Nationwide Reach of District/Circuit Isaac Wunder Orders and the High Court’s Inherent Anti‑Vexation Injunction (Not a “Protective” Jurisdiction)

1. Introduction

This Supreme Court decision (judgment of Murray J., concurring with Dunne J.) addresses two points of recurring practical importance in Irish civil procedure concerning so‑called “Isaac Wunder orders” (vexatious-litigant restraint orders):

• Geographical reach: whether an Isaac Wunder order made in the District Court or Circuit Court must be geographically confined to the particular District or Circuit in which it is made.
• Legal basis: the precise foundation for the High Court’s ability to restrain a person from instituting proceedings in the District Court or Circuit Court without permission (typically of the Presidents of those courts).

The parties are G.M. (applicant/appellant) and I.M. (respondent), with the Attorney General as notice party. While the underlying factual dispute is dealt with in Dunne J.’s lead judgment, Murray J. isolates and resolves the systemic questions above—questions that shape how Irish courts manage abusive and repetitive litigation while maintaining the constitutional autonomy of courts of local and limited jurisdiction.

2. Summary of the Judgment

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

• Kirwan v. Connors [2025] IESC 21
  Used to distinguish between (i) a court controlling its own process and (ii) asserting a broader jurisdiction affecting the right to litigate in other courts or against non-parties. Murray J. relies on this framing to explain that “Isaac Wunder order” is an umbrella label for different juridical mechanisms.
• Riordan v. Ireland (No. 4) [2001] 3 IR 365
  Cited for the constitutional permissibility of implied powers: courts may imply powers necessary to discharge their functions and prevent abuse of their own procedures. This anchors the first category of Isaac Wunder orders in the constitutional function of courts under Article 34.
• Grepe v. Loam (1887) 37 Ch D 168
  Identified as the long-standing root of restraining serial vexatious applications. Murray J. uses it to show the power was a recognised feature of judicial function at the time of constitutional adoption.
• SP v. UG [2016] IEHC 693
  Abbott J.’s description (para. 22) is endorsed as accurate: the source of an Isaac Wunder order is the implied power arising from the duty of all courts to supervise and control their own procedures so as not to be oppressive.
• The State (Boyle) v. Neylon [1986] IR 551
  Walsh J.’s observation—there is only one District Court and one Circuit Court—supports Murray J.’s key point: a District/Circuit judge is a judge of that court as a whole, not merely of a geographic unit. This underpins nationwide effect of an in personam restraint once jurisdiction is properly engaged.
• Hosie v. Lawless [1927] IR 464
  Relied upon to clarify the “decentralisation of jurisdiction” policy of the Courts of Justice Act 1924: it was not intended to confine the reach of orders once jurisdiction is properly assumed.
• Grimes v. Owners of SS Bangor Bay [1948] IR 350
  Murray J. carefully distinguishes Grimes: it concerned whether the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction could be construed as effectively unlimited (invalid), not whether orders made within proper jurisdiction are geographically limited. He treats Grimes as a “limited and local jurisdiction” case about jurisdiction to hear certain causes, not about territorial efficacy of in personam orders.
• Permanent TSB plc v. Langan [2017] IESC 71, [2018] 1 IR 375
  Used to reinforce the constitutional requirement that Circuit Court jurisdiction be “limited,” while rejecting the idea that this implies territorial confinement of orders once jurisdiction is validly engaged. Langan is reconciled with Grimes: both insist jurisdiction must be meaningfully “limited,” but neither imposes a territorial cap on in personam orders ancillary to valid jurisdiction.
• The People (DPP) v. MS [2003] 1 IR 606
  Keane CJ is cited for the proposition that some subject-matters may be inherently incapable of being “limited” in the constitutional sense—highlighting that “limited” is a substantive constraint, not a formality.
• Sligo Corporation v. Gilbride [1929] IR 351
  Fitzgibbon J. is relied upon to interpret statutory “ancillary powers” provisions. Murray J. uses this to support the Circuit Court’s capacity to make ancillary orders (including procedural restraints) as an incident of valid jurisdiction.
• Lett v. Lett [1906] 1 IR 618
  Cited as part of the “anti-suit injunction” line: the High Court may restrain proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction. This supports the principle that injunctive relief can restrain litigation beyond the High Court itself.
• Joseph Murphy Structural Engineers Ltd. v. Manitowac (UK) Ltd. (Unreported, Supreme Court, 30 July 1985)
  Used to show (i) stays/anti-suit principles and (ii) the inherent jurisdiction rationale: preventing improper vexation by legal procedure. Murray J. notes Griffin J.’s reliance on earlier authority to ground jurisdiction in protecting defendants from oppressive litigation.
• In Re Connolly Brothers Ltd, Wood v. Connolly Brothers Ltd. [1911] 1 Ch 731
  A central authority for restraining litigation in another court (including inferior courts) where proceedings are “vexatious or oppressive.” Murray J. draws from Buckley LJ the idea that the High Court can protect parties from being vexed by litigation “anywhere.”
• McHenry v. Lewis (1882) 22 Ch D 397
  Jessell MR’s phrase—“general jurisdiction of the Court to prevent a Defendant being improperly vexed by legal procedure”—is used as a concise statement of the underlying principle.
• AG v. O'Kelly [1928] IR 308
  Used by analogy on continuity of powers (contempt) post-independence, supporting Murray J.’s reasoning that pre-existing inherent jurisdictions are not presumed extinguished by constitutional change.
• Wunder v. Hospitals Trust (1940) Ltd. (Unreported, 11 April 1967)
  Discussed not as the origin of the power but as an illustration of a familiar jurisdiction exercised without elaborate citation—suggesting continuity with pre-independence inherent powers.
• Shannon v. Moran (Unreported, Supreme Court, 9 December 2004)
  Cited to show practical flexibility in framing such orders (“no proceedings”), apparently including the Circuit Court, even if the power point was not litigated there.
• The State (Hunt) v. Circuit Judge of the Midland Circuit [1934] IR 196 and The State (Abenglen Properties) v. Corporation of Dublin [1984] IR 381
  Key to Murray J.’s rejection of a “protective jurisdiction”: the High Court’s role is “superintending and corrective,” i.e., supervisory legality review, not general guardianship over lower courts.
• Clune v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1981] ILRM 17 and Kelly v. National University of Ireland [2017] IECA 161, [2017] 3 IR 237
  Used to emphasise the procedural autonomy of courts of limited jurisdiction. Murray J. interprets Clune as rejecting “purported intervention” by superior courts in day-to-day procedure, while recognising supervisory correction for jurisdictional error.
• R. v. Davies [1906] 1 KB 32, Attorney General v. O'Ryan and Boyd [1946] IR 70, Attorney General v. Connolly [1947] IR 213, and The State (DPP) v. Walsh and Conneely [1981] IR 412
  These authorities are used to critique importing an English “custos morum” conception into Irish constitutionalism. Murray J. argues that a broad “protective jurisdiction” (as in Davies) is foreign to the Irish system and should not be treated as transferred wholesale on independence; Walsh is cited to show limits on invoking “protection of justice” to override constitutional structure.
• Quinn and White v. Stoke and Quirke [1931] IR 558 and Connor v. O'Brien [1925] 2 IR 24
  Support the proposition that post-1922/1924 courts form a new constitutional scheme of “separate but co-related units,” reinforcing autonomy and delimiting superior-court intrusion.
• Attorney General v. Cooke [1924] 58 ILTR 157
  Included to show early post-1924 practice on contempt affecting the District Court; Murray J. treats continuity of contempt as compatible with rejecting a broader “protective jurisdiction” theory.
• RD Cox Ltd. v. Owners of the MV Fritz Raabe (Unreported, Supreme Court, 1 August 1974)
  Henchy J.’s statement that Article 34.3.1° is “investitive” not “creative” is used to resist circular reliance on “full original jurisdiction” as a basis to invent new jurisdictions.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) What an “Isaac Wunder order” is (and why the category matters)

