Pysz v An Garda Síochána [2025] IEHC 698:
Good‑Faith Immunity, Public‑Place Seizures, and Evidentiary Thresholds for Allegations of Discriminatory Policing

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the High Court decision in Pysz v An Garda Síochána ([2025] IEHC 698), an ex tempore judgment delivered by Gillane J on 4 December 2025 on appeal from the Circuit Court.

The case arises from the seizure and subsequent destruction of a van purchased by the plaintiff, Mr. Tomasz Pysz, a Polish national, and his claim that the seizure constituted:

“Theft of a vehicle from a private property”
“Destruction of property”
“Discrimination” (alleged racism)

At its core, the judgment addresses three key legal questions:

Whether the seizure of an untaxed and uninsured vehicle in a residential car park was lawful under s. 41 of the Road Traffic Act 1994.
Whether An Garda Síochána (and the contractors they engaged) were negligent in the detention and ultimate disposal (crushing) of the vehicle, such that they could be civilly liable in damages.
Whether the circumstances gave rise to a viable claim of discrimination and/or racism against the plaintiff.

The decision is significant for its clear reaffirmation of:

the scope of Garda powers under s. 41 of the Road Traffic Act 1994,
the protective “good faith and without negligence” immunity in s. 41(5),
the designation of a residential car park as a “public place” for traffic law purposes, and
the evidentiary threshold for serious allegations of discriminatory or racist conduct by State agents.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Factual Background

The essential facts, as found or accepted by the Court, can be summarised as follows:

In October 2022, Mr. Pysz purchased a van (registration number 09D26970) for approximately €2,000.
He had not yet registered himself as the owner with the licensing authority; the previous owner remained the registered owner on the official records.
On 16 October 2022, the van was parked in a residential car park at Archers/Arthurs Wood, Blanchardstown, Dublin 15.
That same day, the plaintiff discovered the van was missing and reported what he believed to be a theft to An Garda Síochána.
The Gardaí initially opened a theft investigation and the Garda Victim Service wrote to the plaintiff on 17 October 2022 confirming that the matter was being investigated.
It quickly emerged from Garda records that the van had not been stolen but lawfully seized earlier that day by Garda David Carson under s. 41 of the Road Traffic Act 1994 because it was neither taxed nor insured, and this was apparent from the absence of displayed tax and insurance discs.
The van was removed by Gannons City Recovery to their compound in Donabate.
In line with their processes, Gannons sent written notices about seizure, storage, and possible destruction to the registered owner, i.e. the previous owner, and no response was received and no letters were returned.
After the expiry of the statutory period, the vehicle was crushed.

The plaintiff’s case was that:

the seizure constituted a wrongful taking (“theft”) from private property;
the demolition of the van was the result of negligence by An Garda Síochána and/or their agents; and
the decision to seize his van, but allegedly not another uninsured vehicle nearby, was the product of discrimination and/or racism against him as a Polish national.

The defendant (An Garda Síochána) denied any wrongdoing and relied upon:

the statutory authority to seize untaxed and uninsured vehicles in a “public place” under s. 41 RTA 1994,
compliance with the statutory disposal procedures, and
the immunity provided by s. 41(5) where actions are taken in good faith and without negligence.

2.2 Evidence before the High Court

The matter proceeded as a full oral hearing on Circuit Appeal. The plaintiff appeared as a litigant in person. The Court heard:

Oral evidence from the plaintiff, who was cross‑examined by counsel for the defendant.
Evidence from:
- Garda David Carson (who seized the van),
- Garda Craig McConnell (who dealt with the theft report and updated the plaintiff), and
- Mr Michael Gormley (administration staff at Gannons City Recovery).
Evidence from a witness called by the plaintiff, Mr Lukasz Waliszewski, who testified about an entirely separate incident involving alleged Garda misconduct against him personally. The Court found that this was irrelevant and disregarded it.

A key evidential dispute concerned what was said in a phone call from Garda McConnell to the plaintiff after it was discovered that the “stolen” van had actually been seized and impounded.

