Quinn v Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission [2025] IEHC 650:
The Scope of GSOC’s Duty to Inform Complainants and the Limited Procedural Rights of Complainants in Garda Disciplinary Investigations

1. Introduction

This High Court judgment of Phelan J, delivered on 26 November 2025, addresses two interlinked areas of Irish public law and police accountability:

• the strict time-limit regime for judicial review of GSOC decisions; and
• the substantive scope of the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission’s (GSOC’s) duty to keep complainants informed under s. 103 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005, particularly in the context of unsupervised disciplinary investigations conducted by An Garda Síochána (AGS) under s. 94.

The applicant, Mr Raymond Quinn, a retired financial consultant residing in Co. Donegal, has for many years pursued complaints arising from alleged fraud and money-laundering against him, said to have been orchestrated by a named Russian oligarch and others outside the jurisdiction. His dissatisfaction with the way AGS investigated, and eventually closed, his original fraud complaint (around 2018, confirmed after review in 2021) later evolved into complaints about:

• the failure of senior Garda officers to provide him with “two reports” said to have been promised, and
• the handling of his complaints within the Garda organisation.

In late 2023, he complained to GSOC about two senior Garda officers (a Deputy Commissioner and an Assistant Commissioner) for alleged neglect of duty in failing to respond adequately and in failing to provide the “two reports”. GSOC:

• admitted the complaints under s. 87 of the 2005 Act;
• classified them as “neglect of duty” and referred them under s. 92(a) for unsupervised investigation by a Garda officer (a GSIO) pursuant to s. 94(1); and
• ultimately decided, under s. 93(1)(c), to discontinue the investigation on the basis that further investigation was “not necessary or reasonably practicable”, having concluded that no breach of discipline was disclosed.

Mr Quinn sought judicial review, contending primarily that:

1. GSOC breached s. 103 and fair procedures by failing to keep him informed of the progress and results of the unsupervised investigation, and in particular by not giving him advance notice of the GSIO’s investigation report before deciding to discontinue; and
2. GSOC acted on erroneous or incomplete information because he was never afforded the chance to correct or supplement the GSIO’s report, notably by furnishing emails (from Supt. Deely) which he says evidenced a promise to supply him with the two Garda “reports”.

He also attempted to challenge the classification/allocation of his complaint for unsupervised Garda investigation rather than investigation directly by GSOC, and sought remittal of his case for consideration by the newly-created Office of the Police Ombudsman (Fiosrú) under the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024.

The judgment provides important guidance on:

• how strictly the three-month time limit for judicial review is applied to GSOC decisions;
• the nature and limits of a complainant’s rights in GSOC/Discipline Regulations processes;
• the interpretation of s. 103 (duty to keep informed) and the relationship between that duty and confidentiality/public interest under s. 81 and s. 103(2); and
• whether GSOC must give complainants the GSIO’s report, or a summary of it, before discontinuing an investigation.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Procedural Outcome

Phelan J dismissed the application for judicial review and refused all relief.

• Time-barred challenges: The challenges to:
  • the admissibility decision of 1 February 2024; and
  • the decision on the same date to classify and allocate the complaint for unsupervised investigation under s. 94(1)
  were held to be out of time under Order 84 r. 21 RSC. No adequate basis was shown for an extension of time.
• No “fresh” decision on 17 April 2024: The Applicant’s attempt to treat GSOC’s refusal, by letter of 17 April 2024, to review its earlier decisions as a new reviewable decision was rejected as an impermissible collateral attack on the original (time-barred) decisions.
• Live issue limited to discontinuance decision: The only timely issue was the decision of 18 June 2024 to discontinue the investigation under s. 93(1)(c), and whether GSOC breached:
  • s. 103 (duty to keep the complainant informed of progress and results); or
  • constitutional/fair procedures, by failing to share or summarise the GSIO report before discontinuing.