Murray J. stresses that “Isaac Wunder order” is not a single, uniform remedy. He distinguishes:

• Category 1 (case-linked, party-protective, process-control): an order made in the course of or at the end of proceedings, restraining a party (usually the claimant) from bringing further proceedings against the opposing party without leave. This is rooted in the court’s control of its own process and the protection of parties before it.
• Category 2 (broader, potentially free-standing): an order restricting a person from suing “anyone” or in “any court,” potentially affecting non-parties and other courts’ processes. Murray J. signals scepticism about lower courts having jurisdiction for free-standing or “against the world” restraint orders.

(B) District Court/Circuit Court: “limited and local” jurisdiction does not mean “local-only” orders

The judgment draws a sharp line between:

• Jurisdictional limits (what cases the court may hear; these must be “limited and local”); and
• Geographical reach of orders made after valid jurisdiction is engaged (which may extend beyond the locality).

Because there is only one District Court and one Circuit Court, a judge’s power to prevent abuse is a power to protect the processes of that court, not merely a sitting location. Consequently, when a validly-seised District/Circuit Court makes a category‑1 Isaac Wunder order, it binds the litigant personally (in personam) and can prevent that litigant from issuing covered proceedings in that court anywhere in Ireland.

Statutorily, Murray J. bolsters this conclusion (at least for the Circuit Court) by invoking s. 22(7) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, conferring “all powers … ancillary to any jurisdiction exercisable by it,” and the interpretation of analogous language in Sligo Corporation v. Gilbride [1929] IR 351.

