Misunderstanding an Argument Is a Matter for Appeal, Not Judicial Review – Commentary on MD v Chief International Protection Officer [2025] IEHC 648

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the High Court of Ireland (Barr J) in MD v Chief International Protection Officer & Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 648, delivered electronically on 24 November 2025.

The judgment sits at the intersection of three important themes in Irish asylum and public law:

• the strict 28‑day statutory time limit and the circumstances in which the High Court will extend time in international protection judicial reviews;
• the scope of the International Protection Office’s (IPO) duty to engage with and decide the “grounds” advanced by an applicant, and how courts assess the adequacy of reasons; and
• the boundary between what is properly the subject of judicial review and what belongs in the statutory appeal to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT).

Most notably, Barr J articulates a clear rule: a contention that the first‑instance protection decision-maker has “misunderstood” an argument is, in principle, a matter for appeal, not a ground for judicial review and certiorari. This reinforces the demarcation between legality review and merits review in the international protection context.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Personal and country background

The applicant, MD, is a Georgian national born in 1988 in Abkhazia, a region of Georgia that experienced severe conflict and ethnic violence in the early 1990s. Key facts include:

• In 1993, during civil unrest in Abkhazia:
  • her grandmother was killed; and
  • her father, fighting on the Georgian side, went missing and is presumed dead.
• MD, her mother and siblings fled Abkhazia and relocated—under hazardous conditions—to Tbilisi, where they settled.
• MD spent virtually all of her subsequent life in Tbilisi:
  • educated there until 2006;
  • worked in a restaurant, eventually becoming manager;
  • married in 2009 and had a daughter in 2010;
  • in 2018, purchased premises and ran a ladies’ clothing business through a limited company.

2.2 Domestic incidents and alleged persecution

MD’s narrative of risk centres not on Abkhazia, which she left as a child, but on events in Tbilisi connected with her late husband and his associates:

• Her husband converted to Islam in 2011, went to Syria to fight in the civil war, and died in 2014 from leukaemia.
• She alleges that he mistreated her (physically and psychologically) because she remained Christian and dressed accordingly.
• Post‑death, she claims that his associates—described as fundamentalist Muslims—monitored how she was raising her daughter.
• In 2021:
  • MD had her daughter baptised into the Orthodox Christian faith.
  • She states that some of her husband’s former associates barged into her property and assaulted her verbally and physically.
  • She reported this to the police, who prepared a report and passed it to the criminal police; she claims no further action was taken.
• In August 2022:
  • she says the same men entered her shop while she and her daughter were present;
  • they allegedly threatened to make her “disappear” (which she understood as a death threat) and to take her daughter abroad;
  • she describes multiple assaults; in the course of fleeing, her leg struck her daughter’s abdomen, allegedly causing a serious diaphragmatic injury requiring emergency surgery.

MD states that this latter incident convinced her that she would never be safe in Tbilisi. On 13 August 2022 she left Tbilisi, leaving her daughter with her mother. She arrived in Ireland on 5 September 2022 and immediately applied for international protection.

2.3 First‑instance decisions and legal submissions

The key domestic procedural steps were:

• IPO recommendation under s.39 of the International Protection Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”) on 15 April 2024, refusing refugee status and subsidiary protection.
• Ministerial decision under s.49 of the 2015 Act on 22 May 2024, refusing permission to remain on other grounds.
• Both decisions were notified to MD on 18 June 2024.

On 27 March 2024, the day before her substantive IPO interview, MD’s solicitor sent a significant letter, which later formed the backbone of the High Court challenge. The core argument was:

“As an IDP [internally displaced person] the applicant need only establish a real risk of persecution/serious harm as an ethnic Georgian in Abkhazia together with unreasonableness of relocation within the rest of Georgia in order to make out her need for international protection… The threat of violence and intimidation from the Islamist associates of her late husband renders continued internal relocation within Georgia unreasonable and/or unduly harsh for the applicant.”

In essence, the solicitor contended:

• MD’s status as an ethnic Georgian originally from Abkhazia (a region in which, according to country materials, Georgians allegedly face persecution and discrimination) created a baseline risk of persecution in Abkhazia itself; and
• her fear of the Islamist associates in Tbilisi made internal relocation elsewhere in Georgia “unreasonable” or “unduly harsh”, thereby completing the international protection test.

