No Duty to Cooperate in a Vacuum: Triggering the State’s Obligations in Safe Country of Origin Cases – Commentary on I.A. & M.M. v IPAT [2025] IEHC 672

No Duty to Cooperate in a Vacuum: Triggering the State’s Obligations in Safe Country of Origin Cases

1. Introduction

This commentary analyses the judgment of the High Court of Ireland in I.A. v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Ors; M.M. v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Ors [2025] IEHC 672, delivered by Gillane J. on 1 December 2025.

The case concerns two related judicial review proceedings brought by a married couple, both Georgian nationals, challenging a decision of the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (“IPAT”). The Tribunal had upheld the refusal of their applications for international protection on the basis that:

  • Georgia is a designated “safe country of origin”; and
  • the applicants had not submitted “serious grounds” for considering Georgia unsafe in their particular circumstances.

The challenge did not concern credibility, which had been ultimately resolved in the applicants’ favour, nor did it concern the absence of an oral hearing. Instead, the applicants focused on a single, tightly framed complaint: that IPAT breached its duty to cooperate (derived from Article 4 of Directive 2004/83/EC) by failing, of its own motion, to assemble and consider country of origin information (COI) relating to religiously motivated persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Georgia.

On that basis, they sought an order of certiorari quashing the Tribunal’s conclusion that state protection was available in Georgia and that the presumption of safety under the “safe country of origin” scheme had not been rebutted. A separate relief seeking remittal of the state protection issue was abandoned at hearing, leaving only the certiorari issue.

The High Court dismissed the applications. In doing so, it set out a significant clarification of the threshold for triggering the State’s duty to cooperate in cases involving a safe country of origin designation. The judgment establishes that the duty to cooperate:

  • is not free-standing or theoretical; and
  • only arises where an applicant has at least identified or indicated “serious grounds” (or “serious counter-indications”) in their own case which put the safe-country presumption in issue.

The decision therefore reinforces the principle that asylum seekers are not passive participants in the process and must, at minimum, articulate the line of challenge on which the duty to cooperate is to operate.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Factual and procedural background

  • The applicants, Georgian nationals, married in May 2022 and arrived in Ireland on 21 May 2022, seeking international protection on 24 May 2022.
  • Their claims centred on threats, violence and intimidation allegedly directed at them by members of the wife’s family in Georgia, in opposition to their relationship and marriage.
  • At first instance, the International Protection Office (IPO) rejected the claims. On appeal, the Tribunal upheld the refusal on the basis that:
    • Georgia is a “safe country of origin” under s.72 of the International Protection Act 2015; and
    • state protection was available; the applicants had not advanced serious grounds to dislodge the safe-country presumption in their circumstances.
  • The Tribunal did, however, find that the applicants’ fear of persecution had a nexus to religion for the purposes of s.8 of the 2015 Act, because one reason for the wife’s family’s disapproval was that I.A.’s parents are Jehovah’s Witnesses.
  • In judicial review, the applicants argued that:
    • the Tribunal relied too heavily on the safe-country designation;
    • it failed to comply with the EU-law duty to cooperate, by not proactively sourcing relevant COI regarding religious minorities (especially Jehovah’s Witnesses) and domestic violence in Georgia; and
    • had that duty been respected, the outcome “might have been different”, referencing X v IPAT [2024] IEHC 551.

2.2 Issues for determination

The central questions were:

  1. What is the nature and scope of the State’s duty to cooperate under Article 4 of Directive 2004/83/EC in the Irish international protection process?
  2. In the context of a “safe country of origin” designation, when is that duty triggered?
  3. Did the Tribunal breach that duty by not assembling further COI, even though the applicants had never clearly advanced a case that Georgia was unsafe for them because of their association with Jehovah’s Witnesses?

2.3 Outcome

The High Court held:

  • The application was misconceived.
  • The applicants had never, at any stage (questionnaire, interviews, appeal notice, or submissions), submitted “serious grounds” for considering Georgia not to be a safe country of origin in their particular circumstances, whether on religious grounds or otherwise.
  • The duty to cooperate is conditional on the applicant first putting forward at least some “serious grounds” or “serious counter-indications” in their own case that call the safe-country presumption into question. That threshold, while low, must be crossed.
  • In the absence of such grounds, the duty to cooperate was not engaged, and therefore could not have been breached.
  • Given that conclusion, it was unnecessary to consider:
    • whether the decision “might have been different” had the duty been fulfilled (the test suggested in X v IPAT); or
    • the new COI extracts (Freedom House, Public Defender of Georgia, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights) invoked for the first time in the judicial review affidavits.
  • The application for certiorari was refused, and costs were awarded to the respondents, subject to a short stay.

