Pilots’ Duty to Cooperate with Ramp Inspections: Scope of the Irish Aviation Authority’s Oversight over Non‑Commercial Operations

1. Introduction

This High Court judgment, Irish Skydiving Club CLG & Eoin Nevin v Irish Aviation Authority DAC [2025] IEHC 723, delivered by Barr J on 19 December 2025, is a significant administrative law and aviation safety decision. It clarifies, in a concrete factual context, the breadth of the Irish Aviation Authority’s (“IAA”) powers to carry out unannounced ramp inspections, the status and responsibilities of the pilot in command (“PIC”) in non‑commercial specialist operations such as parachute dropping, and the extent (or limits) of any right to insist on legal representation before complying with on‑the‑spot regulatory inspections.

The applicants were:

Irish Skydiving Club CLG, a company limited by guarantee operating as a non‑commercial skydiving and parachuting club in Co. Kilkenny, chartering two UK‑registered GA8 Airvan aircraft; and
Mr Eoin Nevin, an electrician, holder of an IAA‑issued private pilot’s licence and certified parachutist, a director and administrator of the club.

The respondent, the Irish Aviation Authority DAC, is the statutory regulator of civil aviation in Ireland, established under s. 11 of the Irish Aviation Authority Act 1993, and the “competent authority” for purposes of the relevant EU regulations.

The dispute centred on two ramp inspections at the Kilkenny airfield on 26 August 2022 and 16 September 2022, and on ensuing enforcement measures:

findings of non‑compliance,
grounding of aircraft G‑VANC, and
provisional suspension of Mr Nevin’s pilot’s licence.

The applicants mounted a broad attack, alleging lack of jurisdiction, lack of legal authority to inspect, absence of inspector competence, breaches of fair procedures, unreasonableness of findings and enforcement actions, and improper communication with the UK Civil Aviation Authority (“CAA”). All reliefs were ultimately refused.

The judgment is important for several reasons:

It confirms that ramp inspections are a lawful and core tool of aviation oversight, including in relation to non‑commercial operations with non‑complex aircraft.
It holds that the PIC is the “operator” for regulatory purposes in the NCO/SPEC context and bears direct legal obligations regarding checklists, risk assessments, and operational safety.
It clarifies that regulated persons cannot insist on legal representation as a precondition to cooperating with on‑the‑spot inspections, and that refusal to cooperate can justify serious regulatory action such as grounding and licence suspension.
It affirms that EASA guidance cannot be used to narrow the broad statutory and regulatory powers conferred on the IAA by EU and Irish instruments.

2. Overview of the Case and Key Issues

2.1 Factual background

The club’s operations were accepted to be non‑commercial and the GA8 aircraft to be “non‑complex motor‑powered aircraft”. Members (including first‑time parachutists) paid a subscription; there was no profit distribution; and revenues went back into running the club and promoting the sport. This classification matters because it determines which parts of EU Regulation 965/2012 apply, in particular Annex VII (Part‑NCO) and the special provisions on non‑commercial specialised operations such as parachute dropping (NCO.SPEC.PAR).

The aircraft were UK‑registered. Following the UK’s departure from the EU, from 1 January 2021 the IAA became the competent authority for oversight of these “third‑country” aircraft when operating in Ireland, notwithstanding their UK registration. This is expressly reflected in NCO.GEN.100 of Annex VII: where an aircraft is registered in a third country, the competent authority is that of the Member State where the operator has its principal place of business or resides.

From mid‑2021 to mid‑2022, there was extensive email and meeting‑based engagement between the IAA (principally via Mr Robert “Bob” Linehan and colleagues) and the club/Mr Nevin (and Mr David Byrnes, a barrister and pilot involved with the club). The IAA:

identified the applicable legal framework (Regulation 965/2012, Annex VII, including NCO.SPEC.PAR),
raised concerns about safety and regulatory compliance observed during visits, and
repeatedly asked for, and tried to assist in developing, a compliant operations manual, risk assessment and checklists for parachute operations from Kilkenny airfield.

Although there was some initial engagement (including Teams meetings and the exchange of draft manual chapters), the applicants (and Mr Byrnes) ultimately disengaged: emails from the IAA from late spring 2022 seeking documentation and compliance were not answered.