This “IDP plus internal relocation” argument later became the alleged “unaddressed ground” in the judicial review.

2.4 The judicial review and time issue

Challenges to IPO and Ministerial decisions in protection matters must be brought under s.5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”). Section 5(1)(og) and 5(1)(oi), as amended, impose a strict 28‑day time limit from notification of the relevant decision.

For MD:

• Notification date: 18 June 2024.
• Last day for a timely judicial review: 15 July 2024.
• Actual issue of judicial review proceedings: 31 July 2024 (approximately 14–16 days late).

To explain this delay, MD relied on a pre‑litigation letter of 8 July 2024 in which her solicitor, on counsel’s advice, invited the IPO to withdraw its decision on the basis that it had failed to address a fundamental plank of her claim. The IPO refused this request by letter dated 15 July 2024—the very day the 28‑day period expired.

MD had also lodged an appeal to the IPAT against the IPO recommendation, giving rise to an argument about alternative remedies.

3. Key Issues Before the High Court

Barr J identified and addressed the following principal issues:

1. Time limit and extension: Whether the judicial review was out of time under s.5 of the 2000 Act and, if so, whether there were “good and sufficient reasons” to extend time.
2. Failure to address a substantial ground: Whether the IPO’s decision was unlawful because it allegedly failed to consider and determine a central ground advanced on MD’s behalf—namely, her claim based on being an ethnic Georgian internally displaced person (IDP) from Abkhazia, combined with unreasonableness of internal relocation.
3. Alternative remedy: Whether the existence of a pending statutory appeal to the IPAT should, even if there were an error, lead the Court to refuse certiorari. Barr J ultimately did not need to decide this point in light of his conclusions on the merits.

4. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court’s conclusions can be summarised as follows:

• Extension of time granted: Applying the approach in GK v IPAT [2022] IEHC 204 and IT v Minister for Justice [2023] IEHC 40, the Court held that there were “good and sufficient reasons” to extend time to 31 July 2024. The delay was short, explained by the reasonable sending of a pre‑litigation letter, caused no prejudice, and did not delay the substantive hearing.
• Substantive ground of challenge rejected:
  • The Court accepted in principle that decision‑makers must address the grounds advanced by applicants.
  • However, the correct test is whether the decision, read as a whole, fairly engages with the substance of the applicant’s case; no rigid formula or express response to every argumentative sub‑point is required.
  • On a fair reading, the IPO had considered MD’s background as an IDP from Abkhazia and focused on the real core of her claim—her alleged fear of serious harm in Tbilisi from her husband’s associates—and concluded that she did not face a real risk of serious harm in Tbilisi.
  • Even if one adopted MD’s IDP‑based formulation, the IPO’s key finding that she could live safely in Tbilisi would still be fatal to her protection claim.
• Misunderstanding an argument is not a ground for certiorari: Barr J held explicitly that even if the IPO “misunderstood” this element of MD’s claim, that is “quintessentially” a matter for appeal, not judicial review. A mere misapprehension of an applicant’s submissions does not, without more, justify quashing the decision.
• Relief refused: As no reviewable error was found, the Court refused to grant certiorari or other reliefs. In view of that, it did not determine the alternative remedy issue.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Extension of the 28‑Day Time Limit

5.1.1 Statutory framework

Section 5(1) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, as amended, provides that any application for judicial review in respect of:

• an IPO recommendation (s.5(1)(og)); or
• a Ministerial refusal of permission to remain under s.49 of the 2015 Act (s.5(1)(oi));

must be commenced within 28 days of the date of notification of the relevant decision, unless the Court considers that there is “good and sufficient reason” to extend time.

This is a statutory time limit, which generally attracts a stricter approach than time limits imposed by court rules. Nonetheless, the statutory phrase “good and sufficient reason” leaves room for a discretionary extension.

