Murphy v Butler [2025] IEHC 636: Drafting Solicitor Evidence, Section 90 Succession Act 1965, and the Boundary with the Armchair Principle

1. Introduction

This High Court decision of Ms Justice Emily Egan in Murphy v Butler [Otherwise Murphy] & Ors ([2025] IEHC 636, 14 November 2025) is an important contribution to Irish succession law, and in particular to:

the operation of section 90 of the Succession Act 1965 on admissibility of extrinsic evidence,
the status and weight of the drafting solicitor’s evidence
the delicate boundary between the “armchair” principle and true extrinsic evidence of intention.

The dispute concerned the true construction of clause 2 of the last will of William Doyle, a bachelor farmer from Bealalaw, Myshall, Co. Carlow, who died in 2019. At stake was whether his nephew, the plaintiff Peter Murphy, took the entirety of the deceased’s registered agricultural lands (comprising several non-contiguous parcels in different townlands), or only the lands physically situate in the townland of Bealalaw, with the remaining parcels falling into residue to be shared amongst other family members (the Roberts defendants).

An earlier “module 1” judgment had already found that there was a patent ambiguity on the face of the will in the phrase “my … lands at Belalaw [sic], Myshall” in clause 2. Module 2 (the present judgment) addressed:

What evidence is admissible under:
- section 90 of the 1965 Act (extrinsic evidence of intention), and
- the common-law armchair principle (contextual evidence of circumstances and character of property);
Whether that admissible evidence resolves the ambiguity as to the scope of the devise to the plaintiff.

The judgment is notable for its:

robust reliance on the drafting solicitor’s evidence and memorandum as decisive proof of the deceased’s intention,
strict exclusion of lay family testimony expressing their own “understanding” of what the deceased wanted, and
quite a narrow conception of what counts as armchair evidence, particularly in relation to the deceased’s habitual nomenclature for the lands.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The parties and family context

Deceased: William Doyle, 77-year-old bachelor farmer of Bealalaw, Myshall, Co. Carlow, owner of a 69-acre registered holding (folio CW11156) comprising four parcels in three townlands:
- Bealalaw lands – incl. farmhouse and yard (Plan 3, c. 8 ha);
- Myshall lands – two non-contiguous parcels (Plans 11 & 29);
- Raheenleigh lands – one parcel (Plan 48).
Plaintiff: Peter Murphy, nephew of the deceased, long-term helper and farmer of the lands, and specific devisee in clause 2 of the will.
First defendant: Monica Butler (née Murphy), niece of the deceased, named as executrix, and sister of the plaintiff.
Other defendants (the “Roberts defendants”): the deceased’s sister and other nieces and nephews (the residuary legatees) including Sean Roberts, P.J. Roberts, Martin Roberts, Gretta Roberts, and Maurice Roberts.

2.2 The 2019 will and the dispute

The last will of 19 July 2019 (the “2019 Will”) was short. The crucial clause was clause 2, which (in substance) provided:

“I GIVE DEVISE AND BEQUEATH my dwelling house, farm buildings and lands at Belalaw [sic], Myshall, in the County of Carlow, together with any Entitlements attaching to the said lands, together with all my farm machinery and livestock owned by me at the date of my death to my nephew Peter Murphy for his own use and benefit absolutely.”

Clause 3 left the “rest residue and remainder” of the estate to the Roberts defendants in equal shares, as joint tenants.

The central issue was how to construe “my … lands at Belalaw, Myshall”:

Plaintiff’s case: this phrase was a shorthand for the entire farm as a single unit — i.e. all the lands in folio CW11156 (Bealalaw, Myshall and Raheenleigh).
Roberts defendants’ case: “lands at Belalaw” meant only the parcels actually in the townland of Bealalaw; the Myshall and Raheenleigh parcels fell into residue to be divided between the residuary legatees.

