality (arguing that the weighting of factors was so one-sided as to be irrational), but the court ultimately rejected this.

4.3 Legal Reasoning in Akande

4.3.1 The standard of review: irrationality, not appeal

A central theme is the limited scope of judicial review. Ferriter J reiterated that:

  • The court’s task is not to decide whether it would have granted citizenship, but whether the Minister’s refusal was within a range of reasonable decisions.
  • To succeed, the applicant had to show that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached this decision on the evidence:
    • that it flew in the face of fundamental reason and common sense; or
    • that relevant considerations were ignored while irrelevant ones were improperly relied upon.

This high bar framed the entire analysis. Having concluded that all relevant material was considered and the weighing exercise was rationally open to the Minister, Ferriter J could not interfere.

4.3.2 The weighing of seriousness versus time and rehabilitation

The crux of the applicant’s challenge was that:

  • the Minister gave excessive weight to a single, historic conviction; and
  • insufficient weight to:
    • over 10 years without reoffending;
    • rehabilitation, educational efforts in prison, and positive participation in the Community Return Scheme;
    • stable, gainful employment since 2016; and
    • marriage to an Irish citizen and integration into the community.

Ferriter J accepted that all those positive factors existed and that the Minister acknowledged them; however:

  • The offence was a serious drug trafficking offence with a significant quantity of drugs (€13,000+), clearly for sale or distribution, not personal use.
  • The statutory regime imposed a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence, underlining the gravity with which the Oireachtas views such offending.
  • Although the sentencing judge ultimately imposed a seven-year sentence with three years suspended, that was still a substantial custodial sanction, indicating the seriousness with which the courts regarded the offence.

Against this backdrop, the court accepted the Minister’s view that:

“the vintage of the offence is very much outweighed by the serious sanction of the conviction.”

This did not mean that the passage of time was irrelevant; it meant that in the particular context—serious drug trafficking—the time factor, though mitigating, did not outweigh the gravity of the underlying criminality. Ferriter J aligned himself with Phelan J’s approach in Ahmed: the fact that weight diminishes over time does not prevent the residual weight from still being decisive, where the misconduct is serious enough.

4.3.3 Treatment of the Community Return Scheme and early release

The applicant argued that the Minister had:

  • misunderstood the nature of his early release, implying it may have been due to prison capacity issues, rather than recognising it as a positive indicator of rehabilitation under the Community Return Scheme; and
  • thereby failed to attach due weight to his successful completion of that scheme.

Ferriter J acknowledged that a line in the decision—

“Prisoners are released early in Ireland for a number of reasons, including good behaviour and due to the capacity limits within the prison service at that time.”

—was somewhat “loose”. However, he concluded that:

  • When read in the round, the decision:
    • clearly recognised the applicant’s participation in the Community Return Scheme;
    • recorded the positive reports from his Community Service Supervisor; and
    • treated these matters as weighing positively in the character assessment.
  • Thus, any general remark about reasons for early release did not evidence a material misunderstanding of the applicant’s circumstances or a failure to give credit for rehabilitation.

In other words, the imperfect wording did not amount to reliance on an irrelevant consideration sufficient to invalidate the decision.

4.3.4 The “never eligible” argument

The applicant’s rhetorical contention was that if a decade of flawless behaviour was insufficient to demonstrate “good character” in light of a single past offence, then he could never succeed in a naturalisation application.

Ferriter J declined to accept this as a matter of law. He emphasised that:

  • The decision letter expressly allowed for the possibility of future applications; there was no absolute or permanent bar.
  • The Minister is required, in any future application, to reconsider matters afresh, including any further passage of time and any additional evidence of good behaviour and integration.
  • The court could not pre-empt how the Minister might weigh those factors at some later date; each decision must be made according to “ordinary standards of reasonableness” and fair procedures “in light of all factors prevailing at that time – good and bad”.

