Paid “Volunteer” Coastguard Rescue Officers Are “Workers” When Attending Remunerated Activities

1. Introduction

Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Groom ([2026] EWCA Civ 6) concerns whether a long-serving Coastguard Rescue Officer (“CRO”), described in MCA documentation as a “volunteer”, nonetheless qualified as a statutory “worker” when he attended coastguard activities for which he could claim hourly remuneration.

The dispute arose after Mr Groom’s termination and the MCA’s refusal to allow him to be accompanied by a GMB official at an internal appeal (“Challenge Meeting”), engaging the statutory accompaniment right under s 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999. That right applies to both employees and “workers” (including “limb (b)” workers) as defined by s 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

The key preliminary issue was therefore status: was Mr Groom a “worker”? The answer has broader implications because the same definition underpins eligibility for rights such as paid holiday, minimum wage, unlawful deductions, and whistleblowing protection.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed the MCA’s appeal and upheld the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s conclusion that Mr Groom was a “worker” when he attended activities in respect of which he had a right to claim remuneration.

The Court held, in substance, that:

Even if CROs were not obliged to accept any particular call-out (and there was no umbrella contract), a contract could arise each time the CRO attended for an activity carrying remuneration.
The relationship during such attendance reflected a classic wage/work bargain: the CRO performed services under the MCA’s direction and, upon claim, the MCA was obliged to pay hourly remuneration (not merely reimburse expenses).
Labels in documentation (“volunteer”, “no mutuality of obligation”, “are not paid”) were not determinative where the reality included enforceable remuneration for work and obligations to follow reasonable instructions.

Lord Justice Bean delivered the principal reasoning; Lord Justice Popplewell and Lord Justice Stuart-Smith agreed, with Stuart-Smith LJ adding detailed analysis on intention to create legal relations and the statutory elements of worker status.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

South East Sheffield Citizens Advice Bureau v Grayson [2004] ICR 1138 (“Grayson”)

Grayson was the principal authority relied upon by the ET and the MCA to argue that “volunteer” arrangements are typically non-contractual and, at most, akin to a unilateral arrangement driven by public service rather than enforceable duty.

The Court of Appeal distinguished Grayson as a “true volunteer” case because the CAB volunteers were not paid (beyond travel expenses), meaning there was no wage/work bargain and no consideration of the kind typically evidencing enforceable contractual relations. By contrast, the MCA’s documents provided for hourly rate remuneration (at not less than NMW), with payslips, P60s, and P45s—features consistent with paid work.

Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5, [2021] 4 All ER 209

Uber BV v Aslam was treated as pivotal for two connected points:

Worker status is a matter of statutory interpretation, not merely enforcing contractual labels or structures.
The fact that an individual is free to work or not (no obligation to accept work; no obligations in the “gaps”) does not preclude worker status when actually working.

The Court used Uber to rebut the MCA’s argument that the absence of an overarching obligation to accept call-outs prevents worker status.

Professional Game Match Officials Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2025] 1 All ER 289 (the “Match Officials case”)

The Court considered this Supreme Court decision decisive reinforcement: even where there is no obligation to offer or accept engagements, and even where cancellation may occur up to a late stage, the necessary conditions (mutuality and control) can exist during the period of paid work.

The Court said the Match Officials case “puts the correct answer… beyond doubt”, supporting the conclusion that CROs can be workers during periods of attendance notwithstanding the absence of obligations between attendances.

Nursing and Midwifery Council v Somerville [2022] ICR 755

Nursing and Midwifery Council v Somerville was relied upon (i) to reject the proposition that lack of obligation to make oneself available is inconsistent with worker status when working, and (ii) to confirm that the ability to withdraw or cancel does not negate the existence of mutual obligations while the contract subsists.

James v Redcats (Brands) Ltd [2007] ICR 1006

James v Redcats (Brands) Ltd supplied a key analytical distinction: the absence of a contract “in the gaps” says nothing about status “when working.” This directly supported the Court’s approach of focusing on each paid attendance rather than requiring an umbrella contract.

X v Mid-Sussex CAB [2011] ICR 460

X v Mid-Sussex CAB provided the cautionary principle that “volunteers come in many shapes and sizes” and status cannot be assumed. The Court used this to resist the MCA’s attempt to treat “volunteer” as a legally conclusive category.

Autoclenz v Belcher [2011] ICR 1157

Autoclenz v Belcher was referenced to contrast cases where written documents may not reflect reality. Here, the Court considered the MCA documents broadly coherent with the practical operation on the ground—yet still not determinative insofar as they asserted “no contract” while providing paid remuneration.

McMeechan v Secretary Of State For Employment [1997] ICR 549; Cornwall County Council v Prater [2006] EWCA Civ 102; [2006] ICR 731

These authorities, cited via Uber, underpinned the proposition that episodic or casual engagement can still generate worker (and sometimes employee) status during assignments even without ongoing obligations between assignments.

Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1967] 2 QB 497

Cited for the classic indicia of a contract of service and, in this judgment, as support for the idea that remuneration for work is a strong indicator of contractual intent, even if not conclusive of employment status.

Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 494

Cited to support the presumption that, in a business context, there is usually intention to create legal relations; the party asserting the contrary bears a heavy burden. This helped defeat the MCA’s argument that there was no legally enforceable arrangement despite structured remuneration.

Murray v CAB [2001] ICR 708

Used (in Stuart-Smith LJ’s reasoning) to reinforce that it is unsustainable to contend that a structured entitlement to payment creates no enforceable right.

Bates van Winkelhof v Clyde & Co LLP [2014] UKSC 32, [2014] 1 WLR 2047

Cited for the method: there is “no substitute” for applying the statutory definition to the facts; labels and generalisations about categories of work are insufficient.

Cotswold v Williams [2006] IRLR 181

Cited for the concept (via Langstaff J) of a wage/work bargain, which the Court found present here during remunerated activities.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Focus on the statutory test and the period of attendance: The Court confined itself to whether a CRO is a worker each time they attend an activity that carries a right to claim remuneration, expressly not deciding employee status or the existence of an umbrella contract.
Intention to create legal relations: Despite repeated references in the Volunteer Handbook and Code of Conduct to “no contract” and “entirely voluntary”, the Court found it “quite unreal” to deny legal relations where (i) the CRO performs services under instruction, and (ii) the MCA is obliged to pay upon a valid claim. Stuart-Smith LJ emphasised the implausibility of the MCA suggesting CROs would have no enforceable right if payment were refused.
Mutuality of obligation during the engagement: The Court rejected the MCA’s argument that mutuality was absent when the CRO attended for work. Mutuality existed in the basic exchange: the CRO must comply with reasonable instructions while on duty; the MCA must pay remuneration on receipt of a proper claim. The Court treated this as sufficient mutuality for “worker” status during the paid activity.
Remuneration, not mere expenses: The documents described payment as “remuneration” and “compensation for… disruption… and… unsocial hours callouts,” with hourly rates and payslips. The Court endorsed the EAT’s characterisation that compensation for interference with a person’s time is “the essence of remuneration,” distinguishing this from mere reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses (which, standing alone, commonly does not create worker status).
Freedom to accept work is not inconsistent with worker status: Drawing on Uber BV v Aslam and Nursing and Midwifery Council v Somerville, the Court held that lack of obligation to accept engagements does not prevent worker status when the individual is actually working.
“Volunteer” is not a legal trump card: The Court accepted that parties’ descriptions are relevant evidence, but not conclusive. Here, the operational reality (controlled performance and paid remuneration) outweighed repeated assertions of “voluntary” status.

3.3 Impact

The decision has potentially significant consequences for organisations that deploy “volunteers” in structured roles with paid attendance or hourly remuneration:

Status reclassification risk: Where individuals can claim hourly pay for attending duties, tribunals and courts may find worker status for those periods, even if the arrangement is labelled voluntary and even if there is no duty to accept future work.
Statutory rights exposure: A finding of “worker” status can trigger rights beyond accompaniment (the immediate context), including minimum wage compliance, paid holiday, protection from unlawful deductions, and whistleblowing protection (subject to the scope and qualifying rules of each regime).
Document drafting limitations: Attempting to negate contractual effect by stating “no contract” or “no mutuality” is unlikely to succeed where the same document suite creates a structured paid-for-services arrangement and operational control.
Engagement-by-engagement contracts: The Court’s approach legitimises “spot” or assignment-specific worker contracts in safety-critical and public service contexts, paralleling casual labour examples and the Supreme Court’s analysis in the Match Officials case.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Worker” (s 230(3)(b) Employment Rights Act 1996): A person who works under a contract (not necessarily employment) where they personally perform work/services for another who is not their client/customer. It sits between “employee” and genuinely self-employed independent contractor.
“Limb (b) worker”: Shorthand for the s 230(3)(b) category: individuals working under “any other contract” to personally perform work/services. Many statutory protections apply to this group.
Mutuality of obligation: The reciprocal exchange of obligations. Here, it was enough that during attendance the CRO must follow reasonable instructions and the MCA must pay remuneration upon a proper claim—mutuality need not exist between separate engagements.
Umbrella contract: A continuing contract that governs the relationship even between assignments. The Court did not need an umbrella contract; it was sufficient that a contract arose each time the CRO attended remunerated activities.
Intention to create legal relations: A requirement for a contract: the parties must intend their arrangement to be legally enforceable. In a structured paid-work setting, courts generally presume such intention despite “volunteer” language.
Remuneration vs expenses: “Expenses” reimburse costs incurred. “Remuneration” compensates time and work. The Court treated hourly compensation for attendance/disruption as remuneration, supporting a wage/work bargain.

5. Conclusion

Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Groom establishes and reinforces a clear principle: where “volunteers” undertake duties under an organisation’s direction and are entitled to claim hourly remuneration for attendance, a contract can arise for each remunerated engagement, making them “workers” under s 230(3)(b) Employment Rights Act 1996.

The Court’s reasoning aligns with modern authority—especially Uber BV v Aslam and the Supreme Court’s Professional Game Match Officials Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs Commissioners—confirming that the absence of ongoing obligations between engagements does not prevent worker status during the work itself. The label “volunteer” remains evidential, not determinative; the legal character follows the statutory test applied to the practical reality of the arrangement.