Res Judicata, Abuse of Process and the Finality of Legal Costs Adjudications under the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015: Commentary on Skoczylas v Minister for Finance [2025] IEHC 700
1. Introduction
1.1 Background to the dispute
The judgment in Skoczylas v Minister for Finance [2025] IEHC 700 (Bradley J, 5 December 2025) is the latest instalment in an exceptionally long-running and complex strand of litigation arising from the State’s response to the financial crisis, particularly a direction order made in respect of Irish Life and Permanent Group under the Credit Institutions (Stabilisation) Act 2010. Within that broader litigation, various costs orders had been made in favour of the applicant, Mr Piotr Skoczylas, against the Minister for Finance. Those orders included: - Interlocutory costs orders in 2012 awarding him “out-of-pocket expenses when taxed and ascertained”. - A significant order by O’Malley J on 1 December 2017 (Dowling & Ors v Minister for Finance [2017] IEHC 832) awarding him “40% of his allowable outlay to be taxed in default of agreement”. The present case concerns the treatment of five invoices raised by an English limited liability partnership, Scotchstone Capital LLP (“SCLLP”), of which Mr Skoczylas was a member. The invoices purported to cover “professional expert non-legal litigation advice and services” provided to him in the parent litigation, which he claimed as recoverable outlay under the 2017 costs order.1.2 The original adjudication and appeals
In 2020, relying on Part 10, Chapter 4 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (“LSRA 2015”), Mr Skoczylas submitted a Bill of Costs to the Office of the Legal Costs Adjudicators (“OLCA”) covering 26 SCLLP invoices (including the five now in issue). The Chief Legal Costs Adjudicator (“LCA”) directed a preliminary issue on whether those invoices were in principle recoverable under the existing costs orders. Following: - an interim determination on 2 June 2021, - a “consideration” decision under s.160 LSRA 2015 on 15 November 2021, and - a Final Certificate of Determination dated 29 April 2022, the LCA disallowed the entire category of SCLLP invoices. Pursuant to s.161 LSRA 2015, Mr Skoczylas sought a review by the High Court. In Skoczylas v Minister for Finance & Ors [2023] IEHC 33, Owens J dismissed the review and confirmed the LCA’s determination, holding that the applicant had failed to adduce evidence demonstrating that the claimed “non-legal litigation services” were truly expert services properly recoverable as outlay. The Court of Appeal, in Skoczylas v Minister for Finance [2024] IECA 201 (Burns J; Costello J and Faherty J concurring), dismissed the appeal and affirmed the High Court’s decision. Although the Court of Appeal gave an important exposition of the common law on recoverability of non-legal expert assistance in litigation, it held that, on the evidence presented, the LCA had been correct to disallow the SCLLP invoices and that the High Court had correctly confirmed that determination. The Supreme Court subsequently refused leave to appeal a later order of the Court of Appeal in Skoczylas v Minister for Finance [2025] IESCDET 62.1.3 The new 2024–2025 application
In September 2024, after the Court of Appeal had delivered its substantive judgment, but before all orders were perfected, Mr Skoczylas lodged a fresh Bill of Costs (Rec. No. H:LCA:OLCA:2024.771) before the LCA. This bill again sought adjudication on five of the same SCLLP invoices already conclusively determined in the earlier adjudication and subsequent review/appeal process. His theory was that: - the Court of Appeal’s 2024 judgment had, in effect, accepted that the invoices were in principle “captured” by O’Malley J’s 2017 costs order, and - the question of “quantum” for five selected invoices had supposedly never yet been adjudicated. The LCA replied by letter dated 11 October 2024, pointing out that: - those five invoices had already been adjudicated upon, - a Final Certificate disallowing them had issued in April 2022, and - both the High Court and the Court of Appeal had confirmed the disallowance. Absent a court order setting aside that final determination, the LCA stated that he had “no jurisdiction” to entertain a new bill relating to the same invoices and vacated a previously scheduled hearing date. Undeterred, the applicant: - treated the LCA’s 11 October 2024 letter as a “determination” under s.157 or s.160 LSRA 2015, - issued a “Notice of Application for Consideration” on 14 October 2024, - received a further letter from the LCA on 15 October 2024 reiterating the lack of jurisdiction, and - then brought the present Notice of Motion dated 16 October 2024 seeking: 1. A “review” under s.161 LSRA 2015 of what he said was a determination made by the LCA on 15 October 2024 in relation to the five invoices; 2. In the alternative, a ruling that the LSRA 2015 did not apply because he was a litigant in person, and that s.27 of the Courts and Court Officers Act 1995 should govern; 3. A reference of two questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) under Article 267 TFEU, grounded on alleged breaches of Article 6(1) and 13 ECHR as general principles of EU law. This is the application determined by Bradley J in the present judgment.2. Summary of the Judgment
