McDaid v Monaghan County Council: Public Roads, Private Farm Lanes and the Limits of the Presumption of Regularity

1. Introduction

1.1 Background and Parties

This case concerns a short but legally significant stretch of roadway in rural County Monaghan. The plaintiff, Donal Gerard McDaid, owns a farm traversed by a 150 metre length of roadway (the “Disputed Road”). That stretch forms part of local road LT81012, known as the “horseshoe road” or the “12 Road”, which connects at both ends to public road LT81011 (the “11 Road”).

The defendant, Monaghan County Council (“the Council”), asserted that this Disputed Road is a public road. The plaintiff maintained that it is either a private road or a private right of way serving land originally owned by an ancestor, Simon Donaghy, subdivided in 1834 into three parcels (the “Donaghy Lands”).

1.2 Central Legal Questions

The core dispute required the High Court (Cahill J) to determine whether the 150m stretch through the plaintiff’s farmyard is:

a private road,
a private right of way,
a public right of way (a highway at common law), or
a public road within the meaning of the Irish roads legislation, taken in charge by the Council.

To resolve this, the Court had to analyse:

the common law principles of dedication of public rights of way,
the statutory mechanisms for taking roads in charge under the Local Government Act 1953 and the Roads Act 1993,
the effect and limits of road schedules and a section 11(5) Roads Act 1993 certificate, and
equitable defences of laches and estoppel, and a claim for damages.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Cahill J held in favour of the plaintiff on the central issues. The main outcomes are:

No public right of way was established over the Disputed Road:
- The Council bore the burden of proving dedication of a public right of way.
- Evidence showed limited, neighbour-based use rather than use by the public at large.
- The Court emphasised the need to protect “good neighbourliness” and avoid forcing landowners into a “fortress mentality”.
The Disputed Road was not shown to have been taken in charge by the Council under any statutory regime:
- No evidence of compliance with the Local Government Act 1953 or Roads Act 1993 formalities.
- No proof that the Disputed Road was ever the subject of a valid declaration as a public road.
Section 11(5) Roads Act certificate given negligible weight:
- A 2019 certificate purporting to certify the 12 Road as a public road was not supported by evidence of any underlying section 11 process.
- The Court refused to treat the certificate as determinative.
Presumption of regularity rejected:
- The maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta could not be used to fill a complete evidential void on statutory preconditions for taking a road in charge.
- The Court stressed the dangers of using the presumption to sidestep mandatory democratic safeguards such as public notices and reserved functions.
Defences of laches, estoppel and “unclean hands” failed:
- The plaintiff’s timing in issuing proceedings was not unreasonable in the context of ongoing planning and enforcement litigation.
- Representations in planning documents describing the route as a public road did not estop the plaintiff from contesting its status, given the statutory framework.
No damages awarded:
- Any claim in negligence or misfeasance was not properly pleaded.
- Even on the facts, the history of inconsistent representations would be a major obstacle to liability.

The Court granted a declaration that the Disputed Road is not a public right of way and not a public road. Costs are provisionally awarded to the plaintiff, subject to submissions.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Legal Framework: Public Rights of Way and Public Roads

3.1.1 Public right of way (highway)

The Court adopted the classic description in Walsh v Sligo County Council [2014] 4 IR 417. A public right of way:

is a highway over private land,
gives the general public a right to pass and repass at all times, day or night,
does not require maintenance by the road authority, and
seriously qualifies the landowner’s privacy and enjoyment of property.

Such a right arises not from mere use, but from dedication by the landowner, which may be express or inferred from long, open, and unchallenged user (“user as of right”).

3.1.2 Taking in charge as a public road

The route from a private way to a public road in law involves both:

existence of a public right of way over the road, and
a statutory declaration by the road authority under:
- section 2 of the Local Government Act 1953, or
- section 11 of the Roads Act 1993.

Both statutory provisions require that:

the road already has a public right of way over it; and
the authority be satisfied that it is of “general public utility”.

They also impose procedural safeguards:

publication of advance newspaper notices,
opportunity for objections or representations, and
exercise of a reserved function by the elected Council members (formal resolution).