3. Legal Framework and Concepts

3.1 Safe country of origin: Sections 72 and 33 of the 2015 Act

Section 72 of the International Protection Act 2015 allows the Minister to designate a country as a safe country of origin, but only where satisfied that, having regard to:

  • the legal situation;
  • application of the law in a democratic system; and
  • the general political circumstances,

it can be shown that generally and consistently there is no persecution, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or indiscriminate violence. The Minister’s assessment must take account of:

  • the country’s laws and how they are applied;
  • respect for ECHR, ICCPR and UNCAT rights;
  • observance of the non-refoulement principle; and
  • availability of effective remedies.

Section 33 then applies that designation to individual cases:

  • A designated country is to be treated as a safe country of origin for a particular applicant only if:
    • it is their country of origin; and
    • they have not submitted any serious grounds for considering the country not to be safe in their particular circumstances.

Jointly, these provisions create a rebuttable presumption of safety. The presumption arises from the Minister’s general assessment, and the onus then shifts to the applicant to show, by means of “serious grounds” in their own case, why that presumption should not apply to them.

3.2 EU law background: Procedures Directive

Section 33 reflects Article 31 of Council Directive 2005/85/EC (“the Procedures Directive”), which provides that a designated safe country may only be considered safe for a particular applicant where they have not submitted “any serious grounds for considering the country not to be a safe country of origin in his/her particular circumstances”.

Recital 17 explains the rationale:

A key consideration for the well-foundedness of an asylum application is the safety of the applicant in his/her country of origin… Where a third country can be regarded as a safe country of origin, Member States should be able to designate it as safe and presume its safety for a particular applicant, unless he/she presents serious counter-indications.

Recital 21 emphasises that designation can never be an “absolute guarantee” of safety and that:

where an applicant shows that there are serious reasons to consider the country not to be safe in his/her particular circumstances, the designation of the country as safe can no longer be considered relevant for him/her.

These recitals firmly ground the Irish statutory language (“serious grounds”) in the concept of “serious counter-indications” to the presumption of safety.

3.3 Duty to cooperate: Article 4 of the Qualification Directive

Article 4 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualification Directive) governs assessment of facts and circumstances in international protection claims. It provides, in essence, that:

  • Member States may treat it as the applicant’s duty to submit all elements necessary to substantiate the application as soon as possible.
  • “In cooperation with the applicant” it is the duty of the Member State to assess the relevant elements.
  • The assessment must be individualised and take into account:
    • all relevant facts regarding the country of origin;
    • the applicant’s statements and documentation; and
    • the applicant’s individual position and personal circumstances.

The “duty to cooperate” is thus conceived as shared between the applicant and the decision-maker. The core interpretive dispute in this case is how far that duty extends and when it is activated, particularly in the context of a safe country of origin.

4. The Applicants’ Case and the Respondents’ Answer

4.1 The applicants’ account as presented to IPO and IPAT

Both applicants completed IPO questionnaires and underwent interviews with interpreters. The core of their claims, as recorded, was as follows:

  • I.A. stated that he left Georgia because his wife’s family did not accept their relationship. Her uncle (described as dangerous, with a criminal history) allegedly threatened and assaulted him, and other relatives were opposed to the marriage. He said they could not go to the police because “a lot of the relatives were involved” and “there were so many people we couldn't go to the police.”
  • He mentioned, almost in passing, that one of the reasons the family did not like his family was that his parents had converted to Jehovah’s Witnesses, but he did not frame this as the legal or factual core of his protection claim.
  • When asked about safety in a country designated as safe, he simply responded that politicians consider Georgia safe but he disagreed, pointing to domestic violence convictions of his wife’s uncles.
  • He explicitly selected “none of these” in response to the list of Refugee Convention grounds in the IPO questionnaire.