Bradley J dismissed the application in its entirety. Key holdings include: 1. No determination, no review jurisdiction The letters from the LCA dated 11 and 15 October 2024 were not “determinations” under s.157 or s.160 LSRA 2015. They were administrative communications stating that the LCA lacked jurisdiction to re‑adjudicate invoices already conclusively determined. As such: - there was no valid “consideration” under s.160, and - there was nothing capable of being reviewed under s.161. 2. Res judicata, issue estoppel and abuse of process Seeking to re‑open the recoverability of the same five invoices, after: - an adjudication, - a consideration, - a Final Certificate, - a High Court statutory review, and - an appeal to the Court of Appeal, amounted to: - res judicata, - issue estoppel, and - an abuse of process, engaging the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to protect the integrity and finality of adjudications. 3. Misreading of the Court of Appeal judgment The applicant’s contention that the Court of Appeal left open the question of “quantum” for five invoices was rejected as a misconception. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal had decided “what” was at issue – namely, the recoverability of the invoices based on the evidence actually presented – and had found that the applicant had failed to establish a recoverable claim. No aspect of quantum remained for adjudication. 4. Refusal of CJEU reference The Court declined to refer questions to the CJEU. There had been no denial of statutory process or access to the LCA. The applicant had availed of, and exhausted, the statutory avenues, and his difficulties stemmed from failing to produce sufficient evidence, not from any breach of EU‑law‑derived rights. 5. 1995 Act argument immaterial Given the above, the alternative argument that s.27 of the Courts and Court Officers Act 1995 applied, rather than the LSRA 2015, did not arise. In any event, Owens J had previously held that Part 10 LSRA 2015 applied to the kind of costs/outlay awarded to the applicant. An order was proposed: - dismissing the s.161 review and associated reliefs as an abuse of process and contrary to res judicata/issue estoppel, and - refusing the Article 267 TFEU reference.3. Legal and Procedural Framework
3.1 The LSRA 2015 adjudication regime
Part 10, Chapter 4 LSRA 2015 replaced the old “taxation of costs” system with a statutory “adjudication of legal costs” by Legal Costs Adjudicators. Key provisions referenced in the judgment:- Section 157 – The LCA, having considered an application under s.155, must make a “determination”. This determination sets out what is allowed or disallowed.
- Section 158(1) – Subject to s.160, a determination is final and takes effect 20 days after being furnished to the parties.
- Section 159 – The LCA may refer a question of law to the High Court for its opinion.
- Section 160 – “Consideration” of a decision. A party dissatisfied with a determination under s.157 may, within 14 days, apply to the LCA for reconsideration. The LCA then:
- reconsiders and reviews the determination (s.160(4)), and
- may either not vary it, or make a new determination (s.160(5)).
- Section 161 – High Court review:
- Only a party who has invoked s.160 may, within 21 days of the s.160 determination, apply to the High Court for review (s.161(1)).
- The Court generally hears the review on the evidence tendered to the LCA (s.161(3)).
- The Court may:
- confirm the LCA’s determination (s.161(4)(a)); or
- allow the review and either remit the matter or substitute its own determination (s.161(4)(b)).
- The High Court shall only allow a review where satisfied that the LCA has erred “as to the amount of the allowance or disallowance so that the determination is unjust” (s.161(5)).
3.2 Finality and the doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel and abuse of process
Bradley J grounds his decision in well-established doctrines aimed at legal finality and preventing repeated litigation of decided matters:- Res judicata – a matter that has already been finally adjudicated between the same parties by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be litigated again.
- Issue estoppel – even where the cause of action differs, a party is estopped from re‑arguing a specific issue of fact or law that has been finally decided in earlier proceedings between the same parties.
