SC v BT: Ordinary Residence for Cohabitant Redress Requires Objective, On‑the‑Ground Ties; “Throughout” Does Not Mean Continuous Presence
Introduction
This High Court decision (SC v BT, [2025] IEHC 547, Jackson J., 13 October 2025) addresses a threshold jurisdictional question under section 196(3) of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (the 2010 Act). The Applicant sought redress as a “qualified cohabitant,” asserting that she and the Respondent lived a two-state domestic life between Ireland and England. The Respondent challenged the Irish court’s jurisdiction to deal with her redress claims, contending that the Applicant was not “ordinarily resident” in Ireland during the one-year period prior to the end of the relationship, as section 196(3) requires of both cohabitants.
The case is factually complex. The parties’ relationship began in 2020; they had a child in November 2023 who is now accepted to be habitually resident in England (where related parental responsibility proceedings are ongoing). The Irish property was always rented in the Respondent’s sole name; the English property was in the Applicant’s sole name. The parties disagreed about the timing of their relationship’s breakdown and whether the Applicant’s connection with Ireland rose to the level of “ordinary residence.”
The Court heard extensive affidavit and oral evidence and treated the jurisdictional question as a preliminary issue on the Respondent’s motion to declare that the Court could not exercise jurisdiction under the 2010 Act and to strike out the redress claim.
Summary of the Judgment
- The Court held that the Applicant failed to prove that she was “ordinarily resident” in Ireland during the one-year period prior to the end of the relationship (viewed broadly as January 2023–March 2024 to accommodate disputed breakup dates).
- While endorsing the interpretation that “throughout” in section 196(3) does not require continuous physical presence and that dual ordinary residence is legally possible (A v B [2021] IEHC 802), the Court emphasized that a claimant must first establish ordinary residence through objective, on-the-ground indicia (Chubb European Group SE v The Health Insurance Authority [2020] IECA 91).
- On the facts—absence of Irish administrative, financial, and domestic anchors; limited days on the ground in Ireland; and extensive contradictions and lack of corroboration—the Applicant’s ties to Ireland were found to be episodic and visit-based rather than “settled” as part of the regular order of life.
- Consequently, section 196(3) was not satisfied, and the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction to determine the Applicant’s redress claims under the 2010 Act. The matter was listed for a further date to address consequential issues arising from the judgment.
Analysis
Precedents Cited and Their Role
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Chubb European Group SE v The Health Insurance Authority [2020] IECA 91
The Court relied on Murray J.’s authoritative synthesis of “ordinary residence.” Key propositions include:- Ordinary residence is primarily established by objective proof, not subjective intention.
- It concerns whether a person has adopted an abode in the jurisdiction for settled purposes as part of the regular order of life (drawing on Shah).
- Continuity is required, but residence may be for a limited period or purpose.
- Dual ordinary residence is possible.
- Proof should be capable of objective application without requiring a “permanent home.”
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R v Barnet London Borough Council ex parte Shah [1983] 2 AC 309
Cited via Chubb, Shah defines ordinary residence as an abode adopted voluntarily for settled purposes as part of the regular order of life (short or long duration). The Court’s application of this definition, demanding demonstrable “settled” presence, was fatal to the Applicant’s claim. -
A v B [2021] IEHC 802 (Barrett J.)
The Court approved the interpretation that:- “Throughout” does not require continuous stay in one place if dual ordinary residence exists.
- The 2010 Act is a remedial statute and should be construed liberally (DC v DR [2015] IEHC 309; Western Health Board v KM [2002] 2 IR 493).
- Where two interpretations are available, prefer the one that permits courts to exercise jurisdiction (Anisminic [1969] 2 AC 147).