This preserves the case-specific and dynamic nature of the “good character” assessment and avoids converting a serious conviction into a de facto lifetime bar.

4.3.5 Proportionality reframed as irrationality

While the applicant had pleaded proportionality, he accepted that, in line with M. v Minister for Justice, traditional proportionality analysis does not strictly apply to the grant of a privilege such as citizenship.

Instead, proportionality was re-packaged as a species of irrationality: the argument was that the imbalance in the Minister’s weighing exercise was so extreme as to render the decision unreasonable.

Ferriter J rejected this. Once he was satisfied that:

  • all positive and negative factors were considered; and
  • the Minister had reasonably concluded that the serious drug trafficking conviction still carried decisive adverse weight,

the court could not re-calibrate the scales. The decision lay within the rational spectrum, and thus the challenge on this ground failed.

4.4 Impact and Significance

4.4.1 For future naturalisation applicants with serious convictions

Akande sends a clear message:

  • A single serious conviction—especially for serious drug trafficking—can continue to weigh heavily against an applicant’s “good character” even after a long period of rehabilitation and non-offending.
  • There is no fixed temporal threshold (e.g. ten years) after which a conviction becomes irrelevant or negligible for naturalisation purposes.
  • Applicants bear the practical burden of showing not only rehabilitation but also that, in all the circumstances, their historic offending no longer tips the balance against them in the discretionary moral assessment of the Minister.

In practical terms, applicants and their advisers should:

  • anticipate that serious offences (drugs, violence, serious dishonesty) may continue to be determinative for longer than minor or technical offences;
  • assemble powerful, detailed evidence of rehabilitation, community contribution, stability and remorse; and
  • consider the strategic timing of applications – an extra few years of spotless conduct and integration may materially affect the Minister’s future assessment.

4.4.2 For the Minister’s decision-making practice

The judgment confirms and encourages certain decision-making practices:

  • Holistic assessment is essential: decisions should explicitly record positive and negative factors, including:
    • explanations and mitigating circumstances;
    • evidence of rehabilitation (e.g. Community Return Scheme, probation reports);
    • family and employment stability; and
    • the seriousness and nature of prior criminality.
  • Transparent weighting: explaining why the seriousness of the offence remains determinative, notwithstanding substantial positive material, will help withstand judicial review.
  • Accuracy and context: while Akande tolerates one “loose” line about reasons for early release, it also illustrates the importance of contextualising such statements and making clear that rehabilitation-related schemes are properly understood and credited.

Where this template is followed, the scope for successful judicial review is narrow.

4.4.3 For Irish public law and administrative law standards

From a broader public law perspective, Akande reinforces:

  • The strict separation between merits objections and legality objections in judicial review.
  • The continued centrality of Wednesbury-style irrationality and the reluctance of the courts to second-guess ministerial discretion in areas expressly designated as matters of “absolute” discretion.
  • The expectation that decision-makers, while enjoying discretion, must operate transparently and in accordance with consistent, principled criteria such as those articulated in MNN and Talla.

It also implicitly underscores the independence of different legal regimes: rehabilitative decisions by the prison and probation services (e.g. early release, closure of files) do not dictate, though they may inform, the separate statutory question of entitlement to naturalisation.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 “Good character” in naturalisation

“Good character” is not defined in the 1956 Act but, in essence, it asks:

Is this person, taken as a whole, someone who meets reasonable standards of honesty, law‑abidingness and civic responsibility, by reference to contemporary Irish values?

Key points:

  • It is a broad, moral and social assessment, not a narrow criminal law test.
  • Having a conviction does not automatically mean you fail, and having none does not automatically mean you pass.
  • The Minister looks at:
    • criminal record (type, gravity, pattern, time since offending);
    • immigration history (e.g. deception, overstaying, compliance);
    • personal conduct (e.g. honesty with authorities, tax compliance);
    • rehabilitation, remorse and positive contributions to the community.