3.1.3 The section 11(5) certificate

Section 11(5) of the 1993 Act provides that a certificate of a road authority that a road is a public road is prima facie evidence of that fact. It does not by itself constitute the decision to declare the road a public road; it reflects and evidences such a decision, if properly made.

3.2 Public Right of Way: Evidence and Findings

3.2.1 Burden and standard of proof

Relying on Walsh, Walker v Leonach [2018] IECA 132 and Kildare County Council v Morrin [2021] IECA 341, Cahill J held that:

The burden of proof lies on the party asserting dedication – here, the Council.
Whether dedication occurred is a question of fact to be decided on all the evidence.
What must be proved is animus dedicandi – the landowner’s intention to dedicate the way to the public, which may be inferred from conduct.

3.2.2 User “as of right” and the “public at large”

User capable of supporting an inference of dedication must be “as of right”, that is:

nec vi – without force;
nec clam – openly, not in secret; and
nec precario – without permission.

Building on Walker, the Court stressed that it is not the volume of traffic that matters but its character:

the way must be used by the public at large,
not merely by a closed class linked by family, employment, tenancy or similar nexus.

3.2.3 Evidence of user

The Council called three factual witnesses: neighbours Mr Gary Keenan and Mr Tom McConnell, and former resident Mr Brian Duffy. Their evidence, accepted as generally credible, established that:

Mr Keenan and his family used the Disputed Road regularly to access their lands from 2008, and earlier as visitors.
Mr McConnell used the route occasionally, especially when moving large trailers or (historically) when a milk tanker collected milk at several farms along the 12 Road.
Mr Duffy recalled walking through the farmyard as a child in the 1960s and using the route a few times a year thereafter when visiting.

Evidence was also given of occasional use by:

a postman, and
milk collection tankers until the mid‑1990s.

On the plaintiff’s side, evidence from Mr McDaid and his father indicated that:

The Disputed Road was principally used by:
- members of the McDaid family; and
- successors to the Donaghy Lands (including the Keenans and Donaghys),
under a private right of way created upon subdivision of the lands in 1834.
The McDaids maintained and resurfaced the Disputed Road themselves.
Any use by near neighbours (including Mr McConnell) was limited, often infrequent, and either by permission or tolerated in a spirit of neighbourliness.

3.2.4 Use by the “public at large”?

Cahill J found that, even taking the Council’s evidence at its highest:

Use was by a finite group of near neighbours – all with close geographical and, in significant cases, family connections to the Donaghy Lands.
There was no convincing evidence of use by the public at large as of right.
Service use (postman, milk tanker) was at most ancillary to their functions and in any event not of a kind that demonstrates the creation of a public right.

In line with Walker, this closed, neighbour-based category of user was insufficient to establish a public right of way.

3.2.5 Tolerated neighbourly use vs dedication

Drawing on Walsh and Walker, the Court emphasised that:

Landowners should not be forced to act “churlishly” by excluding neighbours;
The law must not be applied so as to discourage neighbourliness and encourage a “fortress mentality”;
Tolerated or courteous use, even over long periods, does not automatically amount to user as of right.

On the facts, it would have been “very unneighbourly” for the McDaids to prevent Mr McConnell using the route occasionally for large trailers or as a child walking to the lake, and similarly for other near neighbours. Such tolerance could not fairly be converted into evidence of dedication to the general public.

3.2.6 Public expenditure on the road

The Council argued that public works in 1978, 2000/2001 and 2022 showed that the Disputed Road was part of the public network. However, evidence from:

the plaintiff and his father, and
the Council’s own engineer witnesses and PMS records,

established that:

Road works in 1978 and 2000/2001 were carried out on other parts of the 12 Road, but stopped short of the 150m farmyard section.
Resurfacing in 2022 also did not extend into the farmyard section, partly because of concerns about different usage patterns (cattle, farm traffic) and design requirements.
The Disputed Road itself was maintained by the McDaids, supported by evidence from their contractor.

Following Morrin, the absence of clear, long-term public maintenance of the specific disputed section strongly undermined the suggestion of dedication and taking in charge.

