Objective-Credibility “Papers-Only” Appeals: When IPAT May Refuse an Oral Hearing Under s.43(b) Despite Credibility Dispute

Case: K.S. v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Anor [2026] IEHC 13 (Ferriter J)
Court: High Court of Ireland  |  Date: 15 January 2026  |  Context: Judicial review of IPAT refusal (accelerated “papers-only” appeal) in an Albanian blood-feud claim

1. Introduction

This judicial review challenged a decision of the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (“IPAT”) dated 23 May 2024 refusing refugee status and subsidiary protection to an Albanian applicant who claimed he was targeted in a blood feud. The applicant alleged a renewed feud culminating in an October 2022 attempted attack in Tirana and contended he would be killed if returned to Albania.

The case centrally concerned process rather than the merits: whether IPAT acted unlawfully by (i) refusing an oral hearing in an accelerated appeal under s.43 of the International Protection Act 2015, (ii) making adverse credibility findings said to be “new” and not previously put to the applicant (fair procedures/duty to co-operate), and (iii) allegedly breaching the credibility-assessment standards in IR v Minister for Justice [2015] 4 IR 144.

The applicant’s appeal was accelerated because the IPO report included a finding under s.39(4)(e) that Albania is a safe country of origin. Under s.43(b), such appeals are decided without an oral hearing unless IPAT considers it “not in the interests of justice” to do so.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Ferriter J refused all relief. The Court held:

• No legal error in refusing an oral hearing: the IPO rejection was not “demeanour”/personal-credibility based but rested on objective credibility concerns (internal inconsistencies, insufficiency of detail, and COI conflict). IPAT was entitled to decide the appeal on the papers.
• No unfair “new matters”: IPAT’s emphasis on vagueness and lack of detail did not amount to reliance on genuinely new credibility issues requiring advance notice; the substance of the credibility problem was already live from the IPO process and addressed (or capable of being addressed) in the notice of appeal.
• No breach of the IR principles: IPAT gave cogent reasons connected to the evidence; the Court would not impermissibly re-weigh the merits in judicial review.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

(a) The oral hearing question in safe-country / accelerated appeals

The judgment situates s.43(b) within a line of authority on the effectiveness and fairness of paper appeals where credibility is decisive:

• SUN v Refugee Applications Commissioner [2013] 2 IR 555: Cooke J framed when a paper-only appeal may be ineffective if the claim was rejected “purely because the applicant has been disbelieved when recounting” events that “could have taken place”. Ferriter J treats SUN as most compelling where the credibility rejection is “personal credibility” in the sense of hesitations/evasions/failures of recollection—i.e., demeanour-type factors.
• SK v IPAT [2021] IEHC 781: Ferriter J’s earlier decision applying SUN and aligning it with Supreme Court guidance in M.M. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] 1 ILRM 361. In K.S., Ferriter J reaffirms the same framework: the “interests of justice” under s.43(b) are more likely to require an oral hearing where credibility is disputed in the “classic sense” and the case turns on whether the narrative is believed.
• TB v International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2022] IEHC 275: Phelan J adopted the SUN/SK approach and (importantly) approved BW on “new concerns” arising on paper appeals. Ferriter J relies on TB as confirming these principles in the 2015 Act context.
• VZ v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 135 and VJ v Minister for Justice [2019] IESC 75: Cited by IPAT for the propositions that not all credibility issues require oral evidence and that what is required is an opportunity to make one’s case appropriate to its nature. Ferriter J considers IPAT’s broad legal summary fair and consistent with the case law.
• UP v Minister for Justice [2014] IEHC 567: Invoked by the applicant in support of an oral hearing; it forms part of the applicant-side narrative that credibility disputes can necessitate oral testing, but the Court ultimately treats the present case as falling on the “objective assessment on papers” side of the spectrum.

(b) “New credibility points” and fair procedures in papers-only appeals

The second major strand is whether IPAT can rely on concerns not previously raised, without giving the applicant a chance to respond.