- Abuse of process – a broader, flexible principle whereby courts prevent misuse of their procedures, including attempts to re‑litigate matters that have already been decided or ought to have been raised earlier.
3.3 The Courts and Court Officers Act 1995
Section 27 of the Courts and Court Officers Act 1995 historically governed certain aspects of costs and taxation, including in contexts involving litigants in person. In earlier proceedings, Owens J had held (in Skoczylas v Minister for Finance & Ors [2023] IEHC 33, para. 90) that: - the definition of “legal costs” in s.13(8) LSRA 2015 is broad, and - Part 10 LSRA 2015 applies to the expenses awarded to Mr Skoczylas, even though he appeared as a lay litigant. Bradley J notes that, because the present application fails on res judicata and abuse of process, the 1995 Act argument is moot. But he also records Owens J’s earlier conclusion that Part 10 LSRA applies to awards like those in favour of Mr Skoczylas.4. Litigation Chronology and Procedural Context
4.1 The underlying litigation and costs orders
The parent litigation began around 2011 and concerned challenges to measures taken in relation to the Irish Life and Permanent Group under the crisis-era legislation. Key for present purposes is the order of O’Malley J dated 1 December 2017 in Dowling & Ors v Minister for Finance [2017] IEHC 832. That order provided:“IT IS ORDERED the Applicants be awarded as against the Respondent a proportion of their outlay and legal costs in relation to this case in the following proportions: – Third Named Applicant 40% of his allowable outlay to be taxed in default of agreement.”The “Third Named Applicant” was Mr Skoczylas. The phrase “allowable outlay” is central: he sought to bring the SCLLP invoices within that concept.
4.2 The first Bill of Costs and LCA’s preliminary issue (2020–2022)
In September 2020, Mr Skoczylas lodged a substantial Bill of Costs with the OLCA covering 26 invoices from SCLLP. These invoices, spanning 2011–2014, claimed large sums for: - “professional research and advisory/consulting and related services; i.e. non-legal litigation services and advice/consulting” in relation to the High Court proceedings, - drafting, reviewing and analysing complex affidavits, expert reports, pleadings and submissions, and - preparing slides and handouts for oral submissions. The LCA (Magee) treated these as a novel claim and, on 18 January 2021, issued directions identifying categories of costs claimed (stamp duty, travel, attendance at court, expert opinions, and non‑legal litigation advice/services). The “vast majority” related to the SCLLP invoices. Critically, the LCA directed that a preliminary issue be determined first: - whether the SCLLP services were “captured by the Court orders” and recoverable in principle. After a preliminary hearing, the LCA issued an interim determination on 2 June 2021, concluding that the SCLLP invoices were not recoverable. On a s.160 “consideration” application, the LCA reconsidered the matter in a detailed 44-page decision dated 15 November 2021 and confirmed the earlier conclusion. A Final Certificate of Determination issued on 29 April 2022, disallowing the invoices.4.3 The first s.161 review: High Court (Owens J, 2023)
On 6 December 2021, the applicant invoked s.161 LSRA 2015 and sought a High Court review of the LCA’s determination. In Skoczylas v Minister for Finance & Ors [2023] IEHC 33, Owens J: - identified the question as whether the applicant was entitled to recover the amounts claimed on foot of the 26 SCLLP invoices, described as “non‑legal litigation services and advice/consulting”, - accepted that, as a matter of legal principle, certain non‑legal expert services could, in principle, be recoverable as outlay, with reference to case law such as London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley and its progeny, but - held that, on the evidence actually put before the LCA, the applicant had not established that the SCLLP services: - were truly “expert” in nature, or - were necessitated by the litigation in the way that established case law requires. Owens J emphasised that: - invoices and assertions that something is “non-legal expert services” are not enough, - a claimant must present evidence showing that the work was of a nature properly claimable as expert outlay, and - the LCA was entitled to treat the absence of such evidence as fatal. He concluded that, because Mr Skoczylas had not shown any error by the LCA in disallowing the amounts, he was obliged by s.161(4)(a) LSRA 2015 to confirm the determination.4.4 The Court of Appeal 2024 judgment and later rulings (2025)
