Reason-Giving as a Gateway to Statutory Appeals: Inadequate Labour Court Reasons Make s.46 Appeal an Inadequate Alternative Remedy

Introduction

In Arkins & Anor v Labour Court [2025] IEHC 605, the High Court (Simons J.) refused applications by the notice party, Metropolitan Films International Ltd, to set aside leave granted to two applicants to pursue judicial review of Labour Court decisions. The case sits at the intersection of administrative law principles on reason-giving and adequate alternative remedies, and the nuanced realities of employment relations in Ireland’s film industry, where producer companies utilise special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to access tax incentives under section 481 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997.

The two applicants, Paul and Jason Arkins, had succeeded before Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) adjudication officers on complaints under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 and the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003. On appeal, however, the Labour Court found that there was no employment relationship between either applicant and the producer company, Metropolitan Films International Ltd, concluding instead that they were employed by named SPV “qualifying companies.”

The High Court was asked to set aside leave to bring judicial review on two grounds:

That a statutory appeal to the High Court on a point of law under section 46 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 was an adequate alternative remedy, and thus judicial review was inappropriate.
That the judicial review proceedings did not meet the low “arguable case” threshold at leave.

This omnibus judgment addresses both applications together given common legal representation, identical issues, and a joint hearing. It is significant for its clear articulation that the adequacy of a statutory appeal is conditioned by the adequacy of the lower tribunal’s reasons: where the Labour Court fails to provide intelligible reasons, the section 46 appeal route may be inadequate, keeping the door open to judicial review.

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court reaffirmed the inherent jurisdiction to set aside ex parte orders (including leave to seek judicial review) but emphasised this jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly for principled and pragmatic reasons.
While the default position is that statutory appeals (here, under section 46 WRA 2015) are the appropriate route, the Court held that this case falls within an exception: the Labour Court’s reasons were so inadequate that the statutory appeal would not be an effective or adequate alternative remedy.
The Court held that the applicants had met the low arguable case threshold. The Labour Court failed to engage with the central question of statutory interpretation—who is the “employer” in the section 481/SPV context—and failed to give sufficient reasons, including an apparent “cut and paste” error citing the wrong legislation in one decision.
Accordingly, the notice party’s motions to set aside leave were refused. Costs were provisionally awarded to the applicants on the motions, subject to submissions.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

M.D. v Board of Management of a Secondary School [2024] IESC 11: The Supreme Court reaffirmed the inherent power to set aside ex parte orders and clarified the onus depending on the nature of the order. Simons J. relies on this to confirm that set-aside is available in principle when leave is granted ex parte, but that the moving party bears the burden.
Adam v Minister for Justice [2001] IESC 38; Gordon v DPP [2002] IESC 47: These authorities confirm the availability of set-aside of leave and underscore that it is the moving party’s task to demonstrate impropriety in the grant of leave. They frame the sparing exercise of the set-aside jurisdiction.
EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd v Data Protection Commissioner [2013] IESC 34: A leading statement of the “adequate alternative remedy” principle in administrative law: judicial review should ordinarily be avoided where an adequate alternative exists. Simons J. takes this as the default position.
Chubb European Group SE v Health Insurance Authority [2020] IECA 91, [2022] 2 IR 686: Establishes the presumption that, absent statutory constraints, a statutory appeal is intended to supplant and enlarge judicial review. The Court acknowledges this presumption but explains why it does not apply given the Labour Court’s paucity of reasons.
Erdogan v Workplace Relations Commission [2021] IEHC 348; Burke v An Adjudication Officer [2021] IEHC 667: Examples of the adequate alternative remedy principle in the employment law context, generally requiring parties to use statutory appeals before invoking judicial review.
Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 2 IR 752: A cornerstone on reason-giving. The Supreme Court stated that reasons must (a) explain, in general terms, why the decision was made and (b) provide enough information to decide whether to appeal or seek judicial review, and to allow a court to properly engage with an appeal or review. Simons J. deploys this as the fulcrum: if reasons are inadequate, appellate jurisdiction cannot be effectively exercised. This transforms the adequacy of the appeal remedy.
Stanberry Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Valuation [2020] IECA 33: Applied by analogy to emphasise that curial deference to an expert body presupposes a properly reasoned decision. Deference does not cure an absence of reasons.
Telstar Investments Ltd v Dublin City Council [2025] IEHC 386: Cited to illustrate that set-aside may be appropriate where proceedings are misconceived or irregular. The present cases are distinguished: they turn on arguable legal error and inadequacy of reasons, not irregularity.
ACC Bank plc v Hanrahan [2014] IESC 40: On costs for interlocutory motions. The Court uses this to justify awarding costs now where the motion issue is self-contained and will not be revisited at trial.
Arkins v Labour Court [2025] IEHC 416 (“Arkins No. 1”): A comparator case. Simons J. distinguishes it because that dispute was essentially factual and did not present the statutory interpretation issues prominent here. The present statements of grounds are broader and more legally focused.

