Mulumba v Partners Group (UK) Ltd & Anor [2026] EWCA Civ 30: When Ridley and Rule 37(5) Cannot Rescue a Defective EAT Appeal

1. Introduction

This Court of Appeal decision concerns the strict approach to time limits and document requirements when instituting appeals to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”). Ms Mulumba (“the Appellant”), a former employee, sought to appeal two Employment Tribunal (“ET”) decisions but faced refusals by the EAT Registrar to extend time. The EAT (HHJ Wayne Beard) dismissed her challenges to the Registrar’s decisions. She then appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The case is framed by the intervening authority of Ridley v HSBC Kirtley (t/a Queen's Court Business Centre) [2024] EWCA Civ 884; [2025] ICR 441 (“Ridley”), which recognised a legally significant distinction between (i) missing the appeal deadline altogether and (ii) filing in time but omitting required documents. Permission to appeal was granted because the EAT’s approach pre-dated Ridley and was arguably inconsistent with it. The Court of Appeal nonetheless dismissed the appeal, holding that Ridley did not assist on the facts and that the EAT had made no material error of law.

Key issues

• Appeal 1: Was an appeal filed after 4pm on the deadline (treated as received next day) capable of being saved by an extension of time?
• Appeal 2: Where the notice of appeal was emailed before 4pm, but key rule 3(1) documents (notably the ET judgment/reasons and pleadings) were sent days later, was the appeal “properly instituted” in time or capable of rescue by discretion?
• Ridley: Did the Ridley distinction (late appeal vs timely appeal with missing documents) apply?
• Rule 37(5): Could the “minor error” power (introduced in 2023) apply, and what counts as a “minor error”?
• Discretion: Did the EAT fail to consider the Appellant’s circumstances (mental health, litigant-in-person status, IT limitations, and alleged prejudice) “in the round”?

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Elisabeth Laing LJ, with Baker LJ and Lewison LJ concurring) dismissed the appeal. In essence:

• Appeal 1 was simply filed out of time (lodged at 23:49 on the last day and treated as received next day). Ridley was irrelevant because nothing compliant was lodged within the time limit.
• Appeal 2 was not properly instituted within time because the Appellant failed to lodge required documents under rule 3(1), including the ET judgment and reasons (in a single document) and the ET1/ET3 pleadings, until after expiry of time.
• Ridley did not apply to Appeal 2 because the Appellant had not “substantially complied” with rule 3(1) within the time limit; at most she lodged Form 1 and (arguably) grounds.
• Rule 37(5) did not assist because (i) “minor error” is a threshold question not informed by broader discretionary factors and (ii) the failure to lodge the judgment/reasons document where they are the same document was not a minor error; additionally, the Court accepted the submission that this was not an “error” at all but known non-compliance accompanied by an explanation.
• The EAT Judge considered the relevant factors and made evaluative findings on the adequacy of the explanations; there was no legal error.
• The Court observed that Form EAT 1 is potentially misleading as it suggests an explanation can be given for not providing the ET judgment; the Court suggested the EAT may wish to revise it.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Ridley v HSBC Kirtley (t/a Queen's Court Business Centre) [2024] EWCA Civ 884; [2025] ICR 441

Ridley’s core contribution is to recognise a legally relevant distinction between: (a) missing the appeal deadline entirely; and (b) meeting the deadline but omitting some rule 3(1) documents—i.e. having “substantially complied”. Ridley also cautions against “programmed” refusals that treat last-day filing as automatically fatal when the real issue is a correctable mistake.

In Mulumba, the Court treated Ridley as a potential “safety valve” but held it did not engage: Appeal 1 involved no timely lodging at all, and Appeal 2 involved too little compliance (missing judgment/reasons and pleadings) to count as substantial compliance.

Melki v Bouygues E & S Contracting UK Limited [2025] EWCA Civ 585; [2025] ICR 1348

Melki interpreted the new rule 37(5) “minor error” provision. It held that whether an error is “minor” must be assessed in the context of compliance with rule 3(1) and not by other criteria.

Mulumba uses Melki to support two propositions:

• “Minor error” is a threshold test: broader discretionary factors (prejudice, promptness, etc.) do not determine whether the error is minor; they come into play only if the threshold is met.
• Missing a core rule 3(1) item is not “minor”: especially where the judgment and reasons are the same document, failing to lodge that document is not a small defect.

