Payment Out of Court Lodgments as a Payment on Account of Costs Under Order 99 RSC and Practice Direction HC125

1) Introduction

Doyle v Buckley [Practising Under the Style and Title of J. Buckley & Company Solicitors] (Approved) [2026] IEHC 27 is an interlocutory decision of the High Court (Bradley J.) arising from long-running litigation commencing in 2011 between Denis Doyle (plaintiff, former client) and Joe Buckley (defendant, solicitor, now retired).

The underlying plenary action concerns, inter alia, the handling of a €600,000 deposit paid by Sandystream Limited in a failed property transaction, the defendant’s alleged use of the deposit to discharge his fees, and extensive allegations (breach of fiduciary duty/trust, misrepresentation, conversion, detinue, etc.). A sum of €45,146.69 (the balance said to have remained in the client account) was lodged into court in 2011 pursuant to court order and undertakings.

By motion dated 22 November 2024, the plaintiff sought, among other reliefs, (i) payment out of the lodged sum (plus interest) to him, and/or (ii) a payment on account of costs under Order 99 and Practice Direction HC125, plus case-management measures including an Affidavit of Means.

Key issues

Whether the High Court should direct payment out of monies lodged in court to the plaintiff as a payment on account of costs pending formal costs adjudication.
The relevance of the parties’ extensive costs/taxation history to exercising that discretion.
Whether the court should compel the defendant to progress the issuance of a Certificate of Taxation.
Whether it was appropriate to order the defendant to swear an Affidavit of Means.

2) Summary of the Judgment

Bradley J. granted the principal relief sought: he directed that the €45,146.69 lodged in court (together with accrued interest) be paid out to the plaintiff on account and in relation to costs, subject to the plaintiff’s solicitor providing the standard undertaking that any overpayment (if the ultimate adjudication yields a lower figure) will be repaid forthwith. Payment was to occur within three weeks of perfection.

The Court also ordered the defendant to furnish an Affidavit of Means within three weeks of perfection.

The Court refused to order the defendant to take steps to complete finalisation of taxation / take up a Certificate of Taxation, holding that the plaintiff had not shown a sufficient basis (including that stamp duty would be payable) to justify compelling the defendant to do so.

The Court indicated a provisional view that, since the plaintiff succeeded in the principal part of the motion, he should obtain the costs of the application, subject to hearing the parties at a mention date.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Doyle v. Buckley p/a Buckley & Co Solicitors [2013] IEHC 292

This earlier High Court judgment (Charleton J.) was a procedural turning point: it referred specified bills of costs (including Bills D215 and D226) to taxation by the Taxing Master. Bradley J. treats this as the origin of the cost-quantification pathway that later produced binding determinations about the scale of reductions to the defendant’s fee claims. The 2013 referral matters because the present application was not argued in a vacuum: it followed a taxation process that, despite being “protracted”, had crystallised substantial findings adverse to the defendant’s billing position.

(b) Buckley v. O'Neill (Taxing Master) and Doyle (party interested) [2018] IEHC 717

Binchy J.’s decision is used as the core factual/legal anchor for Bradley J.’s assessment of whether it was appropriate to order a payment out/on account. Bradley J. recites specific reductions upheld in that decision (e.g., major reductions across files D215, D226, D240, D54, and D151A/1-4), illustrating that:

the defendant’s fees were subject to significant downward adjustment by the Taxing Master,
those adjustments were judicially reviewed and largely upheld, and
the dispute has generated repeated costs orders against the defendant.

The practical influence of Buckley v. O'Neill (Taxing Master) and Doyle (party interested) [2018] IEHC 717 in the present case is evidential and contextual: it demonstrates that many “disputed” matters are no longer open in the same way, because they have already been determined in the taxation/review litigation.

(c) Buckley v. O'Neill (Taxing Master) and Doyle (party interested) [2023] IECA 288

The Court of Appeal’s affirmance is deployed to reinforce finality: it confirms that the High Court refusal of review (save a limited aspect) remained intact on appeal. Bradley J. uses this appellate imprimatur to justify treating the taxation reductions and related conclusions as settled staging posts, strengthening the fairness of ordering an interim payment for costs where long delays should not advantage the unsuccessful party.

