MT v International Protection Appeals Tribunal: Extensions of Time, Credibility and Duty of Candour in International Protection Judicial Review

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the High Court judgment of Ms Justice Sara Phelan in MT v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Minister for Justice and Equality [2025] IEHC 686 (4 December 2025). The case arises from an unsuccessful application for international protection by a young Georgian national, who claimed a risk of persecution based on a Chechen “blood feud” and consequent threats to his life if returned to Georgia.

The judgment is significant in three main respects:

It consolidates and applies the post–Heaney and post–MO’S jurisprudence on extensions of time under s.5(2) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, emphasising the need for concrete reasons for delay and the relevance of the underlying merits.
It reaffirms a deferential but structured approach to credibility findings in international protection appeals, including treatment of medical evidence and country of origin information (COI).
It underlines the duty of candour resting on applicants (and their lawyers) in judicial review, particularly in describing what occurred before the Tribunal.

In the result, the Court refused both the substantive relief (certiorari of the Tribunal’s decision, deportation order, and permission-to-remain refusal) and the sought extension of time.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Factual Background

The applicant, MT, is a 23-year-old Georgian national of Chechen ethnicity. His claim for international protection, made on 12 December 2022, rested on the following core assertions:

In or around 2018, his father was involved in a road traffic accident in which a passenger died. Although the autopsy indicated that the passenger had died from a heart attack rather than accident injuries, the deceased’s brother and son blamed MT’s father.
Because of Chechen tradition and the culture of blood feuds, MT claimed that a male family member (himself) was required to be killed in revenge to preserve the honour of the deceased’s family.
He said that he was aware of the risk immediately after the accident, avoided public places and behaved cautiously.
From 2018 to 2022, he attended university in Tbilisi, living there and returning home during holidays. When Covid-19 began in spring 2020 and classes moved online, he gave up his accommodation in Tbilisi and moved home permanently.
He claimed he could remain in Georgia because the deceased’s brother and son were living in Russia until around 2022. They allegedly returned to Georgia to avoid mobilisation in Russia after the outbreak of the war with Ukraine.
MT stated there are no time limits on revenge in blood feuds; negotiations with the deceased’s family failed.
On 30 September 2022, he alleged that the deceased’s brother and son stopped his car, assaulted him, and intended to kill him. They carried guns but did not shoot him because his mother was present and, according to his evidence, Chechen custom forbids killing in front of women.
He said he went into hiding after the attack and, on 29 November 2022, left Georgia, travelling via Turkey, Bulgaria, Germany, Finland and the UK, arriving in Ireland on 12 December 2022.

2.2 Asylum Procedure and Tribunal Decision

On arrival, MT applied for international protection and completed the standard questionnaire, using an interpreter. He attended an interview under s.35 of the International Protection Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”) on 12 January 2023; part of that interview was in English, part through an interpreter.

On 27 February 2023 the International Protection Office (IPO) recommended refusal of both refugee status and subsidiary protection, based on:

Negative credibility findings, and
A conclusion that there were no substantial grounds for believing he faced a real risk of serious harm if returned to Georgia.

On the same date the Minister refused permission to remain (PTR).

MT appealed the IPO recommendation to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT):

A first audio-visual hearing took place on 6 September 2023. Contrary to what was later averred in affidavit, evidence was in fact heard that day up to an advanced stage (evidence in chief and at least some cross-examination), but technical issues then required adjournment.
A resumed hearing took place on 12 December 2023, again by audio link, with MT represented by counsel and using an interpreter.

By decision dated 8 February 2024 (communicated on 14 February 2024), the Tribunal affirmed the IPO’s recommendation, rejecting the credibility of the blood-feud-based fear. Following the statutory PTR review process under s.49(7) and (9) of the 2015 Act, the Minister again refused permission to remain on 28 February 2024.

2.3 Judicial Review Proceedings and Time Issue

MT sought judicial review of:

The Tribunal’s negative credibility findings (primarily as to blood feud, the alleged attack and documentary corroboration).
The deportation order of 4 April 2024.
The refusal of PTR.

However, the JR was out of time under s.5(2) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, as amended by s.34 of the Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 2014, which imposes a 28‑day limit from notification of the impugned decision.