5.1.2 The GK / IT factors

At paragraph 20, Barr J endorsed and applied the framework derived from GK v IPAT [2022] IEHC 204 and IT v Minister for Justice [2023] IEHC 40. He summarised that, when assessing whether to extend time, the Court may consider:

• the length of the delay;
• the reasons for the delay, including any personal fault on the part of the applicant as distinct from their legal representatives;
• “all relevant facts and circumstances”, including:
  • the nature of the decision challenged;
  • the nature and seriousness of the alleged unlawfulness; and
  • any relevant circumstances relating to the parties;
• the interests of justice, including the consequences for the applicant if time is not extended; and
• whether the time limit is imposed by statute or by court rules (statutory limits generally attract more caution in extending).

This confirms that the approach in protection cases is not a mechanical “out of time = dismissed”; rather, there is a structured but flexible balancing exercise.

5.1.3 Application to MD

In applying those principles, the Court placed particular weight on:

• Shortness of delay: roughly 14 days beyond the 28‑day limit, which is at the lower end of delays typically seen in such applications.
• Reason for delay:
  • MD’s solicitor, acting on counsel’s advice, sent a pre‑litigation letter on 8 July 2024, within time, inviting the IPO to withdraw its decision.
  • The IPO refused by letter of 15 July 2024—the last day of the limitation period—by which time the 28‑day clock had effectively run out.
  • Barr J held that the solicitor “acted reasonably” in sending this letter.
• Absence of prejudice and procedural impact:
  • The short delay did not cause any delay in the substantive hearing of the judicial review.
  • No prejudice to the respondents was shown or suggested.
• Nature of the challenge: The claim alleged a serious defect—that the IPO had failed to address a fundamental ground of the protection claim—which, if true, could have significant consequences for MD.

At paragraph 21, the Court cautioned that there is no statutory basis in the 2015 Act for pre‑litigation letters, and sending such a letter does not automatically entitle an applicant to an extension of time. Nevertheless, in this case:

• the solicitor’s step was reasonable;
• the delay was minimal; and
• there was no prejudice and no impact on the progression of the case.

In these circumstances, the Court held that there were “sufficient reasons to justify an extension of time” and formally extended time to 31 July 2024 (para. 22).

5.1.4 Significance

The time‑extension portion of the judgment reinforces several practice‑relevant points:

• Substance‑based discretion: Even in the tightly regulated asylum context, the High Court will extend time where a short delay is reasonably explained and causes no prejudice.
• Pre‑litigation correspondence: While not legally required, reasonable attempts to resolve alleged defects with the IPO before litigation can support an extension application, but they are not a safe substitute for issuing proceedings within time.
• Responsibility of representatives: The Court looks specifically at the conduct of legal representatives; where they act reasonably, their decisions can justify a short delay.

There is no new legal test here, but a concrete illustration of how GK and IT operate in practice in protection cases.

5.2 The Alleged Failure to Address a Fundamental Ground

5.2.1 The applicant’s core complaint

MD framed her primary ground as a “failure to consider” argument: she contended that the IPO had not grappled with a central legal theory of her case, namely:

1. As an internally displaced person (IDP) and ethnic Georgian originally from Abkhazia, she faced a real risk of persecution/serious harm in Abkhazia itself.
2. On the country materials furnished, it was said to be clear that ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia faced persecution and discrimination.
3. The only remaining question should therefore have been whether internal relocation within Georgia (specifically to Tbilisi or elsewhere) would be reasonable and not unduly harsh.
4. Given the alleged threats from Islamist associates of her late husband, internal relocation to Tbilisi (or elsewhere) was said to be unreasonable.

Counsel thus presented the Abkhazia/IDP issue as a stand‑alone ground or “fundamental plank” of the protection claim, which the IPO had supposedly not addressed in its decision.

5.2.2 The Court’s general approach: substance, not form

At paragraph 33, Barr J articulated two important propositions:

1. It is incumbent on a protection decision‑maker “to give a decision on the grounds put forward by an applicant as to why they should be granted asylum or international protection”.
2. However, this does not require “some sort of rigid formula” when giving reasons. The “essential question” is whether the decision‑maker has “fairly addressed the substance of the case put forward by the applicant”.