The judgment text also references (with an apparent inconsistency in the year) Buckley v Taxing Master O'Neill and Doyle (party interested) [2013] IECA 288. Whether typographical or not, Bradley J.’s reliance is substantively on the point that the appellate court affirmed the relevant High Court stance.

(d) Fitzpatrick v Behan [2021] IECA 23

This is the principal authority on interim payments on account of costs in the modern Irish context. Bradley J. quotes extensively from Donnelly J.’s discussion of an “interim payment order” and the rationale underlying the then Practice Direction HC71: long delays in taxation/adjudication should not confer a windfall on the party liable for costs, while the successful party should not be forced to finance the system’s delay.

The decision is influential in two ways:

Jurisdictional logic: Donnelly J. considered it “anomalous” if superior courts lacked power to make such interim payments; Bradley J. adopts the same functional understanding of the discretion.
Policy rationale: cashflow fairness and delay-allocation—successful parties should not shoulder the cost burden pending slow adjudication.

(e) AX v BX [2023] IECA 109

Bradley J. cites Woulfe J.’s reference to Fitzpatrick v Behan [2021] IECA 23, treating it as confirmation that interim payment practice is consistent with the “recast” Order 99, r. 2(5) and r. 7(1). The significance lies less in new doctrine and more in consolidating appellate acceptance that interim payments are orthodox where appropriate.

(f) The earlier procedural orders and rulings (Murphy J., Kearns P., Taxing Master rulings)

While not analysed as “precedent” in the strict sense, Bradley J. relies on the procedural architecture built by: the High Court orders of 18 July 2011 and 29 July 2011 (Murphy J.), undertakings regarding preservation of assets and prompt payment if sums were found due, and the Taxing Master’s final ruling of 22 May 2015. These are treated as part of the “staging posts” justifying interlocutory relief: the Court is not re-trying the merits, but managing consequences of a long process.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Statutory and rules framework: interim payment on account of costs

The Court locates its power in a coordinated framework:

Section 168(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, confirming that a court may order a party to proceedings to pay costs “at any stage”.
Order 99, rule 2(5) of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 (as amended), permitting payment forthwith notwithstanding that proceedings are not concluded.
Order 99, rule 7(1), to similar effect.
Practice Direction HC125, which expressly encourages orders directing payment of a reasonable sum on account pending adjudication, often backed by a solicitor’s undertaking to repay any overpayment.

Bradley J. reads these provisions as responding to systemic delay and cashflow unfairness, while preserving interim protection through the undertaking mechanism.

(b) Why payment out of a court lodgment was appropriate here

Although the plaintiff framed relief both as “payment out” and/or “payment on account”, the Court effectively fuses them: it directs payment out of an existing court-held fund as a payment on account of costs. The reasoning is grounded in contextual fairness rather than a final merits determination, emphasising that:

the litigation has been ongoing since 2011 with multiple failed challenges by the defendant;
there are numerous costs orders in the plaintiff’s favour, and limited recovery to date (save €25,000 paid on account in 2018);
significant elements of the costs/fees dispute have already been determined by the Taxing Master and upheld by the High Court and Court of Appeal;
the defendant is retired, raising a practical concern about sufficiency of assets to meet liabilities if the plaintiff succeeds;
the Court cannot resolve contested facts on an interlocutory application, but can act on the reality that many matters are already settled and that interim relief is designed to address delay and cashflow.

The Court treats the lodged sum as a suitable, proportionate source for interim satisfaction “on account” because it is already within the control of the court, and because the undertaking to repay protects the defendant from overpayment risk once costs are finally adjudicated.

(c) The undertaking safeguard as a condition of interim relief

A central doctrinal feature is the insistence on the solicitor’s undertaking, mirroring Practice Direction HC125. Bradley J. makes payment conditional upon the plaintiff’s solicitors undertaking to repay any overpayment if adjudication produces a smaller figure. This makes the interim order reversible in financial terms and positions it as a cashflow adjustment, not a final determination of net liability.