On appeal, in Skoczylas v Minister for Finance [2024] IECA 201, the Court of Appeal: - endorsed the High Court’s conclusion that the applicant had failed to discharge the evidential burden needed to show recoverable expert outlay; - clarified, as a matter of law, that: - certain “non-legal” expertise may indeed be recoverable as outlay, - this can extend not only to employees but also to third parties engaged by a litigant, provided the expertise is properly required and truly expert in nature (paras. 44–46 of Burns J’s judgment); but - held that this legal principle did not assist the applicant because he had not proved that the SCLLP services satisfied these criteria. Following the 2024 judgment, the Court of Appeal issued two further rulings which are central to Bradley J’s reasoning: 1. Skoczylas v Minister for Finance [2025] IECA 5 (15 January 2025) – ruling on the applicant’s request to “correct” paragraph 76 of the 2024 judgment, where he claimed he had “prevailed” on the main issue of liability. The Court: - rejected the assertion that the applicant was successful on the central issue, - clarified that the appeal actually concerned whether the LCA was correct in refusing the expenses claimed, not what the abstract law of costs was, and - confirmed that the applicant had been “unsuccessful on all grounds of appeal”. 2. A further ruling on 10 February 2025 (cited in the High Court judgment) – refusing the applicant’s application to defer perfecting the Court of Appeal order pending the outcome of the new costs application. The Court: - confirmed there was no contradiction between the High Court and Court of Appeal judgments, - reiterated that the fatal flaw was the applicant’s failure to adduce evidence of recoverability before the LCA, despite being expressly permitted to do so, and - emphasised that any hardship resulting from that evidential failure was the applicant’s “sole responsibility”. These rulings directly contradict the narrative advanced by the applicant in the present application.4.5 The Supreme Court determination (2025)
In Skoczylas v Minister for Finance [2025] IESCDET 62, the Supreme Court: - dealt with a separate application concerning a stay on the perfection of the Court of Appeal’s order, and - refused leave to appeal. The Supreme Court noted that: - the proceedings were effectively at an end, subject only to that limited appeal question, - the Court of Appeal’s order was a “negative order” (i.e. confirming disallowance), and - there was a misunderstanding by the applicant as to the legal effect of the Court of Appeal judgment; there was no basis to delay perfection of the order.4.6 The second Bill of Costs and the October 2024–2025 steps
Despite this closure, on 25 September 2024, the applicant prepared a new Bill of Costs (lodged on 27 September 2024) seeking to have five of the original 26 SCLLP invoices adjudicated upon again, now styling the issue as “quantum” of claims allegedly never adjudicated. The LCA’s letters of 11 and 15 October 2024: - made clear that: - those invoices had already been adjudicated, - a Final Certificate disallowing them stood, - no court order authorising re‑opening had been produced; - stated explicitly that “absent an Order of the Court … the previous determination and Final Certificate of Determination stand” and the office had “no jurisdiction to deal with the ‘new’ Bill of Costs”. The applicant then launched the present High Court motion of 16 October 2024, attempting to characterise these letters as “determinations” which he could subject to s.160 consideration and s.161 review.5. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning
5.1 Characterisation of the LCA’s correspondence
A central plank of the judgment is the Court’s conclusion that the letters of 11 and 15 October 2024 were not “determinations” within the meaning of ss.157 and 160 LSRA 2015. Bradley J emphasises: - A “determination” under s.157 is a formal adjudicative act whereby the LCA, having considered an application, confirms or disallows particular charges or sets amounts to be charged. - A “determination” under s.160(5) similarly arises only after a valid application for “consideration” has been made in respect of an existing s.157 determination. The letters in question: - did not purport to assess or re‑assess any item on its merits, - simply identified the fact that the same invoices had already been adjudicated upon and disallowed, and - pointed out that the LCA had no statutory jurisdiction to embark on a second adjudication absent an order of the court disturbing the existing Final Certificate. Thus, they were jurisdictional communications, not adjudications on the merits. There was therefore no “decision … under section 157” being “confirmed”, “varied” or “replaced” to which s.160 and s.161 could attach. The Court found that the applicant’s attempt to: - treat the 11 October 2024 letter as a s.157 determination, - seek a s.160 consideration of that letter, and - then claim a s.161 review of the 15 October 2024 letter, was legally misconceived and could not manufacture a jurisdiction the statute did not confer.5.2 Res judicata, issue estoppel and abuse of process