2.2 The two ramp inspections

(a) 26 August 2022

Three IAA inspectors (Mr Donnelly, Mr Linehan and Mr Dowd) arrived unannounced wearing IAA‑marked high‑visibility vests and ID badges. After a flight piloted by Mr Nevin landed, Mr Donnelly requested:

Mr Nevin’s pilot licence and medical certificate, and
aircraft documentation and operational checklists, including those required for parachute operations under NCO.SPEC.PAR.100.

The court found that:

Mr Nevin initially said the parachute checklist was “being updated” and not in the aircraft.
He then produced a single‑page document from the hangar which he presented as the relevant checklist.
The inspectors considered this grossly inadequate for both normal operations and specialist parachuting operations, and lacking any evidence of a site‑specific risk assessment.
The flight charts on board were out of date; Mr Nevin said he relied on a “Sky Demon” app on his phone for current information.
Decal markings on the exterior door mechanism were so faded as to be almost illegible.

During the inspection, Mr Byrnes, speaking via speakerphone held close to Mr Donnelly, adopted a confrontational tone, demanding specific legal bases for the inspection and advising that Mr Nevin should not sign anything. Mr Donnelly nonetheless explained the findings, left the ramp inspection form on the pilot’s seat when Mr Nevin refused to sign, and departed.

The formal findings were categorised as:

CAT 3: flying without an adequate parachuting operations checklist (NCO.SPEC.PAR.100).
CAT 2: (i) inadequacy of the single‑page checklist in covering normal/abnormal/emergency procedures for both normal and parachute operations; (ii) absence of current charts on board.
CAT 1: illegible external door opening markings.

(b) 16 September 2022

The same three inspectors returned for another unannounced ramp inspection. On landing, Mr Nevin approached them with a Go‑Pro type device and stated that he was recording video and audio. The inspectors expressly did not consent to being recorded, but he continued.

Critically, Mr Nevin:

refused to produce his licence and aircraft documents, and
stated that he would not participate in the inspection or allow access to the aircraft until his legal adviser (Mr Byrnes) arrived, which would take about an hour.

The inspectors regarded this as a refusal of access and cooperation. Anticipating potential confrontation if they grounded the aircraft, they prudently called the Gardaí, who arrived in uniform. Mr Donnelly then:

informed Mr Nevin that aircraft G‑VANC was grounded,
recorded on the ramp form that the PIC had refused to cooperate and refused to produce his licence, and
left the documentation in the aircraft when Mr Nevin would not accept it.

The aircraft remained grounded until March 2023, when a subsequent (announced) inspection by different IAA personnel, with access afforded, found it airworthy for normal operations and the grounding was lifted.

2.3 Procedural history and issues

The applicants issued a strongly worded solicitor’s letter on 31 August 2022 disputing the IAA’s jurisdiction and challenging the lawfulness of the first ramp inspection and its findings, threatening judicial review. After the second inspection, the IAA:

grounded G‑VANC under Article 6 of the Irish Aviation Authority (Operations) Order (SI 61/2006), and
provisionally suspended Mr Nevin’s pilot licence on 23 September 2022, inviting representations and offering a meeting (which were not taken up).

The High Court identified seven core issues (paraphrased):

Jurisdiction: Did the IAA have lawful authority to carry out the ramp inspections?
Interaction with prior engagement: Did earlier discussions on an operations manual limit the IAA’s power to inspect?
Lawfulness of conduct: Were the inspections conducted lawfully and fairly?
Evidence: Was there evidence justifying the inspectors’ findings?
Grounding: Was the grounding of G‑VANC lawful?
Licence suspension: Was the provisional suspension of Mr Nevin’s licence lawful?
Information sharing: Was the IAA’s response to the UK CAA enquiry about Mr Nevin lawful and accurate?