(d) Ordering an Affidavit of Means

The Court orders an Affidavit of Means by reference to:

the elapsed time since the 2011 undertakings and orders,
the developments and determinations since then, and
the continuing concerns about the defendant’s ability to meet liabilities.

The reasoning implicitly links the Affidavit of Means to effective case management and enforcement realism in protracted litigation, particularly where earlier undertakings were premised on asset sufficiency and non-depletion.

(e) Refusal to compel the defendant to take up a Certificate of Taxation

Bradley J. refuses to order the defendant to complete finalisation/take up the Certificate of Taxation. The plaintiff’s key practical complaint—having to pay stamp duty to obtain the certificate—was held insufficient. The Court also notes the plaintiff’s own affidavit evidence that he was liaising with his legal costs accountant about steps required.

The refusal reflects a disciplined boundary between (i) relieving delay-based unfairness via interim payments and (ii) shifting procedural burdens without a clear juridical basis.

3.3 Impact

(a) Normalising payment out of lodged funds as a vehicle for interim costs relief

The decision’s practical precedent is the Court’s willingness to deploy an existing lodgment to the credit of the action as a source of payment on account of costs under the modern costs framework (Order 99 + HC125). This encourages parties (and courts) to view monies already secured in litigation as capable of being re-purposed to mitigate delay harm, provided adequate safeguards (undertaking) are imposed.

(b) Reinforcing “delay should not benefit the liable party”

By expressly aligning with Fitzpatrick v Behan [2021] IECA 23 and AX v BX [2023] IECA 109, the judgment adds High Court force to a now-settled policy: where liability for costs is not genuinely in dispute (or where a judge deems it appropriate), interim payment orders can prevent the costs-liable party from enjoying the time-value/cashflow benefit of slow adjudication systems.

(c) Affidavits of Means as part of managing long-running costs-heavy litigation

The Affidavit of Means order signals that, in exceptionally protracted disputes with significant costs history and asset undertakings, the court may require updated financial disclosure to ensure orders are meaningful and to reduce enforcement gamesmanship.

(d) A limit on compelling “finalisation steps” in taxation/certification

Conversely, the refusal to order the defendant to take up the Certificate of Taxation suggests that courts may be slow to compel an opposing party to perform procedural acts simply to spare the applicant expenses like stamp duty, absent a clearer legal entitlement. This may influence how practitioners structure applications: interim-payment relief may be more attainable than orders reallocating procedural burdens.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

Taxation / adjudication of costs: Historically, “taxation” before the Taxing Master determined the proper amount of costs; modern practice uses adjudication mechanisms. Either way, it can take significant time, which is why interim payments exist.
Payment on account of costs: A provisional payment made before the final figure is fixed. It is not a final assessment; it is meant to address cashflow and delay.
Practice Direction HC125: A direction encouraging courts to order a reasonable interim sum where appropriate, typically requiring a solicitor’s undertaking to repay any overpayment.
Lodgment into court: Money paid into court to be held pending the outcome. Here, the court treated the lodged sum as available to be released as an interim costs payment.
Affidavit of Means: A sworn statement of assets and liabilities. It is used to inform the court about a party’s capacity to meet liabilities and to support effective case management/enforcement.
Interlocutory application: An application made during proceedings, before final trial. Courts typically will not decide disputed facts at this stage, but can make procedural and protective orders.

5) Conclusion

Doyle v Buckley [Practising Under the Style and Title of J. Buckley & Company Solicitors] (Approved) [2026] IEHC 27 strengthens and operationalises the modern Irish approach to interim costs relief: where prolonged proceedings and adjudication delay risk unfairness, the High Court may order payment out of funds lodged in court as a payment on account of costs, conditioned by an undertaking to repay any overpayment.

The judgment also illustrates the court’s broader case-management stance in long-running disputes: it will require meaningful financial disclosure (Affidavit of Means) where justified, but will not necessarily compel procedural steps (such as taking up a Certificate of Taxation) merely to reallocate incidental burdens like stamp duty.