For M.M.:

  • She described danger from her own family, particularly an uncle who disapproved of her having a boyfriend and of the marriage. She referred to the beating of her husband and threats from two uncles.
  • When asked why her family did not like her husband, she said simply that “they didn’t like him” and “didn't want me to get married at all.”
  • She stated she could not go to the police because that would mean going against her family.
  • In relation to Georgia as a safe country, she responded in general terms that while recognised as safe, this was not true for everyone, citing domestic violence problems and her own lack of independence.
  • She too chose “none of these” as the applicable Convention grounds in the questionnaire.
  • Asked directly about religious issues, she said her uncles had a problem “before they knew about the religious aspect”.

On appeal, both applicants lodged identical notices of appeal, which:

  • did not assert that Georgia was not a safe country of origin in their case because of religious persecution or any specific systemic failure of state protection; and
  • focused largely on the need for an oral hearing to address IPO credibility findings (which the Tribunal ultimately resolved in their favour on the papers).

Critically, the appeal did not develop any argument that the safe-country presumption should be disapplied due to religious factors or otherwise; a general “reservation” of the right to add grounds (ground 8) was never acted upon.

4.2 The Tribunal’s findings

The Tribunal:

  • Accepted the applicants’ credibility and resolved previous adverse findings in their favour;
  • Found that religion was one of the reasons for the feared persecution, thereby establishing a nexus with a s.8 ground; but
  • Concluded that state protection was available in Georgia and that the applicants had not submitted serious grounds to displace the safe country of origin presumption.

4.3 The applicants’ legal arguments in judicial review

In the High Court, the applicants re-framed their case substantially. They contended that:

  • Their international protection claim was based on persecution linked to the religious faith of I.A.’s parents (as Jehovah’s Witnesses).
  • The Tribunal’s express finding that religion was a ground for the feared persecution meant that the case fell squarely within a Convention ground, making the safe-country question particularly sensitive.
  • Under Article 4 of the Qualification Directive and the CJEU ruling in M.M. v Minister for Justice (Case C‑277/11), the State had a strong duty to cooperate in assembling all elements needed to substantiate the claim. They placed heavy emphasis on the words “if, for any reason whatsoever, the elements provided… are not complete, up to date or relevant”, arguing that:
    • this meant there was no need for the applicants first to demonstrate anything before the duty of cooperation arose; and
    • the duty required IPAT to proactively obtain and consider up-to-date COI about the position of Jehovah’s Witnesses and about domestic violence and state protection failures in Georgia.
  • They sought to rely on COI materials – a Freedom House report, a report of the Public Defender of Georgia, and a Council of Europe Commissioner’s report – suggesting difficulties in Georgia relating to religious minorities and domestic violence. Although these reports were not properly exhibited, extracts were referenced in affidavits.
  • They argued, adopting the approach in X v IPAT [2024] IEHC 551 (Barrett J.), that it was sufficient to show that, if the duty to cooperate had been respected, the decision “might have been different”, a “notably low hurdle”.

4.4 The respondents’ position

The respondents’ arguments can be summarised as follows:

  • Section 33 of the 2015 Act, read in light of Article 31 and recitals 17 and 21 of the Procedures Directive, establishes a clear structure:
    • first, a general presumption of safety based on the Minister’s designation decision; and
    • second, an obligation on the applicant to submit “serious grounds” (or “serious counter-indications”) if they wish to rebut that presumption.
  • While Georgia is designated safe, the applicants never advanced, even in rudimentary form, a case that Georgia was not safe for them as Jehovah’s Witnesses (or associates of Jehovah’s Witnesses), nor that state protection was systematically unavailable to them for religious reasons.
  • The duty to cooperate under Article 4 of the Qualification Directive does not arise in a vacuum. Instead:
    • it is triggered by and oriented around the elements actually provided by the applicant;
    • it does not entail the construction of a new case that the applicant could have made but did not; and
    • it may require the decision-maker to assemble COI or clarify facts, but only in relation to issues put in play by the applicant.
  • They emphasised Humphreys J.’s summary in A.A.L. v IPAT [2018] IEHC 792, particularly the statement that the duty to cooperate involves identifying “the elements of the application actually made, not an application that the applicant could have made but did not.”
  • They relied on:
    • S.H.I. v IPAT (No. 2) [2019] IEHC 269 (Keane J.), holding that the State’s duty does not extend to going behind or “teasing out” the applicant’s voluntary statements;
    • M.M. v IPO [2025] IEHC 118 (Barr J.), where a decision-maker was found not obliged to consider persecution linked to clan membership when the applicant had not put that case forward; and
    • P.P. v IPAT [2025] IEHC 134 (Owens J.), which stressed that s.33 places an obligation on applicants to “submit” grounds, though the Tribunal must evaluate the COI actually provided.
  • On that basis, they argued there had been no breach of duty to cooperate, because:
    • the applicants had not put the safe-country issue in play on religious grounds;
    • the Tribunal had nonetheless considered the COI and arguments actually submitted; and
    • the applicants were impermissibly seeking to recast their case for the first time through judicial review, which is not a rehearing or an appeal on the merits.

