Mulligan v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána: Duty to Provide Adequate Reasons and Ensure Fair, Expeditious Suspension and Disciplinary Review under the Garda Síochána Act 2005

Introduction

Mulligan v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána & Ors [2025] IEHC 297 is a High Court judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley on 15 May 2025. The applicant, John Mulligan, a probationer member of An Garda Síochána, challenged two parallel administrative processes instituted against him: (1) his continuing suspension from duty since August 2020; and (2) disciplinary proceedings before a statutory Board of Inquiry. He contended that both processes were unlawful due to (i) failure to furnish adequate reasons; (ii) undue delay; and (iii) ultra vires actions taken by the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) and the Board (including the appointment of a liaison officer). The respondents were the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, the Minister for Justice and the Attorney General.

Mulligan argued that his continued suspension—paused only by periodic three-monthly renewals—had prejudiced his probationary status under the Garda Síochána (Admissions and Appointments) Regulations 2013, effectively placing his career “on hold” for nearly four and a half years. He further alleged that GSOC’s Section 95/97 report of 14 November 2022 was ultra vires the Garda Síochána Act 2005 and that the Board’s procedures breached natural justice. At the core was the contention that fairness demanded full disclosure of materials, clear reasons and an expeditious process tailored to his probationer rights.

Summary of the Judgment

Justice Bradley refused Mulligan all relief. The Court held that:

GSOC lawfully proceeded under Sections 98 and 95 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005; its report of 14 November 2022 was not ultra vires.
The suspension regime under Regulation 7 of the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations 2007 was properly applied. Suspension notices appropriately reflected changing circumstances—including the DPP’s decision not to prosecute and the establishment of a disciplinary Board—and furnished sufficient context for the probationer to understand and respond.
The Board of Inquiry validly regulated its own procedure under Regulation 29(5) and could appoint a liaison officer without infraction of vires.
Although an applicant in long-running disciplinary or suspension processes acquires heightened procedural safeguards, Mulligan had been able to meaningfully participate at every stage: he was served with documents, allowed to make submissions, and informed of review dates. The inquiry had progressed to the point where three days of hearing were listed for August 2024.
Mulligan failed to demonstrate individual prejudice in his defence arising from delay or lack of reasons. He continued to receive full suspension allowance; his probationary hiatus was a statutory consequence of suspension, not an arbitrary penalty.

The Court concluded that neither the suspension nor the disciplinary process had been unlawful, unfair, or vitiated by delay. The application for leave and substantive relief was refused and costs were reserved.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31: Established that reasons are aimed at ensuring fairness, open process and effective judicial review; they need not be formal but must enable affected persons to identify issues and respond.
Gillen v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2012] I.R. 574: Held that delay in disciplinary investigation is not per se fatal; a balance must be struck between individual interests and public confidence in the police.
Canavan v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2016] IEHC 225: Reiterated judicial reluctance to prohibit ongoing disciplinary processes; distinguished between unexplained initial delays and procedural adjacency once an inquiry has commenced.
Baynham v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2023] IEHC 735 and Brannock v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2023] IEHC 300: Developed the “spectrum” approach to procedural fairness in suspension, from “holding suspension” to “long-term suspension,” with contextual factors determining the extent of required fair procedures.
O’Sullivan v HSE [2023] IESC 11: Affirms a “holding suspension” pending third-party investigation and that a failure to progress may alter required safeguards, but does not automatically invalidate the process.

Legal Reasoning

The judgment applied established principles of statutory interpretation, starting with the plain meaning of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 and related Regulations, read in context and for their public-interest purpose. Part 4 of the 2005 Act (Sections 95–102) delineates GSOC’s dual powers to investigate disciplinary-type misconduct that does not amount to a criminal offence (Section 95) and criminal misconduct (Section 98), with a mandatory Section 101 report to the DPP and a Section 97 report to the Garda Commissioner. Section 102(5) expressly permits GSOC to pursue a Section 95 investigation after a DPP “no prosecution” decision.

