1. Introduction

Rogers v The Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors ([2026] IECA 5) is a Court of Appeal decision dismissing Ms Linda Rogers’ appeal from the High Court’s refusal of leave to bring a third judicial review arising out of the same underlying District Court prosecution and conviction.

The case originated in Ms Rogers’ arrest on 15 March 2023 and subsequent prosecution for two offences under the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 (as amended). A recurring dispute concerned disclosure (including CCTV). Ms Rogers pursued multiple judicial review applications—first seeking to prohibit or stay the prosecution, then seeking certiorari to quash her conviction, and then issuing a third application substantially repeating earlier claims while also seeking a recommendation for legal representation under the Legal Aid – Custody Issues Scheme.

The Court of Appeal treated the third application and the appeal as plainly untenable because (i) it attempted to relitigate matters already determined (or which should have been brought earlier), (ii) it sought to judicially review High Court decisions (impermissible), and (iii) it failed to identify any clear, timely, properly pleaded new ground capable of meeting the leave threshold for judicial review.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Allen J., with McCarthy and Burns JJ. concurring) dismissed the appeal and affirmed that:

• The third judicial review application was a “textbook example” of abuse of process because it sought (again) certiorari quashing the same conviction already targeted in an earlier judicial review refused by Hyland J., with that refusal then under appeal.
• The applicant could not circumvent prior determinations by “starting afresh”; the controlling principles of res judicata and finality precluded re-litigation and also precluded bringing forward matters that could and should have been raised earlier.
• A High Court decision is not amenable to judicial review; complaints about Hyland J. (including allegations of bias) could not ground a judicial review.
• Any complaint about non-compliance with a disclosure order in Circuit Court proceedings was (a) inadequately pleaded, (b) for the Circuit Court to manage, and (c) in any event could not logically undermine the validity of the District Court conviction.
• Because no arguable case existed, there was no basis to recommend assignment of a solicitor and counsel under the Legal Aid – Custody Issues Scheme.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A.A. v. The Medical Council [2003] IESC 70, [2003] 4 I.R. 302

Gearty J., and the Court of Appeal approvingly in substance, relied on Hardiman J.’s articulation of the rule that litigants must bring forward their whole case and will not generally be permitted to reopen the same subject matter later by raising points that could have been advanced earlier. This authority anchored the judgment’s characterisation of the third application as barred by finality principles and as an abuse of process, not merely a weak or repetitive pleading.

Blackall v Grehan [1995] 3 I.R. 208

This case was invoked for the settled proposition that a decision of the High Court is not subject to judicial review. The attempted inclusion of Hyland J. as a respondent (and allegations of bias/prejudice) was therefore misconceived at the level of jurisdiction and remedy: judicial review is directed at “inferior” bodies in the supervisory sense, not the High Court itself.

People (DPP) v Quilligan, [1989] IR 46

Cited via Henchy J.’s statement that the High Court is not an inferior court subject to corrective orders such as mandamus. The Court of Appeal used this line of authority to reinforce that judicial review cannot be used to collaterally attack High Court decisions, and that allegations framed as “public law failures” do not create jurisdiction where the supervisory remedy is structurally unavailable.

Woods

Although not fully cited in the text, “Woods” was referenced in the High Court’s discussion of the Legal Aid – Custody Issues Scheme. The significance lies in the Court’s treatment of the scheme as requiring, at minimum, an “arguable case” standard akin to the ordinary judicial review leave test—rather than an unconditional entitlement to taxpayer-funded representation simply because custody might be implicated.

A.P. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] IESC 2, [2011] 1 I.R. 729

Murray C.J.’s insistence on precision in judicial review pleadings (“clearly and precisely each and every relief” and “each and every ground”) was deployed to reject Ms Rogers’ attempt to rely on a vaguely expressed, “buried” complaint about alleged non-compliance with a Circuit Court disclosure order. The authority supported a procedural discipline rationale: prolix, repetitive pleadings do not satisfy the minimum requirements of fair notice, case management, and proper leave-stage scrutiny.

Rogers v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] IEHC 316

Hyland J.’s refusal of leave in the second judicial review provided key context for finality and forum-appropriateness: where complaints are legally cognisable, they were more appropriately ventilated in the appeal against conviction, and no arguable case was shown that the District Court process was so fundamentally flawed as to deny trial “in due course of law.” This earlier refusal set up the res judicata/abuse analysis when the same certiorari objective reappeared in the third application.

Rogers v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] IECA 159

The Court of Appeal’s earlier dismissal of Ms Rogers’ second appeal was used in this judgment to reiterate (in particular at the referenced para. 50) that the relevance and adequacy of disclosure—such as CCTV—are quintessentially matters for the trial judge. The present judgment extends that logic to the Circuit Court appeal by way of rehearing: disclosure compliance issues in that forum are for the Circuit Court judge, and cannot be used as a vehicle to attack the underlying District Court conviction by collateral judicial review.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The leave stage as a real filter: arguability, not repetition

The Court treated the third application as failing at the threshold because judicial review leave requires an arguable case. Repeating (often verbatim) grounds and reliefs already rejected—while earlier refusals were under appeal—did not merely weaken the case; it removed any legitimate basis to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction again. The “arguability” requirement was thus applied substantively: a claim that is barred by finality or brought in a court lacking supervisory competence over the target decision cannot be “arguable.”