5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

5.1 No serious grounds ever submitted: the factual foundation

Gillane J. first undertakes a close factual analysis of the record. He notes:

  • At the IPO stage, neither applicant selected any Refugee Convention ground (they chose “none of these”).
  • Their interviews consistently framed their problems as:
    • a familial dispute arising out of a conservative family’s opposition to a relationship and marriage; and
    • a reluctance to report to the police because those threatening them were family members, not because of state complicity or systemic failure.
  • The only references to Jehovah’s Witnesses were:
    • a short remark by I.A. that his parents had become Jehovah’s Witnesses and that this was one reason the wife’s family disapproved of him; and
    • M.M.’s statement that her uncles had a problem with him even before they knew about any religious aspect.
  • The notices of appeal to IPAT did not mention any claim that Georgia was not a safe country of origin for them on religious grounds or that Georgia’s designation as safe should be disapplied in their cases.
  • Even in the judicial review affidavits, the applicants did not substantively engage with:
    • the religious faith of I.A.’s parents; and
    • its concrete connection to their own lives and the alleged unavailability of state protection,
    in a way that could amount to “serious grounds” or “serious counter-indications”.

On that foundation, the Court concludes that the applicants did not submit any “serious grounds” in the sense contemplated by s.33 and the Procedures Directive.

5.2 The threshold for triggering the duty to cooperate

The judgment’s central legal holding is captured in the following propositions.

(a) There is an onus to indicate serious grounds, even if the bar is low

At para. 79, Gillane J. states:

I am satisfied that there is an onus on the applicants to at least identify or indicate “strong grounds” or “serious counter-indications” in their particular circumstances before the presumption of safety becomes unsettled. While this is a low bar, it must be overcome.

Thus:

  • Applicants are not required to produce exhaustive evidence or detailed legal submissions;
  • but they must at least identify the core of the counter-case – here, for example, that Georgia is not safe for them because of their association with Jehovah’s Witnesses and that state protection is inadequate in practice for such persons.

(b) The duty of cooperation is triggered only once the threshold is crossed

This is the central doctrinal clarification. At para. 80, the Court holds:

It is only at that stage that the duty of cooperation can be said to arise. This is consistent with the wording of the Procedures Directive and the authorities: see M.M., A.A.L. and S.H.I.

In other words:

  • The duty to cooperate is not a free-floating, universal investigative burden on the Tribunal;
  • it attaches only when the applicant has done enough to put the relevant issue in play by submitting serious grounds directed at rebutting the presumption of safety;
  • only then does the State’s duty to gather and assemble COI and other elements become operative in relation to that issue.

(c) The duty cannot arise in a vacuum or in purely theoretical terms

At paras. 67–68 and 83, the Court emphasises that:

  • The concept of “serious grounds” or “serious counter-indications” must be anchored in the particular applicant’s circumstances;
  • The safe-country presumption is created by reference to the general situation in the country, while the rebuttal process is individualised;
  • The duty of cooperation must likewise be shaped by reference to “the actual position of the applicant”; it cannot be theoretical.

This is also a direct response to the applicants’ reliance on the phrase “for any reason whatsoever” from the CJEU’s judgment in M.M.. Gillane J. remarks (para. 81) that the applicants have taken those words out of context. The CJEU was addressing situations where “the elements provided by an applicant… are not complete, up to date or relevant”. That implies that:

  • the applicant has already provided elements;
  • the duty arises in relation to those elements, not in a factual vacuum; and
  • the notion of cooperation presupposes contribution by both parties.

(d) Decision-makers need not consider unraised issues

At para. 82, the Court adopts Barr J.’s statement in M.M. v IPO [2025] IEHC 118:

a decision maker cannot be expected to consider and determine issues that have not been raised by an applicant.