3.2.7 Planning applications and acknowledgements

Planning applications made on behalf of the plaintiff and his father between 2002 and 2007 repeatedly described the route as a “public road” or “county road”, and planning conditions were framed on that basis. The Court found:

Those representations were indeed made by their agents.
The plaintiff and his father were not entirely credible in denying any awareness of such representations.
However, these descriptions:
- were made to secure planning permissions;
- did not, of themselves, establish an intention to dedicate; and
- could not outweigh the lack of objective evidence of public user and public maintenance.

Crucially, without sufficient public user, planning labels could not themselves create a public right of way.

3.2.8 Road closures

The Disputed Road was temporarily closed in 2015, and again from December 2017 onwards, through formal road closure procedures. The Council relied on the plaintiff’s failure to challenge these closures as implicit acknowledgment that the road was public. Cahill J rejected this argument:

The closures were better understood as the Council’s exercise of statutory powers in response to works on the underpass.
Compliance with or non-challenge to closure orders did not amount to an admission of dedication.

3.2.9 Conclusion on public right of way

On all the evidence, the Court held that:

The Council, bearing the burden of proof, failed to establish a public right of way.
User was:
- limited in duration, intensity and category of users; and
- consistent with a private right of way between Donaghy descendants and neighbourly tolerance.
The necessary animus dedicandi and “user as of right” by the public at large were not shown.

3.3 Was the Disputed Road Taken in Charge as a Public Road?

3.3.1 Pre‑1953 position

The Council tentatively suggested that the road might have been taken in charge under pre‑1925 “presentment” regimes associated with the Grand Jury (Ireland) Act 1836. However:

Its own witness, Mr McMahon, accepted that this was speculative.
No records of any presentment or adoption were produced.
The Court held there was no evidential basis to find the road had been taken in charge before 1953.

3.3.2 Requirements of section 2, Local Government Act 1953

Section 2 of the 1953 Act allows a road authority to declare a road over which a public right of way exists, and which is not already a public road, to be a public road, if satisfied that it is of general public utility. The Court emphasised the key elements:

There must be an existing public right of way for pedestrians, animals, and vehicles.
The road must not already be a public road.
The authority must form a view that the road is of general public utility.
At least one month before making such a declaration, the authority must publish a notice in at least two newspapers circulating in the area, with prescribed particulars.
The declaration is a reserved function and must be exercised directly by the Council (formal decision/minute).

Crucially:

The Council conceded that it had no records of complying with any of these requirements.
There was no evidence of:
- a public right of way over the Disputed Road (first requirement already failed),
- a Council resolution,
- any assessment of “general public utility”, or
- any newspaper notices.

3.3.3 Requirements of section 11, Roads Act 1993

Section 11 of the 1993 Act re‑enacts a broadly similar structure:

The authority may declare “any road over which a public right of way exists” to be a public road.
It must:
- satisfy itself that the road is of general public utility,
- consider the financial implications,
- publish a newspaper notice indicating where a map may be inspected and inviting objections within specified timeframes, and
- consider any objections or representations.
The making of such an order is a reserved function.

Once again, no evidence was produced that:

a section 11 order had ever been made in respect of LT81012; or
any of the procedural preconditions (notices, consideration of objections, Council resolution) had been met.

3.4 Road Schedules, the 1981 Courthouse Fire and the Presumption of Regularity

3.4.1 Road schedules

The Council relied heavily on its road schedule, which has listed the entire 12 Road as a public road since 1965. The plaintiff challenged the schedule for not being signed, sealed or dated. The Court made two key points:

As a matter of substance, a road schedule cannot itself create a public road or operate as a taking‑in‑charge mechanism; it merely records the Council’s own view.
At best, it is evidential, but here it carried limited weight because:
- the Disputed Road was treated differently in practice (never maintained by the Council, described in 1997 by the Council as “used only as a farm access road”);
- no statutory process could be identified to support the schedule’s classification.