2.3 The modular approach

By agreement, the case proceeded in two modules:

Module 1 (judgment 1 February 2024):
- Question: was there an ambiguity or contradiction on the face of the will so as to trigger section 90?
- Held: Yes. The phrase “my … lands at Belalaw, Myshall” was ambiguous because (a) it could be read as confined to lands in the townland of Bealalaw, or (b) as a reference to the testator’s residential farm as commonly known by its postal address (Bealalaw, Myshall, Co. Carlow). The internal scheme of the will did not resolve this.
- Consequence: Extrinsic evidence of the deceased’s intention could be admitted under section 90 in module 2, subject to admissibility rules.
Module 2 (current judgment):
- Question: what extrinsic evidence and armchair evidence was admissible, and what did it show on the balance of probabilities about the deceased’s intention?

The Court heard extensive viva voce evidence from:

the plaintiff (Peter Murphy),
the executrix (Monica Butler),
various Roberts defendants (Sean and Gretta Roberts),
the drafting solicitor, William Clarke of Clarke Jeffers & Co.,
a neighbouring farmer, Myles Fitzpatrick, and
Victor Clarke, the managing partner of Clarke Jeffers (although most of his evidence ultimately proved irrelevant).

3. Summary of the Judgment

3.1 The holding in brief

Justice Egan ultimately concluded that:

The phrase “lands at Belalaw [sic], Myshall in the County of Carlow” in clause 2 was intended by the deceased to comprise all the lands in folio CW11156, not just the parcel physically situated in Bealalaw townland.
Accordingly, the plaintiff took the entire farm holding — dwelling house, farm buildings, and all associated parcels (Bealalaw, Myshall, and Raheenleigh) — by virtue of clause 2.
The remaining parcels did not fall into residue; the residuary legatees therefore took only what was left after that full devise (other assets, not including any of the farm lands).

3.2 Key determinations of law and evidence

In reaching that conclusion, the Court decided:

The patent ambiguity finding in module 1 was binding for the purposes of module 2; the Roberts defendants were not entitled to re-argue that there was no ambiguity.
Extrinsic evidence of intention under section 90 is admissible only if:
- (a) there is an ambiguity or contradiction on the face of the will, and
- (b) it is necessary to have recourse to such evidence to ascertain the testator’s intention.
Both conditions were satisfied.
Only evidence of the deceased’s own intention is admissible under section 90. The views, opinions, or understandings of relatives about what the deceased wanted are inadmissible.
The drafting solicitor’s viva voce evidence and his memorandum of the consultation (made 15 days after death) were admissible and highly probative section 90 evidence of the deceased’s intention.
The solicitor’s evidence established on the balance of probabilities that:
- the deceased intended no change to the existing gift of his house and entire farm to the plaintiff (as per the 1998 will), and
- the only change sought in 2019 was to the residuary clause.
The Court rejected the evidential value of:
- family members’ assertions about alleged conversations with the deceased regarding splitting the land, and
- post-death discussions among the beneficiaries about what the will meant.
Under the armchair principle, evidence was admissible as to:
- the long-standing, close relationship between the deceased and the plaintiff,
- the fact the plaintiff had been farming the lands with the deceased from a young age, and
- the use of the entire holding as a single farming unit.
However, the Court drew a tight line around armchair evidence:
- evidence about the viability of the holding if split, and
- evidence about the deceased’s habitual nomenclature for the lands or local naming customs
  were not treated as armchair evidence and were excluded where they veered into inferred intention rather than background context.

Taken together, the admissible extrinsic evidence and armchair context compelled the conclusion that the devise in clause 2 extended to all the lands in the folio.

4. Analysis of the Judgment

4.1 Statutory and doctrinal background

4.1.1 Section 90 Succession Act 1965

Section 90 provides that:

“Extrinsic evidence shall be admissible to show the intention of the testator and to assist in the construction of, or to explain any contradiction in, a will.”

On its face, section 90 appears broad. But Irish case law, beginning with Rowe v Law [1978] IR 55, has interpreted it restrictively. The section operates only when:

There is an ambiguity or contradiction on the face of the will (often referred to as a patent ambiguity), and
It is necessary to look beyond the text of the will to ascertain the testator’s intention.