2.3 Findings and Decision

The High Court made the following key findings:

Lawful seizure under the Road Traffic Act 1994:
- The van was untaxed and uninsured at the time of seizure, a fact that was common case.
- The location of the van, though part of a residential development, was a public place within the statutory meaning (as per s. 49 RTA 1994) because it was a place to which the public have access with vehicles, whether as of right or by permission, and whether for payment or free.
- Accordingly, Garda Carson lawfully seized the vehicle pursuant to s. 41 RTA 1994. He was unaware of the identity or nationality of the owner; he was “oblivious” to those matters and was simply performing his statutory function. The Court accepted this evidence.
No negligence and applicability of statutory immunity:
- The subsequent storage and eventual disposal of the vehicle followed the statutory framework, including written notices to the registered owner and observance of the statutory waiting periods before disposal.
- Section 41(5) RTA 1994 provides that “No action shall lie in respect of anything done in good faith and without negligence” in the detention, removal, storage, release or disposal of a vehicle under that section.
- The Court found no negligence on the part of the Gardaí in the seizure, storage, or disposal process and determined that all relevant acts had been done in good faith.
- Consequently, no civil cause of action lay in respect of the seizure or destruction of the vehicle.
No proof of discrimination or racism:
- The Court acknowledged that if discrimination or racism by State officials were proven, it would be “odious” and “abhorrent”.
- However, it stressed that such allegations are serious and can be “ugly” when made without evidential foundation.
- The Court accepted Garda Carson’s evidence that he did not know who owned the van, and therefore could not have been motivated by the plaintiff’s nationality.
- The alleged presence of another uninsured vehicle nearby, not seized, was unsupported by reliable evidence and, in any event, could not objectively establish racist motivation.
- No evidence suggested that any actions of Garda McConnell or others were tainted by discriminatory intent.
Outcome:
- The High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim in its entirety.

3. Legal and Factual Analysis

3.1 The Core Issues Before the Court

From the judgment, the following core legal issues can be distilled:

Was the seizure of the van lawful?
This turned on whether:
- the statutory conditions for seizure under s. 41 RTA 1994 were met (notably that the vehicle was untaxed and uninsured in a public place), and
- the location of the vehicle — a residential car park — fell within the statutory definition of a “public place”.
Did the Gardaí (and/or their agents) act negligently in the seizure, storage, or destruction of the vehicle?
This encompassed:
- whether there was a breach of any duty owed to the plaintiff in the execution of the seizure and disposal process;
- whether any statutory procedure was misapplied or ignored; and
- whether the statutory immunity in s. 41(5) applied.
Did the acts or omissions of the Gardaí amount to unlawful discrimination or racism?
This required the Court to examine:
- what factual basis, if any, supported an inference that the plaintiff was treated differently because of his Polish nationality; and
- whether the plaintiff’s anecdotal comparison with another vehicle was enough to sustain a discrimination claim.

3.2 Statutory Framework: Road Traffic Act 1994

3.2.1 Section 41 – Seizure of Vehicles

Section 41 of the Road Traffic Act 1994 empowers the Gardaí to detain and remove vehicles in specified circumstances, including where:

a vehicle is used in a public place without valid motor tax or insurance, and
those defects are apparent or can be ascertained by the Garda in the course of his or her functions.

In this case, it was common case that:

the van had no tax or insurance at the material time; and
this was evident from the absence of tax and insurance discs.

Accordingly, the statutory preconditions for seizure were plainly satisfied.

3.2.2 “Public Place” – Section 49 Definition

The judgment explicitly references the definition of “public place” contained in s. 49 RTA 1994. While s. 49 primarily concerns drink‑driving offences, its definition of “public place” is often applied across the Act:

“…including a place to which the public have access with vehicles, whether as of right or by permission, and whether subject to or free of charge.”