3.4.2 The 1981 courthouse fire

The Council suggested that key documents could have been lost in a 1981 fire at Monaghan courthouse. Cahill J rejected this as a basis for inferring that a valid taking‑in‑charge had occurred:

The evidence went no further than that documents may have been lost.
There was no evidence that the particular documents (orders, resolutions, notices) ever existed.
The fire could not plausibly explain the absence of newspaper notices, which should survive in press archives.

The Court treated this as mere conjecture, echoing the scepticism shown in Walker towards speculative reliance on destroyed records.

3.4.3 The presumption of regularity

To plug the evidential gaps, the Council invoked the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta (the presumption of regularity), relying on Clark v Early [1980] IR 223, Re Delahunty [2021] IEHC 657 and Martins v Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] IEHC 268.

From those authorities, the Court distilled the following:

The presumption can allow a court to fill a limited evidential gap about formalities where it is otherwise satisfied the act was done.
It cannot contradict direct evidence to the contrary.
An absence of evidence that something happened is not the same as evidence that it did not happen, but some foundational evidence of the act is still required.

Applying this, Cahill J held:

In the public law context, particularly over the taking in charge of roads, the presumption must be applied with great caution.
To allow it to substitute for proof of all the mandatory statutory preconditions (public right of way, general public utility, newspaper notices, Council resolution) would be “far‑reaching and potentially dangerous”.
Such use would effectively rewrite the statute, bypassing democratic safeguards and public participation designed by the Oireachtas.

On the evidence:

There was no evidence of any intention to take this specific 150m section in charge.
The Council’s own senior officer accepted there was “nothing that shows” a statutory taking in charge.
No newspaper notices could be found despite “quite extensive searches”.

In these circumstances, the threshold for invoking the presumption was not met. The presumption of regularity was held not to apply.

3.5 The Section 11(5) Certificate

In August 2019, shortly after withdrawing a Roads Act prosecution and while pursuing committal proceedings against the plaintiff, the Council issued a section 11(5) certificate stating that LT81012 is a public road.

Critical features:

The certificate was signed by the Deputy Chief Executive, Patricia Monahan, who did not give evidence.
The senior roads official, Mr McMahon, was not involved in its preparation and did not know what, if any, checks were done before issuing it.
In response to an FOI request, another senior official, Mr Clifford, wrote in October 2019 that:
- no order had ever been made under section 11(1) in respect of LT81012;
- no assessment of general public utility or financial implications had been carried out;
- no notices were published, no objections invited, and no meeting held.

The Council argued that the certificate was merely confirmatory of an existing public road status and did not depend on the section 11 process. The Court was not persuaded:

The certificate’s evidential value depends on there being some underlying factual or legal basis for the assertion.
Here, the Council’s own documentation disavowed any section 11 process.
Absent proof that the road was otherwise a public road (through valid dedication and taking in charge), the certificate could not be treated as determinative.

Cahill J concluded that no weight could be attached to the certificate and expressly had “no regard to it” in determining the status of the road.

3.6 Defences: Laches, Estoppel and Unclean Hands

3.6.1 Laches and delay

The Council argued that:

the status of the road came into issue in 2017 with the underpass works;
the plaintiff only clearly asserted private status around 2019; and
issuing these proceedings in October 2021 was unreasonably late and unconscionable, causing prejudice to the Council and road users.

The Court rejected this, noting that:

The controversy about status only became acute after the Council initiated planning enforcement and criminal proceedings.
The plaintiff was engaged in a complex web of litigation (section 160 proceedings, criminal prosecution, planning appeals, judicial review) where the status issue could in principle have been resolved.
The Council itself was still investigating the road’s status, undertaking extensive searches and issuing the section 11(5) certificate.
No public monies had been expended on the Disputed Road itself, undermining any claim of material prejudice.
The alleged prejudice to neighbours was not compelling, given the Court’s finding that their use arose under private rights or neighbourly tolerance, not public right.

Accordingly, the plea of laches was dismissed.

3.6.2 Estoppel

The Council contended that:

The plaintiff and his father, through their planning agents, had repeatedly represented the route as a public road.
The Council relied on those representations when granting planning permission.
The plaintiff should now be estopped from denying the road’s public status.