Section 90 is not a licence to re-write an unambiguous will. It allows the court to give effect to the meaning intended by the testator where the language used is ambiguous, not to impose a new or more convenient testamentary scheme.

4.1.2 The armchair principle

The armchair principle is a common-law rule of construction, typified in cases such as Corrigan v Corrigan [2007] IEHC 367:

The court “sits in the testator’s armchair” and looks at the world as the testator would have seen it when making the will.
The court may thus receive evidence of the surrounding circumstances:
- the testator’s family relationships,
- the nature, extent, and configuration of property,
- the way property is actually used, etc.
But this is not evidence of intention in the strict sense; rather it illuminates the character of the gift and the factual matrix against which the words of the will were chosen.

Crucially, armchair evidence does not require a prior finding of ambiguity. It can be used to elucidate the meaning of words that might otherwise be unclear in context, without invoking section 90.

4.2 Precedents cited and their influence

4.2.1 Rowe v Law [1978] IR 55

Rowe v Law is the foundational authority interpreting section 90. It laid down the two-prong test:

There must be an ambiguity or contradiction on the face of the will; and
Consultation of extrinsic evidence must be necessary to ascertain the testator’s intention.

Justice Egan explicitly relies on this interpretation (para. 66), reiterating that if either limb fails, section 90 cannot be invoked. Her module 1 judgment had already found a patent ambiguity in “lands at Belalaw, Myshall”, and module 2 simply proceeds on the basis that the first limb is satisfied.

4.2.2 O’Connell v Bank of Ireland [1998] 2 IR 596

The Supreme Court in O’Connell v Bank of Ireland endorsed the Rowe v Law approach. In Murphy v Butler, Egan J notes that O’Connell confirms the necessity of both limbs for section 90 to operate (para. 66), thereby reinforcing the narrow gateway for admission of extrinsic evidence.

4.2.3 O’Connell v O’Connell [2021] IEHC 127

In O’Connell v O’Connell, Butler J emphasised that extrinsic evidence admitted under section 90 must be capable of establishing the alleged intention on the balance of probabilities. It is not enough that the evidence be consistent with a particular construction; it must actually persuade the court that this was the deceased’s intention.

Justice Egan expressly adopts this standard (para. 70, 82), and this becomes central: she concludes that the solicitor’s evidence and memorandum, taken together, do meet this threshold and effectively decide the case.

4.2.4 Goodwin v Murphy [2023] IEHC 383

In Goodwin v Murphy, Stack J:

stressed that opinions of others (even relatives with close knowledge of the background) as to what an ambiguous phrase in a will “means” are not admissible under section 90, and
indicated that the evidence of a person who actually drafted the will (in that case a niece) is analogous to a solicitor’s evidence and can, in principle, be admitted if an ambiguity exists.

Justice Egan leans heavily on these points:

She cites Goodwin in support of excluding the subjective interpretations offered by various family members (para. 68, 94–95).
She expressly analogises William Clarke’s evidence to the kind of evidence Stack J would have admitted if an ambiguity had been found in Goodwin (para. 75).

The net effect is a strong affirmation that only the testator’s own intention is relevant under section 90, and the best (and sometimes only reliable) proxy for that intention is the evidence of the person who took instructions and drafted the instrument.

4.2.5 Daly v Murphy [2017] IEHC 650

In Daly v Murphy, Gilligan J faced an uncertain trust in the residuary clause of a will. The trust would have failed for uncertainty unless the court could ascertain its object.

The court admitted attendance notes and correspondence from the solicitor who had drafted the will, recording the testator’s instructions.
Those materials showed clearly that the testator intended the trust to be for both charitable and non-charitable purposes, allowing the court to interpret and uphold the clause accordingly.

Egan J treats Daly v Murphy as a direct precedent for admitting a solicitor’s records under section 90 when a will admits of alternative interpretations (para. 73). The parallel is close: in Murphy v Butler there are two rival interpretations of “lands at Belalaw, Myshall” (all lands vs. Bealalaw-only), and the solicitor’s memorandum resolves which was actually intended.