5.2 “Absolute discretion” and judicial review

Although s.15 refers to the Minister’s “absolute discretion”, this does not mean:

  • the Minister can act arbitrarily; or
  • the courts have no power to oversee her decisions.

Instead, it means:

  • naturalisation is a privilege bestowed by the State, not a legal right owed to the applicant; and
  • the Minister has a wide margin of appreciation in deciding whom to admit to the community of citizens.

Judicial review still applies, ensuring that:

  • relevant factors are considered;
  • irrelevant or unlawful factors are not relied on; and
  • decisions are not irrational or procedurally unfair.

5.3 Judicial review vs appeal

A vital distinction in understanding Akande is between:

  • Appeal: where a higher body re‑decides the case and can substitute its own view.
  • Judicial review: where the court examines the lawfulness of the decision-making process, but does not normally substitute its own view of the merits.

In Akande, the High Court was firmly in judicial review mode. It could not say: “We would have granted citizenship”; it could only ask: “Was the Minister’s decision lawful, rational, and procedurally fair?”

5.4 Irrationality (Wednesbury unreasonableness)

“Irrationality” in this context is a technical term. A decision is irrational only if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have made it.

It is not enough that:

  • the court would have come to a different conclusion; or
  • reasonable people could disagree about the proper outcome.

The threshold is deliberately high, to respect the separation between executive decision-making and judicial oversight.

5.5 The Community Return Scheme

The Community Return Scheme is an incentivised programme under which certain prisoners are released early from custody on condition that they complete supervised, unpaid community work. Successful participation typically:

  • reflects good behaviour in prison;
  • aims to support reintegration and reduce reoffending; and
  • is often associated with positive probation and supervision reports.

In Akande, the Scheme was a significant piece of mitigation: the applicant’s successful completion and positive reports were rightly treated as evidence of rehabilitation and good conduct.

5.6 Proportionality in the context of privileges

“Proportionality” normally requires that State measures interfering with rights be:

  • rationally connected to a legitimate aim;
  • no more than necessary; and
  • a fair balance between individual rights and the public interest.

However, as emphasised in M. v Minister for Justice and adopted in Akande, this strict test does not apply in the same way to the grant of a privilege like naturalisation. Instead, the court asks whether the decision is within the bounds of rationality and fairness.

6. Conclusion

Akande v Minister for Justice and Equality [2025] IEHC 679 is an important reaffirmation of the approach to “good character” in Irish naturalisation law where serious historic criminal convictions are involved.

The key takeaways are:

  • The Minister’s discretion under s.15 of the 1956 Act is wide, but remains subject to the rule of law, fair procedures, and judicial review.
  • In assessing “good character”, the Minister must consider:
    • all aspects of an applicant’s history and conduct;
    • the nature, gravity and context of any past offending;
    • mitigation, rehabilitation, and the passage of time; and
    • current integration, employment, family life and contributions to society.
  • Long periods of good behaviour, even over a decade, and strong evidence of rehabilitation do not automatically neutralise a single grave conviction. Serious criminality—here, significant drug trafficking—may continue to justify refusal of naturalisation.
  • The courts will not reweigh the factors or substitute their view of the merits. Intervention is reserved for cases where the Minister ignores relevant considerations, relies on improper ones, or reaches a conclusion outside the range of reasonable responses.
  • Historic misconduct does not create a permanent bar to citizenship as a matter of law, but applicants may need to show a very substantial period of unblemished conduct and compelling evidence of integration and civic responsibility before the Minister can reasonably be expected to find them “of good character”.

In policy terms, the decision sits at the intersection of criminal justice, rehabilitation, and membership of the national community. It acknowledges the applicant’s commendable rehabilitation and integration, yet affirms that the State may still set a very high moral threshold for conferring the privilege of citizenship where the past offence is exceptionally serious. Future applicants, especially those with serious convictions, and their advisers must calibrate their expectations and strategies accordingly.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: High Court of Ireland

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