Introduction

The Judgment in Director of Public Prosecutions v JB; Director of Public Prosecutions v SM ([2025] IESC 10) marks a significant development in Irish criminal procedure. The case arises from the shooting incident of a teenager, AB, in early 2021 on a Dublin city centre street—a case with profound public interest due to its violence and potential harm to multiple members of the community.

The appellants, JB and SM, were initially acquitted by a trial judge on charges including attempted murder, possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life, and in the case of JB, additionally damaging property. The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) contended that an error of law occurred when the trial judge directed the jury to acquit the appellants, and subsequently moved for a re-trial under the provisions of s. 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010, as amended.

This commentary examines the legal reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in quashing the acquittals, the role played by the inference provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1984, and the detailed analysis of the factors under s. 23(12) of the 2010 Act that justify a re-trial.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court reviewed the appellate decision concerning the acquittals rendered at trial. Citing its earlier decision ([2024] IESC 57) and the Court of Appeal judgment ([2024] IECA 116), the Court found that the trial judge erred in law by directing the jury to acquit the appellants. The error centered on the inadequate consideration of crucial inference provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 1984, specifically sections 18 and 19, which were relevant during the subsequent Gardaí interviews.

Relying on section 23(3)(b) and empowered by section 23(11) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010, the Court determined that the requirements as articulated under s. 23(12), namely fairness in the conduct of a re-trial, the passage of time since the incident, the victim’s interests, and any related matters, were satisfactorily met. Consequently, the Court directed that the acquittals be quashed and a re-trial ordered.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Judgment highlights several key precedents that have shaped its reasoning:

• The People (DPP) v. JC [2015] IESC 50 and DPP v. A. McD [2016] IESC 71: These cases reinforce the principle that when a trial judge directs a jury to acquit on account of perceived insufficient evidence, such directions must be meticulously scrutinized for legal error. The decisions emphasized that errors in jury direction, especially where compelling evidence exists, warrant a re-trial.
• The People (DPP) v. TN [2020] IESC 53 and The Director of Public Prosecutions v. DK and MK [2021] IECA 32: Both cases underscored the necessity for a fair and balanced judicial process even when errors occur, and they set the stage for evaluating whether a re-trial meets the broader 'interests of justice' requirement.
• The People (DPP) v. BK [2023] IESC 38: Particularly influential in this Judgment, BK affirmed that while a trial error is not automatically remedied by ordering a re-trial, the DPP bears the onus to demonstrate that the order is just and necessary.

These precedents collectively contributed to framing the current decision, reinforcing the notion that a re-trial should only be ordered when aggregate factors—ranging from evidentiary considerations to victim impact—unequivocally support such a measure.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's legal reasoning in reaching its decision can be distilled into several key points:

• Error in Jury Direction: The Supreme Court determined that the trial judge’s directive to acquit was legally flawed because it failed to account for the inference provisions under ss. 18 and 19 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984. This oversight potentially obscured strong evidence gathered from subsequent investigative interviews by the Gardaí.
• Application of Section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010: The DPP invoked s. 23(3)(b) and s. 23(11), arguing that an error in direction—when accompanied by compelling evidence—warrants the granting of a re-trial. The Court carefully considered the statutory criteria set out in s. 23(12), which include:
  • Whether a fair re-trial is practicable;
  • The interval between the original incident and the potential re-trial;
  • The interests of the victim and bystanders;
  • Any other relevant factors.
• Balancing Public and Individual Interests: The Judgment noted the significant public interest in prosecuting serious offences like attempted murder, particularly where there is an overwhelming societal need to identify and convict the responsible parties. This public interest supersedes, in many instances, individual considerations such as the defendant’s prolonged pre-trial detention.

Impact on Future Cases

This Judgment is likely to have far-reaching implications:

• It reinforces that judicial error in jury directions—especially where statutory inference provisions are not properly considered—can lead to the quashing of acquittals and re-trials. Future cases may see heightened scrutiny of how directions to juries are given.
• The decision clarifies the application of s. 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010. Prosecutors and defense counsel alike will now have clearer benchmarks for evaluating the appropriateness of re-trials, particularly in serious criminal cases involving violence and significant public interest.
• The emphasis on balancing the interests of both the victim and scale of the public interest provides a template for addressing future appeals where judicial errors are alleged.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal concepts in this Judgment deserve further explanation:

• Inference Provisions: The provisions under ss. 18 and 19 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 allow the courts to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, even if direct testimony is absent or insufficient. In this case, these provisions were critical in establishing that the evidence available could have convinced a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Section 23 Appeal Mechanism: Section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010 provides a procedural avenue for the DPP to challenge a jury’s acquittal when a legal error, such as a misdirection, is found. The mechanism stipulates conditions under which a re-trial may be ordered, thus ensuring that justice is served by balancing evidentiary shortcomings with fairness in judicial process.
• Interests of Justice: This broad concept encapsulates not only the rights of the defendant but also the needs of the victims and the community’s interest in the proper administration of criminal law, especially when serious offences are in question.

Conclusion

In closing, the Supreme Court's decision to quash the acquittals and order a re-trial in Director of Public Prosecutions v JB; Director of Public Prosecutions v SM represents a landmark clarification of judicial responsibility and procedural fairness. By meticulously analyzing both statutory provisions and relevant precedents, the Court has underscored that errors in jury direction, particularly regarding inference evidence, cannot be dismissed lightly.

The Judgment underscores that the public interest in achieving justice in serious offences—such as attempted murder—can, and sometimes must, outweigh individual grievances, thus setting a robust precedent for future cases. For legal practitioners and scholars, the ruling provides an instructive template on balancing statutory mandates with the real-world demands of administering justice fairly and comprehensively.