This reiterates and sharpens the principle that:

• Courts assess adequacy of reasons holistically, by reading the decision as a whole;
• They do not require specific, labelled responses to every argument or every paragraph of a solicitor’s submission;
• The focus is on whether the real issues raised by the applicant’s account have been considered and determined.

5.2.3 Why the Abkhazia IDP argument failed in this case

Barr J’s reasoning proceeds in several steps:

1. Recognition of the Abkhazia background:
   • At paragraph 34, the judge notes that the decision expressly refers “a number of times” to the fact that MD fled from Abkhazia in 1993.
   • There is “no suggestion” in the IPO decision that it would be safe for her to return to Abkhazia.
   • Crucially, the judge states: “The issue of returning [there] did not arise.”
2. Identification of the true core of the protection claim:
   • The judge finds (para. 35) that the “core” of MD’s case is a claimed fear of serious harm at the hands of the associates of her deceased husband, if returned to her home area of Tbilisi.
   • This reflects the reality that MD had lived for around 30 years in Tbilisi—her childhood, education, employment, family life, and business were all based there.
3. Findings of the IPO on the Tbilisi risk:
   • The IPO did not accept MD’s narrative of ongoing threats and risk from her husband’s associates, for reasons given in the decision (not reproduced in full in the High Court judgment).
4. Consequences for the IDP/internal relocation theory:
   • Even “if one were to adopt the argument put forward by the applicant” (para. 37)—i.e. treating her as an IDP from Abkhazia who must show both lack of state protection and the absence of a reasonable internal relocation alternative—the decisive point remains that the IPO found she could safely live in Tbilisi.
   • On that footing, the internal relocation test would necessarily fail: the existence of a safe place (Tbilisi) within Georgia would negate her entitlement to refugee or subsidiary protection status, whatever the risk profile in Abkhazia might be.

In sum, the Court held that:

• The IPO’s decision did, in substance, take account of MD’s Abkhazia origins and IDP history.
• The IPO understandably focussed on her present and recent life in Tbilisi, as the only realistic return‑or‑relocation option.
• Given the IPO’s (unchallenged, for JR purposes) credibility and risk findings about Tbilisi, the Abkhazia element could not have changed the outcome.

5.2.4 Adequacy of reasons and the proper forum for disagreement

At paragraph 38, Barr J concludes that:

“on any reasonable reading of the decision in this case, it is clear that the respondent carefully took account of all aspects of the case put forward by the applicant. Having done so, he reached a decision that was open to him on the evidence. There is no basis on which this Court can order that that decision should be struck down.”

That paragraph encapsulates the key judicial review test:

• Was the decision‑maker aware of and did he consider the relevant aspects of the claim?
• Did he rationally address the key factual and legal elements?
• If so, and if the outcome was “open to him on the evidence”, the Court will not substitute its own assessment.

Disagreement with the weighing of the evidence or with the decision‑maker’s view of the plausibility of the applicant’s narrative is a matter for the statutory appeal, not for judicial review.

5.3 Misunderstanding an Argument: Appeal, Not Judicial Review

Paragraph 39 of the judgment contains what is arguably the clearest statement of a new, or at least freshly crystallised, principle:

“In her written submissions, it was submitted that the decision-maker had misunderstood this element of her claim. If he did that, it meant that he had at least considered the point. If the applicant feels that he misunderstood her argument in this regard, that is quintessentially a ground for inclusion in an appeal, where the applicant can remake the argument in a different or more forceful manner. The assertion that a decision-maker may have misunderstood an argument that was put forward on behalf of an applicant, is not a ground for granting certiorari of the decision.”

This passage does several things:

• It recognises that an alleged “misunderstanding” implies that the decision‑maker engaged with the argument, even if imperfectly. This engagement ordinarily satisfies the requirement to consider the point.
• It therefore distinguishes between:
  • failure to consider a substantial, properly raised ground (which can be a reviewable error); and
  • misinterpretation or misweighing of a ground (which is a merits issue for appeal).
• It underscores that the statutory appeal to IPAT is the “quintessential” forum to argue that the first‑instance decision‑maker has misunderstood the nature or implications of the applicant’s submissions.
• It expressly denies that such a misunderstanding, without more, can found a successful application for certiorari.