2.2 Substantive Holdings

• Section 103 duty narrowly construed:
  • The duty under s. 103(1) “to provide … sufficient information to keep [the complainant] informed of the progress and results” of an investigation is mandatory, but minimalist.
  • It does not require disclosure of the GSIO’s report (or even a detailed précis) to the complainant.
  • The duty was satisfied by the sequence of letters notifying:
    • admissibility and referral for unsupervised investigation;
    • appointment of a GSIO; and
    • the decision to discontinue under s. 93(1)(c), with brief reasons.
• No right to GSIO report or pre-discontinuance consultation:
  • Under the statutory scheme for unsupervised investigations:
    • AGS, not GSOC, has the statutory duty under s. 94(9) to notify the complainant and others of the “results” of the investigation.
    • There is no statutory entitlement for GSOC, still less for the complainant, to obtain or receive the GSIO’s full report in an unsupervised investigation.
  • The complainant’s fair procedure rights are limited; he is akin to a witness, not a person in jeopardy of sanction. There is no constitutional or statutory right to:
    • prior consultation before discontinuance; or
    • disclosure of the GSIO report or a detailed summary.
• GSOC’s “universal practice” of non-disclosure of GSIO reports is lawful:
  • Non-disclosure of GSIO reports to complainants is consistent with s. 81 (confidentiality) and s. 103(2) (no duty to disclose information where disclosure would prejudice investigations, endanger safety, or not be in the public interest).
  • This practice is not an unlawful fettering of discretion but a correct application of statutory limits on disclosure.
• No unfairness from “incomplete information” about the Deely emails:
  • GSOC did not have the actual Deely emails (which were first exhibited in 2025), but:
    • AGS had written to the Applicant’s solicitor on 28 February 2024, seeking that correspondence; and
    • that letter, summarising what these “reports” were (internal correspondence, not investigation reports) and noting that the Applicant had only been told that “a report was being sought” was before GSOC via the GSIO report.
  • The Applicant consciously chose not to respond or supply the emails when invited to do so by the Assistant Commissioner.
  • On a proper reading, the Deely emails did not promise to provide the Applicant with copies of operational reports, only that he would be contacted on receipt of them.
  • Even if GSOC had seen the full emails, they would not have altered the conclusion that:
    • there was no evidence of a commitment to release operational Garda reports; and
    • in any event, Garda practice would preclude such disclosure.
• No realistic prospect of remittal to Fiosrú under the 2024 Act:
  • Section 228 of the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024 preserves the 2005 Act regime for complaints already admitted for investigation.
  • Absent a successful challenge to the admissibility decision (for which no legal ground was pleaded and which was out of time), there is no pathway for remittal to the new Office of the Police Ombudsman.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Statutory and Institutional Context

The judgment is deeply grounded in the structure of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 (since repealed but preserved for transitional cases by the 2024 Act). The key provisions are:

• Section 67: GSOC’s objectives – efficient, fair and transparent handling of complaints and promotion of public confidence.
• Sections 81 & 103: Confidentiality of GSOC information, counterbalanced by a duty to keep specified persons informed of “progress and results” of investigations, subject to a public interest override.
• Sections 83–87: Complaints process – who can complain, time limits (s. 84), and admissibility decisions.
• Section 92: GSOC’s options once a complaint is admissible – referral to AGS under s. 94, internal GSOC investigation under s. 95, or investigation by designated officers under s. 98.
• Section 93: GSOC’s power to discontinue an investigation where:
  • the complaint is frivolous or vexatious in light of further information; or
  • was knowingly false or misleading; or
  • “having regard to all the circumstances, … further investigation is not necessary or reasonably practicable”.
  Reasons must be given in writing to the complainant, the Garda member concerned and the Commissioner (s. 93(2)).
• Section 94: Disciplinary investigations by AGS:
  • Unsupervised investigations (as here) – Commissioner appoints an investigating member under the Discipline Regulations; GSOC’s role is limited.
  • Supervised investigations – GSOC can approve the investigator, direct interim reports, attend interviews and direct further investigative steps.
  • Crucially, s. 94(9): in unsupervised investigations, it is the Garda Commissioner who must inform GSOC, the complainant, and the Garda member of:
    • “the results” of any disciplinary proceedings or, if none, the investigation; and
    • any proposed action.
• Sections 95 & 98: Investigations by GSOC itself (respectively for non‑criminal and potentially criminal matters) – with significantly more robust procedural entitlements, especially for the subject of the complaint.

