No Proactive Monitoring Injunctions Under the Digital Services Act and No Automatic Right to Reinstatement: Farina v X Internet UC [2025] IEHC 514

Introduction

This High Court of Ireland decision, Farina v X Internet Unlimited Company [2025] IEHC 514 (Barrett J., 24 September 2025), addresses whether a social media user can obtain, at the interlocutory stage, a mandatory injunction compelling a platform (X, formerly Twitter) to (i) reinstate a suspended account and (ii) proactively block or prevent impersonation accounts or accounts with confusingly similar names from appearing.

The plaintiff, Mr Eduardo Jardel Furlan Farina, operated a successful cryptocurrency-focused presence on X and other platforms. His verified X account was suspended in July 2025, following an acknowledged instance of impersonation committed by him in March 2022, contrary to X’s terms of service ([7], [9], [13], [32]). He also complained of widespread impersonation of his brand by third-party accounts on X. He sought interlocutory relief: (a) an order restraining continued suspension (which, in substance, required reinstatement), and (b) an order requiring X to proactively suspend, block or prevent impersonation or confusingly similar accounts ([1]–[3]).

Barrett J refused the interlocutory injunctions and vacated an interim order earlier granted ex parte (and then stayed). The judgment clarifies the stringent standard for mandatory interlocutory relief, applies the Digital Services Act (DSA) prohibition on general monitoring to platform moderation orders, and contains notable observations on the acceptability of AI-generated responses to legal correspondence.

Summary of the Judgment

Nature of relief: Both reinstatement and proactive blocking are mandatory injunctions, requiring positive steps by X ([2]).
Merits threshold: The plaintiff failed to establish the “strong case” required for mandatory interlocutory relief (Maha Lingham v HSE; Ryanair v Skyscanner) ([30]–[31]).
Contractual foundation: No express term or settled duty was identified obliging X to reinstate the account or proactively monitor/block impersonators; any implied duty was not established on the evidence ([28], [31]).
Proportionality/free expression: While exclusion from a major platform can raise freedom of expression questions (citing Douez v Facebook), the plaintiff did not make a strong case that suspension disproportionately curtailed such rights, given admitted impersonation and availability of other channels ([19]–[21]).
Adequacy of damages: The plaintiff’s losses were quantified and other revenue streams continued; damages would be an adequate remedy if he ultimately succeeds ([26]–[28]).
Balance of convenience: The proposed proactive monitoring order posed significant burdens and risks, including wrongful suspensions and third-party freedom of expression concerns, whereas the plaintiff’s loss was essentially quantifiable ([18], [34]).
DSA Article 8: The proactive monitoring relief would impose a general monitoring or active fact-finding obligation prohibited by Article 8 DSA and contrary to CJEU authority (Glawischnig-Piesczek; Peterson/YouTube and Cyando). On the application as framed, incompatibility with Article 8 was “unavoidable” ([35]–[37]).
Status quo: Equity does not preserve a status quo tainted by breach; restoring the account would reinstate a position the plaintiff had no continuing entitlement to after admitted impersonation ([39]).
AI-generated correspondence: There is no legal requirement that a solicitor’s letter be answered by a human; it is legitimate for a platform to use AI or automated systems to respond to legal correspondence ([16]).
Order: Interlocutory relief refused; stayed interim order vacated; costs to be heard later ([40]–[42]).

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Merck Sharp and Dohme Corp. v Clonmel Healthcare Ltd [2020] 2 IR 1: Reaffirms that interlocutory injunctions aim to provide a just solution pending trial. This frames the court’s approach to interim restraint but is applied with caution for mandatory orders ([30]).

Maha Lingham v HSE [2005] IESC 89: Sets the heightened threshold for mandatory interlocutory relief—applicants must show at least a “strong case” that they are likely to succeed at trial ([30]). This standard is central to the refusal here.

Ryanair DAC v Skyscanner Ltd & Ors [2022] IECA 64: Summarizes interlocutory principles, including preserving the status quo ante if all else is even. Barrett J adds an important nuance: the “status quo” must be a lawful baseline; equity will not preserve a state of affairs “tainted by breach” ([39]).

Douez v Facebook, Inc. [2017] 1 SCR 751 (SCC): Recognizes the public importance of social media to free expression and democratic participation. Barrett J cites Douez to acknowledge that exclusion from major platforms can, in principle, raise free expression issues, but he finds no strong case that such rights were disproportionately curtailed on the record here ([19]–[21]).

Digital Services Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065), Article 8: Prohibits imposing general monitoring or active fact-finding obligations on intermediary service providers. The judge treats the proposed proactive monitoring injunction as amounting to a general monitoring obligation that Article 8 squarely prohibits ([35]–[37]).

Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Ltd, Case C-18/18: CJEU allows targeted removal obligations (including “equivalent” content) where sufficiently specific, but rejects general monitoring. Supports the conclusion that an open-ended proactive monitoring and blocking order is impermissible.

Peterson v Google LLC & Ors (Joined Cases C-682/18 and C-683/18): Confirms, in the platform-liability context, limits on imposing general monitoring and clarifies knowledge/active role thresholds. Cited to reinforce the DSA-consistent refusal to impose broad proactive obligations on platforms ([35]).

Legal Reasoning

1) Characterisation of the relief and the “strong case” threshold

Although framed negatively as a restraint, the requested orders would have required X to take positive steps: reinstating a suspended account and actively suppressing new or confusingly similar impersonation accounts. Barrett J therefore classifies both limbs as mandatory injunctive relief ([2]). This triggers the heightened standard from Maha Lingham: the applicant must establish at least a strong case likely to succeed at trial ([30]).

2) Contractual and legal foundation: no express duty, no workable implied duty

The plaintiff showed no contractual term binding X to reinstate his account or to proactively police impersonation beyond its published processes. Nor was any coherent implied duty established. The court notes that X provides defined reporting channels (with identity verification) precisely because of scale and the need to process complaints efficiently and reliably ([11]–[12]). Without a clear term or recognized duty, the merits were not strong enough to justify mandatory relief ([28], [31]).

3) Equity and the plaintiff’s own impersonation

The plaintiff admitted an earlier instance of impersonation in March 2022, contrary to the platform rules ([7], [9], [13], [32]). The court does not treat this as an automatic bar to equitable relief but frames it as a significant factor: “he who seeks equity must do equity” ([8]). This weighs against reinstatement and informs the court’s status quo analysis.

4) Proportionality, freedom of expression, and alternative avenues

Recognizing that major platforms can be central to modern speech and association (Douez), the court nonetheless requires a strong case that suspension is a disproportionate interference with rights. On the current record, that threshold is unmet: the plaintiff admitted impersonation, and he retains significant alternative channels (TikTok, YouTube, a training website, and diversified revenue streams) ([6], [20]–[21], [26]–[27]). The court also emphasizes its role at the interlocutory stage to avoid rendering rights nugatory, but maintains the mandated “strong case” threshold for mandatory relief ([21]).

5) Adequacy of damages and balance of convenience

The plaintiff quantified monthly losses allegedly flowing from the suspension. This strongly suggests losses are compensable in damages if he ultimately succeeds ([26]–[28]). By contrast, the proposed proactive monitoring order would expose X to reputational and legal risks from false positives and could impact innocent users’ freedom of expression ([18], [34]). The balance of convenience did not favour granting the injunctions.

6) The Digital Services Act and the prohibition on general monitoring

Article 8 DSA prohibits imposing general monitoring or active fact-finding obligations on intermediaries. The court accepts uncontroverted evidence of scale, dynamism (usernames/display names/biographies change), and the technical limits and risks of automated detection for nuanced impersonation, all of which mean that the proposed relief would likely require constant, platform-wide monitoring and human review to make subjective judgments ([18], paras 55–67). On the application as framed, “a finding of incompatibility with Art.8 is, with respect, unavoidable” ([37]).

Related CJEU case law (Glawischnig-Piesczek; Peterson/YouTube and Cyando) underpins the distinction between permissible, specific, notice-based obligations and impermissible general monitoring ([35]). The plaintiff did not offer a narrow, workable formulation that would avoid the Article 8 prohibition, and the court declines to redesign the relief for him ([37]).

7) The lawful status quo

Ryanair’s “status quo ante” principle assists only where it preserves a lawful baseline. Here, reinstatement would restore a state of affairs the plaintiff had no continuing entitlement to, given admitted breach of platform rules through impersonation. Equity will not preserve or restore a position “tainted by breach” ([39]).

8) Procedural and evidential points

Unsworn affidavits: Given urgency, the court had regard to unsworn affidavits as though sworn, but disregarded a stand-alone solicitor’s letter not exhibited on affidavit ([10], [33]).
Submissions versus evidence: Counsel’s assertions about what platform technology can do (e.g., analogies to child protection monitoring) cannot substitute for sworn evidence where the platform’s affidavit evidence is uncontroverted ([22]).
AI-generated correspondence: The court declined to censure X for using automated or AI-generated responses to legal correspondence; there is no legal requirement that replies be human-authored, particularly given the platform’s scale ([16]).