(C) High Court: power to restrain proceedings in inferior courts is grounded in orthodox inherent jurisdiction (not “protection” of those courts)

Murray J. gives several converging foundations for High Court jurisdiction to restrain vexatious proceedings in the District/Circuit Courts:

• Abuse of process as actionable wrong + injunction to prevent repetition: if instituting abusive proceedings is actionable, injunctive relief can prevent recurrence, without being confined to High Court proceedings alone.
• Anti-suit injunction logic: the High Court can restrain proceedings in foreign jurisdictions (Lett v. Lett [1906] 1 IR 618) and can stay proceedings where parallel foreign proceedings exist (Joseph Murphy Structural Engineers Ltd. v. Manitowac (UK) Ltd. (Unreported, Supreme Court, 30 July 1985)).
• The unifying principle: preventing a defendant being “improperly vexed by legal procedure” (McHenry v. Lewis (1882) 22 Ch D 397), including by litigation in other courts (In Re Connolly Brothers Ltd, Wood v. Connolly Brothers Ltd. [1911] 1 Ch 731).

(D) Why “protective jurisdiction” is rejected

A major constitutional clarification in this judgment is conceptual: Murray J. rejects describing the High Court’s relationship to lower courts as “protective.” The High Court’s constitutional role is “supervisory”—reviewing legality, correcting error, and (where appropriate) directing by mandamus/remittal/declaration (The State (Hunt) v. Circuit Judge of the Midland Circuit [1934] IR 196; The State (Abenglen Properties) v. Corporation of Dublin [1984] IR 381).

He critiques the English “guardian of public justice” idea exemplified by R. v. Davies [1906] 1 KB 32 as constitutionally alien to Ireland’s post‑1922 court architecture. Irish courts are “separate but co-related units” (Connor v. O'Brien [1925] 2 IR 24) and are not to be placed under superior-court “direction” as to their procedures, save for supervisory correction of illegality—a point clarified through Clune v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1981] ILRM 17 and its later repetition in Kelly v. National University of Ireland [2017] IECA 161, [2017] 3 IR 237.

(E) Constitutional anchoring: implied powers vs “creative” jurisdiction

The judgment distinguishes between:

• Implied powers necessary to discharge judicial function (e.g., controlling a court’s own process under Article 34.1); and
• Inventing new jurisdictional heads by reference to the High Court’s “full original jurisdiction” under Article 34.3.1°—which Murray J. resists as circular, invoking Henchy J.’s statement that Article 34.3.1° is “investitive of jurisdiction, not creative of jurisdiction” (RD Cox Ltd. v. Owners of the MV Fritz Raabe (Unreported, Supreme Court, 1 August 1974)).

3.3 Impact

• Practical nationwide effect of lower-court restraint orders: litigants subject to a category‑1 Isaac Wunder order in the District Court/Circuit Court cannot evade it by issuing in another District/Circuit. This strengthens procedural economy and protects defendants from “forum shopping” within the same level of court.
• Clear doctrinal pathway for High Court intervention: High Court restraint of lower-court proceedings is justified by established anti-vexation/anti-suit principles and defendant-protection logic, reducing reliance on vaguer notions of “protecting” inferior courts.
• Reinforcement of lower-court autonomy: by rejecting a broad “protective jurisdiction,” the judgment reasserts that District/Circuit Courts are masters of their own process (subject to legality review), preserving constitutional design while still permitting targeted in personam restraints against abusive litigants.
• Drafting flexibility: future orders may be framed with different “gatekeepers” (e.g., President of the High Court), depending on proportionality and case needs, with Shannon v. Moran (Unreported, Supreme Court, 9 December 2004) noted as suggestive practice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Isaac Wunder order”: a court order requiring a person who has abused litigation to obtain permission before bringing further proceedings (often against the same opponent). It is a tool to prevent vexatious, repetitive, or oppressive litigation.
• In personam vs in rem: in personam orders bind a person (e.g., “you must not sue without leave”); in rem proceedings determine rights against property or a “thing” (e.g., an admiralty claim against a ship). Murray J. stresses Isaac Wunder orders are typically in personam.
• “Limited and local jurisdiction”: the District/Circuit Courts can only hear cases within legislated subject-matter/monetary and locality constraints. But if a case is properly within jurisdiction, the resulting orders (especially in personam) can have effects beyond the locality.
• “Ancillary powers” (s. 22(7) of the 1961 Act): powers that are not the main subject of the case but are necessary to make the court’s jurisdiction effective—e.g., injunction-like procedural restraints to prevent abuse in the future.
• “Supervisory” jurisdiction: the High Court’s power to review and correct legal error by lower courts (typically via judicial review remedies), not to run their procedures or act as a general institutional “protector.”

5. Conclusion

Murray J.’s judgment crystallises two durable principles. First, a District Court or Circuit Court Isaac Wunder order made as an adjunct to properly-instituted proceedings is an in personam restraint that can operate nationwide within that court level; “local jurisdiction” is a constraint on seisin, not on the territorial effectiveness of personal orders. Second, the High Court’s capacity to restrain vexatious proceedings in inferior courts is firmly grounded in established inherent jurisdiction aimed at protecting defendants from oppressive litigation, and should not be justified by importing an expansive English-style “protective” power that is inconsistent with Ireland’s constitutional court structure. In doing so, the decision both strengthens the system’s ability to deter abusive litigation and reaffirms the procedural autonomy of the courts of local and limited jurisdiction.