Against that backdrop, the central interpretive questions are:

• what “sufficient information … of the progress and results” in s. 103(1) requires; and
• whether, in an unsupervised s. 94 investigation, that requirement extends to disclosure (or pre‑decision disclosure) of the GSIO’s report.

3.2 Time Limits, Extensions, and Collateral Challenges

3.2.1 Rigid application of Order 84 r. 21

The application for leave to seek judicial review was made on 21 June 2024. The key “early” decisions were made on 1 February 2024 and communicated immediately:

• the complaint was found admissible under s. 87; and
• it was referred under s. 92(a) for unsupervised investigation by a GSIO under s. 94(1).

Order 84 r. 21(1) requires an application for leave to be made within three months of the date when grounds first arose. The application was therefore prima facie out of time for these 1 February decisions.

Order 84 r. 21(3) only allows an extension where:

1. there is “good and sufficient reason” to extend time; and
2. the failure to apply in time resulted from circumstances:
   • outside the applicant’s control; or
   • which could not reasonably have been anticipated.

Order 84 r. 21(5) requires an affidavit explicitly setting out reasons for failing to bring proceedings within time and for any subsequent delay.

Phelan J draws heavily on:

• M. O’S. v Residential Institutions Redress Board [2018] IESC 61;
• Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v HPRA [2022] IECA 109; and
• Winters v Legal Aid Board [2025] IECA 205.

These authorities stress that:

• the extension jurisdiction is strictly circumscribed and now wholly contained in Order 84 r. 21(3)–(7);
• the applicant must provide a sworn, reasoned explanation for delay, addressing both the three‑month period and any further lapse; and
• mere ongoing correspondence or attempts to persuade a decision-maker to reconsider do not of themselves amount to “good and sufficient reason”, still less to circumstances outside the applicant’s control or not reasonably anticipatable.

In this case:

• No separate, focused affidavit was sworn to apply for an extension in compliance with r. 21(5); reliance was instead placed on the fact that correspondence with GSOC continued into April 2024.
• The Court held that:
  • ongoing correspondence cannot re‑start the clock;
    and
  • hoping that GSOC might exercise a non‑statutory review power where none exists does not satisfy the requirement of circumstances beyond control or unforeseeable.

3.2.2 No reviewable “new” decision on 17 April 2024

The Applicant tried to treat GSOC’s letter of 17 April 2024, refusing to review the classification/allocation decision, as a fresh decision that would restart time. Phelan J rejected this approach:

• There is no statutory right to a review of the classification/allocation decision.
• GSOC’s letter simply confirmed its existing decision; it did not constitute a new, self-standing determination.
• To allow the Applicant to challenge the April letter would in substance permit a collateral attack on the February decisions, contrary to the time-limit regime.

The Court emphasised that litigants cannot extend time “by contrivance”, i.e. by inviting a public body to reconsider and then claiming that the refusal to reconsider is a fresh reviewable decision.

3.2.3 Lack of substantive grounds to quash the admissibility decision

An additional, and quite fundamental, point is that:

• The Applicant did not plead any legal defect in the admissibility decision; it was in fact favourable to him.
• His real motive in seeking to quash it was to try to escape the 2005 Act regime and bring his complaint within the new 2024 Act system (Fiosrú).

Phelan J held that:

• Without a pleaded and substantiated legal flaw in the admissibility decision, there is no basis for a quashing order – judicial review is not a mechanism to re-engineer the governing statutory regime for policy reasons.
• Given s. 228 of the 2024 Act, the 2005 Act continues to apply to complaints already admitted, unless that admissibility decision itself is invalidated.

This reasoning illustrates a key corollary: even if time had been extended, the relief of quashing the admissibility decision would have been futile in the absence of any pleaded unlawfulness. This futility strongly weighed against exercising the extension discretion.

3.3 Section 103 and the Duty to Keep Complainants Informed

3.3.1 The wording and statutory context

Section 103(1) provides that GSOC “shall provide” certain specified persons, including the complainant, with:

“sufficient information to keep them informed of the progress and results of an investigation under this Part.”