Key dates:

14 February 2024: Tribunal decision notified.
11 April 2024: Judicial review papers filed in the Central Office and leave application brought ex parte.
17 June 2024: Hyland J grants leave, expressly “without prejudice” to the respondents’ right to object on the basis of delay.

Under the pre‑April 2024 version of Order 84 RSC (as interpreted in Heaney v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 123), a judicial review application was not “made” for time‑limit purposes merely by filing papers; it had to be opened before a judge. Consequently, the delay was not c. 29 days (as the applicant thought) but approximately 40 days.

The applicant sought an extension of time, supported by an affidavit from his solicitor which set out a bare chronology of steps taken between 14 February and 11 April 2024, but did not describe any concrete difficulty or impediment explaining why the 28‑day limit was missed.

The respondents opposed both the extension of time and the substantive grounds.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court refused all relief. The key holdings may be summarised as follows:

Extension of time refused: Applying s.5(2) of the 2000 Act and the relevant case law, the Court held that:
- The delay (around 40 days) was significant in an immigration context.
- The solicitor’s affidavit simply set out dates; it did not provide “good and sufficient reason” for the delay, as required by s.5(2). Mere delay by legal advisers was insufficient, echoing S v Minister for Justice and CS v Minister for Justice.
- Although merits must be considered when exercising the extension discretion, the claim was not found to have substantive merit. That weighed against granting an extension.
Substantive judicial review grounds rejected: Even if time had been extended, the Court would not have quashed the Tribunal’s decision. Specifically:
- The Tribunal’s adverse credibility finding about the applicant’s claimed fear of a blood feud (§4.1) was not irrational. MT’s conduct in Georgia (studying in Tbilisi, travelling home, failing to go into hiding until late 2022) was inconsistent with his claim of long‑standing, pervasive fear.
- The Tribunal was entitled to draw adverse inferences from the applicant’s limited knowledge of his father’s court case and his failure to obtain documents despite an opportunity to do so (§4.3).
- The Tribunal’s treatment of the hospital medical report (§4.2) — finding it unreliable because it conflicted with MT’s own account (e.g., surgery vs no surgery; one day vs ten days in hospital) — was rational and did not contravene any “Mibanga‑style” obligation to consider medical evidence differently.
- The complaint that the Tribunal failed properly to consider COI on blood feuds in Georgia was not substantively developed and, in any event, the Tribunal had accepted the existence of blood feuds; it merely disbelieved that MT was personally at real risk.
Safe Country of Origin presumption affirmed: Georgia’s designation as a safe country of origin (under the 2018 Order) engaged s.33 of the 2015 Act. The Court reiterated, following PP v IPAT [2025] IEHC 134, that this creates a legal (not just evidential) presumption that a protection claim from such a country is unfounded unless the applicant submits “serious grounds” to the contrary.
Duty of candour emphasised: MT’s affidavit had averred that the Tribunal hearing of 6 September 2023 had “not proceeded” because of technical issues. In fact, the hearing had proceeded to an advanced stage. This was a breach of the applicant’s duty of candour to the Court. Although not decisive of the outcome, it was highlighted as conduct that could affect matters such as costs and demonstrates the importance of accuracy in affidavits, especially on ex parte leave applications.
Costs: Applying the general rule in s.169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, Phelan J indicated that costs would follow the event and would in principle be awarded to the respondents, subject to submissions on the precise form of the order.

4. Analysis of the Decision

4.1 Extensions of Time under s.5(2) of the 2000 Act

4.1.1 Statutory framework

Section 5(2) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, as amended, provides that:

“An application for leave to apply for judicial review … shall be made within the period of 28 days … unless the High Court considers that there is good and sufficient reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made, and such leave shall not be granted unless the High Court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for contending that the decision … is invalid or ought to be quashed.”

Important features:

The default time-limit is short and statutory, reflecting a strong legislative policy for prompt resolution of immigration matters.
The Court may extend time only if:
- There is “good and sufficient reason” for the extension; and
- The case meets the “substantial grounds” threshold on the merits.