Mulligan’s challenge that GSOC was functus officio after the DPP’s non-prosecution ruling failed. The Court held that Section 95(2) and Section 98(4) contemplate precisely this sequence: GSOC may investigate under Section 98, receive a DPP direction not to prosecute, then investigate residual disciplinary issues under Section 95 and report under Section 97. The recommendations on disciplinary charges thus fell squarely within GSOC’s statutory remit.

On suspension, Regulation 7 of the 2007 Discipline Regulations empowers the Commissioner to suspend “in the interests of the Garda Síochána,” with mandatory tri-monthly review (Regulation 7(3)). Mulligan alleged the Commissioner failed to provide reasons for renewals and to consider alternatives. The Court examined the policy document on suspension from duty and the sequence of suspension notices (August 2020, April 2022, January 2024) which mirrored the evolving factual and legal landscape. They were found adequate in context—each notice identified the material circumstances then current and permitted engagement. In the absence of actual prejudice or arbitrariness, no breach of fair procedures was shown.

The Board’s appointment of a liaison officer was challenged as ultra vires. Regulation 29(5) grants the Board discretion to regulate its own procedure, including the use of administrative support. The Court held the liaison officer played no investigative role and assisted only in logistics, so no natural-justice breach occurred.

Impact

Mulligan establishes a clear benchmark for disciplinary and suspension processes involving probationary members of An Garda Síochána. Key takeaways:

Statutory Sequence Affirmed – GSOC may validly proceed under Section 98, refer to the DPP, then continue under Section 95 and report under Section 97, even after a “no-prosecution” direction.
Contextual Reasons – Suspension and disciplinary notices must accurately reflect evolving circumstances; contextual clarity can satisfy reasons requirements without exhaustive recitation of all deliberations.
Spectrum of Fair Procedures – The decision confirms that the degree of procedural fairness depends on contextual factors: initial “holding” suspensions require fewer safeguards than protracted “long-term” suspensions, but adequate opportunities to be heard and meaningful engagement must increase over time.
Judicial Restraint – Courts will not lightly prohibit ongoing disciplinary inquiries, particularly where a process has been established, documents served, and a hearing scheduled.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 95 vs Section 98 Investigations – Section 98 covers alleged criminal misconduct by a Garda; if GSOC finds evidence of an offence, it reports to the DPP. Section 95 covers non-criminal misconduct (e.g., breaches of the Discipline Regulations). Even after a DPP declines to prosecute under Section 98, GSOC can continue under Section 95.
Section 97 Report – Following a Section 95 inquiry, GSOC must send a Section 97 report to the Garda Commissioner, stating facts, recommending disciplinary action, and giving reasons.
Ultra Vires – “Beyond legal power.” Mulligan claimed GSOC and the Board exceeded statutory authority. The Court found their actions fell within clear statutory delegations.
Natural Justice and Reasons – Core requirements: (i) hearing an affected person; (ii) giving reasons if the decision-making context requires it. Reasons need only be sufficient to show why a decision was made and allow meaningful challenge.
Spectrum Approach – Procedural safeguards increase with the severity or duration of the administrative process. A brief “holding suspension” may suffice with minimal process; a multi-year suspension demands fuller engagement.

Conclusion

The High Court in Mulligan v Commissioner clarifies the law governing suspension and discipline of probationary Gardaí. It confirms that:

GSOC’s dual investigatory functions under the 2005 Act may lawfully run in sequence without nullification after a DPP “no-prosecution” direction.
A Garda Commissioner’s duty to review suspension tri-monthly must be tempered by reasonableness and context; clear, contextualized reasons and opportunities to be heard satisfy fair-process requirements absent demonstrable prejudice.
Courts will not lightly halt a properly instituted, progressing disciplinary inquiry.

Mulligan thus sets a precedent for ensuring transparency and fairness in long-running disciplinary and suspension procedures involving police probationers, reinforcing that rights to reasons and expedition exist on a spectrum calibrated to each case’s facts.