3. Summary of the Judgment

Barr J dismissed the application in its entirety, refusing all reliefs. The court held that:

The IAA, as the competent authority under EU law, has clear jurisdiction and wide powers to conduct ramp inspections (including unannounced inspections) of aircraft operating within the State, including non‑commercial operations using non‑complex aircraft and third‑country‑registered aircraft.
Previous collaborative engagement by IAA staff (notably on developing an operations manual) did not create any legal limit on the IAA’s ability to conduct ramp inspections at any time; regulated entities cannot dictate when and how they will be regulated.
Both ramp inspections were carried out lawfully, reasonably, and in a professional manner. There was no breach of fair procedures or oppression.
The inspectors’ findings (on inadequate checklists, outdated charts, faded markings, and refusal of access) were rational and supported by evidence. The court would not interfere on judicial review where the findings were well within the bounds of reasonableness.
The decision to ground aircraft G‑VANC under Article 6 of SI 61/2006 was lawful and justified given the unresolved safety concerns and refusal of access.
The IAA’s decision to provisionally suspend Mr Nevin’s pilot licence was lawful, supported by serious concerns arising from the inspections and his refusal to cooperate, and was accompanied by appropriate offers of procedural fairness (opportunity to make representations and attend a meeting).
The IAA’s communication to the UK CAA that Mr Nevin’s licence was “currently provisionally suspended and ongoing enforcement actions … are the subject of legal proceedings” was accurate and within the scope of consent given by Mr Nevin, giving rise to no lawful complaint.
The court expressly rejected the applicants’ suggestion that the club, as a company limited by guarantee, was the relevant “operator”; in this context, the PIC is the operator for purposes of Annex VII (Part‑NCO), with personal responsibilities for checklists, risk assessments and compliance.
The court held that there is no right to postpone or halt an on‑the‑spot regulatory inspection pending the arrival of legal counsel. The ordinary rights to silence and legal representation arise in different contexts (e.g. Garda detention, formal disciplinary hearings) and do not entitle a PIC to refuse access to inspectors during a ramp inspection.

Barr J was particularly critical of the PIC’s refusal to cooperate with the second inspection, describing a pilot’s refusal to allow regulators access to his aircraft during a safety inspection as “truly shocking” and demonstrating “a serious lack of understanding” of the purpose of safety inspections.

4. Legal Framework and Precedents

4.1 EU aviation safety framework

Several EU instruments form the backdrop:

Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 (“the 2008 Regulation”): established common rules in civil aviation and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Article 10 required Member States to conduct investigations, including ramp inspections, and empowered them to take measures, including grounding, to prevent infringements.
Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (“the 2018 Regulation”): replaced 216/2008 but largely replicates the structure. Article 62(2)(c) explicitly mandates that the Agency and national competent authorities must “conduct the necessary investigations, inspections, including ramp inspections, audits and other monitoring activities” to identify possible infringements.
Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 (“the 2012 Regulation”): lays down detailed technical and administrative requirements for air operations. Key provisions:
- Article 3(1): Member States designate a competent authority (here, the IAA) for certification and oversight.
- Article 3(5): authorised personnel of the competent authority may:
  - examine records, data, procedures;
  - take copies;
  - seek on‑site explanations;
  - enter premises and operating sites;
  - “perform audits, investigations, assessments, inspections, including ramp inspections and unannounced inspections”; and
  - take or initiate enforcement measures.
- Annex VII (Part‑NCO): governs non‑commercial operations with other than complex motor‑powered aircraft. Sub‑provisions include:
  - NCO.GEN.100 – Competent Authority: defines which authority is competent where aircraft are registered in a third country.
  - NCO.GEN.105 – PIC responsibilities and authority: makes the PIC responsible for safety, adherence to operational procedures and checklists (linked to Annex IV of the 2008 Regulation), and ensuring operational limitations are respected.
  - NCO.SPEC.PAR.100 – Checklist: requires a parachuting operations checklist covering:
    1. normal, abnormal and emergency procedures;
    2. relevant performance data;
    3. required equipment;
    4. any limitations; and
    5. responsibilities and duties of the PIC, crew and task specialists.

4.2 Irish domestic law

Domestically, the key provision for grounding is Article 6 of the Irish Aviation Authority (Operations) Order 2006 (SI 61/2006). It allows an authorised officer of the IAA to ground an aircraft where:

“the aircraft has been, is intended to be or is likely to be flown from any place within the State in such circumstances that the flight … was or would be a cause of danger to persons or property therein or elsewhere.”