4.1.2 Case law and principles applied

Phelan J drew together several lines of authority:

S v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 163; CS v Minister for Justice [2005] 1 IR 343
These Supreme Court decisions (both in refugee contexts) permitted modest extensions (about two weeks) but stressed that delay by legal advisers is usually not a “good and sufficient reason”. Denham J held that such delay requires exceptional circumstances to excuse it.
GK v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418 (SC)
Hardiman J interpreted the phrase “good and sufficient reason for extending the period” as allowing the Court to consider the underlying merits:
“… the phrase … does not appear to me to limit the factors to be considered in any way and thus, in principle, to include the merits of the case. If a claim is manifestly unarguable there can normally be no good or sufficient reason for permitting it to be brought …”
GK v IPAT [2022] IEHC 204 (Barr J)
Barr J refused an extension where counsel accepted responsibility for a 51-day delay, warning that accepting such explanations would render the statutory limit “near ineffective”.
M v Chief IPO [2024] IEHC 623 (Heslin J)
Heslin J refused an extension of 49 days. A bare chronology of steps taken was insufficient; the Court needed evidence explaining and justifying why the necessary steps were not taken within the 28-day period and during the subsequent delay.
Heaney v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 123 (Donnelly J)
Clarified that, under the then-applicable rules, a JR application was not “made” simply by filing papers; it had to be opened before a judge. This meant MT’s delay was around 40 days, not 29.
MO’S v Residential Institutions Redress Board [2019] 1 ILRM 149 (SC)
Finlay Geoghegan J restated the general approach to applications for extension of time:
- The Court must be told why the application was not brought within the prescribed time and why each subsequent period elapsed.
- Reasons must objectively explain and justify the delay.
- The Court must consider all relevant circumstances and the interests of justice, including the nature of the decision and prejudice to any party.
P (Zimbabwe) v IPAT [2025] IEHC 403 (Simons J)
Although delivered after the hearing in MT, Phelan J considered it. Simons J emphasised that where an extension application is heard with the substantive JR, and the merits are found to be well‑founded, it would often be disproportionate to refuse relief solely because of a short delay, especially where there is no real prejudice to the State.

4.1.3 Application to MT’s case

Applying these authorities, Phelan J identified the following factors (drawing in part on IT v Minister for Justice and M):

Length of delay: approximately 40 days, which is substantial relative to a 28‑day limit.
Reasons for delay: the solicitor’s affidavit of 24 May 2024 simply set out:
- Receipt of instructions to challenge on 14 February;
- Correspondence with counsel on four dates between 14 February and 4 April;
- Draft papers returned on 6 April; finalised on 8 April; affidavit sworn on 10 April; papers filed on 11 April.
There was no explanation of why these steps could not reasonably have been taken within the 28‑day window, nor of any specific obstacle.
All relevant circumstances, including:
- The importance of prompt resolution in immigration cases;
- The statutory nature of the time limit;
- The absence of demonstrated prejudice to the State (though that is not decisive);
- The nature of the challenge (to international protection and removal decisions).
Merits of the claim: the Court ultimately found no error of law in the Tribunal’s reasoning; the JR was not “well‑founded on the merits”.

Critically, the Court found that “no ‘good and sufficient reason for the delay’ has been provided”. The affidavit was merely a chronology of events. Consistent with M and GK (2022), this did not justify missing the statutory deadline.

However, Phelan J made an important observation of more general significance: had she found substantive merit in the applicant’s claim, she might well have forgiven the delay, especially as no prejudice was asserted by the State. In doing so she expressly endorsed the proportionality analysis in P (Zimbabwe):

“… it would be disproportionate to refuse an application for judicial review in immigration proceedings, which the court has determined to be well founded on the merits, on the basis that the leave application was out‑of‑time by a number of weeks … The disbenefit to the applicant … would be out of all proportion to any benefit to the public interest in the expeditious resolution of legal challenges.”

Thus, MT confirms a now-settled position:

Concrete reasons for delay are essential: a bare list of dates is not enough.
Merits matter: where a JR is manifestly unarguable, delay will not be excused; where a JR is clearly meritorious, a short or moderate delay may, in an appropriate case, be overlooked in the interests of justice.