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DC v DR [2015] IEHC 309 and Western Health Board v KM [2002] 2 IR 493
Cited for liberal construction of remedial statutes. The Court applied that approach to the “throughout” element but refused to dilute the objective content of ordinary residence. -
Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147
Supports interpreting legislation to facilitate the exercise of jurisdiction where possible; still subject to satisfying statutory preconditions. Jackson J. reconciled this with Chubb’s objective test: permissive interpretation cannot replace proof of core jurisdictional facts. -
MW v DC [2017] IECA 255 and XY v ZW [2019] IEHC 257
Concern continuity of the cohabitation period under section 172 of the 2010 Act. The Court noted these authorities but they were not determinative on the preliminary issue. -
Wachman and Ors v Barne Estate and Ors [2025] IEHC 491 (Barrett J.)
Invoked in submissions about the fallibility of memory. This judgment’s emphasis on documentary, objective corroboration echoes that concern and informed the Court’s scepticism toward uncorroborated assertions.
Legal Reasoning
Section 196(3) provides that the court shall only exercise jurisdiction to determine redress under section 173 if both cohabitants were “ordinarily resident in the State” throughout the one-year period prior to the end of the relationship, and either is domiciled in the State on the application date or ordinarily resident throughout the year ending on that date. It was accepted that the Respondent’s position satisfied the statutory requirements; thus, the jurisdictional dispute turned on the Applicant’s ordinary residence.
Three issues framed the Court’s analysis:
- What was the date of the end of the relationship? Because the parties disagreed, the Court examined a broad window (January 2023–March 2024) to encompass any plausible one-year period.
- Was the Applicant “ordinarily resident” in Ireland during that period? The Court applied Chubb/Shah to this factual question.
- What does “throughout” mean? The Court endorsed A v B: “throughout” does not mandate continuous presence and dual ordinary residence is possible. But the “ordinary residence” status must first be factually established.
Application to the Facts
Jackson J. emphasized the need for objective evidence over subjective intention. Several features were particularly persuasive against ordinary residence in Ireland:
- Lack of Irish administrative and financial anchors: no Irish bank account; no joint accounts; no PPS number, PRSI, or health insurance in Ireland; not registered to vote; not on any Irish lease or utility account; no Irish doctor/dentist; no tax evidence.
- Accommodation and belongings: the Irish property remained solely in the Respondent’s name despite a change of rental property in 2022; the Applicant consistently travelled with luggage, suggesting she did not keep belongings in Ireland indicative of a settled abode; the evidence did not depict combined family life or shared effects in both homes.
- Objective time-on-the-ground: while initial figures varied (19, 33, 45 days), the Court accepted the Respondent’s corrected chart as broadly accurate, showing short, sporadic trips in 2023–early 2024 rather than regular, settled presence.
- “Remote” domestic support: extensive online ordering and grocery arrangements, often made from England for delivery in Ireland, were acknowledged but regarded as consistent with a long-distance relationship rather than proof of residence.
- Contemporaneous statements: the Applicant’s own letter to the Respondent’s youngest child (May 2023) predicted that “lots of the time the baby will be in [England] with the cats and me,” reflecting an England-based life.
- Credibility and corroboration: internal inconsistencies (e.g., claiming to spend most of Spring 2023 in Ireland versus not travelling in the first trimester, juxtaposed with a “fit to fly” certificate close to the birth) undermined the Applicant’s narrative; corroboration was lacking even where it should have been readily available.
On these facts, the Court concluded:
- The Applicant did not have a “settled and usual place of abode” in Ireland.
- Her presence in Ireland was “casual and uncertain” rather than part of the “regular order” of life.
- She did not meet the objective threshold to prove ordinary residence in Ireland across the relevant period.
Accepting that “throughout” can accommodate dual ordinary residence and movement between homes, the Court stressed that none of that helps unless ordinary residence exists in the first place. Here it did not. The jurisdictional precondition of section 196(3) was not met, so the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction to determine the redress claims. The case was listed for a further date to address consequential orders (including reliefs sought to strike out).
Impact and Significance
- Recalibration of proof in cross-border cohabitation cases: Dual ordinary residence remains doctrinally available, but claimants must foreground objective “on-the-ground” evidence in Ireland: leases, utilities, healthcare, tax, banking, and sustained presence.
