No Proxy Remittances: Applicant-linked, year-by-year proof of residence required under the Long‑Term Undocumented Migrants Scheme

Commentary on VM v The Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 574 (High Court, Bradley J., 21 October 2025)

Introduction

This High Court judgment addresses the evidential standard for proving continuous residence under the Regularisation of Long‑Term Undocumented Migrants Scheme (the Scheme), an ex gratia, time‑limited program operated administratively by the Minister for Justice from 31 January 2022 to 31 July 2022. The applicant (VM), a Zimbabwean national who arrived in Ireland in 2010 and remained undocumented, challenged the Minister’s refusal (27 March 2023, upheld on appeal 1 December 2023) to grant her residence permission under the Scheme.

Identity was not in issue. The central question was whether VM furnished “satisfactory documentary evidence” demonstrating continuous undocumented residence for each year in the four‑year qualifying period immediately before the Scheme opened (2018–2021) and up to her application (6 July 2022). VM had little or no interaction with the State: no PPS number, tenancy or utility accounts, bank account, GP registration, or social protection records. Her case turned on a bundle of character references, church links, photographs, and crucially, remittance receipts showing her friend (SM) in Sligo sending funds to VM’s children in Zimbabwe, coupled with an affidavit and a letter asserting that the friend remitted monies “on VM’s behalf.” A MoneyGram receipt in March 2022 in VM’s own name was also furnished.

VM argued that the Minister misapplied the Scheme by:

• Treating the list of acceptable documents in Section 6 too strictly when it is expressly non‑exhaustive;
• Refusing to infer residence for 2018–2021 from earlier (2010–2017) evidence and the “totality” of circumstances;
• Discounting third‑party remittance proofs even when accompanied by corroboration (letters, certificates) that the transfers were for VM and her family.

Bradley J. rejected the challenge. The judgment clarifies key evidential principles for the Scheme: the year‑by‑year requirement is strict; “non‑exhaustive” does not mean “anything goes”; and “proof of money transfers between the applicant and a third party” requires evidence tying the transfer directly to the applicant as sender (or otherwise verifiably traceable to her), not merely to a third party remitter with an assertion that it was “on behalf of” the applicant.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Scheme is an administrative, ex gratia measure conferring a benefit; the Minister is entitled to define and apply eligibility criteria (paras 49–53).
• To qualify, VM had to show continuous residence for 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 and up to application on 6 July 2022 (paras 16–19, 40).
• While the list of acceptable proofs in Section 6 is “not exhaustive,” the evidence must be “sufficient and satisfactory,” verifiable, and show the applicant’s presence in each qualifying year (paras 11, 52–54, 62).
• Third‑party remittance receipts (from SM to VM’s children) do not prove “money transfers between the applicant and a third party” unless they verifiably link the applicant as the sender or otherwise directly connect the transactions to her presence in Ireland (paras 64–71, 75–77).
• Pre‑2018 material and letters/affidavits can play a supporting role but cannot substitute for applicant‑linked, year‑specific proof of residence in 2018–2021 (paras 62–64, 74, 77).
• The Minister’s process was fair; multiple opportunities were given to supply year‑by‑year proof; the evidential threshold was not “onerous” (paras 53–55, 72–73).
• Judicial review relief was refused; provisional costs to the successful Respondent, with liberty to make submissions (paras 79–81).

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court grounded its approach in a line of authority on administrative, ex gratia schemes where the Minister defines the criteria and eligibility:

• Bode v Minister for Justice [2008] 3 I.R. 663 (SC): The Supreme Court characterised such schemes as conferring a “gift” or benefit, not engaging legal rights in the same way as statutory entitlements. Courts do not rewrite or expand the scheme’s criteria and will review ministerial decisions on conventional public law grounds (error of law, unfairness, irrationality), not on the merits. Bradley J. adopts this frame (paras 49–51), emphasising that the Minister may set evidential thresholds and apply them strictly if rational and fairly communicated.
• Rana & Ali v Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 (SC): Reaffirms Bode’s principle of broad ministerial discretion in the administration of ex gratia schemes and the limited scope of judicial supervision. Bradley J. relies on this to underscore that courts will not convert a non‑exhaustive list into a free‑form evidential inquiry divorced from verifiability and the scheme’s own logic (para 47).
• AKR v Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 325 (Bolger J.) and E.L. v Minister for Justice [2024] IEHC 647 (O’Regan J.): These High Court decisions reflect consistent deference to the Minister’s criteria and application where the scheme is ex gratia and the Department has articulated clear documentary expectations. Bradley J. draws on this line to conclude the Minister was entitled to insist on applicant‑linked, year‑specific proof (para 47).
• MA v Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 135 (Heslin J.): Another decision on the same Regularisation Scheme, emphasising fidelity to the published criteria and the requirement of proof for each qualifying year. The present judgment aligns with MA in rejecting “in the round” arguments that would collapse the scheme’s year‑by‑year architecture (para 47).
• BB v Minister for Justice and Equality [2024] IECA 36 (CA, Ní Raifeartaigh J.): The Court of Appeal again distinguishes between decisions engaging legal rights and ex gratia benefits; in the latter category, proportionality review is correspondingly narrow. Bradley J. follows the same restrained stance (para 47–49).

Collectively, these authorities shape two controlling propositions applied here: (i) the Minister sets the evidential yardstick for an ex gratia scheme and may apply it strictly; and (ii) judicial review tests legality and fairness of process, not whether the court would have accepted the same documentary bundle as “enough.”

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) The scheme’s evidential architecture: specific, annualised, and applicant-linked

• Annualised requirement: The Scheme required proof of continuous residence in each of 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021, plus up to the application date (paras 16–19, 40). The Court rejected arguments that residence in earlier years (2010–2017) could, by inference or “in the round,” stand in for shortfalls within the qualifying window (paras 63–64, 74).
• Non‑exhaustive but verifiable: Section 6 lists acceptable proofs and states the list “is not exhaustive,” but also that the Minister may accept “other forms of verifiable evidence, where appropriate,” and that letters from friends/neighbours “will not be accepted as the only proof” (paras 11, 62). Bradley J. interprets this as permitting flexibility at the margins, not a relaxation of the requirement that proof be objectively verifiable and tied to the applicant for each year.
• Meaning of “proof of money transfers between the applicant and a third party”: The Court construes this as requiring evidence that the applicant is the sender (or that the transaction is otherwise verifiably attributable to the applicant) at a money transfer facility in the State (paras 41, 60–71, 75–77). Remittances by a friend, even if claimed to be “on behalf of” the applicant, do not, without more, prove the applicant’s own presence or activity in the State in the relevant year.

b) Assessment of VM’s documentary bundle

• Third‑party remittances (2018–2021): Receipts showed SM (not VM) remitting money to VM’s son and son‑in‑law in Zimbabwe in each of the qualifying years. The Minister was entitled to treat these as insufficient because they did not identify VM as the sender or otherwise verifiably link the transfers to VM (paras 65–71, 75–77).
• Pre‑window remittances (2016–2017): A Western Union receipt in VM’s own name in 2017 and an SM‑to‑child transfer in 2016 were outside the qualifying period and could not prove residence for 2018–2021 (paras 60–63).
• Single in‑window transfer (March 2022): A MoneyGram receipt in VM’s name from March 2022 did not repair the absence of evidence for 2018–2021 (para 70, 76).
• Letters and affidavits: Character references and affidavits can support, but not replace, verifiable documentary proof for each year (paras 62–64, 74, 77). The Department’s published Note to Section 6 was given full effect.

c) Procedural fairness and Ministerial latitude

• The Department invited additional material twice (2 March and 15 March 2023) and gave links to the criteria. VM’s solicitor candidly explained the lack of State‑facing documentation. The Court held the process was fair and the requirements “not onerous” in context (paras 53–55, 72–73).
• Within an ex gratia framework, the Minister may insist on “sufficient and satisfactory” proofs. The Court saw no legal or factual error in the refusal, given the gap between what VM chose to rely upon and what the Scheme required (paras 73–77).