4.2 Duty of Candour and the Misdescription of the Tribunal Hearing

An important procedural aspect concerned the applicant’s description of the Tribunal hearing of 6 September 2023. In his affidavit grounding the JR, MT averred that:

“[My] appeal was set down for an audio-visual hearing on the 6th September, 2023 but did not proceed because [I] had difficulties when appearing on [my] phone.”

This suggested that no hearing at all took place on that date. However, the Tribunal’s decision referred to “the first hearing date” and “the resumption of the hearing”, and specifically recorded exchanges on 6 September about:

The applicant’s willingness to try to obtain court documents relating to his father’s case;
A document regarding his father’s hospital treatment following the accident.

On recalling the parties, it emerged — and was accepted — that:

The hearing had, in fact, progressed to evidence in chief and some cross-examination.
Technical difficulties then intervened, requiring adjournment.
The inaccurate averment stemmed from counsel’s mistake, but was sworn by the applicant.

Phelan J took the opportunity to restate the law on the duty of candour in judicial review:

The duty of candour is owed by all parties, not just respondents or public authorities (see A v Minister for Justice, B v IPAT [2024] IEHC 183).
It is especially important on an ex parte leave application, where the Court has no contradictor.
Parties must place all material facts before the Court, and do so “in a manner of utmost accuracy”.
This is particularly critical where the applicant alleges irrationality or procedural unfairness in the Tribunal’s handling of the case.

The Court also noted a practical consequence: if, in another case, a dispute arose as to what transpired at a Tribunal hearing, and only counsel (without an instructing solicitor) had attended, counsel might become a witness of fact, raising potential conflicts with his or her role as advocate in subsequent JR proceedings.

As to sanction, Phelan J referred to K (Aged Out Child) v DPP [2025] IEHC 470, where non‑disclosure affecting how the applicant’s conduct was portrayed could appropriately be reflected in a costs order. In MT, because the applicant lost on the merits in any event, the lack of candour did not change the outcome; but it was emphasised that:

The failure was “careless and frustrating”.
It could, in principle, justify an adverse costs order.

The key precedent value is the clear statement that:

Applicants in immigration judicial reviews must give an accurate account of previous proceedings (e.g. Tribunal hearings, IPO interviews).
Material inaccuracies may affect the Court’s discretion on relief and costs, even where not outcome-determinative.

4.3 Credibility, the Benefit of the Doubt, and Safe Country of Origin

4.3.1 Legal framework on credibility and benefit of the doubt

The Court restated the key principles governing credibility in international protection claims:

Standard of proof: balance of probabilities, supplemented by the “benefit of the doubt” where appropriate (see ON v RAT [2017] IEHC 13; G & M v IPAT [2025] IECA 208).
Statutory benefit of the doubt – s.28(7), 2015 Act: an applicant can have unsupported statements accepted without documentary corroboration only if five cumulative conditions are satisfied:
1. Genuine effort to substantiate the claim.
2. All relevant elements at the applicant’s disposal have been submitted, or a satisfactory explanation given for any omission.
3. Statements are coherent and plausible and do not contradict relevant COI.
4. Application made at the earliest possible time, absent good reason.
5. The applicant’s general credibility has been established.
If these are not all met, the “benefit of the doubt” doctrine does not arise (see AH v IPAT [2022] IEHC 84; MZ v IPAT [2023] IEHC 637).
IR v Minister for Justice [2015] 4 IR 144 is the leading Irish authority on credibility assessment. Cooke J’s principles (approved in RA v RAT [2017] IECA 297) include:
- Credibility is for the administrative decision-maker, not the Court.
- Evidence must be assessed “by reference to the full picture”, not on gut feeling.
- Adverse findings must be based on correct facts and cogent reasons.
- One or more mistakes do not necessarily vitiate an overall credibility conclusion.
- Decisions should be read as a whole; courts should avoid “parsing” individual sentences (cf. NPBK (DRC) v IPAT [2020] IEHC 450).
Standard of review – irrationality/unreasonableness: following Meadows v Minister for Justice [2010] 2 IR 701, the High Court must ask whether the decision “properly flows from the premises” and is not “fundamentally at variance with reason and common sense.” Proportionality may inform the assessment.

4.3.2 Safe country of origin – s.33, 2015 Act

Georgia is designated a Safe Country of Origin under the International Protection Act 2015 (Safe Countries of Origin) Order 2018. Section 33 of the 2015 Act provides that a designated country shall be considered safe unless the applicant shows “serious grounds” for considering it unsafe in his or her particular circumstances.