4.2.6 Black v O’Sullivan Centre Ltd [2016] IEHC 695

Black v O’Sullivan Centre concerned a misdescription of a beneficiary. The deceased left an apartment to “Rosemary Black, daughter of my niece Maureen Black”, but Maureen had no daughter named Rosemary. The court:

admitted affidavits of family members and the drafting solicitor (including an attendance note), and
found that the only plausible intended beneficiary was Barbara, Maureen’s daughter, who had in fact visited the deceased regularly.

Again, Egan J cites Black as authority for:

using extrinsic evidence (especially the solicitor’s documents) to correct an error in description, and
emphasising that the court is not rewriting the will but reading it with the benefit of explanatory material to give effect to the testator’s real intention (para. 74, 89).

In Murphy v Butler, the error is not a beneficiary’s name but the geographical description of the lands (the testator evidently believed all his farmlands were “in Bealalaw”), and the court uses the solicitor’s evidence in the same way to reconcile text and intention.

4.2.7 Corrigan v Corrigan [2007] IEHC 367

Corrigan is invoked for the classic formulation of the armchair principle (para. 100), emphasising the court’s task of placing itself in the testator’s position to understand what he was trying to achieve.

Egan J leverages this in two ways:

to justify admitting evidence about the relationship between the deceased and the plaintiff and the way the farm was operated as a unit, and
to frame the ultimate question as: “What is the phrase ‘my … lands at Belalaw, Myshall’ a shorthand for, from the deceased’s perspective?” (para. 101).

4.3 The Court’s legal reasoning

4.3.1 Ambiguity and the limits of re-argument

The Roberts defendants attempted in module 2 to argue that the will was in fact clear and unambiguous, with the effect that section 90 would never be engaged and no extrinsic evidence could be called. Justice Egan firmly closes this door:

She reminds the parties that module 1 had definitively decided the ambiguity question (para. 63–64).
Given the modular structure agreed by all parties, it was not open to re-open that determination.
Consequently, condition (b) of the section 90 test — existence of an ambiguity — stood satisfied.

4.3.2 What counts (and does not count) as extrinsic evidence under section 90

The judgment draws a sharp distinction between:

evidence of the deceased’s own intention, and
evidence of other people’s views or interpretations of his intention.

Only the former is admissible under section 90 (para. 68). The latter category is excluded, even if:

the witnesses are close relatives,
they had dealings with the testator, or
they were present at post-mortem meetings where the will was discussed.

On that basis, the Court excludes as inadmissible under section 90:

the plaintiff’s recounting of conversations in which the deceased allegedly said he would never split up the farm or would leave it intact to the plaintiff (para. 94),
Sean Roberts’ assertion that he “knew what Willie wanted” and his reports of discussions about giving different sites to Roberts family members (para. 50–52, 95),
Gretta Roberts’ similar opinions about the deceased intending to confine the gift to Bealalaw (para. 57–58, 95), and
all evidence about the heated meeting of 7 January 2020, convened by Victor Clarke, where family members aired their understandings of the will (para. 25, 44, 94–95).

The judgment thus flags a clear warning: testamentary construction proceedings are not an open forum for family members to give their views on “what the deceased really wanted”. Unless those witnesses are relaying actual instructions given to the drafter or describing specific, relevant declarations made by the deceased, their opinions will almost always be inadmissible under section 90.

4.3.3 Admissibility and weight of the drafting solicitor’s evidence

By contrast, the evidence of William Clarke, the solicitor who drafted the 2019 will, is admitted and treated as central.