• BW v RAT [2017] IECA 296: The key binding authority. Peart J held that even where there is no entitlement to an oral hearing, the applicant remains entitled to an effective appeal and fair procedures; where a “material concern” emerges for the first time on a paper appeal, the applicant must have an opportunity to address it (in writing or orally depending on context). Ferriter J treats BW as the controlling benchmark and articulates a “common sense” test: is it truly a new material issue, or merely different emphasis/characterisation on the same underlying material already in play?
• V.M. (Kenya) v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal & ors [2013] IEHC 24: Quoted within BW for “heightened vigilance” by courts reviewing documentary appeals. Ferriter J acknowledges this vigilance while still holding that no new issue arose here.
• Moyasola v RAC [2005] IEHC 218: Part of the jurisprudential background referenced in BW on the procedural fairness owed in asylum determinations.
• MA v RAT [2015] IEHC 528 and JH v IPAT [2018] IEHC 752: These suggest a robust view of the de novo nature of appeal and that IPAT need not “revert” merely because it draws negative credibility inferences from what the applicant already said. Ferriter J notes that to the extent of conflict, he is bound by BW, but he also narrows the dispute: K.S. is not a case where IPAT relied on unknown material or truly novel credibility concerns.

(c) Credibility assessment standards on judicial review

• IR v Minister for Justice [2015] 4 IR 144: Cooke J’s “10 principles” on credibility review. Ferriter J uses principles (4) and (5) as the applicant’s main yardstick, but holds IPAT rationally analysed and fairly weighed the evidence, with cogent reasons legitimately connected to the adverse findings.
• RA v RAT [2017] IECA 297: Cited as approving the IR principles. It reinforces that the High Court’s role is supervisory, not merits-based.
• Rana and Ali v Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 and GK v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418: Applied on the “engagement” complaint. The Court reiterates that decision-makers need not list every item considered; if a decision states all material was considered, the challenger must produce evidence (direct or inferential) that representations were ignored.

(d) EU law and the duty to co-operate

• Directive 2004/83/EC (Qualification Directive) and Directive 2005/85/EC (Procedures Directive): Provide the EU framework for fact-finding and procedural guarantees. Ferriter J links these to the domestic statutory duty to co-operate.
• Case C-726/21 X v IPAT: Confirmed as supporting the importance of the duty of cooperation and the possibility that the Tribunal may need to seek further information depending on circumstances. Ferriter J notes s.44 empowers IPAT to seek further enquiries, but finds no trigger for that duty on the facts.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The operational rule on when an oral hearing is required under s.43(b)

The judgment clarifies how s.43(b)’s “interests of justice” discretion should be applied in accelerated (including safe country of origin) appeals:

• Not all credibility disputes require oral hearings. Where credibility concerns are capable of objective paper assessment—e.g., internal inconsistency, lack of coherence, insufficient detail, contradiction with COI—IPAT may legitimately refuse an oral hearing.
• The “demeanour/personal credibility” distinction matters. The Court treats SUN-type necessity as most acute where rejection was rooted in how the applicant presented orally (hesitation, evasiveness, recollection), rather than content-based implausibility.
• Applicant’s procedural opportunity is assessed holistically. Ferriter J emphasises the applicant had multiple opportunities to set out and clarify his case (questionnaire, s.35 interview, notice of appeal) and did not add further evidence/clarification despite knowing the IPO’s credibility concerns.

(b) “New findings” vs “different emphasis” on the same record

The applicant argued IPAT made new adverse findings (e.g., “vague” account of the blood feud; insufficient detail about how the feud resumed; inadequate detail about escape from attackers) without those being put to him.

Ferriter J’s response is practical and record-based:

• Substance over labels: although the IPO at one point described the blood-feud account as “sufficiently detailed”, the IPO’s adverse credibility case already included a central inconsistency about the applicant’s claimed lack of knowledge versus claimed family discussions once targeted. IPAT’s “vagueness/lack of detail” conclusions were intertwined with that same inconsistency and plausibility assessment—i.e., not a new issue requiring re-notification.
• Attack narrative detail: the IPO also criticised the lack of detail about the October 2022 incident and escape. IPAT’s similar critique was therefore not “new”, even if expressed in different terms.
• No iterative obligation: the Tribunal is not obliged to re-open submissions each time it characterises the same evidential deficits somewhat differently; otherwise, paper appeals could become an endless back-and-forth. The touchstone remains fairness: whether the applicant had a fair opportunity to meet material concerns.