Gillane J adopts this expansive statutory meaning and applies it to the residential car park in Archers/Arthurs Wood:

The car park was accessible to residents and, crucially, to the public with vehicles by permission (e.g., as guests, visitors, contractors).
Ownership of the land (private versus public) is not decisive; the key test is public access with vehicles.
The Court explicitly rejects the plaintiff’s characterisation of the area as “private” so as to exclude Garda jurisdiction, noting that the point was not ultimately pressed and in any event could not succeed.

This confirms and reinforces the proposition that multi‑unit residential car parks can, and frequently will, constitute “public places” for the purposes of traffic enforcement, including vehicle seizure powers.

3.2.3 Disposal of Vehicles and Notice Requirements

The 1994 Act further provides that:

a vehicle detained under s. 41 shall not be disposed of for a specified minimum period after its seizure, and
there must be notice of intended disposal given in the prescribed manner to the registered owner.

The judgment summarises the key rule:

“The 1994 Act provides that a vehicle shall not be disposed of before the expiration of a period of three weeks from the date of its detention, or two weeks after notice of the intended disposal has been given in the prescribed manner.” (para. 18)

Gannons City Recovery, acting as the Garda‑engaged contractor:

sent notices about seizure, storage and potential destruction to the registered owner of the van;
received no reply, and the letters were not returned undelivered; and
after the stipulated statutory period, the vehicle was crushed.

A critical factual feature is that the plaintiff had not yet registered himself as owner; the seller remained the registered owner. The statute directs notice to the registered owner, not any unregistered purchaser. The High Court considered this situation to be “unfortunate” but not unlawful.

3.2.4 Section 41(5) – Good Faith Immunity

Section 41(5) states:

“No action shall lie in respect of anything done in good faith and without negligence in the course of the detention, removal, storage, release or disposal of a vehicle under this section.”

This is a crucial immunising provision. It does not give absolute immunity; rather, it protects only those acts done:

in good faith – honestly, for the statutory purpose, without ulterior or improper motive; and
without negligence – in compliance with the standard of reasonable care in the circumstances, including adherence to statutory procedures.

The High Court held that:

Garda Carson’s decision to seize was taken in good faith and on an objectively lawful basis: an untaxed and uninsured vehicle in a public place.
There was no negligence in the seizure process, nor in the subsequent notification and disposal steps as administered by Gannons.
Hence, s. 41(5) barred any civil liability for the detention, storage or destruction of the van.

3.3 Evaluation of Negligence

Although the judge does not explicitly set out the classical elements of negligence (duty, breach, causation, loss), his reasoning effectively tracks that framework:

Duty of care – It is accepted that the Gardaí owe a duty to act lawfully, reasonably, and with due care when exercising their statutory powers and handling private property.
Breach – The Court finds no breach:
- The seizure was squarely within the power conferred by s. 41 RTA 1994.
- The place of seizure was properly regarded as a public place.
- The procedure for disposal, including written notice to the registered owner and observation of the statutory waiting period, was followed.
- Garda McConnell took the additional step of contacting the plaintiff personally, because he had made the theft report, and informed him that the van was in Gannons and could be crushed after the three‑week period. The Court accepts this version of events.
Causation and damage – While the plaintiff did suffer loss through the destruction of his van, that loss did not flow from any wrongful act by the defendant. It arose “under unfortunate circumstances” where:
- he had not registered himself as the owner and so did not receive formal notices, and
- no response ever came from the registered owner.

Given the absence of breach and the operation of s. 41(5), the negligence claim could not succeed.

3.4 Findings on Discrimination and Racism

The plaintiff’s claim of discrimination/racism was central to his narrative, but legally it was very weak. Gillane J handles this aspect in a balanced but firm manner.

3.4.1 The Plaintiff’s Position

When asked to articulate the basis of his discrimination claim, the plaintiff’s core contentions were:

he is a Polish national; and
another uninsured vehicle allegedly parked near his van was not seized, which he said indicated discriminatory treatment.

He evidently inferred that, because he is foreign and his vehicle was seized (whereas another allegedly non‑compliant vehicle was not), the Gardaí must have been acting out of racism.