- “Remote housekeeping” is insufficient: Online shopping, travel coordination, and occasional hosting of events—even if extensive—do not convert visits into ordinary residence without concrete evidence of a settled Irish abode.
- Disputed breakup dates: Where the end of the relationship is contested, courts may assess a period that spans the competing dates to ensure the one-year window is fairly captured. Applicants should be prepared to demonstrate ordinary residence across any plausible one‑year period prior to breakdown.
- Burden and standard of proof: The burden lies with the applicant, on the balance of probabilities. This judgment signals a rigorous evidential approach: credibility and consistency matter, but documentary corroboration is king.
- Segregation of regimes: The child’s “habitual residence” in England (driving English parental proceedings) is conceptually and legally distinct from the Applicant’s “ordinary residence” for Irish cohabitant redress. Parties should avoid conflating these residence concepts.
- Litigation strategy: Given the Court’s emphasis on objective indicia, early jurisdictional challenges are likely to be decisive. Applicants should evaluate whether Irish jurisdiction is realistically sustainable before issuing.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Ordinary residence: Where a person lives as part of the regular order of life, voluntarily and for settled purposes, even if for a limited period or purpose. It can, in principle, be held in more than one place. Proof is mainly objective.
- Habitual residence: A concept used in child law and other contexts focusing on the centre of a child’s life. It is distinct from ordinary residence; here, it grounded English jurisdiction over child-related proceedings.
- Domicile: A person’s permanent home for legal purposes. Under s.196(3), either domicile in Ireland at application date or ordinary residence in Ireland in the year ending on that date is also required, in addition to the one-year pre‑breakdown ordinary residence by both parties.
- “Throughout” (s.196(3)): Does not mean continuous presence without interruption. If a person truly has dual ordinary residence, “throughout” can be satisfied while living between two homes. But the status of ordinary residence must be established first.
- Remedial statute: Legislation designed to provide remedies (like the 2010 Act) should be construed liberally where possible. However, courts cannot ignore express statutory preconditions.
- Burden of proof: The Applicant must prove the jurisdictional facts—here, ordinary residence in Ireland across the relevant period—on the balance of probabilities.
Practical Guidance (Evidential “Checklist”)
For applicants seeking cohabitant redress in cross-border situations, persuasive objective indicia of Irish ordinary residence may include:
- Irish lease or ownership; being named on utilities; evidence of paying Irish rent/bills.
- Irish bank account and regular Irish transactions; tax registration; PPS/PRSI evidence.
- Irish healthcare registration/attendance (GP, dentist, hospital) beyond sporadic emergencies.
- Regular time physically present in Ireland, evidenced by travel records, employment, schooling (if applicable), community involvement.
- Personal effects and belongings maintained in Ireland; not having to travel with substantial luggage for short stays.
- Evidence of family/social life rooted in Ireland (family visits to the Irish home, community activities) that reflects the “regular order” of life.
- Consistent, corroborated documentary records aligning with affidavit testimony.
Conclusion
SC v BT clarifies and consolidates two important propositions in the cohabitant redress jurisdictional architecture:
- First, following A v B, “throughout” in section 196(3) does not demand continuous presence and is compatible with dual ordinary residence; the 2010 Act remains remedial and merits a liberal construction where possible.
- Second—and decisive here—Chubb’s objective, fact‑driven test governs whether ordinary residence exists at all. Without concrete, on‑the‑ground indicia of a settled Irish abode forming part of the applicant’s regular life, episodic visits and remote domestic involvement do not satisfy ordinary residence “throughout” the one-year pre‑breakdown period.
On the evidence, the Applicant’s ties to Ireland were intermittent and largely relational. The Court therefore held that it cannot exercise jurisdiction to determine the Applicant’s redress claims under the 2010 Act. The judgment will likely shape future cross‑border cohabitation litigation by underscoring a rigorous, documentary approach to ordinary residence and by distinguishing genuine dual residence from visit‑based relationships augmented by remote support.
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