Bradley J then grounds his refusal of relief in the doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel and abuse of process.5.2.1 “What” was decided: Munnelly v Hassett
Invoking O’Donnell C.J.’s analysis in Munnelly v Hassett [2023] IESC 29, the Court stresses that res judicata focuses on what was decided, not on the precise analytical route. Applying that to this case: - The core question decided in the earlier LCA/High Court/Court of Appeal sequence was whether the SCLLP invoices (all 26, including the 5 in issue here) were recoverable as outlay under the existing costs orders. - Both courts concluded that: - while the legal principle permitted, in theory, recovery of certain non‑legal expert services, - the applicant had failed, on the evidence presented, to prove that the SCLLP services fell within that category. That conclusion – that the invoices were not recoverable on the evidence actually advanced – was the determinative issue. It cannot be revisited via a new procedural label such as “quantum”.5.2.2 Elements of issue estoppel applied
Drawing on George v AVA Trade (EU) Ltd, McCool Controls and Curran & O’Donnell v Ulster Bank, Bradley J notes the classic ingredients of issue estoppel: 1. A judgment by a court (or adjudicative body) of competent jurisdiction; 2. A final decision on the merits; 3. Determination of the same question now sought to be raised; and 4. Identity of parties (or privies). He then applies these ingredients: - There was: - a final LCA determination (confirmed after s.160 “consideration” and evidenced by a Final Certificate), - a High Court statutory review under s.161 confirming that determination, and - a Court of Appeal judgment affirming the High Court. - Each step was taken by a competent decision‑maker, and each resulted in a final conclusion that the invoices were not recoverable. - The same invoices and the same factual substratum are in play. - The parties are the same (Mr Skoczylas and the Minister for Finance). The Court concludes that the applicant is estopped from relitigating the recoverability of those invoices, whether couched as “liability” or “quantum”.5.2.3 Abuse of process and the court’s inherent jurisdiction
Even apart from strict res judicata or issue estoppel, Bradley J emphasises the broader doctrine of abuse of process. Citing Morrissey v IBRC and Right to Know v An Taoiseach, he highlights: - the public interest in finality of litigation; - the need to protect litigants from being repeatedly dragged through substantially the same dispute; and - the High Court’s inherent power to control its own process and prevent its procedures being used to undermine earlier final decisions. The Court finds that: - After an adjudication, consideration, Final Certificate, High Court review and Court of Appeal appeal all going against him, the applicant’s attempt to create a second round of adjudication on the same invoices – relying on new evidence which could and should have been presented earlier – is a paradigm case of abusive re‑litigation. This justifies refusing the application in limine.5.3 Misinterpretation of the Court of Appeal’s 2024 judgment
A core misunderstanding driving the applicant’s strategy was his belief that the Court of Appeal’s July 2024 judgment had, in effect: - accepted his argument on liability/recoverability in principle; and - left open the question of “quantum” for (at least) five invoices, which he now sought to litigate. Bradley J carefully analyses this contention and rejects it, relying heavily on the Court of Appeal’s own clarificatory rulings of January and February 2025. Those rulings make clear: - The appeal before the Court of Appeal concerned whether the LCA (and High Court) were correct to disallow the SCLLP invoices on the evidence before them. - While the Court of Appeal did refine or clarify the legal test for recoverability of certain kinds of non-legal expertise, the respondent had not appealed the High Court’s adoption of the relevant common law principle. - The Court of Appeal expressly stated that: - the applicant had been “unsuccessful on all grounds of appeal” ([2025] IECA 5, para. 9), - there was no error to correct in the statement that “the Appellant has been unsuccessful on all grounds of appeal”, and - “what was at issue in the appeal was not what the law was in relation to the issue of costs but rather whether the LCA was correct in refusing the expenses claimed on the basis of the claim before him” ([2025] IECA 5, para. 7). The February 2025 ruling further underlined that: - it was the applicant’s failure to adduce necessary evidence before the LCA that “ultimately proved fatal to his case”, - that failure was entirely his responsibility, and - it could not ground any stay or re‑opening of the Court of Appeal’s judgment. Against this backdrop, Bradley J concludes that the applicant’s attempt to recast the Court of Appeal’s decision as a victory on liability leaving quantum open is simply unsustainable.5.4 Quantum versus recoverability: why quantum never arose