Relying on Ulster Investment Bank v Rockrohan Estate Ltd [2015] 4 IR 37, the Court accepted that estoppel requires:

clear conduct or representation by the party to be estopped;
reasonable reliance by the other party; and
a new “objective state of affairs” as between the parties.

However, several factors militated against applying estoppel here:

The underlying legal question – whether the road is a public road – depends on compliance with statute, not merely on how parties describe it.
Estoppel cannot be used to circumvent mandatory statutory requirements such as Council resolutions and public notices, or to create a public road “by agreement” in the absence of lawful process.
Any estoppel would operate only inter partes, generating uncertainty as to the road’s status vis‑à‑vis third parties and the public at large.
There was also inconsistency on the Council’s side about the road’s status over time (for example, the 1997 letter describing it as a mere farm access road).

Cahill J therefore held that estoppel was inapplicable and inappropriate in this context.

3.6.3 “Unclean hands”

A suggestion that the plaintiff came to court with “unclean hands”, based on Board of Management of Wilsons Hospital School v Burke [2023] IEHC 22, was raised late and not developed in substance. Given the Court’s factual findings, this argument was summarily rejected.

3.7 Damages

The plaintiff sought damages, invoking Barlow v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources [2025] IESC 14, and arguing that a duty of care arose from the Council’s allegedly unreasonable behaviour, including:

issuing the section 11(5) certificate; and
closing the road in 2017.

The Court refused to entertain a damages claim for two central reasons:

Pleading defects:
- No cause of action in negligence, breach of statutory duty, misfeasance or similar was actually pleaded.
- No duty, breach, causation or quantifiable loss was particularised in the statement of claim.
Substantive obstacles:
- Even if properly pleaded, the long history of inconsistent representations by or on behalf of the plaintiff that the road was a public road would be a significant obstacle to any finding of liability.

Accordingly, no damages were awarded.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

4.1 Walsh v Sligo County Council [2014] 4 IR 417

This Supreme Court authority was the primary source of principles on public rights of way by dedication. Cahill J applied it to:

Define a public right of way as a highway granting unrestricted passage to the public over private land.
Emphasise the burden of proof lies on the party alleging dedication.
Reiterate that:
- “User alone does not create a public right of way”.
- Dedication requires user as of right and an intention to dedicate, inferred from all the circumstances.
Stress that the law should not penalise generosity and should avoid compelling landowners to act unneighbourly.

McDaid exemplifies the application of Walsh’s cautionary approach to rural farm contexts, refusing to translate neighbourly tolerance into public rights.

4.2 Walker v Leonach [2018] IECA 132

Walker was central to defining the required category of users. Cahill J drew from it the principle that:

The material test is not how many people use the way, but whether it is available to and used by the public at large rather than a closed category.

In McDaid, this approach was decisive. The Court found that use by:

Donaghy descendants,
immediate neighbours, and
the occasional visitor or service provider,

did not amount to use by the public at large. Walker was also followed on:

the evidential weight of public expenditure (supportive but not conclusive), and
a sceptical stance on speculative reference to destroyed records (as with the 1922 Four Courts fire in Walker, and here the 1981 Monaghan courthouse fire).

4.3 Kildare County Council v Morrin [2021] IECA 341

Morrin reinforced:

the onus on local authorities to prove animus dedicandi, and
the importance of proof of maintenance and repair by the authority as evidence of dedication.

In Morrin, two invoices for works were held insufficient to infer dedication over a forecourt. In McDaid, the Council’s inability to point to any clear, long‑term, documented maintenance of the specific 150m stretch, combined with the plaintiff’s own maintenance, was treated as a strong indication against dedication and taking in charge.

4.4 Connell v Porter (1972) [2005] 3 IR 601 and Mullen v Irish Fish Meal Company (1970)

These authorities, referenced via Walsh and Morrin, illustrate earlier applications of dedication principles:

Connell v Porter involved decades of documented public maintenance (paving, lighting, cleaning, refuse collection), which strongly supported an inference of dedication.
Mullen was cited on the “time immemorial” concept and the notion of user where the starting point cannot be proved, a concept not directly applicable here since the Council itself only claimed some 60 years’ user.