This principle dovetails with the safe-country structure:

  • Unless the applicant raises a challenge to the safe-country presumption (by articulating serious grounds), the decision-maker is entitled to proceed on the basis that the designation applies.
  • The Tribunal is not required to search for potential objections that the applicant could have made, or to develop a new thematic case (e.g. religious persecution) that was never properly advanced.

5.3 Use of key precedents

(a) CJEU M.M. v Minister for Justice (Case C-277/11)

The CJEU held that, while the applicant bears the primary responsibility to submit elements substantiating the claim, Member States must “cooperate actively” with applicants where the elements are incomplete, outdated or not fully relevant; and that the State may be better placed to obtain certain documents.

Gillane J. endorses that principle but reads it as:

  • confirming that the duty attaches to “elements provided by an applicant”; and
  • consequently rejecting the applicants’ attempt to use the phrase “for any reason whatsoever” to erase the applicant’s initial role in raising the issue.

(b) A.A.L. v IPAT [2018] IEHC 792 (Humphreys J.)

Humphreys J.’s structured summary of the duty to cooperate is central. In particular:

  • The duty involves cooperation “with the applicant as opposed to a fully inquisitorial procedure” and requires identifying “the elements of the application actually made, not an application that the applicant could have made but did not.”
  • There is an investigative burden in relation to country situation information, closer to an inquisitorial function, but primarily once the relevant issue has been put in play.
  • The State is not generally better placed to obtain documents personal to the applicant, due to confidentiality constraints (s.26 of the 2015 Act), so its role is more limited regarding personal factors.

Gillane J. takes from this that:

  • The applicant must set the parameters of the claim; and
  • The duty to cooperate cannot be used to reconstruct a new claim ex post facto.

(c) S.H.I. v IPAT (No. 2) [2019] IEHC 269 (Keane J.)

Keane J. held that the Tribunal’s duty:

  • does not extend to going behind or “teasing out” the applicant’s own voluntary statements;
  • must be balanced with the applicant’s shared duty to cooperate; and
  • does not allow the applicant to remain a passive participant.

Gillane J. uses this to support the proposition that IPAT was not obliged to infer and investigate a religious-persecution/state-protection argument which the applicants had never clearly articulated.

(d) P.P. v IPAT [2025] IEHC 134 (Owens J.)

In P.P., the Tribunal erred by failing to evaluate COI that had been provided. However, Owens J. also stressed that s.33 obliges applicants to “submit” grounds and that they have a “self-serving duty to put their best foot forward”.

Gillane J. relies on the emphasis on “submit” to reinforce that:

  • the onus is on the applicant to raise the issue; and
  • the Tribunal’s duty to engage with COI and to cooperate arises in relation to the case as actually advanced, not as it might later be reframed.

(e) M.M. v IPO [2025] IEHC 118 (Barr J.)

In this case, the IPO was not found deficient for failing to consider clan-based persecution (Gabooye clan) where this ground had not been made by the applicant. That principle is directly transposed here: IPAT was not obliged to consider a religious-based safe-country challenge that was never put forward.

(f) X v IPAT [2024] IEHC 551 (Barrett J.)

Barrett J. suggested that, where a breach of the duty to cooperate is established, the applicant need only show that the decision might have been different if the duty had been fulfilled – a “notably low hurdle” as to prejudice. That case is under appeal, and the Supreme Court has reserved judgment.

Gillane J. acknowledges this standard but deems it irrelevant, because:

  • he finds no breach of the duty to cooperate; and
  • the “might have been different” question only arises once such a breach is established.

5.4 Refusal to consider new COI and the “recasting” concern

Because the Court concludes that the duty to cooperate was never engaged, it finds no need to delve into the COI extracts produced at judicial review stage. Indeed, it characterises the attempt as an impermissible recasting of the case:

  • Judicial review is concerned with the lawfulness of the decision-making process, not with building a new merits case;
  • The applicants’ newfound emphasis on Georgia’s treatment of Jehovah’s Witnesses and on systemic state protection issues was not present in the original claim, appeal, or submissions;
  • The Court refuses to reconstruct the case on a new factual and legal basis after the fact under the guise of a procedural complaint.