3.4.2 The Court’s Approach

The Court makes several important points:

Condemnation of racism if proven:
Gillane J explicitly states that any act of discrimination or racism by a State official would be “odious” and “abhorrent”. This affirms, at a high level of principle, the gravity with which the courts view such misconduct.
Need for evidential foundation:
The judge then states that the charge of discrimination/racism “can be an ugly allegation where it is not founded in evidence” (para. 33). This is a strong reminder that:
- serious accusations against public officials must be grounded in concrete, credible evidence; and
- mere assertion, suspicion, or anecdotal comparison is insufficient.
No evidence of discriminatory motive:
The Court finds:
- Garda Carson was “completely oblivious” to the nationality or identity of the owner when seizing the van;
- his actions were based solely on the objective fact that the van was untaxed and uninsured in a public place; and
- there is “nothing to support” any inference that Garda McConnell’s subsequent actions were racially motivated.
Alleged comparator vehicle:
The plaintiff referred to another allegedly uninsured vehicle not being seized. However:
- Garda Carson had no recollection of such a vehicle;
- no evidence was adduced establishing its insurance/tax status; and
- even if another vehicle were missed or not acted on, that would not of itself prove racial motivation, as opposed to (for example) oversight or a different assessment.

The Court therefore categorically rejects the discrimination claim. This part of the judgment sends a clear signal: serious allegations of racist policing require cogent evidence and will not be sustained on speculative or unsubstantiated assertions alone.

3.5 Credibility and the Phone Call Evidence

An important aspect of the reasoning relates to the contested phone call between Garda McConnell and the plaintiff.

Garda McConnell’s evidence: he telephoned the plaintiff, informed him that the van had been seized and was being held by Gannons, and explicitly told him that it could be crushed after three weeks.
The plaintiff’s evidence: he accepted that a phone call took place and accepted that Gannons “may have been mentioned”, but denied being told about the three‑week period and otherwise had an imperfect recollection.

The Court prefers McConnell’s version, reasoning that the very purpose of the phone call was to alert the plaintiff to:

the fact and location of the seizure; and
the need to take specific steps to recover the van within a certain time.

Gillane J notes that it would “make little sense” for the Garda to phone the plaintiff for that purpose and then withhold the crucial information about time limits. This is a classic application of common‑sense probability and purposive reasoning in resolving evidential conflicts.

Once McConnell’s evidence is accepted, the plaintiff’s negligence claim further weakens: he had personal, direct information that:

his van was in Gannons’ compound; and
there was a finite time window before it could be destroyed.

If he failed to act on that information, the loss of the van cannot fairly be laid at the defendant’s door.

3.6 Relevance and Exclusion of Collateral Evidence

The plaintiff called a witness, Mr Lukasz Waliszewski, who testified that he had sued Ireland over an incident where he alleged that members of An Garda Síochána had attacked him at his home. This evidence:

did not relate to the plaintiff’s van,
did not involve the Gardaí or events in issue in this case, and
had no bearing on the specific lawfulness or motivation of the seizure at Archers/Arthurs Wood.

The Court therefore regarded it as irrelevant and disregarded it. This illustrates the fundamental rule of relevance in evidence: that only facts logically connected to the issues to be decided should influence the outcome.

4. Precedents and Broader Jurisprudence

4.1 Precedents Cited in the Judgment

This was an ex tempore High Court judgment delivered orally and then transcribed. As is typical for short ex tempore decisions, it does not cite previous case law or authorities by name. The Court instead resolves the case by direct application of:

the text of the Road Traffic Act 1994 (especially s. 41 and the s. 49 definition of “public place”), and
general principles of negligence and evidentiary evaluation.

There are therefore no explicit judicial precedents cited in the text of the judgment.