However, s. 103(2) expressly limits this duty: GSOC is not obliged to provide information where disclosure would:

• prejudice a criminal investigation or prosecution;
• jeopardise a person’s safety; or
• “for any other reason not be in the public interest”.

This dovetails with s. 81, which criminalises harmful disclosure of GSOC-held information and is designed to preserve the integrity and effectiveness of complaint investigations.

The Court interpreted s. 103(1) in close harmony with:

• s. 94(9): in unsupervised investigations, it is AGS, not GSOC, that must notify results to the complainant; and
• s. 93(2): which requires GSOC, when it discontinues an investigation, to notify the complainant and others of its decision and its reasons in writing.

3.3.2 The nature and extent of the duty

Phelan J held that:

• The duty under s. 103(1) is mandatory but limited. It obliges GSOC to keep the complainant minimally informed of:
  • key progress milestones (e.g. admissibility, allocation, appointment of a GSIO); and
  • the “results” of the investigation (e.g. discontinuance, discipline, or other outcome).
• It does not entail:
  • disclosure of the full investigation file;
  • disclosure of the GSIO’s report; or
  • furnishing detailed reasons beyond what is needed to understand, in general terms, why a decision was made.

The Court stressed that the Act itself distinguishes between:

• instances where reasons must be provided (e.g. s. 88 – reasons for inadmissibility; s. 93(2) – reasons for discontinuance); and
• the general duty under s. 103(1) to inform about “progress and results”, which does not expressly require reasons or reports.

It would therefore be inconsistent with the statutory structure to construe s. 103(1) as requiring disclosure of investigation reports or detailed analyses, especially given:

• the confidentiality obligations in s. 81; and
• the public interest carve-out in s. 103(2).

3.3.3 Application to this case

On the facts, GSOC:

• notified the Applicant of:
  • admissibility and referral for unsupervised investigation (1–2 February 2024);
  • appointment of a GSIO (19 February 2024); and
  • discontinuance and the broad reasons for it (18 June 2024).

Phelan J accepted GSOC’s evidence that:

• the investigation was completed within the 16-week timeframe, so no extension request arose;
• no further material events occurred that needed to be communicated to the complainant under s. 103(1); and
• it follows GSOC’s “universal practice” in s. 94 cases not to disclose GSIO reports, in order to protect investigative effectiveness and confidentiality – a practice justified under s. 81 and s. 103(2).

Accordingly, the s. 103 duty was fully met without furnishing the GSIO report.

3.4 Fair Procedures and the Limited Rights of Complainants

3.4.1 General framework: fairness is context-specific

The judgment reiterates the orthodox Irish position: fair procedures are not uniform. The content of fair procedures depends on:

• the nature of the decision;
• the statutory framework;
• the interests and rights at stake; and
• the potential consequences for the individual.

The Court cites authorities such as:

• O’Brien v Bord na Móna [1983] IR 255 (Finlay P) – the decision-maker must devise fair procedures consistent with constitutional justice where statute is silent;
• Murphy v GSOC & Ors [2021] IECA 26 – the design of the Garda complaints system is primarily for the Oireachtas, but whatever mechanism is chosen must operate fairly and in accordance with natural justice.

3.4.2 Complainant vs subject of complaint

Phelan J draws a sharp distinction between:

• the rights of a Garda member who is the subject of a complaint (and potentially facing disciplinary or criminal consequences); and
• the rights of the complainant, who is not in jeopardy but has an interest in having his or her complaint considered according to law.

In this she relies heavily on Lidl Ireland GmbH v Chartered Accountants Ireland [2021] IEHC 26, which addressed the procedural rights of a complainant in the disciplinary system of a professional body. In Lidl, Ferriter J held that:

• the complainant’s role is limited, particularly at preliminary and screening stages; and
• it is “as a matter of sensible legal policy” that complainants have no right to disclosure of all materials furnished by or on behalf of the person complained against, nor to make representations on them, nor to dictate how the disciplinary body investigates.