This is a significant clarification in the asylum judicial review landscape. It will make it harder for applicants to repackage dissatisfaction with the reasoning or evaluation of their case as a justiciable “failure to consider” error. The Court insists on a real conceptual boundary:

• Judicial review: was there a jurisdictional or procedural defect—e.g. ignoring decisive material, failing to address an essential limb of the claim at all, or applying an incorrect test?
• Appeal to IPAT: did the IPO misunderstand, undervalue, or misweigh the arguments or evidence despite having considered them?

5.4 Precedents Cited and Their Role

5.4.1 GK v International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2022] IEHC 204

In GK v IPAT, the High Court articulated the multi‑factor approach for extensions of time in asylum‑related judicial review. Though the full facts of GK are not rehearsed in MD, Barr J extracts from it (and IT) the following key principles:

• There is no automatic or rigid rule; the court must weigh several considerations.
• The length of the delay is relevant but not determinative.
• The reasons for delay must be assessed, with careful attention to whether the applicant personally is at fault or whether the delay arose from solicitors’ actions.
• The court must consider the interests of justice and the consequences for the applicant, especially where the underlying decision can have life‑altering outcomes (as in protection cases).
• The statutory nature of the time limit tends to argue against extension but is not an absolute bar.

In MD, these principles underpin the Court’s willingness to extend time where there was:

• a modest delay;
• a reasonable tactical explanation (the pre‑litigation letter); and
• no identifiable prejudice to the State.

5.4.2 IT v Minister for Justice [2023] IEHC 40

IT is cited alongside GK as reinforcing the same multi‑factor, interest‑of‑justice approach. Although the MD judgment does not expand on IT, its invocation signals the Court’s commitment to:

• maintaining a structured and principled discretion when extending statutory time limits; and
• assessing delay contextually—in light of the nature of the decision under challenge and the realities of protection litigation.

5.4.3 PD v Minister for Justice and Law Reform [2015] IEHC 111

MD relied on PD to bolster an argument about the IPO’s duty of inquiry and investigation. In that earlier case:

• the applicant was a homosexual man from Zimbabwe and Malawi; and
• the Court held the first‑instance decision unlawful because the decision‑maker had failed to investigate whether the laws in those countries criminalised homosexual acts, which would have been crucial to assessing the safety of return.

As described in MD (para. 27), PD shows that:

• the decision‑maker has an active duty of inquiry into material aspects of the risk profile, especially where objective questions of law or country conditions arise;
• a failure to conduct such inquiry on an obviously relevant issue can render a decision invalid.

MD’s counsel argued that, analogously, the IPO failed to “investigate” or address the position of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia as an essential component of MD’s claim.

Barr J’s rejection of that analogy rests on two points:

• The IPO did recognise MD’s displacement from Abkhazia but, given her decades‑long life in Tbilisi and the absence of any suggestion that return to Abkhazia was being contemplated, the “issue of returning [to Abkhazia] did not arise” (para. 34).
• The genuine live question was whether MD faced a real risk in Tbilisi; on that, the IPO had engaged, evaluated, and rejected her narrative.

Thus, whereas PD involved an omission to investigate a central and immediate legal risk (criminalisation of homosexuality in the countries of return), MD involved, at most, a contention that the IPO had not given separate, formalised treatment to a background aspect of the claim (the historical displacement from Abkhazia), which:

• was recognised in the decision;
• did not feature as a real return destination; and
• would not have changed the outcome once Tbilisi was held to be safe.

Accordingly, PD remains good authority on the duty of investigation, but MD clarifies that this duty is triggered only by issues that are genuinely material to the actual return scenario and risk assessment, not by every conceivable thread of the applicant’s life history.

5.5 The Role of the IPAT Appeal and Alternative Remedy

The respondents argued that, even if there were some arguable flaw in the IPO decision, MD had an adequate alternative remedy in the form of a full merits appeal to the IPAT, which she had already invoked.