2. Legal Reasoning

a) Set-aside jurisdiction exercised sparingly

The Court underscores that set-aside of leave is an exception, not the rule. Two rationales support restraint:

Principled: The leave threshold (arguable case for conventional judicial review) is modest and somewhat subjective at the margins. Setting aside would require demonstrating an error of law by the leave judge in deciding that threshold was met—a high bar.
Pragmatic: Frequent set-aside motions would create a three-stage litigation (ex parte leave, contested set-aside, substantive hearing), inducing systemic delay. It is generally more efficient to proceed to a merits hearing.

b) Adequate alternative remedy: reasons as a condition precedent to appeal effectiveness

The notice party invoked the default rule: use the explicit statutory appeal (section 46 WRA 2015) rather than judicial review. Simons J. accepts the default but identifies a critical exception: the Labour Court’s reasons were too sparse and, in one instance, improperly transposed, to allow an effective statutory appeal on a point of law.

Applying Connelly v An Bord Pleanála, the Court holds that:

Reasons must explain, at least in general terms, why the decision was made; and
Must be sufficient to allow the affected party to assess and pursue an appeal and to allow the appellate court to properly engage with the issues.

Here, the Labour Court’s decisions baldly stated that each applicant was employed by a named SPV “qualifying company,” without engaging with the core legal question raised by the applicants: whether, in the context of section 481’s structure and policy (including a focus on “quality employment”), and given the producer company’s control over SPVs, the producer company could be the true employer or whether the legislation requires a broader interpretative approach to “employee” and “employer.”

The Court emphasises that this is not a mere quibble about drafting. The Labour Court’s failure to tackle the step of statutory interpretation—especially when the WRC had ruled the other way—renders the appellate pathway ineffective. Without articulated reasoning, the High Court on a section 46 appeal is deprived of the necessary substrate to evaluate alleged legal errors. In short, reason-giving is a gateway requirement; its absence can make a statutory appeal an inadequate alternative remedy, keeping judicial review available.

c) Arguable case threshold is satisfied

The notice party argued the issues were factual and fell within the Labour Court’s fact-finding expertise, relying on the limited scope for intervention in primary fact findings. Simons J. rejects this characterisation. Two points underpin the finding that an arguable case exists:

Core issues of law were ignored: The appeals called for interpretative analysis of “employee” and “employer” within the legislative framework (Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994; Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003) and in the specific section 481 context. The Labour Court did not engage with those issues.
Reason-giving deficit undermines deference: While curial deference applies to an expert tribunal’s fact-finding, that deference presupposes that the tribunal has given reasons linking evidence to findings. Absent reasons, deference cannot insulate a decision from review. The Court notes, too, an apparent “cut and paste” error where the wrong legislation was quoted—further evidence of inadequate engagement.

On this basis, the applicants have an arguable case of (i) failure to provide adequate reasons, (ii) failure to have regard to relevant considerations, and (iii) legal error in interpreting the concepts of “employee” and “employer” in their proper statutory and policy context.

d) Distinction from Arkins No. 1

The Court distinguishes its earlier decision in Arkins No. 1. There, the dispute was essentially factual and lacked the “intermediate step” of legal interpretation now squarely raised. The present statements of grounds are broader, laying a foundation for arguable legal error beyond mere reappraisal of facts.

e) Orders and costs

The motions to set aside leave were refused. On costs, applying Order 99 rule 3 RSC and section 169 LSRA 2015 (and having regard to ACC Bank v Hanrahan), the Court’s provisional view is that costs follow the event and the applicants should recover their motion costs from the notice party, subject to written submissions within stated timeframes.

3. Impact and Implications

a) Strengthening the duty to give reasons in the Labour Court

This judgment concretely links the adequacy of reasons to the viability of the statutory appeal route under section 46 WRA 2015. Labour Court decisions that omit to grapple with central statutory interpretation issues risk being susceptible to judicial review on the basis that the statutory appeal is, in practice, not an adequate alternative remedy. The Court’s focus on the need to address the “employee”/“employer” concepts in their full legislative and policy context will likely prompt more robust, tailored reasoning in Labour Court determinations, especially in complex industries with atypical employment structures.

b) Administrative law: a calibrated “adequate alternative remedy” test

The decision does not displace the default rule favouring statutory appeals. Rather, it clarifies that the “adequacy” of the alternative is context-sensitive and depends on whether the lower tribunal’s reasons enable an appeal to function. This is a principled extension of Connelly v An Bord Pleanála into the employment appeals sphere, and is likely to be cited wherever reason-giving deficits are said to frustrate the appellate function.