Applying that reasoning, Phelan J holds that:

• A complainant to GSOC/AGS does not have a right to:
  • control or supervise the investigation;
  • be consulted on every material development; or
  • receive investigation reports or interview statements.
• The complainant’s core entitlement is procedural: to have his complaint processed in accordance with the statutory scheme and the requirements of fairness appropriate to his limited role.

3.4.3 Burke and Sharpe distinguished

The Applicant invoked authorities such as:

• P. & F. Sharpe Ltd v Dublin City & Council Manager [1989] IR 701; and
• Burke v Minister for Education [2022] IESC 1.

Those cases concerned decisions adversely affecting individuals’ protected rights (e.g. property rights, constitutional rights to education), where there may be a duty to give notice of the “charge” against a person and an opportunity to respond. Charleton J in Burke spoke of “the minimum standard” of notice and hearing where a person’s rights are at stake and there is a public declaration of wrongdoing.

Phelan J holds these authorities inapplicable or only loosely analogous:

• Mr Quinn is not facing accusation or sanction; he is a complainant.
• The decision to discontinue under s. 93(1)(c) does not declare him at fault or adversely affect any substantive right beyond his limited statutory interest in the complaint process.
• Thus, the full apparatus of “charge and answer” (as in disciplinary or quasi-criminal settings) is not required.

3.4.4 Duty to give reasons for discontinuance

Although the complainant has no right to the GSIO report, s. 93(2) does entitle him to written reasons for GSOC’s decision to discontinue. The Court adopts a pragmatic standard, again following Lidl:

• Reasons need only:
  • allow the complainant to understand in broad terms why the decision was made; and
  • permit a court to assess lawfulness on judicial review.
• They need not be elaborate or discursive.

In Quinn’s case, the 18 June 2024 decision letter stated that:

• GSOC had considered the GSIO’s report and associated documentation;
• the threshold for a breach of discipline had not been met;
• AGS had in fact responded to his queries;
• there was no evidence that AGS had committed to give him copies of the two reports; and
• in any event, operational Garda reports would not be disclosed to members of the public as a matter of Garda procedure.

Phelan J held that these reasons were adequate for statutory and constitutional purposes.

3.5 Non-disclosure of GSIO Reports and Public Interest Privilege

A central practical question is whether GSOC must or should, as a matter of law, disclose GSIO reports to complainants.

GSOC’s position was that:

• its “universal practice” in s. 94 cases is not to disclose GSIO reports to complainants or others; and
• disclosure could jeopardise:
  • the effective functioning of GSOC in receiving and investigating complaints; and
  • the operational effectiveness of AGS.

It invoked s. 81 and s. 103(2), and relied also on McEvoy v GSOC [2015] IEHC 203, which recognised the public interest in preserving confidentiality in complaint investigations, including to encourage complainants and witnesses to come forward without fear of exposure.

Phelan J accepted and endorsed this position:

• Properly interpreted, s. 103(1) does not require disclosure of investigation reports.
• Sections 81 and 103(2) clearly indicate that sensitive investigative material is generally confidential and need not be disclosed where that would prejudice investigations or the public interest.
• GSOC’s non-disclosure practice is therefore an application of the statute, not an unlawful self‑imposed fetter on its powers.

This is significant. It effectively places GSIO reports in the category of material not ordinarily disclosable to complainants, and confirms public interest privilege in this context.

3.6 Application to the Facts

3.6.1 The factual morass and the Court’s need for clarity

The judgment devotes substantial space to reconstructing the Applicant’s long and multi-layered history of complaints to AGS, PSNI, politicians and GSOC. Phelan J:

• highlights the Applicant’s tendency to conflate:
  • his original 2015 fraud/money-laundering complaint (closed in 2018 and again in 2021); and
  • the later 2023 complaints about AGS’s failure to furnish him with reports and properly respond;
• notes his frequent introduction of sprawling, unsubstantiated allegations (corruption, collusion, “anti-American hate crime”, sex scandals, MI6 collusion, etc.) into correspondence about the more discrete issue of the two reports; and
• observes that this lack of focus made it more difficult for AGS, GSOC and the Court to identify the precise issues.