(b) Abuse of process and res judicata as dispositive public policy doctrines

A central theme is that judicial review cannot be used as an iterative, serial strategy to keep disputes alive. The judgment underscores two related controls:

• Res judicata / finality: once determined, the matter cannot be reopened between the parties.
• Extended preclusion: claims that could and should have been raised in earlier proceedings are also barred (as expressed in A.A. v. The Medical Council).

Importantly, the Court frames the problem as structural: once judicial review has been “deployed,” it cannot be redeployed to reframe the same controversy. The proper avenues were the existing appeals (Court of Appeal for High Court decisions; Circuit Court for appeal against conviction).

(c) Non-amenability of High Court decisions to judicial review

By relying on Blackall v Grehan and People (DPP) v Quilligan, the Court reaffirmed a bright-line rule: judicial review is not a mechanism to supervise the High Court. This disposed of the attempt to treat alleged judicial bias or dissatisfaction with High Court handling as a basis for judicial review relief. The implication is procedural and constitutional: the corrective mechanism is appeal, not judicial review.

(d) Disclosure disputes belong in the trial/appeal forum, not collateral JR

The judgment treats disclosure adequacy as quintessentially within the competence of the relevant trial or appeal judge. Even if there were a Circuit Court disclosure deficit, it would be managed by the Circuit Court, and could not logically invalidate the earlier District Court conviction. This reasoning does two things:

• It enforces forum discipline (trial/appeal courts handle trial management issues).
• It avoids collateral attacks on convictions via public law pleadings.

(e) Legal aid under the Custody Issues Scheme depends on prospects

The Court rejected the appellant’s recurring assertion that she was entitled to legal aid “as of right” in these proceedings. It held that the scheme requires the court to be satisfied the case warrants the assignment of solicitor and counsel, assessed by whether the claim is arguable and has some prospect of success. The judgment also clarifies a categorical distinction: reliance on Directive 2012/13/EU (right to information in criminal proceedings) could not transform civil judicial review proceedings into criminal proceedings for the purpose of legal aid entitlements.

3.3 Impact

(a) Strengthening control of repetitive public law litigation

The decision reinforces that Irish courts will treat serial judicial review applications arising from the same nucleus of facts—especially where earlier applications were refused—as an abuse of process. This will be influential in managing high-volume, prolix, repetitive filings, and in preventing litigants from using successive proceedings to delay or complicate criminal processes or appeals.

(b) Clarifying the “legal aid recommendation” threshold in custody-related JR

The case is a practical guide to how the Legal Aid – Custody Issues Scheme is to be approached: the applicant must still demonstrate an arguable, viable public law claim; custody implications do not displace finality doctrines or jurisdictional limits.

(c) Reaffirming procedural discipline in judicial review pleadings

By invoking A.P. v. Director of Public Prosecutions, the Court signals that excessively long, repetitive statements of grounds that obscure rather than identify issues will not satisfy the leave-stage discipline. Vague “new” points buried in a morass of repetition will not rescue an otherwise barred application.

(d) Protecting the allocation of functions between trial, appeal, and supervisory jurisdictions

The judgment emphasises that disclosure disputes are ordinarily for the trial/appeal judge. This reduces the risk of judicial review becoming a parallel procedural track for trial management disputes and preserves the integrity and efficiency of criminal appeals (here, the Circuit Court rehearing).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Judicial review (JR): a civil procedure where the High Court supervises the legality of decisions/actions of public bodies or inferior tribunals; it is not a criminal appeal.
• Leave stage: the initial permission stage; the applicant must show an arguable case and comply with pleading/time rules.
• Certiorari: an order quashing a decision (here, sought to quash a conviction).
• Prohibition / stay: orders aimed at stopping a trial/prosecution from proceeding (or pausing it).
• Res judicata: once a court finally decides a matter, the same parties cannot litigate it again.
• Abuse of process: using court procedures in a way that is unfair, oppressive, or undermines finality (e.g., repeated proceedings to re-run the same dispute).
• Not “amenable” to JR: the High Court cannot judicially review itself; the remedy is appeal.
• Moot: an issue is academic because events have overtaken it (e.g., seeking to stop a trial after it has ended).
• Disclosure: prosecution obligations to provide material to the defence; disputes over adequacy are typically for the trial (or appeal) judge managing the proceedings.
• Directive 2012/13/EU: protects rights to information in criminal proceedings; it does not automatically apply to civil JR proceedings or generate a right to civil legal aid.

5. Conclusion

[2026] IECA 5 is a firm reaffirmation of finality, jurisdictional boundaries, and pleading discipline in judicial review. The Court of Appeal held that Ms Rogers’ third judicial review was barred in substance by res judicata and abuse of process, could not be used to attack High Court decisions, and failed to articulate any properly pleaded, forum-appropriate new ground that could meet the arguability threshold. The judgment also clarifies that a recommendation for representation under the Legal Aid – Custody Issues Scheme is not automatic: it depends on the existence of an arguable case with some prospect of success.