Key points from his evidence include:

He had drafted the 2019 will on instructions from the deceased on 19 July 2019.
He could not locate the deceased’s 1998 will in time for the consultation.
The deceased told him the only change he wanted was to alter the residuary clause (previously in favour of the executrix alone) so that residue would be divided among the Roberts defendants.
The deceased expressly confirmed that he still wished his house, lands, stock and entitlements to go to the plaintiff as before.
When asked where his lands were, the deceased replied “Bealalaw”, and, when asked if all his lands were there, he confirmed that they were.
Mr Clarke was unaware, at the time of drafting, that the lands in fact spanned three townlands.
Shortly after the deceased’s death, when told by the plaintiff that there were lands in other townlands, Mr Clarke realised a potential interpretative issue and therefore wrote a detailed memorandum of that 2019 consultation (dated 26 November 2019).

Egan J considers:

the viva voce evidence, and
the memorandum prepared shortly after death

to be admissible extrinsic evidence of intention under section 90 (paras. 72–82). She reasons that:

The solicitor was recording (and later recalling) the deceased’s own expressed instructions, not offering his opinion on what the deceased might have wanted.
While the memorandum was not contemporaneous with the drafting, it was sufficiently proximate in time (15 days after death) for its accuracy to be reliable (para. 78).
Mr Clarke had no personal relationship with the deceased or the plaintiff; he gave evidence as an independent professional witness.
As a solicitor, he was professionally trained to take instructions and understand what a client wanted to achieve — a “lock, load, repeat” function carried out daily (para. 79).
The evidence and memorandum were internally consistent and coherent; there was “no reason whatsoever” to doubt them (para. 85).

On that basis, the Court holds that:

This evidence meets the section 90 admissibility requirements.
It is sufficient, by itself, to establish the deceased’s intention on the balance of probabilities (paras. 82–83, 92).

4.3.4 Interpreting the change from the 1998 will

The deceased’s 1998 will, drafted by William Clarke’s father, devised:

the “dwelling house … together also with my farm and livestock, farm stock, farm machinery and implements … and any other items on my said farm” to the plaintiff absolutely, and
left residue to the plaintiff’s sister (now the executrix).

The Court accepts that the 1998 will is admissible as a prior expression of testamentary intent (para. 96), but treats it with caution:

It shows what the deceased intended in 1998, not necessarily in 2019 (para. 97).
Intentions may change over time; the court must not assume continuity without specific proof.

The Roberts defendants tried to argue that the shift in drafting language from “my farm” (1998) to “my … lands at Belalaw, Myshall” (2019) indicated a deliberate narrowing of the plaintiff’s gift to Bealalaw only. The Court rejects this for two reasons (para. 98):

Mr Clarke did not have the 1998 will before him when drafting the 2019 will, so he could not have been consciously altering that wording; and
Mr Clarke’s evidence was that the deceased expressly said the only change he wanted was to the residuary clause.

Accordingly, any change in drafting language is treated as a product of:

differing drafting style, and
the solicitor’s (mistaken) belief that all the lands were in Bealalaw townland, prompted by the testator’s answers.

4.3.5 The armchair evidence: what was admitted and why

Justice Egan then turns to the “armchair” evidence: contextual information about the deceased, the plaintiff, and the property.

Admitted as armchair evidence (paras. 104–110):

Relationship evidence:
- the close and enduring relationship between the deceased and the plaintiff;
- the fact that the plaintiff had been farming the lands with the deceased since childhood;
- the general lack of involvement of the Roberts cousins in farm work.
Use and configuration of the property:
- that the entire 69-acre holding was farmed as a single unit centred on the Bealalaw homestead;
- herd and stock moved across the non-contiguous parcels as part of one farming operation.

This evidence is seen as illustrating:

what the testator’s “farm” looked like in practical terms, and
how natural it would be, from his perspective, to think and speak of his lands as one unit.