Barr J ultimately found no reviewable error and therefore held it unnecessary to decide whether the existence of the appeal should preclude certiorari (para. 40). Nonetheless, the judgment’s reasoning implicitly defines the respective domains of:

• Judicial review – for:
  • strictly legal errors (e.g. application of the wrong statutory test);
  • serious procedural defects (e.g. failure to address a core element of the claim, denial of fair procedures); or
  • irrationality in the strong, public law sense.
• IPAT appeal – for:
  • re‑arguing or reframing the applicant’s case;
  • challenging the IPO’s evaluation of credibility and factual risk; and
  • contending that arguments were misunderstood or insufficiently weighed.

The explicit statement that an alleged “misunderstanding” of a ground is “quintessentially” a matter for appeal reinforces the primacy of the IPAT as the forum for re‑litigating the substantive merits of the protection claim.

6. Simplifying Complex Legal Concepts

6.1 International Protection, Refugee Status and Subsidiary Protection

• International protection under the 2015 Act encompasses:
  • Refugee status – where the applicant has a well‑founded fear of persecution in their country of origin for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group, and cannot (or is unwilling to) avail of that country’s protection.
  • Subsidiary protection – where the applicant does not qualify as a refugee but faces a real risk of serious harm (e.g. death penalty, torture, or indiscriminate violence in situations of armed conflict).

The IPO first examines refugee status; if refused, it then considers subsidiary protection. Both are subject to the same 28‑day judicial review regime.

6.2 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

An internally displaced person is someone who has been forced to flee their home but has not crossed an internationally recognised border. IDP status:

• is not, by itself, a category protected under the Refugee Convention; but
• can be highly relevant to assessing past persecution, vulnerability, and risk in parts of the country.

In MD’s case, she argued that being an ethnic Georgian displaced from Abkhazia was inherently persecutory and that Abkhazia remained unsafe. The Court accepted that this background was relevant but held that, given her long‑term life in Tbilisi and the lack of any proposal to return her to Abkhazia, this did not form a free‑standing basis for international protection once Tbilisi was found safe.

6.3 Internal Relocation (Internal Flight Alternative)

The concept of internal relocation (or internal flight alternative) asks:

• If the applicant faces persecution or serious harm in one part of their country, is there another part where they can reasonably and safely live?

If such a place exists, and it is not unduly harsh or unreasonable to expect the person to live there, refugee or subsidiary protection status may be refused. The analysis generally has two components:

1. Is there an area of the country where the applicant would not face persecution or serious harm?
2. Would it be reasonable or not unduly harsh to expect them to stay there, considering personal circumstances (e.g. health, family, past trauma) and general conditions?

MD’s lawyers tried to invert the logic: they said Abkhazia was dangerous and that Tbilisi was not a reasonable relocation option because of threats from Islamist associates. The IPO, however, had concluded that Tbilisi was safe, so the internal relocation argument could not assist her.

6.4 State Protection and “Real Risk”

In both refugee and subsidiary protection contexts, an applicant must typically show:

• a real risk of persecution or serious harm; and
• that state protection is not reasonably available (e.g. laws are ineffective, the authorities are unwilling or unable to protect them).

In MD’s narrative, she alleged that:

• the police recorded her complaint about the 2021 attack but no further action was taken; and
• this implied an absence of effective state protection.

The IPO evidently either did not accept her version of events or found that overall, the evidence did not show a real risk without protection in Tbilisi. That assessment, being fact‑sensitive, is classic appeal territory rather than a matter for judicial review.

6.5 Judicial Review vs Appeal and the Remedy of Certiorari

• Judicial review examines whether a public body acted lawfully, fairly, and rationally within its powers. It is not a rehearing of the case.
• Certiorari is the order by which a court quashes a decision for legal error.
• A statutory appeal (here, to the IPAT) allows a fuller reconsideration of the merits: facts, credibility, and updated evidence.

MD’s case demonstrates this distinction sharply:

• A genuine failure by the IPO to consider a substantial ground could warrant certiorari.
• But a complaint that the IPO misunderstood or undervalued that ground—assuming it was at least considered—belongs on appeal.

6.6 Duty to Investigate and to Co‑operate (Section 28 of the 2015 Act)

Section 28 of the International Protection Act 2015 (referred to by MD) obliges the IPO to:

• examine and investigate all relevant elements of the applicant’s protection claim; and
• co‑operate with the applicant in establishing their claim.