Impact and Future Significance

1) Social media injunctions: a higher bar and a narrower path

This judgment signals that Irish courts will apply the “strong case” threshold rigorously to mandatory interlocutory relief against platforms. Applicants seeking reinstatement must:

Identify a clear legal entitlement (contractual, statutory, or otherwise) to reinstatement or the specific moderation sought;
Demonstrate that damages are inadequate and that harm is irreparable or rights-critical on a strong evidential record; and
Where proactive moderation is sought, propose a narrowly tailored, specific order that avoids the DSA’s prohibition on general monitoring and minimizes collateral impact on third parties.

2) DSA Article 8 in Irish litigation

The judgment is an early and clear articulation, in an Irish High Court social-media context, that broad “proactive monitoring” injunctions are likely to be incompatible with Article 8 DSA. Litigants must focus on notice-and-action mechanisms and concrete, particularized obligations (e.g., relating to specific content, accounts, or identifiers) rather than open-ended duties to police the platform.

3) Freedom of expression and platform access

While the court accepts that platform exclusion can implicate free expression, applicants must present concrete evidence showing why a particular platform is indispensable to their speech and why alternative channels are inadequate. Bare assertions are insufficient at the interlocutory stage, especially where the platform has legitimate rule-enforcement reasons for suspension and offers an appeal mechanism ([13], [20]–[21]).

4) Third-party rights and collateral effects

The court’s emphasis on risks to innocent users’ accounts and free expression will weigh heavily in the balance of convenience against wide moderation injunctions. Orders that risk sweeping in legitimate users or require subjective, ongoing judgments by the platform will face headwinds.

5) Evidence, not extrapolation

Platform-scale affidavits detailing operational constraints and risks carry real weight if uncontested. Applicants should anticipate this with expert evidence, data, and concrete, auditable proposals for narrowly targeted relief. Counsel’s analogies or technological assumptions, without evidential grounding, will not suffice ([22]).

6) Professional practice: AI correspondence is acceptable

It is notable that the court expressly recognized the legitimacy of AI or automated systems in responding to legal correspondence. Absent some separate legal duty, courts will not sanction parties for using such tools, particularly at platform scale ([16]).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Interim vs interlocutory vs mandatory injunction:
- Interim injunction: short-term, often ex parte, preserving position until a fuller hearing.
- Interlocutory injunction: pending trial, granted after hearing both sides.
- Mandatory injunction: compels positive action (e.g., reinstate an account). It requires a “strong case” likely to succeed at trial.
“Strong case” vs “serious issue to be tried”:
- Serious issue: a lower threshold often applied to prohibitory injunctions.
- Strong case: higher threshold applied to mandatory injunctions; the applicant must show a high likelihood of ultimate success.
Adequacy of damages: If the applicant’s loss can be fairly compensated with money (and is reasonably quantifiable), an injunction is less likely.
Status quo ante: The baseline the court may preserve pending trial. Equity will not preserve or restore an unlawful or breach-tainted status quo.
DSA Article 8 (No general monitoring): EU law bars courts from imposing broad, ongoing duties on intermediaries to proactively monitor users or hunt for infringing content/accounts. Targeted, specific obligations on notice can be permissible; open-ended “police the platform” orders are not.
“He who seeks equity must do equity”: A party seeking equitable relief must come with clean hands. A past breach (e.g., admitted impersonation) does not automatically defeat relief, but it counts heavily in the balance.

Conclusion

Farina v X Internet UC clarifies several important points in the fast-evolving law of platform governance and interim remedies:

Mandatory interlocutory relief against platforms—especially reinstatement orders and broad proactive moderation duties—faces a high bar. Applicants must demonstrate a strong merits case and the inadequacy of damages.
The Digital Services Act’s prohibition on general monitoring is a decisive constraint. Open-ended “proactive monitoring” or “blocking of confusingly similar accounts” is likely unlawful unless framed in narrowly specific, evidence-backed terms consistent with EU law and CJEU authority.
Freedom of expression arguments are recognized in principle but will require a robust evidential showing of indispensability and disproportionality; mere assertions or business inconvenience will not suffice at the interlocutory stage.
Equity will not restore a status quo tainted by admitted breach of platform rules, and courts will be slow to interfere where a platform’s terms, enforcement mechanisms, and appeals processes exist.
Courtroom practice is evolving: AI-generated correspondence is not inherently improper or sanctionable, particularly in large-scale platform operations.

Ultimately, the High Court refused the interlocutory injunction and vacated the interim order, emphasizing that the applicant had not established the strong case necessary for mandatory relief, that damages were adequate, and that the proposed proactive monitoring obligation would, in substance, contravene the DSA. The judgment sets an important benchmark for litigation at the intersection of private platform governance, EU digital regulation, and equitable remedies in Ireland.