c) Film industry employment: SPVs, producer companies, and continuity of employment

Although the case is at the leave stage and does not adjudicate the merits of who the employer is, the High Court views as arguable the proposition that an overly narrow focus on SPV contracts may “obscure the true nature of the employment relationship” where workers move seamlessly between SPVs controlled by a producer company. The Court flags that statutory policy under section 481—requiring “quality employment”—and definitions in the Film Regulations 2019 (the concept of a “film group”) may be relevant to interpreting “employer” and “employee.” This signals to adjudication officers and the Labour Court that group structures, associated-employer concepts, and continuity across successive SPV engagements require careful legal analysis and reasoned treatment.

d) Litigation strategy for respondents and notice parties

The judgment cautions against routine set-aside motions after leave for judicial review is granted. Save for cases of irregularity or proceedings that are plainly misconceived, the more efficient course is to proceed to a substantive hearing. Respondents should also appreciate the costs exposure in unsuccessful set-aside applications, as reflected in the Court’s provisional costs order here.

e) Judicial review standards: deference presupposes reasons

The Court’s use of Stanberry Investments underscores a key principle: curial deference to specialist tribunals is not a substitute for reasons. Tribunals cannot shield decisions from review by saying “trust our expertise” without showing their workings. This will resonate beyond employment law to all expert decision-makers operating under statutory appeal schemes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Adequate alternative remedy: A doctrine that discourages judicial review where another legal avenue (like a statutory appeal) can adequately address the grievance. If that alternative route is ineffective in the circumstances—e.g., because the decision under challenge provides no intelligible reasons—judicial review may still be appropriate.
Ex parte and set-aside of leave: Leave to seek judicial review is often sought without notifying the other side (ex parte). Courts have inherent power to set aside such orders, but use it sparingly to avoid delay and duplication.
Arguable case threshold: The low bar a claimant must clear at leave for conventional judicial review. It requires showing that there is a reasonable argument that the decision may be unlawful; it is not a final merits determination.
Curial deference: Courts often defer to specialist tribunals on matters within their expertise, especially fact-finding. However, deference applies only where the tribunal explains its reasoning; it does not excuse a failure to give reasons.
Section 46 Workplace Relations Act 2015 appeal: A statutory right to appeal Labour Court decisions to the High Court on points of law. It is not a full rehearing. Its effectiveness depends on the lower court’s reasons being clear enough to identify alleged legal errors.
Section 481 film tax credit and SPVs: To claim the credit, a producer company must set up a wholly-owned SPV (“qualifying company”) for each film. Workers may move from one SPV to another under the same producer. This can complicate questions about who their employer is and whether they have continuous employment.
Film Regulations 2019 and “film group”: The regulations define a “film group” to include the producer company, the qualifying company, and linked businesses. While not dispositive, the concept can inform the interpretation of employment relationships in the industry.
Associated employer and continuity: Concepts found in employment legislation that can attribute responsibility across related entities and recognise uninterrupted service across successive contracts, potentially relevant where workers shift between SPVs.

Conclusion

Arkins & Anor v Labour Court clarifies a pivotal point of administrative law with practical consequences for employment litigation: a statutory appeal on a point of law is not an “adequate alternative remedy” where the tribunal’s reasons are too sparse to enable the appellate court to discharge its function. Reason-giving is thus not merely a fairness requirement—it is a functional prerequisite to the operation of statutory appeal schemes.

The judgment also signals to the WRC and Labour Court that, in industries with complex corporate architectures—such as film production under section 481—decision-makers must grapple explicitly with statutory interpretation of “employee” and “employer” and with the broader legislative context (including the policy of “quality employment” and the significance of group structures). Bald assertions of SPV employment will not suffice where the evidence and statutory scheme suggest a more intricate reality requiring analysis.

Procedurally, the case reaffirms that set-aside of leave is exceptional and that the arguable case threshold remains modest. Substantively, it strengthens the culture of reasoned adjudication and ensures that statutory appeals perform their intended role. Its immediate effect is to permit the applicants’ judicial review claims to proceed; its broader legacy is to entrench reason-giving as the gateway to the adequacy of statutory appellate remedies in employment disputes and beyond.

Case Metadata

Case: Arkins & Anor v Labour Court (Approved)
Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 605
Court: High Court of Ireland
Judge: Simons J.
Date: 10 November 2025
Record: 2025 307 JR; 2025 308 JR
Respondent: Labour Court
Notice Party: Metropolitan Films International Ltd
Appearances: Roddy McConnell for the applicants (Yeats Vaid & Company Solicitors); Des Ryan for the notice party (Phillip Lee LLP). The respondent did not participate.