(c) Duty to co-operate and s.44 enquiries

Ferriter J acknowledges the statutory and EU-law duty to co-operate (s.28(2), s.27) and IPAT’s power to seek further information (s.44). However, he holds there was no unfairness or legal necessity requiring IPAT to seek further information because:

• no genuinely new issue emerged for the first time at appeal stage;
• the credibility concerns were already apparent from the IPO report and process; and
• the applicant did not provide additional evidence/clarification in the notice of appeal to warrant further enquiry.

(d) The limits of judicial review in credibility disputes

The Court repeatedly returns to the boundary drawn by IR: judicial review is not a merits appeal. Once IPAT’s reasons are connected to the evidence, rationally analysed, and not speculative, the High Court will not re-assess plausibility.

3.3 Impact

• Clarifies s.43(b) in practice: This decision strengthens the proposition that an oral hearing is not “the default” simply because credibility is disputed; rather, the decisive question is whether credibility depends on demeanour/personal credibility or whether it can be determined objectively on the record.
• Frames “new issue” analysis in common-sense terms: It reinforces that BW protects applicants against truly new, material credibility concerns on paper appeals, but does not prevent IPAT from adopting different emphases or a more “nuanced” characterisation of the same defects already raised.
• Practical consequence for appellants: Where an IPO report points to deficiencies in detail, coherence, and consistency, appellants seeking an oral hearing (or seeking to avoid an adverse paper decision) will likely need to identify concretely what additional evidence/clarification they would provide and why it cannot fairly be assessed without oral testing.
• Institutional consequence for IPAT: The judgment supports robust paper determinations where the credibility case is documentary/analytic; but it implicitly underscores the continuing need to be alert to BW-type “new concern” situations and to use written queries or an oral hearing where fairness requires.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Judicial review vs appeal: Judicial review checks legality/fairness/reasoning process; it does not decide whether the applicant is truthful or should receive protection on the merits.
• “Papers-only” (no oral hearing) appeal under s.43(b): In certain accelerated appeals (including safe country of origin cases), IPAT decides from the file unless it would be against the “interests of justice” to do so.
• Personal credibility (demeanour) vs objective credibility: “Personal credibility” concerns how testimony is delivered (e.g., evasiveness, hesitation). “Objective” credibility concerns what is said—internal consistency, level of detail, plausibility, and consistency with external material (like COI).
• Duty to co-operate (s.28(2), s.27; EU law): The State and applicant share responsibility for establishing relevant elements. But it does not mean IPAT must continually request more material where the applicant has already had a fair opportunity to address known concerns.
• “New matter” on appeal (BW principle): If IPAT relies on a significant credibility concern that was never raised before and the applicant never had a fair chance to answer it, fairness may require IPAT to invite written submissions or convene an oral hearing.
• Refugee status vs subsidiary protection: Refugee status requires a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason; subsidiary protection covers real risk of “serious harm” even if not a Convention refugee.

5. Conclusion

K.S. v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Anor [2026] IEHC 13 consolidates a practical approach to s.43(b): an oral hearing is not required merely because credibility is central. Where the credibility rejection is grounded in objective documentary assessment—insufficiency of detail, inconsistency, implausibility, and COI conflict—IPAT can lawfully decide on the papers. The decision also delineates the boundary of BW v RAT [2017] IECA 296: fairness requires an opportunity to answer truly new, material concerns, but does not prevent IPAT from reaching adverse findings by placing different emphasis on credibility problems already apparent in the record. Ultimately, the judgment reaffirms the supervisory nature of judicial review under the IR v Minister for Justice [2015] 4 IR 144 principles: the court polices legality and procedural fairness, not the merits of credibility.