Relying on PP v IPAT [2025] IEHC 134 (Owens J), the Court emphasised:

This is a legal presumption (not merely evidential).
If the decision-maker validly concludes that the applicant has not submitted any “serious grounds for considering” the country unsafe, the claim must be treated as unfounded.
Only if serious grounds are shown does the enquiry move on to whether effective protection is available under s.31.

In MT, this presumption formed part of the background context, though the judgment’s focus is more on the credibility analysis than on a detailed application of s.33.

4.4 The Blood Feud Narrative – Challenge to §4.1

4.4.1 Tribunal’s reasoning

At §4.1 of its decision, the Tribunal examined MT’s account of his alleged fear of revenge killing. It noted, among other features:

MT claimed to have been in continuous fear from 2018 onwards due to blood feud culture, yet he attended university in Tbilisi, lived there and returned home on holidays, without going into hiding until after the alleged attack in September 2022.
His explanation that he felt “safer” at home once the deceased’s relatives were in Russia did not explain why, if the fear were genuine and acute, he continued to move relatively freely in Georgia for several years.
The inconsistency between his stated fear and his conduct undermined the subjective element of a “well-founded fear”.

The Tribunal concluded that his evidence “regarding blood feuds and his risk of being a victim of one does not tally with his actions whilst in Georgia” and was not credible.

4.4.2 Applicant’s arguments

MT advanced two principal lines of attack:

Failure to decide on the occurrence of the September 2022 attack:
Counsel argued that the Tribunal had not clearly stated whether it accepted that the September 2022 assault occurred. Allegedly, this rendered its reasoning opaque, because if the attack was accepted, it might corroborate the claimed fear.
Improper reliance on “plausibility” and speculation:
The applicant contended that the Tribunal had, in effect, placed itself in MT’s shoes, reasoning that “if I were in his position, I would have left Georgia sooner”. This was said to be impermissible, relying on Keene LJ’s caution in Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 that judges should be wary of deeming accounts “inherently incredible” based on their own cultural expectations.

A further, lightly‑developed ground alleged a failure to have regard to relevant COI on the existence and nature of blood feuds in Georgia.

4.4.3 High Court’s response

On the “failure to decide on the attack” point, Phelan J held:

That ground was not pleaded in the amended statement of grounds. Under the rule in AP v DPP [2011] 1 IR 729, unpleaded grounds cannot, absent leave, be entertained in judicial review.
No such leave had been sought. The Court therefore refused to adjudicate on that argument.

On the plausibility/speculation point, the Court distinguished and properly contextualised Y v SSHD:

Keene LJ’s warning was against an adjudicator using UK‑centric views of what is “normal” without regard to country context. But he also stressed that the decision-maker is not required to suspend judgment and may reject accounts which are “so far‑fetched” as to be incapable of belief, provided they are assessed through the lens of relevant COI.
In MT’s case, the Tribunal did not say that his narrative was impossible or unbelievable simply because “people in our country would behave differently”. It focused on inconsistencies between his expressed fear and his actual conduct in Georgia.
That form of implausibility reasoning is entirely orthodox under IR and Meadows: decision‑makers may weigh conduct in country of origin against stated subjective fear.

On the COI ground, the Court observed:

Counsel did not substantively develop the argument in submissions.
The relevant COI — that blood feuds do exist in parts of Georgia — was accepted. The Tribunal’s issue was not whether blood feuds exist, but whether MT had personally shown a credible risk of being killed in one.
The Tribunal had thus not contradicted COI; rather, it had found MT’s personal account unreliable.

Accordingly, the High Court held that the Tribunal’s §4.1 analysis:

Was grounded in evidence (MT’s own narrative and conduct).
Was consistent with IR and the rationality standard in Meadows.
Was not “at variance with reason and common sense”.

4.5 The Father’s Court Case – Challenge to §4.3

4.5.1 Tribunal’s reasoning

At §4.3, the Tribunal addressed MT’s knowledge of a court case arising from his father’s accident. MT knew the outcome (the father was, apparently, not held criminally responsible) but gave very limited detail on:

Nature of the proceedings (civil/criminal);
Dates, duration, or procedural steps;
Evidence presented or any interaction between the families.