The Court emphasises that:

• the 2005 Act (s. 84) imposes a 12‑month time limit for complaints about Garda conduct, subject to limited extension grounds; and
• the 2018 decision not to pursue the original fraud allegations, and the 2021 review confirming that position, cannot themselves be re-litigated via the 2023 GSOC complaints about follow-up correspondence.

3.6.2 The Deely emails and the claimed “promise” of two reports

A key factual plank of the Applicant’s argument was that Supt. Deely had, in 2023 emails, “committed” to provide him with two investigation reports. Those emails were, however:

• not furnished to GSOC at the admissibility stage; and
• first exhibited in a replying affidavit in March 2025.

In substance, the emails said:

• that “a report” was being sought from relevant Assistant Commissioners;
• that the Superintendent would be “in contact” with the Applicant upon receipt of the report(s); and
• they did not say he would be given copies of the internal reports themselves.

AGS, through the Assistant Commissioner for Governance and Accountability, wrote to the Applicant’s solicitor on 28 February 2024:

• requesting the correspondence relied on as a “commitment” to provide reports;
• clarifying that “report” in Garda usage often means internal correspondence, not a formal investigative report; and
• stating that inquiries showed the Applicant had been told only that “a report” was being sought, not that copies of operational reports would be released.

The Applicant chose not to respond to this letter or provide the emails, later asserting (only in a supplemental affidavit after the hearing) that he feared it might be construed as interfering with an ongoing GSOC investigation. Phelan J found this explanation unconvincing and inconsistent with other correspondence where his solicitor responded to AGS after GSOC had admitted the complaint.

Thus:

• GSOC had, via the GSIO report, access to:
  • the fact that such correspondence existed; and
  • AGS’s accurate account that it referred only to an internal report being sought and future contact, not a promise to supply copies.
• Even if the full emails had been furnished, they would only have reinforced AGS’s and GSOC’s interpretation: they did not amount to a binding commitment to release operational reports.

3.6.3 Could pre‑discontinuance notice have altered the outcome?

Even on the assumption (contrary to the Court’s primary view) that fairness might sometimes require pre‑decision consultation where a discontinuance is based on a new factual element unknown to a complainant, Phelan J asks a pragmatic question: would such consultation have mattered here?

Her answer is no, for several reasons:

• The Applicant:
  • knew of the AGS decisions in 2018 and 2021 not to proceed with his original complaint;
  • knew he had declined to provide detailed statements of complaint when invited; and
  • had been explicitly invited to clarify the alleged commitment about “two reports” but refused to do so.
• These were precisely the factual elements summarised in the GSOC consideration document and alluded to in the discontinuance decision letter.
• The only additional information he could have offered was the Deely emails; but their content did not substantively alter the case.
• Moreover, it is clearly established that “it would not be Garda procedure to disclose operational Garda reports to members of the public”. Even if an officer had mistakenly suggested otherwise, failure to follow through on such a misunderstanding would not, in context, amount to a breach of discipline justifying further investigation.

Accordingly, there was no actual prejudice or unfairness arising from GSOC’s failure to share the GSIO report or to invite submissions on it prior to discontinuance.

3.6.4 Repeated complaints and “exaggerated standards”

Finally, the Court emphasises that complaint mechanisms should not be exploited to impose “exaggerated standards” on public bodies in dealing with serial or repetitive grievances. Where decisions have been clearly communicated, authorities are not required to:

• re-open the substantive merits each time a disappointed complainant writes again; or
• issue fresh, detailed explanations on every occasion.

Past communications (here, the 2018 and 2021 decisions not to prosecute, and the 2023 and 2024 correspondence) can fairly be relied upon as answering later, essentially repetitive complaints.

4. Precedents and Authorities Cited

4.1 Time Limits and Extensions

• M. O’S. v Residential Institutions Redress Board [2018] IESC 61
  – The Supreme Court stressed that extension of time is a discretionary jurisdiction requiring the applicant to satisfy the court of the reasons why the application was not brought within time and during any subsequent period.
• Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v HPRA [2022] IECA 109 (Murray J)
  – Clarified that Order 84 r. 21 places a positive obligation on an applicant to identify on oath the reasons for failing to apply in time.
• Winters v Legal Aid Board & Ors [2025] IECA 205 (Hyland J)
  – Confirmed that Order 84 r. 21(3)–(7) now comprises a complete code for extending time, including criteria, procedure and the relevance of third-party impacts.