Richardson v Extreme Roofing [2023] ICR 328

Richardson concerned an appellant who lodged in time but did not supply required documents, offering explanations tied to IT difficulties. HHJ Tayler emphasised that an explanation for missing documents must be a “genuine” one, aligned with the Practice Direction’s assumption that documents may be missing because the appellant does not have them (not because they chose not to comply or expected the EAT/ET to do it).

Mulumba endorses Richardson’s approach: where rule 3(1) permits an “explanation”, it must be a good explanation. The Court held the EAT was entitled to find the Appellant’s explanation (file size/IT constraints) was not good given that the documents were produced only a couple of days later without a coherent account of what changed.

Anghel v Middlesex University [2022] EAT 176

Cited for the proposition that litigants in person do not receive special dispensation from compliance with time limits and procedural rules. Mulumba applies this to reject any argument that self-representation alone lowers the standard for extensions of time.

J v K [2019] EWCA Civ 5; [2019] ICR 815

J v K is a leading case on missing an EAT deadline due to technical constraints (EAT server attachment limit). The Court extended time because the appellant’s failure was closely tied to the system’s limitation, and the appellant lacked the guidance materials that would have warned him.

Mulumba uses J v K more as a comparator than an analogue: it confirms technical barriers can matter, but only where they genuinely explain the default and are supported by the evidence. Here the EAT found the Appellant’s “file size” explanation did not satisfactorily account for failure to lodge core documents within time.

Green v Mears Limited [2018] EWCA Civ 751; [2019] ICR 771 and BPP Holdings Ltd v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2016] EWCA Civ 121; [2016] 1 WLR 1915

Lewison LJ’s concurring judgment situates the case in the broader appellate landscape. In Green v Mears the Court of Appeal rejected importing the more flexible Denton-style approach (applied in BPP Holdings to the tax tribunal) into the EAT time-extension jurisdiction. Mulumba confirms that the strict EAT culture on time limits remains entrenched and binding.

United Arab Emirates v Abdelghafar [1995] ICR 65 and Jurkowska v Hlmad Limited [2008] ICR 841

These authorities underpin the EAT’s traditional “strict but discretionary” extension-of-time framework: extensions are an indulgence; a full, honest and acceptable explanation is ordinarily required; and the time limit is relaxed only rarely. Jurkowska shows that even where professional advisers make a “venial” mistake on the last day, an extension can be justified—illustrating discretion, not laxity. Mulumba relies on this lineage to validate the EAT Judge’s approach and to underline that the outcome is fact-sensitive.

Davies v BMW (UK) Manufacturing Limited [2025] EWCA Civ 356; [2025] IRLR 515

Laing LJ referenced her own prior summary of Ridley and its antecedents in Davies. Its role here is explanatory: it provides the structured statement of the Abdelghafar/Jurkowska/J v K line and Ridley’s “substantial compliance” distinction.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Separate ET decisions mean separate appeal deadlines

A key attempted route was to argue that the time for appealing the merits decision (“judgment 2”) ran from the later case-management reasons (“judgment 3”). The Court held the EAT Judge was correct: judgment 2 and judgment 3 were separate decisions and therefore carried different appeal clocks. Crucially, the Court found no evidential basis that the Appellant was actually confused about the judgment 2 deadline at the time; she attempted to lodge on 15 February 2022.

(B) Rule 3(1) compliance: the ET judgment/reasons document is not optional

For Appeal 2, the Court accepted that Form EAT 1 might mislead by implying that an appellant can simply explain the absence of the ET judgment. But the Rules require lodging “the written record of the judgment … and the written reasons” (rule 3(1)(c)). Where judgment and reasons are combined into one document, failing to lodge that document means neither judgment nor reasons were lodged in time. The EAT Judge was entitled to treat that omission as substantive, not technical.

(C) “Explanation” must be a good explanation (Richardson applied)

The Court held that where the Rules and Practice Direction contemplate an explanation for missing documents, that explanation must be adequate. The EAT was entitled to reject “file size/IT tool” difficulties as not explaining why a core document could not be lodged in time, particularly when it was lodged shortly afterwards.

(D) Why Ridley did not apply

Ridley assists only where there is substantial compliance with rule 3(1) within the time limit. The Court held:

• Appeal 1: no compliance at all within time; the notice itself was late. Ridley is irrelevant.
• Appeal 2: at most Form 1 (and arguably grounds) were lodged; the judgment/reasons and pleadings were missing. This was not substantial compliance. Ridley is therefore irrelevant.