6. Clarifying Complex Legal Concepts

6.1 International protection

“International protection” in Irish law is an umbrella term covering:

  • Refugee status: protection for persons outside their country of origin with a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group, and who cannot or will not avail themselves of that country’s protection.
  • Subsidiary protection: protection for persons who may not qualify as refugees but face a real risk of serious harm if returned (e.g. death penalty, torture, indiscriminate violence in armed conflict) and cannot rely on state protection.

6.2 Refugee Convention / section 8 grounds

Section 8 of the 2015 Act requires decision-makers to assess persecution “for reasons of”:

  • race;
  • religion;
  • nationality;
  • membership of a particular social group; or
  • political opinion.

These are the classic Refugee Convention grounds. A “nexus” to one of these grounds is an essential element of a refugee claim. In this case, the Tribunal accepted that religion was one such ground. That, however, is only one element of the analysis and does not by itself establish a lack of state protection or rebut a safe-country presumption.

6.3 Safe country of origin & rebuttable presumption

A “safe country of origin” is a state which, following an assessment by the domestic authorities (in Ireland, the Minister for Justice), is deemed to be generally safe in terms of:

  • absence of systematic persecution or serious harm;
  • respect for fundamental human rights; and
  • effectiveness of remedies and the rule of law.

This designation gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the country is safe for applicants who are nationals of that country. “Rebuttable” means that:

  • the presumption applies by default, but
  • an individual applicant can displace it by presenting serious grounds or “serious counter-indications” specific to their circumstances.

In effect, the burden shifts to the applicant to show why, for them, the general assumption of safety does not hold.

6.4 Duty to cooperate

The “duty to cooperate” is a shared duty:

  • Applicants must:
    • submit as soon as possible all elements needed to substantiate their claim;
    • set out the factual narrative and explain why they fear persecution or serious harm; and
    • indicate why they believe state protection is unavailable.
  • The State (IPO, IPAT) must:
    • assess the claim on an individual basis;
    • actively assist, where necessary, in obtaining or completing relevant elements (especially COI); and
    • ensure that the decision is based on up-to-date, relevant, and sufficiently comprehensive information.

I.A. & M.M. clarifies that, in a safe-country context, this cooperative duty does not spring into existence until the applicant has at least identified serious grounds which challenge the presumption of safety in their own case.

6.5 State protection

An applicant must generally show not only a risk of persecution or serious harm but also that their state cannot or will not protect them. This can be because:

  • the state is itself the persecutor; or
  • the persecutors are non-state actors (e.g. families, clans, militias) and the authorities are unwilling or unable to provide effective protection.

In this case, the applicants’ interviews focused on intra-family violence and threats, and on their reluctance to involve the police because the perpetrators were relatives. They did not build a case that Georgian authorities are systematically unwilling or unable to protect persons in their situation, particularly due to religion. That omission is critical to the Court’s reasoning.

6.6 Country of Origin Information (COI)

“COI” comprises reports and data on the conditions in the applicant’s country of origin, issued by:

  • international organisations (UNHCR, Council of Europe, etc.);
  • NGOs (e.g. Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House);
  • state or EU agencies; and
  • domestic institutions (e.g. national human rights bodies).

COI is used to:

  • assess the plausibility of the applicant’s story;
  • measure risk levels and prevalence of harm; and
  • evaluate the availability and effectiveness of state protection.

The duty to cooperate can require decision-makers to seek out and evaluate relevant COI, but I.A. & M.M. confirms this duty is targeted at the issues actually raised by the applicant.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 Practical implications for applicants and practitioners

The judgment sends a clear and practical message to international protection applicants and their legal representatives:

  • Do not rely on generic narratives. It is not sufficient to say, in general terms, that one’s country is unsafe or that one feels unprotected. Applicants must identify why their state is not safe for them, and whether this is linked to:
    • a Refugee Convention ground (e.g. religion);
    • a structural failure of state protection; or
    • a combination of both.
  • Explicitly challenge safe-country presumptions where relevant. If an applicant comes from a designated safe country of origin, and wishes to contest that designation in their own case, they must say so and explain on what basis (e.g. membership of a persecuted minority, evidence of state inaction, etc.).
  • Use the forms carefully. Selecting “none of these” for Convention grounds (as occurred here) can be highly consequential. If religion is part of the case, it should be clearly identified as such from the outset.
  • Develop the argument in appeals. Notices of appeal to IPAT should specifically address any safe-country issues and any alleged lack of state protection. A reserved right to add grounds is not sufficient if never acted upon.
  • Provide COI at the earliest stage. While the Tribunal has a duty to seek and evaluate COI, applicants should still put forward the most relevant materials they can find; this both shapes the inquiry and anchors the duty to cooperate.