A recurring theme is the applicant’s attempt to separate “recoverability” (liability) from “quantum” and argue that only the latter is now in issue. The Court’s response is twofold: 1. Sequential structure of adjudication The LCA was entitled to take a preliminary decision on whether, in principle, there was any legal basis for recovering the SCLLP invoices before engaging in a granular, “root and branch” quantum assessment. Owens J expressly endorsed this approach, and the Court of Appeal agreed. 2. No recoverable head of claim, no quantum The High Court and Court of Appeal examined each disputed invoice and found: - the invoices described work which, on their face, did not fall into an identifiable category of recoverable expert outlay; and - no underlying evidence was produced to demonstrate that the services were: - truly expert (as opposed to general assistance or personal research), or - properly necessary for the litigation. Absent proof that the invoices belonged to a recoverable category, the question of “how much” (quantum) never logically arose. The applicant therefore cannot sidestep these final determinations by now seeking to litigate quantum based on fresh evidence that he chose not to present at the time.5.5 The evidential deficit and the attempted “second bite”
Another core driver of the Court’s decision is the applicant’s explicit acknowledgement (in his 16 October 2024 affidavit) that he was now seeking to rely on additional evidence – notably, a “Consolidated summary expert report” of SCLLP dated 29 August 2013 – which was not put before the LCA in the original adjudication. Owens J had already emphasised:“No evidence was produced which demonstrates that any of the invoices related to properly claimable expert services. The invoices on their face make claims for items which are not recoverable as party and party costs.” … “No evidence was presented which demonstrated precisely what the claimed expert non-legal ‘professional’ services were or how they were distinguishable from the benefit of personal research …”The Court of Appeal too, in its February 2025 ruling, noted that while reports had been exhibited in later proceedings, they had not been put before the LCA despite procedural directions allowing the parties to lodge any materials on which they wished to rely. Bradley J takes the view that: - The applicant’s new Bill of Costs and s.161 motion amount to an impermissible attempt to fill that earlier evidential gap by re‑opening a concluded adjudication. - The doctrines of res judicata and abuse of process preclude such a “second bite” where the applicant had a full opportunity to present his case and evidence in the first adjudication.
5.6 Applicability of the LSRA 2015 vs. Courts and Court Officers Act 1995
The applicant argued (in the alternative and without prejudice) that: - the LSRA 2015 regime should not apply to him as a litigant in person, because it regulates “legal services” and “legal practitioners”; and - s.27 of the Courts and Court Officers Act 1995 should apply instead. Bradley J treats this as a peripheral issue because: - the application is dismissed on finality and abuse of process grounds; and - therefore, the question of statutory basis for any hypothetical re‑adjudication does not arise. Nonetheless, he records that: - Owens J, in 2023, had interpreted “legal costs” in s.13(8) LSRA 2015 purposively to include the type of outlay awarded to the applicant; - the LSRA regime was thereby held applicable to the adjudication of his outlay; and - the Court of Appeal had not disturbed that conclusion (indeed, it found it unnecessary to address that issue in detail). The practical takeaway is that litigants in person, when awarded costs or outlay, are not outside the ambit of the LSRA adjudication regime.5.7 EU law arguments and refusal of Article 267 reference
The applicant sought a preliminary reference to the CJEU, framing two questions in terms of: - Articles 6(1) and 13 ECHR (fair trial and effective remedy) as general principles of EU law, and - whether those principles preclude a Legal Costs Adjudicator from: - denying access to adjudication of “quantum” where formal requirements are met and res judicata does not apply; and/or - failing to conduct a “proper examination” of submissions and evidence so that parties’ observations are “actually heard”. Bradley J refuses to refer on the basis that: 1. No denial of statutory process or access The applicant: - had the benefit of the statutory adjudication process, - obtained an interim determination, a consideration decision, and a Final Certificate, and - pursued a High Court review and an appeal to the Court of Appeal. His grievance is not that he was denied access, but that he lost on the merits due to evidential deficiencies. 