Principles for Amending Judicial Review Pleadings and GDPR Obligations in Disciplinary Inquiries

Introduction

In Wales v Solicitors' Disciplinary Committee & Anor [2025] IEHC 281, the High Court of Ireland (Barr J.) addressed a solicitor’s application to amend his judicial review grounds in order to challenge the validity of service, alleged procedural irregularities, and an alleged breach of data‐protection law (GDPR) arising from a professional‐misconduct inquiry. The applicant, Matthew Wales, sought to prohibit the Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) from resuming its inquiry, contending defects in service of documents, excessive delay, breaches of natural and constitutional justice, ultra vires conduct, and—by way of new amendment—violations of GDPR. The Law Society of Ireland and the SDT resisted, invoking inordinate delay and arguing that many proposed grounds were new causes of action or were already known to the applicant.

Key issues:

Which principles govern amendment of pleadings in judicial review (Order 84, Rules 20 & 23)?
How do the Keegan test and subsequent authorities apply?
Is there an arguable GDPR breach when a prosecutor’s representative informs the tribunal registrar of a respondent’s whereabouts for service?
How should the court balance delay, prejudice, and the interests of justice?

Summary of the Judgment

Barr J. reviewed the applicant’s proposed amendments to his statement of grounds, applying the three‐stage test from Keegan v Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission [2012] 2 IR 570 and subsequent cases (BW, Habte, Northwest Meath Turbine, Copymoore, O’Brien). The test asks:

Is the new ground prima facie arguable?
Has the applicant given a sufficient explanation for its late introduction?
Would the amendment cause irremediable prejudice or derail the interests of justice?

The court allowed amendments that:

Pleaded a GDPR‐based argument (information imparted to effect service of documents).
Clarified and expanded existing grounds on delay, ultra vires conduct, breaches of natural and constitutional justice.
Added one new ground on delay by the Law Society paralleling the existing ground against the SDT.

The court refused amendments that:

Introduced wholly new causes of action (e.g. alleged duress to Mrs Wales during the Tribunal hearing).
Repeated matters already known to the applicant in mid‐2019 without explanation for five years’ delay.
Sought vague new reliefs (contempt, breach of confidence).

Directions were given for delivery of the amended pleadings, any further opposition, and submissions on costs.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court’s decision turned on the evolution of judicial discretion to amend review pleadings:

Keegan v Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission [2012] 2 IR 570 – established the three‐stage test for amendment: arguability, explanation, prejudice/interests of justice.
BW v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 725 (upheld IECA 2017) – restated Keegan test; emphasised no irremediable prejudice.
Habte v Minister for Justice [2019] IEHC 47 – reinforced “interests of justice” as overriding.
Northwest Meath Turbine Action Group v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 126 – held that a substantially new case requires a more stringent approach; minor enlargements are more readily permitted.
Copymoore Ltd v Commissioners of Public Works [2014] IESC 63 – recognised public good and prompt resolution as factors against protracted interlocutory litigation.
O’Brien v Governor of Cork Prison [2024] IEHC 109 – applied Keegan test in context of late amendments.

Legal Reasoning

The court systematically applied the Keegan framework:

Arguability: The proposed GDPR ground was prima facie arguable—alleging unlawful processing/disclosure of personal data (Arts 5, 33, 34 GDPR). Other new grounds (duress, contempt) were not arguable as they were either new causes of action or too vague.
Explanation for Delay: Although the GDPR‐related facts were known by mid‐2019, the court held that admitting the amendment would not delay the yet‐unscheduled substantive hearing, would not require additional affidavits, and that the respondents conceded no irremediable prejudice. The interests of justice thus outweighed the delay.
Prejudice & Interests of Justice: The court emphasised the public interest in timely resolution of professional‐discipline inquiries and avoiding endless interlocutory skirmishes. Amendments clarifying or modestly enlarging existing grounds were allowed; submissions that would prolong or relitigate settled facts were refused.

Order 84, Rules 20(4) & 23(2) empower the court to allow amendments “on such terms as it thinks fit.” Barr J. concluded the balance lay in favor of permitting precise, legally coherent amendments that did not derail the process.

Impact

This judgment:

Confirms that GDPR arguments may be advanced in judicial review of disciplinary processes if facts are on the record and arguable as a matter of law.
Reinforces the Keegan three‐stage test and the paramountcy of the interests of justice over procedural technicalities.
Signals judicial impatience with repeated interlocutory applications and inordinate delay, especially in professional‐discipline contexts.
Provides guidance on drafting amendment applications: focus on clarifying/enlarging existing grounds; avoid wholly new causes of action at a late stage.
Demonstrates flexibility in allowing amendments before leave or final hearing, even in telescoped hearings, when no hearing date is yet fixed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Order 84 (Judicial Review Rules): Governs applications for leave, service of documents, and amendment of grounds in judicial review.
Keegan Test: Courts ask (1) is the new point arguable? (2) Is there a good reason for its late introduction? (3) Will it unfairly prejudice the other side or harm the public interest?
Telescoped Hearing: A compressed timetable for dealing with leave and substantive issues together.
GDPR Articles 5, 33, 34: Set out principles of data processing (lawfulness, purpose limitation) and requirements for notifying and reporting data breaches.
Ultra Vires: Acting beyond the powers conferred by statute or rules.

Conclusion

Wales v Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal & Anor delivers a structured exposition of when and how courts will permit amendments to judicial review pleadings. It underscores that:

The interests of justice—including the public interest in timely professional‐discipline processes—are paramount.
GDPR issues can be pressed in a disciplinary‐inquiry review if supported by the record and not unduly prejudicial.
Delay alone does not bar amendment, but a clear explanation and minimal impact on process are required.
Repeated, dilatory interlocutory skirmishes will be curtailed in favour of moving to a final hearing.

This decision will guide practitioners and tribunals in balancing procedural fairness, data‐protection obligations, and efficient resolution in judicial review of regulatory inquiries.