4.2 Garda Complaints Framework

• Murphy v GSOC & Ors [2021] IECA 26
  – The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality and validity of the 2005 Act’s complaints regime, emphasising that:
  • the structure and allocation of investigative responsibilities between GSOC and AGS are policy choices for the Oireachtas; and
  • unless the statute is itself challenged, courts will not recast that balance on grounds of perceived ineffectiveness or lack of independence.
  Phelan J leans on Murphy to reject any implicit suggestion that unsupervised s. 94 investigations are inherently inadequate or unfair.
• McEvoy v GSOC [2015] IEHC 203
  – Recognised the public interest in confidentiality of GSOC investigations and the potential for public interest privilege to protect investigative material from disclosure, even to parties involved.
• Flood v Garda Síochána Complaints Board [1999] IESC 56, [1999] 4 IR 560; and older cases such as McCormack
  – Previously indicated a very limited duty to give reasons in Garda complaints contexts. Phelan J notes that more recent jurisprudence on reasons-giving has developed, but that even under the modern approach, only modest reasons are required in contexts such as this.

4.3 Fair Procedures and Complainants’ Rights

• O’Brien v Bord na Móna [1983] IR 255
  – Established that, where legislation is silent, decision-makers must devise and follow fair procedures consistent with constitutional justice.
• Lidl Ireland GmbH v Chartered Accountants Ireland [2021] IEHC 26
  – A foundational authority on the limited role and rights of complainants in disciplinary regimes. It holds that:
  • complainants are not entitled to full disclosure of all evidence and submissions; and
  • disciplinary bodies may decide whether to seek further information from complainants without being required to do so.
  This case is central to Phelan J’s reasoning in limiting Mr Quinn’s entitlements.
• Burke v Minister for Education [2022] IESC 1; P. & F. Sharpe Ltd v Dublin City & Council Manager [1989] IR 701
  – Both cited by the Applicant but distinguished, as they concern persons whose substantive rights are directly affected and where a “charge and answer” model of fairness may be required, unlike the present complainant context.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Judicial Review Time Limits (Order 84)

In simple terms, if you want to challenge a public law decision (like a GSOC decision) by judicial review:

• You normally have three months from when the decision is made and notified.
• If you miss this window, you must:
  • swear an affidavit explaining precisely why you were late – both during the original three months and afterwards; and
  • show:
    • “good and sufficient reason” to extend time; and
    • that the reasons for delay were outside your control or could not reasonably have been anticipated.
• Simply writing letters hoping the body will change its mind does not usually stop the clock.

5.2 Supervised vs Unsupervised GSOC Investigations

Under the 2005 Act, once GSOC admits a complaint it decides how it should be investigated:

• Supervised investigation (s. 94(3)–(6)):
  • AGS conducts the investigation, but GSOC “supervises” it.
  • GSOC can:
    • approve the investigating officer;
    • require updates and interim reports;
    • attend interviews; and
    • direct further investigative steps.
  • The GSIO must send a report to GSOC.
• Unsupervised investigation (s. 94(1) & (9)):
  • AGS alone is responsible for investigating under the Discipline Regulations.
  • GSOC does not oversee the day‑to‑day work.
  • At the end, the Garda Commissioner must inform GSOC, the complainant and the Garda member of the outcome and any action taken.
  • There is no statutory requirement that a detailed report ever be sent to GSOC or the complainant.

In Quinn’s case the investigation was unsupervised, so GSOC’s role and his entitlements were more limited.

5.3 What does “fair procedures” mean for a complainant?

“Fair procedures” is a flexible concept. For a complainant in a Garda disciplinary process, it means:

• the complaint is properly recorded and considered in line with the statute;
• the complainant is kept informed in basic terms of:
  • whether the complaint is admissible;
  • what form of investigation will take place; and
  • what the outcome is and why, in general terms.
• the complainant may be asked for information or clarification.