When asked whether he was not interested in the case, MT said that he was interested but, because of the accident and its consequences, he was not able to move around as freely. Yet:

He had an opportunity between September and December 2023 to seek documentation or more information from his father or other family members.
He indicated at the first hearing that he could try to obtain documents, but did not produce any by the resumed hearing or afterwards, nor did he seek an extension of time or offer an explanation.

The Tribunal considered his evidence to be “lacking in detail and quite basic in nature” and, in light of his failure to follow up on his own indication that he could obtain documents, regarded this as undermining his overall credibility and failing to show a “genuine effort to substantiate” his claim as required by s.28(7)(a).

4.5.2 Applicant’s arguments

MT argued that:

The Tribunal’s expectation that he would know more about the court case was unreasonable; many laypersons focus only on the bottom line.
The Court allegedly mischaracterised his explanation as being based on his being “away at university” when, in fact, he had said he could not move about freely.
The Tribunal improperly used the absence of documents against him, contrary to the logic behind s.28(7) and the reasoning in GA v IPAT [2022] IEHC 440.

4.5.3 High Court’s response

Phelan J rejected these submissions:

The suggestion that the Tribunal had relied on the fact he was “away at university” was a misreading of §4.3. That explanation appeared in the applicant’s pleading, not in the Tribunal’s decision.
Far from being penalised for failing to produce documents despite otherwise positive credibility findings, MT’s position was the converse: his general credibility had already been significantly undermined (e.g. concerning his claimed fear and his hospital treatment). Therefore he could not rely on s.28(7) to dispense with documentary corroboration.
The Tribunal was entitled to view his professed interest in the court case, combined with his failure over several months to obtain documents or fuller information, as further evidence that he had not made a genuine effort to substantiate the account.
Citing NPBK, the Court observed that if a decision-maker describes evidence as “vague”, that itself constitutes a reason; the law does not require “reasons for the reasons” by specifying precisely what additional details were expected.

Thus, the High Court held that the Tribunal’s treatment of the court-case evidence was rational, appropriately reasoned, and consistent with the statutory scheme.

4.6 Medical Evidence and the “Mibanga Duty” – Challenge to §4.2

4.6.1 The inconsistency

The applicant relied on a hospital report from a local hospital following the alleged attack in September 2022. His own oral evidence, however, contained serious inconsistencies:

He initially claimed he spent one day in hospital and did not undergo surgery.
The hospital report stated that he had been hospitalised for about ten days and that he had undergone eye surgery.
When confronted, he suggested that the interpreter may have mistranslated “ten days” as “one day” but did not provide a coherent explanation regarding the surgery inconsistency.

The Tribunal concluded that:

“… it was to be expected that the Appellant would be in a position to state with clarity whether he underwent surgery. His account of his injuries … was vague and lacking in detail and then his evidence did not tally with that contained in the medical report which he submitted. This undermines the reliability of the report submitted … [T]he Tribunal does not accept that he has provided credible evidence in this regard.”

4.6.2 Applicant’s “Mibanga” argument

The applicant invoked the English case Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367, where the Court of Appeal held that it was an error for an adjudicator to reach a conclusion on credibility first and then dismiss medical evidence as valueless on that basis, rather than integrating the medical evidence into the initial credibility assessment.

He argued that:

The Tribunal had “artificially separated” the medical evidence from the rest of the evidence, making adverse credibility findings first and only then discounting the hospital report.
If the medical report had been fully factored into the overall assessment “in the round”, the inconsistency might have been forgiven or contextualised, particularly if MT was otherwise found credible.

