No Suspensive Effect of Judicial Review on Deportation Orders under s.22 IPC Act 2015

Introduction

This commentary examines the High Court’s decision in GT v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Ors ([2025] IEHC 220), delivered by Ms. Justice Bolger on 28 March 2025. The case arose from the applicant’s urgent injunction application to restrain his deportation, scheduled for 19 March 2025, pending judicial review of decisions under s. 22 of the International Protection Act 2015 (“the Act”). The applicant, G.T., had exhausted his initial protection application and appeal (IPO and IPAT decisions of May and March 2023), then applied under s. 22 for consent to submit a fresh claim. Both the IPO and IPAT refused that application in February and March 2025. The question was whether (a) an injunction should issue under the Supreme Court’s test in Okunade v Minister for Justice, and (b) any suspensive effect of the first-instance s. 22 process extends into judicial review.

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court refused the injunction. Applying the Okunade principles, it held that:

No arguable case of real risk of serious harm upon return to Georgia was made out, adopting Phelan J.’s country-of-origin analysis.
There is no statutory or EU-law basis (Procedures Directive 2005/85/EC) for suspending a deportation order during judicial review of IPO/IPAT decisions under s. 22.
The applicant could, if successful on review, apply under s. 11 to revoke the deportation order and seek readmission.

Accordingly, Ms. Justice Bolger found the least risk of injustice lay in permitting deportation to proceed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court’s reasoning was framed by key authorities:

Okunade v Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform [2012] 3 IR 152
Established the four-stage injunctive relief test for deportation cases:
1. Arguable grounds (serious issue to be tried).
2. No adequate alternative remedy (damages usually inadequate in asylum context).
3. Balance of convenience/least risk of injustice.
4. Public interest and policy considerations.
Emphasises that the default is implementation of a prima facie valid deportation, modified only by weighty considerations of irremediable harm.
P.N.S (Cameroon) & Seredych v Minister for Justice
Confirm that s. 22 appeals do not carry automatic suspensive effect under the 2015 Act or the Procedures Directive; injunctive relief must be sought under domestic law principles.
CJEU Tall (C-563/13)
Aligns with Seredych on non-suspensive effect of national appeal procedures absent clear EU provision.
G.T. v Minister for Justice & Ors (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 154
Phelan J.’s recent judgment refused injunctive relief on the same facts, particularly on the absence of personal risk indicators in the country-of-origin material and no rights-based suspensive effect under EU law.

Legal Reasoning

Ms. Justice Bolger’s decision unfolded in three stages:

Application of Okunade
She confirmed that the applicant bore the burden of showing a real risk of irremediable harm upon return to Georgia and that the balance of convenience favored an injunction. The court accepted that damages were inadequate but found no cogent evidence of individualized risk.
No Suspensive Effect for Judicial Review
Echoing Phelan J., the court held that once the IPO decision issues, any suspensive effect of the s. 22 appeal ceases. EU law (Procedures Directive) does not require otherwise. A judicial-review application cannot prolong the stay without impermissible judicial law-making beyond the Act’s scheme.
Remedies Post-Deportation
The court noted that if the applicant succeeds on judicial review, he may apply for revocation of the deportation order under s. 11 and thereafter seek re-entry either by visa or informal arrival, at which point any remitted protection claim can be processed. This preserves effective access to remedy without restraining the initial deportation.

Impact

This decision clarifies and consolidates Irish law on injunctive relief and deportation orders in the international-protection context:

It reaffirms the narrow scope for injunctive relief—applicants must show personal, serious, irremediable harm.
It dispels any notion that judicial review alone suspends deportation; only explicit statutory or EU directive provisions can do so.
It highlights s. 11 revocation and re-entry mechanisms as adequate alternative remedies, reducing injunction applications’ strategic value.
Future appellants must frontload strong country-of-origin and personal risk evidence at the IPO/IPAT stage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Suspensive Effect: A legal provision that automatically delays enforcement (here, deportation) while an appeal or review is pending. Absent clear statutory or EU mandate, no suspensive effect exists.
Injunctive Relief Test (Okunade): A four-step test requiring (1) arguable grounds, (2) no adequate remedy, (3) balance of convenience, and (4) public interest. In asylum cases, due weight is given to the validity of the deportation decision.
Section 22, International Protection Act 2015: Allows failed applicants to seek ministerial consent for a fresh claim on new evidence. The appeal to IPAT does not automatically suspend removal.
Section 11 Revocation: Provides a post-removal mechanism to vacate a deportation order, permitting re-entry. It safeguards effective judicial review without halting all removals.

Conclusion

The High Court’s judgment in GT v IPAT & Ors establishes that:

Injunctions against deportation require clear evidence of individualized, serious harm and a balance of convenience favoring delay.
Judicial review of s. 22 decisions carries no automatic suspensive effect under Irish or EU law.
Effective alternative remedies—such as s. 11 revocation and re-entry procedures—satisfy access to justice without freezing deportations indefinitely.

This decision will guide litigants and courts in international protection cases by delineating the limited circumstances in which deportation can be stayed and affirming the procedural architecture designed by the Oireachtas.