In PD, a failure to investigate whether homosexual acts were criminalised in the applicant’s countries of origin was held to breach that duty. In MD, however, the Court found no comparable failure:

• the historical Abkhazia background was known and mentioned;
• the real issue for return was Tbilisi; and
• the IPO had investigated and made findings on that core issue.

Thus, the duty to investigate is engaged by material and live issues in the claim, not by every facet of the applicant’s personal history.

7. Impact and Practical Implications

7.1 For International Protection Decision‑Makers (IPO and IPAT)

• Holistic reasoning is acceptable: The judgment endorses a “read as a whole” approach. Decision‑makers need not structure decisions as point‑by‑point replies to every legal argument, provided the substance of the claim is clearly addressed.
• Focus on the real return scenario: Where an applicant has long resided in a particular area of the country and there is no realistic prospect of return to a conflict‑ridden region left decades earlier, the risk analysis properly focuses on the actual area of prospective return.
• Record engagement with core elements: While a rigid formula is unnecessary, it remains prudent to:
  • identify the main grounds advanced;
  • summarise relevant country of origin information; and
  • show, in broad terms, how those grounds have been evaluated.

7.2 For Practitioners and Applicants

• Framing “failure to consider” grounds:
  • After MD, it will be more difficult to argue successfully that the IPO “failed to consider” a ground where the decision mentions the relevant background and addresses the core risk narrative.
  • Counsel will need to show that a material component of the claim was wholly omitted, not merely insufficiently discussed or arguably misinterpreted.
• Choosing between judicial review and appeal:
  • Complaints about mis‑evaluation of country information or misunderstanding of the import of submissions belong in the IPAT appeal.
  • Judicial review should be reserved for clear legal or procedural defects.
• Use of pre‑litigation letters:
  • Such letters can be valuable in attempting to correct obvious errors quickly and can support an application for extension of time if sent in a timely and reasonable way.
  • However, they do not stop the time limit from running and do not guarantee an extension.

7.3 For IDP‑Based Claims from Conflict Regions

• IDP status is relevant but not determinative:
  • Being an IDP from a conflict region is an important factual element but does not automatically establish entitlement to international protection in another country.
• Emphasis on current risk and feasible return options:
  • Courts and decision‑makers will focus on where, in reality, the person would live if returned and what the present risk is there.
  • Long‑term relocation within the country (as in MD’s 30‑year residence in Tbilisi) can shift the analysis away from the original displacement area.

7.4 On the Duty of Inquiry and Avoiding Overreach

MD subtly recalibrates how far applicants can press the duty of investigation under s.28 and cases like PD:

• The Court reaffirms that there is such a duty, but it must be proportionate and targeted.
• Decision‑makers are not obliged to carry out full‑scale investigations into every potentially relevant situation in every part of a country where there is no real prospect of the applicant being returned.

8. Conclusion

MD v Chief International Protection Officer [2025] IEHC 648 is principally important for two reasons.

First, it clarifies the boundary between judicial review and appeal in the international protection context. Applicants cannot convert dissatisfaction with the IPO’s understanding or weighing of their arguments into a valid ground for certiorari. A mere allegation that the IPO “misunderstood” an argument is, in Barr J’s words, “quintessentially” a matter for the statutory appeal to IPAT.

Second, it reinforces that the duty to give reasons and to consider the grounds advanced is assessed substantively and holistically. Decision‑makers must engage with the real issues raised by the claim, but they are not required to adopt a rigid, argument‑by‑argument format, nor to treat every element of the applicant’s history as a free‑standing ground for protection.

On the procedural side, the judgment also illustrates a measured and pragmatic approach to the extension of the 28‑day statutory time limit, particularly where a short delay is reasonably explained, untainted by personal fault of the applicant, and causes no prejudice to the respondents.

Taken together, the decision provides valuable guidance to protection decision‑makers, practitioners and litigants on:

• how reasons will be evaluated;
• how to distinguish between reviewable legal defects and appealable disagreements on the merits; and
• how the courts will exercise discretion in relation to time limits in high‑stakes protection litigation.