4.6.3 Irish jurisprudence on medical reports

Phelan J surveyed the Irish authorities, which have consciously avoided adopting a rigid “Mibanga duty”:

RMK (DRC) v RAT [2010] IEHC 367 (Clark J)
Clark J cautioned against a “slavish application of the forensic timing principle”. Medical evidence is “secondary” to the preliminary determination of credibility around identity, origin and reasons for claiming asylum. While medical reports are important, they do not “by themselves neutralise negative credibility findings”.
MM v RAT [2015] IEHC 158 (Faherty J)
Faherty J summarised the principles:
- Medical evidence must be considered as part of the totality of the evidence; it must not be treated as tangential.
- It is for the decision-maker to assess the probative value of such reports.
- If medical evidence corroborates a story that “might be true”, the overall assessment should weigh in the applicant’s favour.
- If medical evidence is rejected, reasons must be provided.
- The obligation to give detailed reasons may be less where other evidence overwhelmingly undermines credibility.
OA (Nigeria) v IPAT [2020] IEHC 100 (Humphreys J)
Humphreys J noted that the UK Immigration Appeal Tribunal in HH (Ethiopia) had confined Mibanga to its facts and warned against treating it as laying down any rigid rule on the sequence in which evidence must be considered.

4.6.4 High Court’s reasoning

Phelan J rejected the suggestion that the Tribunal had committed a Mibanga‑type structural error:

This was not a case where medical evidence positively corroborated the applicant’s narrative and was then ignored because of a prior negative credibility finding.
Instead, the hospital report contradicted the applicant’s own oral account on key points (surgery and duration of stay). The Tribunal used those contradictions as part of its credibility analysis.
In other words, the medical evidence was integrated into the assessment, not treated as peripheral or considered in isolation.
The Tribunal gave clear reasons for finding the report unreliable: one would expect any patient to recollect whether they had undergone surgery.
Importantly, MT did not contest the Tribunal’s specific rationale (the surgery inconsistency) by explanation in affidavit; counsel accepted it was a “significant and material finding”.

Accordingly, the Court held that:

The Tribunal had complied with Irish requirements on the treatment of medical evidence as summarised in MM.
There was no legal error in the order in which it considered the evidence.
The conclusion that MT had not provided credible evidence concerning his injuries was rational and adequately reasoned.

4.7 Severability

The applicant had also raised the question whether, if one or more of the Tribunal’s adverse findings were unlawful, the remainder of the decision might survive under the doctrine of severability. Because all of the challenged findings (§4.1, §4.2 and §4.3) were upheld, Phelan J found it unnecessary to consider severability. The judgment thus leaves that doctrinal question untouched in this context.

5. Impact and Significance

5.1 On extensions of time in immigration judicial review

MT reinforces a strict but nuanced approach to s.5(2) applications:

Bare chronologies are insufficient: solicitors must articulate why the application could not be made within time, not merely list when correspondence or drafting steps occurred.
Legal advisers’ workload is not a blanket excuse: building on GK (2022) and M (2024), the Court confirms that delay attributable to counsel or solicitors will usually not amount to a good and sufficient reason.
Merits and proportionality: consistent with GK (SC, 2002) and P (Zimbabwe), the Court expressly accepts that a strong, well‑founded case may justify extension despite a moderate delay, particularly where the State suffers no prejudice. But in a weak case, delay is unlikely to be overlooked.

Practitioners should treat this decision as a clear warning: if relying on an extension, be ready to provide detailed, evidence-based justification for each period of delay and to demonstrate that the underlying case is at least arguably strong.

5.2 On credibility assessments and medical evidence

MT also contributes to the steady consolidation of Irish law on credibility in asylum cases:

It reaffirms that credibility findings are for the Tribunal, subject only to public law review for rationality and fairness.
It underscores the Court’s warning in NPBK that decisions should not be “parsed and overanalysed” line by line; they must be read holistically.
On medical evidence, it reinforces the Irish stance that there is no rigid “Mibanga duty”. What matters is that medical reports are factored into the totality of the evidence, that their probative value is assessed, and that cogent reasons are given if they are discounted.
Where a medical report contradicts, rather than corroborates, an applicant’s own account, a decision-maker may rationally treat this as undermining both the report and the applicant’s credibility.

5.3 On the duty of candour and professional practice

The judgment is particularly instructive for solicitors and counsel:

Affidavits must accurately describe prior proceedings. Statements that a hearing “did not proceed” when, in truth, it proceeded substantially but was adjourned, breach the applicant’s and lawyer’s duty of candour.
In asylum JR practice, where allegations of unfairness or irrationality often turn on what was, or was not, said at the IPO or Tribunal, accurate contemporaneous notes (usually by an instructing solicitor) are crucial.
Where counsel alone attends a tribunal hearing, there is a risk that he or she may later be required as a witness of fact if disputes arise about what occurred. MT highlights this as a factor to be considered when organising representation.
While minor lapses may not per se defeat relief, they will increasingly be taken into account in discretionary decisions, particularly on costs.