4.2 Fit Within Existing Legal Principles

Even without explicit case citations, the judgment is clearly grounded in well‑established principles:

Statutory police powers: Courts have long recognised that where statute confers precise powers on the Gardaí to act in specified circumstances (here, s. 41 concerning vehicles in public places without tax/insurance), the court’s task is primarily to determine whether those statutory conditions were met and whether the powers were exercised lawfully and in good faith.
Public place doctrine: Irish and other common‑law courts frequently hold that private ownership does not preclude an area from being a public place if the public has access by right or permission (e.g., car parks for customers, residents and visitors).
Negligence of public authorities: State entities may be liable in negligence if they act outside their powers or without reasonable care, but statutory immunities (such as s. 41(5)) can limit or exclude such liability where officials act in good faith and without negligence.
Discrimination claims: Whether framed constitutionally, under equality legislation, or in tort, discrimination claims require evidence establishing that the reason for differential treatment was a protected characteristic (e.g. race or nationality). Bare allegations, personal suspicion, or anecdotal comparators are insufficient.

From this perspective, Pysz is not a radical departure or a novel construction; it is an orthodox application of existing principles to a specific fact pattern. Its importance lies in the clarity with which it articulates those principles in a high‑visibility context (seizure and destruction of a private vehicle) and links them explicitly to the good‑faith immunity framework.

5. Impact and Significance

5.1 Implications for Garda Practice and Vehicle Seizure

The judgment has several practical implications for policing and vehicle enforcement:

Confirmation of powers in residential developments:
Gardaí can confidently rely on s. 41 to seize untaxed/uninsured vehicles located in residential car parks, provided those areas are open to public vehicular access (even if only by permission). This is likely to be cited in future as authority that such locations are “public places” for road traffic law purposes.
Emphasis on procedure and documentation:
Recovery companies and Garda stations should continue to:
- record seizure details carefully,
- document that notices are sent to the registered owner at the correct address, and
- keep clear records of non‑responses and disposal dates.
Where these procedures are followed, s. 41(5) offers robust protection against civil claims.
Communication with complainants:
The Court viewed Garda McConnell’s phone call to the plaintiff favourably. While not necessarily a formal legal requirement, this type of proactive communication:
- helps ensure fairness to those who, although not registered owners, have an obvious interest in the vehicle, and
- can help demonstrate “good faith” in any subsequent litigation.

5.2 Implications for Vehicle Purchasers and Owners

For members of the public, the case highlights several important lessons:

Prompt registration of ownership:
A purchaser who fails to register promptly as the vehicle’s owner runs significant risks. Statutory notices will go to the registered owner, and if that person does not respond, the vehicle may be lawfully destroyed without the purchaser ever receiving written notice.
Maintain tax and insurance:
Parking an untaxed and uninsured vehicle, even in a residential complex, does not shield it from enforcement. If the area is a “public place” within the statutory meaning, seizure is a lawful and foreseeable consequence.
Act promptly on information:
If notified (whether by letter or phone call) that a vehicle has been impounded, an owner or user must act quickly. Delay may result in lawful disposal, and any loss may be legally irrecoverable.

5.3 Implications for Discrimination / Racism Claims Against State Authorities

The judgment also sends a broader message about the litigation of equality and racism claims:

Allegations must be evidence‑based:
Courts will take allegations of racist or discriminatory policing very seriously, but they will also insist on:
- Specific facts supporting the inference of discrimination;
- Objective indicators that race or nationality was a material factor in the decision; and
- Some reliable comparator or pattern, rather than a single uncorroborated anecdote.
Inferences cannot be drawn from bare suspicion:
The fact that a person is foreign and has suffered an adverse decision by authorities does not, without more, give rise to a presumption of discrimination.
Relevance of collateral misconduct allegations:
Evidence of alleged misconduct towards other persons in unrelated incidents will not ordinarily be admissible or persuasive in proving discrimination in a specific case unless clear legal and factual links can be shown.

While this may make it harder for some discrimination claims to succeed, it also preserves fairness to public officials and ensures that such grave allegations are reserved for cases with a solid evidentiary basis.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

To aid non‑lawyers and students, several key legal concepts appearing in the judgment are explained below.

6.1 “Public Place”

A “public place” in road traffic law does not mean land owned by the State. Instead, it asks:

Can members of the public drive vehicles there, either as of right or with permission?