7.2 Implications for IPAT and IPO

From the perspective of decision-makers, the judgment:

  • Confirms that they are not obliged to hypothesise or construct unarticulated claims on behalf of applicants.
  • Supports a structured approach:
    • identify what the applicant has actually claimed;
    • check whether any “serious grounds” have been advanced to rebut a safe-country presumption;
    • if so, cooperate by gathering COI and clarifying factual gaps around those issues; and
    • if not, they may rely on the presumption.
  • Limits exposure to judicial review on “duty to cooperate” grounds where the applicant clearly did not raise the relevant issue below.

7.3 Doctrinal impact on the duty to cooperate

The judgment is significant in the growing line of Irish case law on the duty to cooperate, which includes:

  • Humphreys J.’s framework in A.A.L. v IPAT;
  • Keane J.’s considerations in S.H.I. v IPAT (No. 2);
  • Barr J.’s approach in M.M. v IPO;
  • Owens J. in P.P. v IPAT; and
  • Barrett J.’s “might have been different” test in X v IPAT.

I.A. & M.M. contributes in two key ways:

  1. It clarifies the triggering mechanism for the duty: an applicant must first cross a low but real threshold by articulating serious grounds or serious counter-indications specific to their circumstances.
  2. It resists expansion of the duty into an entirely inquisitorial model, preserving the balance between applicant responsibility and State responsibility envisaged by EU law.

7.4 Relationship with the pending Supreme Court appeal in X v IPAT

Although the Supreme Court’s forthcoming judgment in X v IPAT may refine the test for prejudice arising from breaches of the duty to cooperate, I.A. & M.M. primarily addresses a prior question:

  • When does the duty arise at all?

Whatever the Supreme Court ultimately says about the “might have been different” standard, the reasoning in I.A. & M.M. is likely to remain influential in delimiting the scope of the duty and reinforcing that applicants must first put the relevant issue in play.

7.5 Critiques and broader policy debate

From a rights-based or NGO perspective, the decision may draw criticism on the ground that:

  • Asylum seekers often lack legal assistance or understanding of complex legal categories (such as safe-country presumptions), making it difficult for them to articulate “serious grounds” in sophisticated terms.
  • A strict threshold may risk excluding genuine cases where persecution is real but poorly expressed.

However, the Court does emphasise that the bar is low – the applicants need only identify or indicate serious grounds, not provide a fully developed legal argument or extensive evidence. The core requirement is that the Tribunal cannot be expected to investigate hypothetical or unarticulated claims.

8. Conclusion

I.A. & M.M. v IPAT [2025] IEHC 672 is a significant addition to Irish asylum jurisprudence on two fronts:

  1. It clarifies the operation of the safe country of origin scheme in Irish law, affirming that:
    • the designation of a safe country creates a robust but rebuttable presumption of safety; and
    • that presumption can only be unsettled if the applicant submits “serious grounds” or “serious counter-indications” specific to their own circumstances.
  2. It defines the trigger for the State’s duty to cooperate:
    • the duty is not abstract or automatic;
    • it requires some initial articulation by the applicant of the relevant counter-case; and
    • it cannot be invoked to demand that decision-makers assemble and assess COI on issues that the applicant never raised.

For applicants and practitioners, the case underscores the importance of:

  • clearly identifying Convention grounds (such as religion) where they are relevant;
  • explicitly challenging safe-country presumptions when appropriate; and
  • framing the lack of state protection as an integral part of the narrative, not as an afterthought.

For decision-makers, it provides judicial support for a disciplined approach to the duty to cooperate, grounded firmly in the case actually presented. In refusing certiorari and awarding costs to the respondents, the High Court signals that judicial review is not a mechanism for reconstructing a new asylum claim based on arguments and evidence that were never put before the Tribunal.

The central legacy of this judgment is its clear articulation of a principled boundary: the State’s duty to cooperate cannot be engaged in a vacuum. It is a shared enterprise that begins only once the applicant has done enough to unsettle the presumption of safety in their own case, even if that threshold is deliberately set low to reflect the vulnerability of protection applicants.

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