(E) Rule 37(5): “minor error” is a threshold and was not met

The Court treated “minor error” as a gateway question: discretionary factors (prejudice, prompt rectification, etc.) do not determine whether an error is minor. Applying that approach, the omission of the judgment/reasons document (where they were the same document) was not minor.

Additionally, the Court accepted the submission that the Appellant’s approach was not properly characterised as an “error” at all: she knew she was not complying with rule 3(1) and instead offered an explanation for that non-compliance. On either characterisation, rule 37(5) did not assist.

(F) The discretion under rule 37(1) and evaluative fact-finding

The Appellant relied on mental health, litigant-in-person status, and the pressures of litigation and media attention. The EAT Judge assessed the evidence and found it did not explain why the appeal could not have been lodged earlier (Appeal 1), or why the missing documents could not have been filed in time (Appeal 2). The Court of Appeal treated these as classic evaluative judgments within the EAT’s discretion, identifying no legal misdirection.

3.3 Impact

(A) Clarifying the boundaries of Ridley

Mulumba is a significant “boundary-setting” case: Ridley does not relax strictness for every incomplete filing. It applies only where the appellant has done enough within time to be described as having “substantially complied” with rule 3(1). Filing Form 1 (and even grounds) without the core judgment/reasons document and pleadings may fall well short.

(B) Rule 37(5) is not a general fairness backstop

The judgment underscores that rule 37(5) is not a broad equitable discretion to forgive non-compliance whenever the consequences seem harsh. It is triggered only by a minor mistake in complying with rule 3(1). The Court’s insistence on “minor error” as a threshold means parties cannot argue “minority” by reference to prejudice, personal circumstances, or promptness of later filing.

(C) Continued endorsement of EAT strictness

Lewison LJ’s concurrence highlights that the Court of Appeal remains bound by Green v Mears Limited [2018] EWCA Civ 751; [2019] ICR 771: the EAT’s strict regime for appeal time limits is not to be reshaped by importing more flexible civil-procedure concepts. This cements a high compliance burden on appellants, including litigants in person.

(D) Practical implications and procedural reform signals

The Court’s observation that Form EAT 1 is potentially misleading is notable. While not determinative here, it signals:

• a risk of unfairness where standard forms appear to permit what the Rules do not; and
• an expectation that the EAT’s materials should be aligned with rule 3(1) to reduce avoidable defaults.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Instituting an appeal” (rule 3(1)): starting an appeal properly by filing not only the notice/grounds but also specified key documents (including the ET judgment/reasons). If those documents are not provided, the appeal may be treated as not properly begun within the time limit.
• “Substantial compliance” (Ridley): filing almost everything required in time, with only a limited omission. Ridley treats this differently from filing late altogether, because the appellant has met the headline deadline but made a correctable procedural mistake.
• “Minor error” (rule 37(5)): a small mistake in meeting rule 3(1) requirements. If the mistake is not minor (for example, omitting the central judgment/reasons document), the rule 37(5) power does not arise.
• “Extension of time is an indulgence”: the starting point is that the deadline must be obeyed; the appellant must usually provide a convincing explanation for missing it, and only in unusual circumstances will time be extended.
• “Balance of prejudice”: the comparative harm to each side. In the EAT extension-of-time context, lack of prejudice to a respondent often carries limited weight; the explanation for default and the need for finality are typically more important.

5. Conclusion

Mulumba v Partners Group (UK) Ltd & Anor [2026] EWCA Civ 30 reinforces the EAT’s strict procedural regime and clarifies that neither Ridley nor rule 37(5) provides a general escape route from non-compliance. The key takeaways are:

• Ridley helps only where there is substantial, timely compliance with rule 3(1); it does not assist where little beyond Form 1 is filed in time or where the notice itself is late.
• Rule 37(5) requires a “minor error” as a gateway; discretionary fairness factors do not make a non-minor omission “minor”.
• Omitting the ET judgment/reasons document (especially where judgment and reasons are the same document) is not a trivial defect.
• Litigants in person and mental health difficulties may be relevant, but they must be evidenced and causally connected to the failure; the EAT’s evaluative findings will rarely be disturbed absent legal error.
• The Court’s critique of Form EAT 1 highlights the importance of accurate procedural guidance to prevent avoidable defaults.