Minister for Justice v Okojie [2025] IEHC 329 – “Once Assured, Always Assured”: The High Court affirms that a clear §45 assurance from an Issuing Judicial Authority stands unless objectively discredited

1. Introduction

In Minister for Justice v Okojie the High Court (McGrath J) confronted a familiar but contentious problem in European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”) practice: can an Irish court disregard an issuing-state assurance that a retrial or appeal will be available to a person convicted in absentia where defence material appears to paint a different picture?

The respondent, Mr David Okojie, faced surrender to Italy to serve 1 year 4 months and 1 day of an aggregated drug-trafficking sentence. Tried twice in absentia, he objected on six grounds; ultimately two survived to argument:

• lack of clarity and alleged non-compliance with s.45 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (right to retrial/appeal);
• Article 8 ECHR and the effect of a 17-year delay.

A dramatic element was a letter from Okojie’s former Italian lawyer stating that no further remedy remained. The core question therefore became whether that private opinion undermined the categorical assurance contained in the EAW and twice reaffirmed by the Italian Deputy Public Prosecutor.

2. Summary of the Judgment

McGrath J ordered surrender. He held that:

1. The EAW complied with s.45: the issuing judicial authority (“IJA”) gave an unequivocal statement under box D.3.4 guaranteeing personal service of the judgment, express information about a right to a full retrial/appeal, and a 30-day window in which to exercise that right.
2. The subsequent confirmation (4 Apr 2025) that those guarantees remained unchanged and fully valid sufficed to dispel any doubt raised by the defence letter. Mutual trust required acceptance of that assurance absent cogent, objective evidence to the contrary.
3. Delay, while lengthy and partly unexplained (2006-2021), is not a stand-alone bar to surrender. Coupled with Article 8, it can only succeed in truly exceptional cases of oppressive family disruption—threshold not met here.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Minister for Justice v Ostrowski [2013] 4 IR 206 – set out proportionality test for Article 8 objections.
• Minister for Justice v Vesteratas [2020] IESC 12 – emphasised the public interest in surrender and high Article 8 threshold.
• Minister for Justice v D.E. [2021] IECA 188 – reiterated that significant disruption of family life is inevitable and usually proportionate.
• Minister for Justice v Palonka [2022] IESC 6 – explained how delay may foster exceptional circumstances but cannot of itself bar surrender.

These authorities guided the court’s treatment of both the Article 8/delay objection and the proper deference to issuing-state assurances, reinforcing a consistent jurisprudential thread: strong mutual trust yields only to clear, verifiable risk of a rights breach.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

a) Section 45 (in absentia convictions)

Section 45 implements Art.4a of the Framework Decision, compelling Irish courts to refuse surrender only if the requested person in absentia did not have, and will not receive, an effective opportunity to challenge the conviction. Here:

• The warrant frankly stated Okojie was absent at both first-instance and appeal hearings.
• Box D.3.4 contained the three mandatory assurances: personal service, explicit right to a retrial/appeal, and a specified timeframe (30 days).
• Nothing in the defence materials objectively contradicted that assurance. A private lawyer’s opinion, unaccompanied by Italian procedural law or authority, did not rise to “objective evidence.”

McGrath J stressed the “core” EU principles of mutual trust and confidence: an Irish court must presume other member states observe EU fundamental rights unless substantial, factual, and objective material undermines that presumption. The court therefore accepted the IJA’s reaffirmed guarantee.

b) Article 8 and Delay

Applying the five principles distilled from Palonka and earlier cases, the judge found:

• Delay alone is irrelevant; only its impact matters.
• Okojie’s wife and adult children reside in the UK; no evidence of dependency.
• The disruption occasioned (14 months imprisonment) was not exceptional or oppressive.

Consequently, surrender did not amount to a disproportionate interference with family life.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

The judgment crystallises an important procedural rule in Irish EAW jurisprudence:

Once an issuing judicial authority provides a clear s.45 assurance, and re-confirms it upon request, Irish courts will not probe further unless the defence supplies cogent, objectively verifiable evidence casting doubt on that assurance. Private or anecdotal material is insufficient.

Practically, this raises the evidentiary bar for respondents seeking to defeat surrender on in absentia grounds. Defence teams will have to furnish concrete legislative or judicial documents showing the absence or ineffectiveness of a retrial right; merely quoting local counsel’s opinion will not suffice.

Additionally, the judgment continues the Supreme Court’s line (e.g. Palonka) that delay-driven Article 8 arguments almost always fail unless truly extraordinary family circumstances are shown. This reinforces predictability: lengthy gaps in prosecution will rarely derail EAWs unless accompanied by demonstrable hardship.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• European Arrest Warrant (EAW): A fast-track, EU-wide system whereby a judicial authority in one member state can request another to arrest and surrender a person either for prosecution or to serve a sentence.
• Section 45 of the 2003 Act: The Irish transposition of Art.4a of the Framework Decision. It obliges refusal of surrender where the conviction took place in absentia unless the issuing state guarantees a fresh trial/appeal.
• “Ticked-box” offences: Serious crimes listed in Art.2.2 of the Framework Decision; if the issuing state ticks the relevant box, Irish courts do not examine dual criminality.
• Mutual Trust: The EU cornerstone presuming that all member states comply with fundamental rights and fair-trial standards; domestic courts should not second-guess unless compelling evidence indicates otherwise.
• Article 8 ECHR: Protects private and family life. In extradition/EAW context, surrender may be refused if it produces exceptional and disproportionate hardship.

5. Conclusion

Minister for Justice v Okojie is not revolutionary but is doctrinally significant. It underscores that:

1. In the EAW system, the word of the issuing judicial authority—when explicit and repeated—carries decisive weight.
2. Defence objections to s.45 assurances must be anchored in hard, verifiable material, not mere opinions.
3. Delay, even extensive, offers scant shelter from surrender absent exceptional family hardship.

The decision bolsters the efficiency and predictability of EAW proceedings while preserving the safety-valve of evidence-based skepticism. Practitioners should treat the case as a clear signal: challenge issuing-state guarantees only with substantive, demonstrably authoritative proof, or risk swift dismissal.