Examples of public places:

Public roads and streets;
Shopping centre or supermarket car parks;
Car parks in residential developments where residents and visitors can drive in;
Petrol stations.

So even if a car park is on private land, it is usually a “public place” for traffic offences and vehicle seizure if visitors and residents can access it in vehicles.

6.2 Section 41 Seizure

Section 41 of the Road Traffic Act 1994 allows Gardaí to:

detain (seize) and remove a vehicle from a public place
if certain conditions are met – for example:
- no valid insurance,
- no valid motor tax, or
- other specified offences.

Once seized, the vehicle is taken to a compound. To get it back, the owner usually must:

pay fees;
provide proof of insurance, tax etc.; and
comply with any other statutory conditions.

6.3 Registered Owner vs Actual (Beneficial) Owner

The registered owner is the person whose name appears in the official vehicle registration records and logbook. The actual or beneficial owner is the person who has paid for and uses the vehicle. Ideally, they are the same person, but not always.

In this case:

The plaintiff was the beneficial owner (he had bought and used the van);
The previous owner remained the registered owner (because registration was not updated).

Many statutory procedures (notices of seizure, tax demands etc.) are directed to the registered owner. If you are the beneficial owner but fail to register, you may miss important notices – as happened here.

6.4 “Good Faith and Without Negligence”

“Good faith” means:

acting honestly;
for the proper statutory purpose; and
without improper motive or malice.

“Without negligence” means:

taking reasonable care in the circumstances;
following the law and prescribed procedures; and
not acting carelessly or recklessly.

Under s. 41(5), if the Gardaí and their agents act in good faith and without negligence when detaining or disposing of a vehicle, they cannot be sued for those actions.

6.5 “Balance of Probabilities”

This is the standard of proof in civil cases. A fact is proven “on the balance of probabilities” if it is more likely than not to be true.

When the judge prefers one witness’s account over another, it is because, in light of all the evidence and common sense, that account seems more likely to be correct.

6.6 Ex Tempore Judgment

An ex tempore judgment is one given orally by the judge at the end of the hearing, rather than reserved and issued in writing at a later date. It is often:

shorter and more focused on the specific case facts;
less likely to contain extensive discussion of authorities or theory; and
still fully binding as a High Court decision.

7. Conclusion

Pysz v An Garda Síochána [2025] IEHC 698 is an illustrative and practically important High Court decision that clarifies several interrelated points of Irish law:

Lawful seizures in residential car parks:
Residential car parks can be “public places” for road traffic law purposes where the public have vehicular access by permission. Untaxed and uninsured vehicles parked there may lawfully be seized under s. 41 RTA 1994.
Protective scope of s. 41(5) immunity:
Where Gardaí and their agents act in good faith and without negligence in the detention, storage and disposal of vehicles, s. 41(5) bars civil proceedings in respect of those acts.
Importance of registration and prompt action by owners:
Purchasers who fail to register themselves as owners risk missing statutory notices, and late or no action may result in lawful destruction of their property, without legal recourse against the authorities.
Evidentiary threshold for discrimination/racism allegations:
While the Court strongly condemns racism if it occurs, it equally insists that such allegations must rest on a firm evidential base. Bare assertions, personal suspicion, or a single anecdotal comparator do not suffice.

The judgment is thus a clear reaffirmation of existing law rather than a revolutionary development, but it has real practical resonance in three domains:

day‑to‑day Garda enforcement of vehicle compliance in residential and quasi‑private spaces,
the civil liability risk (or lack thereof) for good‑faith execution of statutory seizure and disposal powers, and
the careful, evidence‑driven manner in which Irish courts will approach serious allegations of discriminatory policing.

For legal practitioners, enforcement authorities, and vehicle owners alike, Pysz serves as a succinct but authoritative statement on the interplay between statutory powers, civil liability, and the demands of evidential rigour in discrimination claims.

Pysz v An Garda Síochána [2025] IEHC 698: Good‑Faith Immunity, Public‑Place Seizures, and Evidentiary Thresholds for Allegations of Discriminatory Policing