Barr J held that, in light of unresolved checklist deficiencies and refusal of access, the inspectors could reasonably conclude that further operation of G‑VANC could be a cause of danger, thus engaging Article 6.

4.3 EASA guidance material

EASA has produced a Ramp Inspection Manual, which states, inter alia, that:

“Ramp inspections are part of a European Union safety programme and should be performed in a harmonised and standardised way … SANA inspections should follow, as far as possible, the same principles as applied to SAFA and SACA inspections in accordance with Part ARO.RAMP.”

The applicants sought to rely on guidance emphasising that on‑the‑spot assessments cannot replace a comprehensive oversight programme. The court accepted that proposition as far as it goes, but held that it does not curtail the IAA’s statutory and regulatory power to employ ramp inspections as part of its oversight toolkit when and where it considers appropriate.

4.4 Judicial precedent: McMahon v Irish Aviation Authority [2014] IEHC 431

The main judicial authority cited was McMahon v IAA, where Hogan J stressed that the law gives regulatory bodies like the IAA “considerable latitude” to act “speedily and decisively” in the interests of public safety. Barr J invoked this in support of the proposition that:

the IAA must be able to intervene promptly when safety concerns arise, and
the courts will be slow, on judicial review, to second‑guess operational safety judgments that are within the regulator’s statutory remit and expertise.

This case thus sits squarely within an established line of authority recognising that, where public safety (particularly aviation safety) is at stake, regulators enjoy a significant margin of appreciation, so long as they act within their legal powers and observe basic fairness.

5. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

5.1 Jurisdiction and scope of ramp inspection powers

On the first and foundational question—whether the IAA had power to conduct the ramp inspections—the court’s answer was unequivocal: yes.

Key elements of the reasoning:

As the designated competent authority under Article 3 of Regulation 965/2012, and under the 2018 Regulation, the IAA has broad powers and responsibilities to oversee all air operations within the State, including those involving third‑country aircraft.
Article 3(5)(e) expressly empowers authorised personnel to perform ramp inspections and unannounced inspections as part of their oversight tasks.
The older 2008 Regulation, though superseded, remains relevant to interpreting the 2012 Regulation’s structure and objectives, and it clearly envisaged ramp inspections and grounding as standard oversight tools.
The EASA Ramp Inspection Manual situates ramp inspections within a European Union safety programme, to be carried out in a harmonised way across participating states. This confirms—rather than dilutes—the centrality of ramp inspections to modern aviation oversight.

The applicants argued that the IAA’s duty to maintain an “oversight programme” could not be discharged merely by ad hoc ramp inspections. Barr J agreed that a proper programme cannot consist only of spot checks, but rejected the leap from that to a limitation on the power to carry out ramp inspections. In his view:

Guidance statements that ramp inspections should not replace a comprehensive programme do not mean ramp inspections are only permissible in narrow circumstances.
Given the serious and often fatal consequences of safety failures in aviation, it is “difficult to envisage any impediment” to a competent authority conducting ramp inspections wherever safety oversight requires.

In short, the court affirms a very broad jurisdiction to conduct ramp inspections, particularly in a high‑risk context such as parachute operations.

5.2 Effect of prior engagement: no fetter or legitimate expectation

The applicants contended that prior interactions between Mr Linehan (IAA) and the club from July 2021 to June 2022—especially references to a forthcoming “audit” of operations—meant that:

the IAA had committed itself to a particular form of oversight (an agreed audit with defined terms of reference), and
therefore it was unlawful or unfair to pivot to an unannounced ramp inspection, allegedly as a backdoor “audit” or approval exercise for which no power existed.

Barr J rejected this argument on several levels:

The email correspondence showed a “genuine attempt to collaborate” by the IAA to assist the club in achieving compliance (especially in developing an operations manual) but did not constitute an undertaking that only a formal audit would be used as an oversight tool.
Any reference to an “audit” was simply part of the IAA’s broader engagement strategy, not an agreement to suspend other regulatory powers pending an agreed audit plan.
The applicants themselves disengaged by ceasing to respond to emails; in those circumstances, it was entirely legitimate for the regulator to move from collaborative support to formal oversight action.