Not admitted as armchair evidence:

Evidence about the economic viability of the farm if split (para. 111–112):
- The Court finds this is neither proper armchair evidence nor section 90 evidence.
- It relates to hypothetical financial consequences rather than the current use or character of the lands.
- There was no evidence that the deceased himself had considered or weighed such financial scenarios.
Evidence about the deceased’s preferred nomenclature for the lands (e.g. whether he called the whole farm “Bealalaw”):
- The plaintiff’s evidence was that the deceased called all of his lands “Bealalaw” and did not refer to Myshall or Raheenleigh as such (para. 18–19).
- The Roberts defendants disputed this, saying he used townland names or specific field names (para. 47, 55–56).
- Justice Egan holds that such evidence, in this context, is not merely background but is effectively an attempt to prove what the phrase “lands at Belalaw” meant to the testator in the will (para. 113).
- Consequently, it crosses the line into extrinsic intention evidence, which should be governed by section 90 and not casually treated as armchair context.
- Since the ambiguity can be resolved without resorting to this disputed nomenclature evidence, the Court declines to admit it (para. 114).
Evidence of local farming nomenclature practice (from neighbour Myles Fitzpatrick and solicitor Victor Clarke):
- They testified that farmers with holdings across several townlands usually refer to their farm by the postal address of the farmhouse (para. 116–117).
- The Court finds this is not genuinely armchair evidence about the deceased’s own practice and is of limited value because local farmers may differ in usage.
- For similar reasons as with the deceased’s own nomenclature, it is excluded as a basis for inferring the meaning of the phrase in the will (para. 118).

Interestingly, having excluded the nomenclature evidence formally, the Court then adds an obiter observation that, had it been admissible, she would have preferred the plaintiff’s version of how the deceased used the term “Bealalaw” and found the Roberts’ version unconvincing (para. 115). But she stresses that she has, in fact, decided the case without relying on it.

4.3.6 The decisive factual inference: the solicitor’s evidence plus armchair context

Synthesising the admissible evidence, Justice Egan concludes that:

The deceased had a longstanding pattern, dating back to 1998, of leaving his entire farm to the plaintiff.
In 2019, he instructed William Clarke that the only change he wanted was to the residue; the specific devise of the “farm” to the plaintiff was to remain unchanged in substance.
When asked where his farm was, the deceased said “Bealalaw”, and confirmed all his lands were there. This was factually incorrect but indicative of his own understanding and terminology.
It is “inherently implausible” that:
- the deceased would have instructed Mr Clarke to “leave his farm in bits and pieces” and that Mr Clarke would have both misunderstood this and recorded the exact opposite (para. 90–91); or
- Mr Clarke would have accepted instructions to split land between beneficiaries without checking the folio, clarifying the parcels and values, and warning about capital acquisitions tax implications.
No credible contrary instruction or specific conversation was proved to rebut the solicitor’s account; at best, Sean Roberts asserted a personal belief that the deceased had changed his mind, unsupported by concrete instructions.

Accordingly, the Court finds, on the balance of probabilities, that:

the intention of the deceased by the words used in clause 2 … was to devise and bequeath to the plaintiff his dwelling house, farm buildings and the entirety of his farm, being the lands comprised in the folio. (para. 92)

Section 90 is thus used not to override or rewrite the text of the will but to:

explain how a mistaken geographical description (“lands at Belalaw, Myshall”) came to be used, and
give those words the effect the deceased intended: a devise of the entire registered farm holding.

5. Impact and Significance

5.1 Strengthening the role of the drafting solicitor’s evidence

The most significant doctrinal feature of this judgment is the centrality accorded to the drafting solicitor’s evidence. While earlier authorities – Daly v Murphy, Black v O’Sullivan Centre, Goodwin v Murphy – recognised the admissibility of such evidence under section 90, Murphy v Butler goes further by:

treating the solicitor’s oral testimony and posthumous memorandum as decisive, effectively carrying the entire evidential burden, and
downplaying or excluding most competing family testimony as inadmissible, irrelevant or implausible.

For practitioners, this underscores several practical points:

Even if an attendance note is not prepared contemporaneously, a carefully drafted memorandum produced promptly after a client’s death can carry substantial weight.
The solicitor should:
- record clearly what the testator said they wanted to change and what was intended to remain unchanged, and
- evidence any clarifying questions asked (e.g. about the location of lands, identity of beneficiaries, etc.).
Where a will later becomes contentious, the drafting solicitor’s recollections and documents may be the single most important piece of evidence in a construction suit.

