South East Sheffield Citizens Advice Bureau v. Grayson

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a decision made by an Employment Tribunal at Sheffield on 6 January 2003, chaired by Judge Trayler. The Appellant, Company A, challenged the tribunal's preliminary ruling concerning the jurisdiction to hear a discrimination claim brought by the Appellee, Plaintiff, a former employee of Company A.

Plaintiff was employed by Company A from September 2001 until March 2002 as a Home Visiting and Outreach Development Worker. She claimed that Company A discriminated against her on the grounds of disability under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, specifically citing rheumatoid arthritis as her disability. She alleged that Company A failed to make reasonable adjustments for her condition and that her dismissal amounted to discrimination.

Company A denied the discrimination claims and contended that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because it qualified for the small employer exemption under section 7(1) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, asserting it had fewer than 15 employees during Plaintiff’s employment.

The preliminary hearing focused solely on whether Company A was exempt under section 7 by virtue of having fewer than 15 employees. While Company A acknowledged having 11 paid employees, Plaintiff argued that certain volunteers and management committee directors should be counted as employees, potentially increasing the number beyond 15.

The tribunal examined whether the volunteers and directors were employees under the statutory definition of employment in section 68(1) of the Act, which includes employment under a contract of service or a contract personally to do any work.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the volunteers and management committee directors of Company A qualify as employees under section 68(1) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 for the purpose of determining the applicability of the small employer exemption under section 7.
2. If volunteers qualify as employees, whether Company A exceeded the 15-employee threshold, thus losing the exemption and allowing the tribunal jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s discrimination claim.
3. Whether the Volunteer Agreement between Company A and its volunteers created legally binding contractual obligations sufficient to establish employment relationships under the Act.
4. Whether the application of the small business exemption infringes Plaintiff’s rights under Article 6 and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Volunteer Agreement is not intended to create any legally binding contract or obligation between Company A and the volunteers.
• Neither Company A nor the volunteers sign the Volunteer Agreement, evidencing no intention to be legally bound.
• There is no basis to interpret the relationship as a contract of service or a contract imposing obligations on volunteers to personally perform work for Company A.
• Absence of an express statement disclaiming legal relations in the Agreement should not be construed as evidence of such relations.

Appellee's Arguments

• This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by emphasizing the fundamental nature of volunteer work as typically lacking a contractual obligation to perform services. It recognized that volunteers generally provide services without reward and may withdraw their services at will without legal consequence.

The court examined the Volunteer Agreement in detail, noting its language framed in terms of "reasonable expectations" rather than unqualified contractual obligations. The absence of signatures on the Agreement and the lack of express intention to create legal relations weighed against finding a contract of employment.

The tribunal had found that volunteers were contractually obliged to provide a minimum of six hours per week and that the consideration for this was training, supervision, experience, and indemnity against liability. The court rejected this reasoning, noting that no legal remedy existed for Company A if a volunteer failed to meet the minimum hours, and that the provision of training and experience did not constitute sufficient consideration to establish a contractual obligation to work.

The court found that the reimbursement of genuine expenses and indemnity against negligence claims could constitute a unilateral contract, but this did not impose an obligation on volunteers to perform work.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the Volunteer Agreement did not impose contractual obligations on volunteers to provide services and that volunteers retained the freedom to cease work without legal repercussions. Therefore, volunteers were not employees under the statutory definition.

The court also considered and dismissed Plaintiff’s human rights arguments under Articles 6 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, finding no denial of a fair trial or discriminatory infringement.

Holding and Implications

The court ALLOWED THE APPEAL, setting aside the Employment Tribunal’s decision. It held that Company A qualifies for the small business exemption under section 7 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 because it had fewer than 15 employees, as volunteers and directors are not employees under the statutory definition.

As a result, the Employment Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s discrimination claim. This decision directly affects the parties by terminating the claim’s progression at the tribunal level. No new legal precedent beyond the application of existing principles to the facts of volunteer status was established.