It does not typically mean:

• a right to see all evidence gathered;
• a right to comment on every piece of information;
• a right to the investigator’s report; or
• a right to prevent the disciplinary body from discontinuing without first inviting submissions.

5.4 Public Interest Privilege and Confidentiality

“Public interest privilege” refers to the principle that some information in the hands of public bodies should remain confidential because disclosure would harm the public interest. In the GSOC/Garda context, this may include:

• witness statements;
• internal reports about Garda operations; and
• investigative strategies.

The 2005 Act codifies aspects of this via:

• s. 81: makes harmful disclosure of GSOC information a criminal offence; and
• s. 103(2): states GSOC is not required to give information where that would prejudice a criminal investigation, jeopardise safety, or otherwise be against the public interest.

This underpins GSOC’s lawful refusal to disclose GSIO reports as a matter of standard practice.

6. Impact and Significance

6.1 For GSOC (and Fiosrú)

Although the 2005 Act has been repealed by the 2024 Act, Quinn will still have practical significance for:

• cases falling within the transitional regime of s. 228 of the 2024 Act; and
• future interpretation of similar duties that may be imposed on Fiosrú or other oversight bodies regarding:
  • how much information must be provided to complainants; and
  • how to reconcile transparency with confidentiality and investigative effectiveness.

The judgment gives clear comfort that:

• a policy of non-disclosing internal investigation reports to complainants is compatible with fairness, provided that:
  • complainants are told the key milestones and outcome; and
  • succinct reasons for discontinuance are given.

6.2 For complainants and their advisers

The case serves as a cautionary tale in three respects:

1. Time limits are unforgiving. If a complainant wishes to challenge:
   • an admissibility decision; or
   • the classification/allocation of a complaint (e.g. supervised vs unsupervised investigation);
   proceedings must be issued within three months. Ongoing correspondence or attempts to secure a non‑statutory review will not extend time.
2. Complainants’ rights are inherently limited. They should not expect:
   • to see GSIO reports;
   • to be consulted on whether an investigation should be discontinued; or
   • to re-open the merits of historic investigations via complaints about later correspondence.
3. Full and timely cooperation is essential. If a complainant holds documents they consider important (as with the Deely emails), they must proactively provide them when asked. Withholding them and then alleging that a decision was taken on incomplete information is unlikely to succeed.

6.3 For judicial review practice

The judgment reinforces several trends in Irish judicial review:

• a strict insistence on compliance with Order 84 time limits and the mandatory affidavit-based explanation for delay;
• a reluctance to allow collateral challenges to out-of-time decisions by dressing refusals to reconsider as fresh decisions; and
• a recognition that courts will not re-design or second-guess the legislature’s chosen structure for police oversight absent a direct constitutional challenge to the statute.

7. Conclusion

Quinn v Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission is a significant High Court judgment that crystallises three key principles in Irish law on police oversight:

1. The duty under s. 103 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 is modest. GSOC must keep complainants generally informed of the progress and outcome of investigations, but:
   • is not obliged to disclose GSIO reports; and
   • need only provide brief, intelligible reasons for discontinuance.
2. Complainants in Garda disciplinary processes have limited procedural rights. They are not in the same position as persons facing disciplinary or criminal sanction; they do not enjoy full rights of participation, disclosure and response. Their core entitlement is to a process that operates lawfully and fairly within the statutory framework.
3. Judicial review of GSOC decisions is tightly time-bound and narrowly focused. Applicants must:
   • challenge key decisions (admissibility, allocation) within three months;
   • clearly plead legal defects in those decisions; and
   • cannot circumvent time limits via collateral attacks on refusals to reconsider.

On the facts, the Court found that:

• the challenges to the February 2024 decisions were out of time and unsupported by any pleaded legal error;
• the June 2024 decision to discontinue complied with s. 93 and s. 103 and met the requirements of fair procedures; and
• the alleged new evidence (the Deely emails) would not, and could not, have altered the lawful outcome of the process.

Accordingly, all relief was refused and the proceedings dismissed. The judgment provides clear, authoritative guidance on the boundaries of complainant participation in Garda disciplinary investigations and the balance between transparency and confidentiality in the operation of police oversight mechanisms in Ireland.