Most importantly, the court emphasised a foundational regulatory principle:

“The entity charged with regulating an industry or an activity, has the powers that are given to it by statute and by law to regulate the relevant industry or activity… It is not the persons being regulated who can choose when and in what manner they shall be regulated.”

This is, in effect, a clear rejection of any notion that a regulated party’s preferences or prior informal understandings can “contract out” of or fetter the regulator’s statutory powers—at least in the absence of a clear, formal promise defining a legitimate expectation, which was conspicuously absent here.

5.3 Conduct of the inspections and fair procedures

5.3.1 First ramp inspection (26 August 2022)

The court had the unusual advantage of an audio recording and transcript of part of the first inspection, and cross‑examined evidence from both sides. Barr J found:

The IAA inspectors identified themselves properly (visible IAA branding, ID badges), and their regulatory role was already known to Mr Nevin.
Mr Donnelly clearly explained that this was a ramp inspection to check compliance with EU regulations, focused in particular on checklists for parachute operations.
Mr Nevin understood the nature and purpose of the inspection and cooperated to the extent of producing his licence and the single‑page checklist.

On fairness and procedural propriety:

Mr Donnelly did not have to quote chapter and verse of each specific provision relied upon. The court held that it is sufficient, in an on‑the‑spot inspection, that inspectors:
- state the general regulatory framework they are enforcing, and
- indicate the nature of the non‑compliances they are investigating.
They are “not obliged to engage in a detailed legal debate” with the regulated person, still less with a lawyer on a telephone line.
Mr Donnelly offered practical assistance by showing template checklists he could download—an offer the court regarded as reasonable and indicative of a constructive approach.
The inspectors remained calm, polite and professional throughout, even when confronted with what the judge described as a “hectoring” tone from Mr Byrnes via speakerphone.

Consequently, there was no breach of fair procedures, no oppression, and no unlawfulness in the conduct of this inspection.

5.3.2 Second ramp inspection (16 September 2022)

The second inspection, again documented by audio‑visual recording, raised sharper questions about cooperation and the right (or lack of right) to legal representation at on‑the‑spot inspections.

The court held:

By refusing to produce his licence and by refusing access to the aircraft until his lawyer arrived, Mr Nevin expressly refused to cooperate with the inspection.
Contrary to the applicants’ submissions, the PIC had no legal entitlement to defer or suspend a ramp inspection pending the arrival of his lawyer. The court carefully distinguished:
- the right to silence and legal advice applicable in Garda detention or criminal proceedings, and
- the right to representation that may apply in formal disciplinary hearings or professional misconduct inquiries.
Those contexts involve compulsion to answer questions or determination of rights/liabilities; an unannounced inspection of a live operational environment is different.
If regulators had to await the arrival of a lawyer before inspecting an aircraft on the ramp, such inspections would be “almost impossible to undertake in any practical sense”, contrary to the public interest in aviation safety.
The IAA inspectors were entitled to call the Gardaí as a precaution when contemplating grounding an aircraft in a potentially contentious environment. The Gardaí were not used to intimidate but to ensure safety and order; they were called after the refusal of cooperation when grounding became necessary, not at the outset.

The court also rejected any suggestion that Mr Nevin was “under arrest”. The IAA has no power of arrest and never purported to exercise such power; any subjective belief to that effect was irrational and created no right to suspend cooperation.

5.4 Evidential basis for the inspectors’ findings

In judicial review, the court does not re‑hear the case on the merits or substitute its own view for that of the decision‑maker. Instead, it asks whether the decision was:

within jurisdiction,
taken fairly, and
rational and proportionate—not so unreasonable that no reasonable decision‑maker could have reached it.

Applying this standard, Barr J held that each of the inspectors’ findings was plainly open on the evidence.

5.4.1 Checklist deficiencies

On 26 August:

The only checklist produced to the inspectors was the single‑page document brought from the hangar. The court expressly found that the PIC did not direct the inspectors to any other document as the operative checklist.
Even if the inspectors had been pointed to the GA8 Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) Supplement 8, Mr Linehan’s evidence was that this would not have sufficed as a valid NCO.SPEC.PAR checklist, because:
- it lacked a site‑specific risk assessment, and
- it did not reflect specific operational conditions at Kilkenny airfield (e.g. grass runway, weight and balance considerations, parachute‑specific procedures).
Against the detailed requirements in NCO.SPEC.PAR.100 (normal/abnormal/emergency procedures, performance data, equipment, limitations, roles of PIC and task specialists), the inspectors were amply justified in finding serious non‑compliance (CAT 3/CAT 2).