5.2 Narrowing section 90 to exclude opinions of family and other lay witnesses

The judgment sharply curtails what many litigants instinctively try to offer in construction disputes: family lore about what the deceased “always said” or “always wanted”.

Under Murphy v Butler:

Such evidence is generally inadmissible under section 90 where it amounts to opinion or interpretation rather than a direct report of specific instructions related to the making of the will.
Even where family members genuinely believe they “know” the deceased’s wishes, their evidence will carry little weight if it is not tied to:
- contemporaneous instructions, or
- precise, relevant statements made by the testator in the course of will-making.

This approach brings greater discipline and predictability to litigation under section 90, reducing the scope for emotive but unreliable testimony to influence the outcome.

5.3 Clarifying the boundary between armchair evidence and extrinsic intention evidence

A particularly interesting – and potentially controversial – aspect of the judgment is the narrow view taken of the armchair principle.

Many practitioners might have assumed that how a testator habitually referred to their own property (for example, calling the entire farm “Bealalaw”) or how local farmers typically describe multisite holdings would be classic armchair material: part of the factual background informing what the testator likely meant by “lands at Bealalaw”.

Egan J, however, reasons that:

Because such evidence is tendered precisely to show what the ambiguous phrase in the will means in the testator’s personal vocabulary, it is in substance evidence of intention, not just context (para. 113, 118).
To treat it as armchair evidence would blur the line between section 90 and the armchair principle and risk an “overextension” of admissibility.
Given the solicitor’s evidence was already sufficient to resolve the ambiguity, there was no necessity to grapple with this boundary issue further.

In effect, the Court is signalling:

Armchair evidence must be confined to objective circumstances and uses of property, relationships, and obvious factual context; and
Evidence that moves towards idiosyncratic meaning or personal usage of words is more properly treated as section 90 extrinsic evidence and must satisfy that section’s stricter preconditions.

This is doctrinally neat, but in practice may invite debate in future cases over where exactly that line should be drawn. Nevertheless, the decision gives clear guidance that courts will police that boundary more tightly than some may have previously assumed.

5.4 Consequences for will-drafting in agricultural and rural contexts

For rural and agricultural estates, the case supplies both comfort and warning.

On the one hand:

It confirms that an imprecise description like “my lands at [postal address]” can, in appropriate circumstances, be construed as covering a multisite holding in several townlands, if that is shown to be the testator’s intention.
Courts will be slow to infer that a long-standing farming unit was meant to be fractured absent clear language and evidence, particularly where such a split would threaten viability or create obvious tax complications.

On the other hand:

Drafting solicitors are reminded that checking folio details and explicitly referencing them in a will can avert such litigation entirely.
When a client says “all my lands at Bealalaw”, the prudent solicitor should:
- verify the exact parcels and townlands via Landdirect or title deeds, and
- record in the will itself that the devise covers all lands comprised in the relevant folio(s).

Had that been done for William Doyle, it is clear this litigation would never have arisen.

5.5 Reinforcing that section 90 is not a licence to rewrite wills

Finally, the decision reiterates that section 90 is not an instrument for equitable re-drafting.

The Court emphasises that its function is to “read the will with the assistance of the extrinsic evidence” and give effect to the testator’s real intention, not to substitute a new testamentary scheme, even if that scheme might seem more reasonable or just (para. 61, 69, 89).
Here, both possible constructions of clause 2 were legally available on the words; section 90 evidence was used to choose between them, not to invent a third route.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

The case touches several technical concepts. The following explanations may assist non-specialists.

6.1 Patent ambiguity vs latent ambiguity

Patent ambiguity:
- An ambiguity that is apparent on the face of the will itself.
- Example: “my lands at Bealalaw, Myshall” where those words can plainly bear more than one interpretation.
- Section 90 is aimed primarily at resolving such ambiguities.
Latent ambiguity:
- An ambiguity that arises only when the will is applied to external facts.
- Example: leaving property to “my cousin John” where there are two cousins named John.