3) Impact and Practical Implications

a) Clarified evidential rule: “No proxy remittances”

The key clarifying effect of VM is the articulation of a practical rule for the Scheme: third‑party remittance receipts do not satisfy the “money transfer” proof unless the evidence verifiably attributes the transaction to the applicant (for example, as sender with name and Irish address, or by objective traceability tying the applicant to the transfer). This is significant for applicants who rely on community support where a friend with documentation remits on their behalf.

b) The year‑by‑year architecture is strict

Applicants must assemble applicant‑linked evidence for each qualifying year. Pre‑window proof, holistic community attestations, and photographs may lend context but cannot displace the annualised, verifiable documentary requirement.

c) “Non‑exhaustive” does not dilute verifiability

Although the list of documents in Section 6 is not exhaustive, flexibility operates only within the guardrails of verifiability and applicant‑specific attribution. Letters and affidavits are supporting only; they cannot be the “only proof.”

d) Anticipated effects on future cases

• Undocumented applicants with minimal State footprint will need to prioritise generating or retrieving applicant‑named, date‑specific proofs (e.g., money transfer receipts in their name, bank/building society statements with activity, medical or school correspondence, RTB records where possible).
• Legal advisers should avoid relying on proxy remittances absent additional, objective linkage to the applicant (e.g., contemporaneous authorisations, receipts showing the applicant as sender or direct bank transfers from an account in the applicant’s name).
• The Minister may continue to apply a strict year‑by‑year lens. Attempts to aggregate non‑verifiable material into a holistic “balance of probabilities” narrative are unlikely to succeed without applicant‑linked, year‑specific anchors.

e) Relationship with other remedies

The judgment underscores that refusal under this ex gratia Scheme does not preclude a separate application under section 3 of the Immigration Act 1999 (para 51). VM had in fact made such representations; their outcome was not before the Court, and potential mootness was noted but not engaged (para 38).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Ex gratia scheme: A discretionary, non‑statutory program that confers a benefit by the executive. It does not create legal entitlement. Courts review for legality and fairness of process, not to substitute their own view of the merits.
• Judicial review: A process to challenge the lawfulness of a decision. It examines whether the decision‑maker acted within power, considered relevant matters, and observed fair procedures. It does not re‑try the facts or re‑weigh evidence.
• Continuous residence (qualifying period): Here, proof was required for each year 2018–2021, and up to the application date. Evidence from earlier years cannot “stand in” for a missing year within the qualifying window.
• Non‑exhaustive list of proofs: The Department listed common acceptable documents but allowed other verifiable evidence. “Non‑exhaustive” does not remove the requirement that proof be objectively verifiable and tied to the applicant for each qualifying year.
• Money transfer proof: The policy’s phrase “between the applicant and a third party … in the State (e.g., Western Union)” is construed to require the applicant’s own transactions (e.g., as sender with Irish location). A friend’s remittance is not, without more, proof that the applicant sent the funds or that she was in Ireland in that year.
• Supporting vs. primary evidence: Letters from friends, neighbours, church leaders, and affidavits can corroborate but cannot be the sole proof of residence for the required years.

Conclusion

VM v Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 574 consolidates the High Court’s approach to the Regularisation of Long‑Term Undocumented Migrants Scheme. It does not expand or contract the Scheme; rather, it clarifies its evidential spine:

• Proof must be applicant‑linked, verifiable, and year‑specific;
• Proxy or third‑party remittances are insufficient absent verifiable linkage to the applicant;
• Pre‑window material and testimonial letters play a supporting, not determinative, role;
• The Minister, administering an ex gratia scheme, may apply these criteria strictly, provided the process is fair and rationally anchored to the published policy.

For practitioners and applicants, the judgment offers concrete guidance: build a documentary record that names the applicant, locates her in Ireland, and covers each qualifying year. Remittances should originate in the applicant’s name (with Irish address/ID linkage) or be otherwise objectively traceable to her. Absent that, “in the round” narratives and community attestations will not overcome the Scheme’s year‑by‑year evidential demands.

On the broader legal canvas, VM sits squarely within the Bode and Rana & Ali line: ministerial discretion in ex gratia schemes is robust, and judicial oversight is correspondingly restrained. The decision’s practical resonance lies in its clear message to future applicants: the proof must be yours, and it must speak—clearly and verifiably—for each year that counts.