5.4.2 Charts and markings

It was not disputed that the paper charts on board were out of date; the PIC’s reliance on an app like Sky Demon did not meet the regulatory requirement, particularly where the app itself warns that it should not substitute for official charts.
The faded door mechanism markings were objectively observable; given their importance for emergency access by first responders, the CAT 1 finding was plainly reasonable.

5.4.3 Second inspection: refusal of access and licence production

On 16 September:

There was clear evidence (video, audio, and oral testimony) that:
- the PIC refused to produce his licence, and
- refused to allow the inspection to proceed pending the arrival of his lawyer.
In these circumstances the inspectors could reasonably find that there had been a refusal to grant access for the purposes of a ramp inspection.
There was no evidence that the earlier CAT 3 deficiency (lack of an adequate parachuting checklist) had been remedied.

The court underlined that these findings were manifestly rational and nowhere near the threshold of “legal unreasonableness” in judicial review.

5.5 Lawfulness of grounding aircraft G‑VANC

The grounding order on 16 September 2022 was scrutinised under Article 6 of SI 61/2006. The threshold is whether the aircraft has been or is likely to be flown in circumstances where the flight “was or would be a cause of danger to persons or property”.

Given:

an outstanding CAT 3 finding from the first inspection,
the absence of evidence that a compliant checklist had been created,
the PIC’s refusal to cooperate or to demonstrate rectification, and
the inherently high‑risk nature of parachute operations,

the court held that the inspectors were entitled to treat further operation of G‑VANC as potentially dangerous and to ground the aircraft until compliance was established. The later (March 2023) inspection confirming airworthiness after due access only reinforced the propriety of the precautionary measure.

5.6 Lawfulness of private pilot licence suspension

The provisional suspension of Mr Nevin’s PPL(A) on 23 September 2022 was examined in light of:

the serious open findings from the two ramp inspections (including a CAT 3 non‑compliance and the later refusal of access),
his refusal to produce his licence during the second inspection, and
his overall lack of cooperation with efforts to ensure compliance.

Mr Simon White, acting for the IAA, set out in affidavit the reasons for the provisional suspension and the steps taken afterwards:

He wrote to Mr Nevin inviting written representations.
When there was no reply or licence surrender, he wrote again via solicitors, inviting a meeting to discuss the issues.
The IAA later agreed, at the applicants’ request, to pause further investigation pending the High Court proceedings, which explains the lack of final determination by the time of judgment.

The court held that this was:

a reasonable regulatory response to serious safety concerns,
consistent with the IAA’s duty to protect public safety, and
procedurally fair, given the repeated opportunities for representations and dialogue that the PIC chose not to take up.

Any complaint about delay in concluding the suspension process was undermined by the fact that it was the applicants themselves who had requested the pause in light of the pending judicial review.

5.7 Information sharing with the UK CAA

When applying for a licence from the UK CAA, Mr Nevin knew that the CAA would check with the IAA about his licensing history and any enforcement actions. In doing so, he consented to the disclosure of relevant personal data.

The CAA asked whether there were any past or pending enforcement actions. The IAA replied:

“The individual’s PPL(A) is currently provisionally suspended and ongoing enforcement actions by the authority are the subject of legal proceedings.”

The applicants argued that this was misleading. The court rejected this firmly: the answer was accurate—the PPL was provisionally suspended and there were ongoing enforcement actions—and given with the applicant’s prior consent. No data protection or fairness issue arose.

5.8 Who is the “operator” in this context?

The applicants sought to argue that the club as a company limited by guarantee, rather than the PIC, was the “operator” of the aircraft. They hoped thereby to shift regulatory obligations away from the individual pilot and to challenge the focus of the ramp inspections.