5.4 On safe country of origin and s.28(7) “benefit of the doubt”

Finally, the judgment consolidates guidance on two structural elements of the protection regime:

Safe country of origin (s.33): MT, following PP, confirms that designation gives rise to a legal presumption of safety. Applicants from such countries carry a heightened burden to establish “serious grounds” that their particular circumstances fall outside that presumption.
Benefit of the doubt (s.28(7)): The decision is a textbook example of how negative credibility findings on central aspects of an account mean that an applicant cannot then invoke s.28(7) to excuse absence of documents or gaps in narrative. General credibility is a gateway condition.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 Judicial review vs appeal

A judicial review examines whether a decision was made lawfully — i.e. within jurisdiction, following fair procedures, on a rational basis, and in accordance with statute and constitutional rights.
An appeal on the merits re‑decides the facts and law and may substitute its own findings.
In MT, the High Court was conducting judicial review, not rehearing the asylum claim. It could not simply decide for itself whether MT was telling the truth; it could only ask whether the Tribunal’s decision was legally flawed.

6.2 Certiorari

Certiorari is an order quashing an administrative decision.
MT sought certiorari of (a) the Tribunal decision, (b) the deportation order, and (c) the PTR refusal. Because the underlying Tribunal decision was upheld, the associated Ministerial decisions also stood.

6.3 “Irrationality” / “Unreasonableness”

In Irish administrative law, a decision is irrational if it does not “flow from the premises” established by the evidence or is “fundamentally at variance with reason and common sense” (State (Keegan); Meadows).
The Court asks: given the evidence available, was the decision within a range of reasonable responses, even if the Court might have decided differently?

6.4 Safe country of origin

A safe country of origin is one that the State has formally designated as generally respecting human rights and not normally producing refugees.
Applicants from such countries must show “serious grounds” why their own circumstances are different (s.33 of the 2015 Act).

6.5 Benefit of the doubt (s.28(7))

The benefit of the doubt does not mean the decision-maker must believe everything an applicant says.
It means that, if an applicant is generally credible and has tried to substantiate their case, aspects of their story that cannot be documented can still be accepted.
If general credibility is not established, s.28(7) does not assist the applicant.

6.6 Duty of candour

The duty of candour requires parties to judicial review, especially applicants, to present all relevant facts truthfully and accurately.
This duty is heightened at the leave (permission) stage, which is often ex parte.
Breach can lead to refusal of discretionary relief or adverse costs.

6.7 The “Mibanga duty” debate

In England, Mibanga was understood by some as requiring decision-makers to consider medical evidence alongside, and before reaching, final conclusions on credibility.
Irish courts have consistently declined to adopt a rigid version of this. Instead, the requirement is to consider all evidence in the round and to give reasons for rejecting medical reports.

7. Conclusion

MT v IPAT does not dramatically alter Irish asylum or judicial review law, but it is an important consolidating decision in several areas:

It tightens and clarifies the requirements for extending time under s.5(2) of the 2000 Act, stressing the need for concrete explanations for delay and recognising the relevance of underlying merits.
It reaffirms the high level of deference accorded to Tribunal credibility assessments, provided they are grounded in evidence, read in the round, and explained with cogent reasons.
It situates the treatment of medical evidence firmly within Irish precedent, rejecting any rigid UK-derived “forensic timing” requirement and emphasising reasoned, integrated evaluation of all evidence.
It underscores the duty of candour on applicants and their lawyers, especially as to what happened before the Tribunal, and highlights potential consequences for costs and professional practice.
It reinforces the structural role of “safe country of origin” designations and the conditional nature of the “benefit of the doubt” under s.28(7) of the 2015 Act.

For practitioners and decision-makers in the international protection sphere, MT is a valuable reference point on procedural discipline (time-limits and candour) and on the boundaries of judicial review in relation to credibility, evidence, and the asylum decision-making process.