2. No failure by the LCA to examine submissions Both Owens J and the Court of Appeal had already found that the LCA was entitled to decide the threshold issue of recoverability on the materials before him and that detailed “root and branch” quantification was unnecessary once it was clear that the invoices did not disclose a recoverable head of claim. 3. No relevant EU law question necessary to resolve the case The outcome turns entirely on domestic doctrines of res judicata and abuse of process and on the statutory architecture of the LSRA 2015. There is no genuine doubt as to the interpretation of EU law that is necessary to decide the case. The high threshold for an Article 267 reference from a court of last instance (Cilfit criteria) is not even engaged, given that the High Court is not in that position and, more fundamentally, there is no live EU‑law issue. Accordingly, the Court declines to make a reference and dismisses the EU‑law‑based reliefs.6. Precedents and Authorities Cited
The decision synthesises several key precedents on finality and abuse of process.6.1 AA v Medical Council [2003] 4 I.R. 302 and Geary v Property Registration Authority [2020] IECA 132
These authorities are cited for the principle that: - courts must guard against multiplicity of proceedings, - there is a strong public interest in finality, and - they possess inherent jurisdiction to prevent the same dispute being relitigated repeatedly. They frame the policy backdrop to the Court’s refusal to allow the SCLLP invoices to be re‑adjudicated.6.2 Thoday v Thoday [1964] 2 WLR 371
Diplock L.J.’s classic analysis of issue estoppel in Thoday v Thoday is referenced via Irish case law as setting out the basic conceptual framework for distinguishing: - cause of action estoppel (the whole claim) from - issue estoppel (particular issues of fact or law). Bradley J uses this line of authority (as applied in modern Irish cases) to demonstrate that, even if the applicant now dresses his claim as one about “quantum” rather than “recoverability”, the underlying issue – whether the invoices are recoverable outlay – has already been finally determined.6.3 Curran & O’Donnell v Ulster Bank Ireland DAC [2023] IEHC 513; George v AVA Trade (EU) Ltd [2019] IEHC 187; McCool Controls [2019] IEHC 695
These cases are cited for their clear articulation of the ingredients of issue estoppel: - competent jurisdiction, - final decision on merits, - same issue, and - same parties. Bradley J adopts those criteria and shows they are squarely met.6.4 Morrissey v IBRC [2015] IEHC 200
Costello J’s judgment is quoted for its concise explanation of the rationale for res judicata and the complementary doctrine of abuse of process: - protection of opposing parties from multiple lawsuits on the same issue, and - the broader public interest in judicial economy and finality. This supports the High Court’s decision to strike out the present application as an abuse of process.6.5 Right to Know CLG v An Taoiseach [2024] IEHC 713
Simons J’s analysis is referenced for the proposition that: - discontent with a judicial determination should be addressed by appeal, and - it is an abuse to attempt to re‑litigate the same question in a fresh set of proceedings. Given that the applicant here exhausted his appeal rights, the attempt to re‑invigorate the same dispute through a new Bill of Costs and s.161 motion is archetypal abuse.6.6 Munnelly v Hassett [2023] IESC 29
O’Donnell C.J.’s emphasis that res judicata focuses on what was decided rather than how it was decided is directly applied: - The fact that the Court of Appeal refined the legal analysis does not alter the fact that it upheld the disallowance of the invoices. - The applicant cannot treat that refined analysis as if it were a substantive victory entitling him to re‑open the claim.7. Complex Concepts Simplified
This judgment interweaves several technical concepts. Clarifying them helps illuminate why the Court ruled as it did.7.1 Legal Costs Adjudicator, “determination” and “consideration”
- Legal Costs Adjudicator (LCA) – An independent statutory officer who replaces the old “Taxing Master”. LCAs decide what legal costs (including outlay) are payable between parties.
- Determination (s.157) – The formal decision of the LCA after considering a Bill of Costs. It sets out which items are allowed or disallowed and in what amounts.
- Consideration (s.160) – A built‑in “review” mechanism within the OLCA. If a party is unhappy with a determination, they can ask the LCA to reconsider. The LCA may then:
- confirm the original determination; or
- make a fresh determination.
- High Court Review (s.161) – A statutory appeal‑type mechanism. If a party is still dissatisfied, they can apply to the High Court to review the s.160 determination. The High Court:
- usually works on the evidence that was before the LCA;
- can only interfere if the LCA erred in a way that makes the determination “unjust”; and
- may confirm, remit, or substitute its own determination.
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