Barr J rejected this interpretation:

While the 2018 Regulation defines “aircraft operator” broadly (“any person operating or proposing to operate one or more aircraft”), this breadth reflects the variety of possible operating structures—from major airlines to sole‑owner pilots.
In the specific context of non‑commercial specialised operations with non‑complex aircraft (NCO/Part‑NCO), the regulatory scheme and Annex VII provisions make it clear that the PIC is treated as the operator:
- NCO.GEN.105 places safety and procedural responsibilities squarely on the PIC.
- The club itself was not licensed or certified by the IAA.
- Membership‑based skydiving operations, where all parachutists are club members and the planes are merely chartered, do not realistically fit the concept of a separate, licensed “operator”.

Accordingly, as PIC of the aircraft on both inspection dates, Mr Nevin was the relevant regulated “operator”. The inspectors were fully entitled to direct their questions and document requests to him personally and to assess his compliance with NCO.SPEC.PAR.100 and associated provisions.

5.9 Strong judicial criticism of refusal to cooperate

The judgment concludes on a notably strong note. The court described the PIC’s refusal to cooperate with the second ramp inspection and to allow inspectors access to the aircraft as:

“truly shocking. It demonstrates a serious lack of understanding on the part of the second applicant of the nature and purpose of safety inspections.”

This is more than rhetorical flourish; it functions as a clear judicial signal that:

PICs and operators are expected to understand that regulatory inspections are a core component of aviation safety, not a hostile intrusion.
Active obstruction or conditional cooperation (e.g. “not until my lawyer arrives”) in the context of on‑the‑spot safety inspections can justifiably trigger robust regulatory responses and is unlikely to attract sympathy from the courts.

6. Simplifying Key Legal and Technical Concepts

6.1 Ramp inspections

A ramp inspection is an unannounced (or occasionally announced) on‑the‑spot inspection of an aircraft, its documentation and its crew while it is on the ground (“on the ramp”). Inspectors check:

airworthiness and obvious defects,
documents (certificates, licences, maintenance logs),
operational equipment and safety markings, and
compliance with required procedures and checklists.

Ramp inspections are not full audits of an operator’s overall system; they are real‑time snapshots of actual practices in the operational environment, used to identify systemic issues and serious non‑compliances.

6.2 SANA, SAFA and SACA

SANA: Safety Assessment of National Aircraft (those registered in the inspecting State).
SAFA: Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft (from non‑EU states, historically; now broader).
SACA: Safety Assessment of Community Aircraft (from EU states).

The EASA guidance encourages that SANA inspections follow broadly the same principles as SAFA/SACA inspections, ensuring harmonised safety oversight across different registration states.

6.3 Non‑commercial operations and non‑complex aircraft

Non‑commercial operations: flights where no remuneration is received, or where revenue is strictly cost‑sharing within a club with no profit distribution. Here, parachutists were club members, paying subscriptions, and any surplus funded the sport rather than profit.
Non‑complex motor‑powered aircraft: generally smaller, simpler aircraft (e.g. single‑engine GA8 Airvan, fixed undercarriage, basic systems) rather than multi‑engine, turbine, or large transport category aircraft. Regulatory burdens are lighter than for airlines but still meaningful, especially in specialist operations like parachuting.

6.4 PIC responsibilities and checklists

The Pilot in Command is the person ultimately responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft and everyone on board. Under NCO.GEN.105, this includes:

deciding whether to initiate, continue, divert, or terminate flights in the interests of safety,
ensuring all operational procedures and checklists are followed, and
ensuring compliance with operational limitations (e.g. weight, performance).

Under NCO.SPEC.PAR.100, for parachute operations there must be a dedicated checklist that covers:

normal procedures (e.g. embarkation, climb, jump run, descent),
abnormal procedures (deviations from normal operations),
emergency procedures (e.g. engine failure during climb, parachutist hung up on exit),
performance data (runway length vs weight, grass runway factors),
special equipment needed (e.g. extra restraints, jump lights),
limitations (e.g. max wind, max weight), and
clear roles for the PIC, any other crew, and “task specialists” (experienced parachutists doing tandem jumps or supervising novices).

A one‑page generic list with minimal content will almost never meet these requirements.