6.2 Section 90 Succession Act 1965

Section 90 allows the court to admit extrinsic evidence (evidence from outside the text of the will) to show what the testator intended, but only where:

there is an ambiguity or contradiction in the will, and
it is necessary to consider this evidence to figure out the intention.

This evidence can include:

attendance notes or memoranda by the drafting solicitor,
letters between solicitor and testator,
other reliable records of instructions, etc.

It cannot, however, be used to:

override the plain meaning of an unambiguous will, or
re-write the testator’s scheme based on what seems fair.

6.3 The armchair principle

Under the armchair principle:

The court imagines sitting in the testator’s place at the time the will was made.
It takes into account:
- who the testator’s family were,
- what property he owned, and how it was used,
- any obvious background circumstances that a reasonable person in his position would know.
This helps interpret the words of the will in context.

Unlike section 90, this principle does not require a prior finding of ambiguity. It is part of normal will-construction.

6.4 Residuary clause and residuary legatees

The residuary clause in a will disposes of what is left (“the residue”) after all specific gifts (e.g. “my house”) and debts have been dealt with.
Those who take under the residuary clause are called residuary legatees.
In this case, one central question was whether some of the farm lands fell into residue for the Roberts defendants, or whether the specific devise to the plaintiff took all lands, leaving only non-farm assets in residue.

6.5 Joint tenants vs tenants in common (briefly)

The residuary legatees in this case were to take “as joint tenants in equal shares”.
Joint tenancy:
- Each co-owner holds the whole together with the others; if one dies, their share passes automatically to the survivors (the right of survivorship).
Tenancy in common:
- Each has a distinct share which can be left by will and does not pass automatically to survivors.

6.6 De bene esse evidence

The Court heard some evidence on a de bene esse basis – that is, provisionally, subject to later ruling on admissibility. If the Court later decides it is inadmissible, it will ignore it in its ultimate reasoning, even though it has technically been heard.

6.7 Folio and registered land

A folio is the Land Registry record for a parcel of registered land in Ireland.
Each folio shows:
- ownership,
- title particulars,
- map references for the plots (plans), sometimes across multiple townlands.
Here, folio CW11156 comprised four separate plans in three different townlands. The phrase “lands at Bealalaw, Myshall” failed to reflect that geographical reality accurately, hence the ambiguity.

7. Conclusion: The Significance of Murphy v Butler

Murphy v Butler is a thorough and carefully reasoned decision that:

reaffirms the two-prong test for admitting extrinsic evidence under section 90;
confirms that such evidence must relate to the testator’s own intention, and must be capable of proving that intention on the balance of probabilities;
demonstrates the decisive weight that courts are prepared to give to the drafting solicitor’s evidence and records in resolving ambiguities;
draws a sharp and doctrinally significant distinction between:
- armchair context (circumstances, use of property, relationships) and
- extrinsic intention evidence (what particular words meant to the deceased or what he intended them to achieve);
strictly limits the admissibility and usefulness of family members’ opinions about the deceased’s wishes; and
illustrates how section 90 can properly be used to correct a misdescription of the subject-matter (here, the geographic label “Bealalaw”) without rewriting the will, thereby giving effect to a testator’s longstanding plan to keep a family farm intact.

In the broader landscape of Irish succession law, this judgment:

offers valuable guidance for solicitors drafting wills, particularly for rural and agricultural estates;
clarifies for litigators how to structure evidence in construction suits, prioritising the drafter’s testimony and documentary record over family recollections; and
will likely serve as a prominent precedent in future section 90 applications, especially where the dispute centres on ambiguous descriptions of land or other property.

Most fundamentally, Murphy v Butler is a strong affirmation of the core principle that in matters of testamentary construction, the court’s task is not to perfect or improve the will, but to identify and implement the intention of the testator as far as the law and admissible evidence allow.