6.5 Categories of findings (CAT 1–3)

Though not elaborated in the judgment, in EASA and IAA practice:

CAT 1: minor non‑compliance (e.g. faded signage) – still important, but typically rectifiable quickly.
CAT 2: significant non‑compliance that could affect safety but may not justify immediate grounding, depending on circumstances.
CAT 3: serious non‑compliance posing an immediate or high risk to safety, often leading to more stringent corrective actions or grounding.

A CAT 3 finding, especially around core operational documentation like checklists, signals a grave concern from the regulator’s perspective.

7. Impact and Implications

7.1 For aviation regulators (IAA and others)

The decision robustly endorses the centrality of ramp inspections and the breadth of oversight powers conferred by EU and domestic law. Key takeaways for regulators:

You may conduct unannounced ramp inspections of non‑commercial specialist operations, including those using third‑country‑registered, non‑complex aircraft.
You are not required to:
- await a trigger such as an accident, complaint or near miss;
- limit yourself to operators who hold formal IAA licences; or
- delay inspections pending the arrival of legal advisers for the PIC or operator.
You may call upon law enforcement (Gardaí) to support enforcement actions (e.g. grounding) where there is a reasonable concern about safety or confrontation, provided this is done proportionately.
Courts will generally respect operational safety judgments that are evidence‑based and within the statutory remit, and will not treat EASA guidance as shrinking statutory powers.

7.2 For pilots and operators, especially in general aviation and skydiving

The judgment sends a clear message to PICs and club‑style operators:

You are directly subject to regulatory obligations, even if you operate in a non‑commercial, club‑based structure.
You can expect ramp inspections at any time during operations in Ireland; you must be ready to:
- produce licences and aircraft documents;
- demonstrate compliant checklists and risk assessments;
- allow access to the aircraft; and
- cooperate with reasonable requests.
You cannot lawfully insist that an inspection wait until your lawyer is present. Doing so may be treated as refusal to cooperate, with serious consequences (CAT 3 findings, grounding, licence suspension).
Generic manufacturer flight manuals or partial club manuals will not suffice as NCO.SPEC.PAR‑compliant checklists unless they are clearly tailored to the specific operation and location.
Attempts to micromanage or quasi‑litigate the inspection in real time (through recorded debates with off‑site counsel) are unlikely to be fruitful and may aggravate the regulator’s concerns.

7.3 For administrative and public law more broadly

The judgment underscores several broader principles:

Statutory powers cannot be informally contracted out of. Friendly engagement and references to audits do not disable a regulator from deploying other tools like unannounced inspections.
Guidance cannot trump primary or delegated legislation. EASA manuals inform how powers are exercised, but do not constrain the scope of the powers conferred by EU Regulations and domestic Orders.
Judicial review respects regulatory expertise in specialised safety regimes. The court scrutinises legality and fairness but will not re‑weigh technical safety judgments where there is a clear evidential foundation.
Rights to legal representation are context‑specific. While strong in criminal and quasi‑criminal contexts, they do not extend to a right to halt all on‑the‑spot regulatory action pending counsel’s arrival.

8. Conclusion

Irish Skydiving Club & Nevin v IAA is an important modern statement of the law on aviation oversight and regulatory inspections in Ireland. It firmly establishes that:

The IAA’s powers to conduct unannounced ramp inspections, including of non‑commercial parachute operations in non‑complex, third‑country aircraft, are clear, broad and integral to its safety mandate.
The PIC is the operator for the purposes of Part‑NCO and carries direct responsibilities for compliant checklists, risk assessments and operational procedures.
Regulated persons must cooperate with on‑the‑spot inspections; they have no entitlement to delay such inspections pending legal representation, and refusal to cooperate justifies serious enforcement measures.
The inspectors’ findings, grounding of the aircraft, and provisional suspension of the PPL were all lawful, reasonable responses to evidenced safety concerns, and the IAA’s communication with the UK CAA was accurate and within consent.

Beyond its immediate facts, the judgment reinforces a broader administrative law message: where public safety—particularly aviation safety—is at stake, courts will uphold decisive, evidence‑based regulatory action that stays within statutory bounds and affords reasonable procedural fairness. It is a clear warning to pilots and operators that confrontational or obstructive attitudes to safety oversight will find little favour in the courts.