McDaid contrasts sharply with Connell, underscoring that without similar “notorious and obvious” public works, dedication cannot be easily inferred.

4.5 Clark v Early [1980] IR 223 and Re Delahunty [2021] IEHC 657

Both are probate cases on the presumption of regularity in will execution. Cahill J adopted and extended their reasoning:

Recognising that the presumption can close minor evidential gaps as to formalities where substantial proof of the act exists.
Insisting that the presumption cannot overcome credible evidence that formalities were not observed.

McDaid is notable for transposing these concepts to the public law context and drawing a line: the presumption cannot be allowed to defeat or dilute mandatory statutory safeguards governing public powers.

4.6 Martins v Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] IEHC 268

Martins was cited to show that the presumption can, in principle, apply outside probate, but Lalor J had not substantively deployed it. Cahill J noted that Martins offered little concrete support for the Council’s argument, and she did not extend Martins into a general licence to presume validity of local authority actions in the absence of any supporting evidence.

4.7 Other authorities

JH v WJH (Keane J, 1979) was cited in relation to laches but did not influence the outcome significantly, given the factual findings on delay.
Barlow v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources [2025] IESC 14 was invoked by the plaintiff in support of a damages claim, but the Court found the claim unpleaded and unnecessary to decide.
Board of Management of Wilsons Hospital School v Burke [2023] IEHC 22 was mentioned in connection with “unclean hands”, but again had no determinative impact.

5. Impact and Significance

5.1 Clarifying the boundary between public and private in rural settings

McDaid provides a detailed and fact‑sensitive application of the Walsh/Walker/Morrin trilogy to a farmyard road, a common but under‑litigated scenario. It confirms that:

Longstanding access arrangements among neighbouring farming families do not, without more, generate public rights.
Courts will be cautious about converting neighbourly tolerance into public highways.
Landowners can, in principle, allow occasional or convenient passage without risking the automatic creation of public rights of way.

5.2 Strong limits on the presumption of regularity in public law

The judgment sets an important limit on the use of the presumption of regularity in the context of local authority road functions:

Authorities cannot rely on the presumption to overcome a complete absence of evidence that mandatory statutory preconditions were met.
Where legislation requires:
- formal resolutions,
- public notices, and
- consideration of “general public utility”,
courts will not infer compliance simply because the authority has long assumed the route to be public.

This has broader implications for administrative law:

Public bodies must maintain robust records of decisions involving reserved functions and public participation.
Historic assumptions are not enough where contested rights in land are at stake.

5.3 Evidential status of road schedules and section 11(5) certificates

The decision significantly qualifies the evidential effect of:

Road schedules: useful but not constitutive; they reflect only the local authority’s view.
Section 11(5) certificates: prima facie evidence at most; where the authority itself admits that no section 11 process took place and no other basis is shown, a certificate may be given little or no weight.

Local authorities will likely need to:

audit their legacy road schedules and certificates;
ensure that any certificate is supported by a demonstrable legal basis; and
where doubt exists, consider invoking section 11 afresh with full compliance with procedural safeguards.

5.4 Consequences for planning and enforcement practice

From a planning and enforcement perspective, McDaid signals that:

Authorities should establish the legal status of a road before:
- issuing enforcement notices,
- commencing criminal prosecutions under the Roads Act, or
- imposing planning conditions predicated on the road being public.
Where the legal basis is unclear, it is risky to rely on unsubstantiated schedules or certificates.
Litigation involving rural infrastructure and underpasses will increasingly require careful historical and documentary analysis rather than assumptions.

5.5 Guidance for landowners

For landowners, McDaid offers both reassurance and caution:

Reassurance: allowing neighbours or service providers to use a farm track does not automatically make it a public road; courts are sensitive to the policy of encouraging good neighbourly relations.
Caution: representations in planning applications and dealings with local authorities should be handled carefully; describing a way as “public” for convenience can later be used against the landowner, even if not ultimately determinative.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Public right of way (highway)
A legal right of the general public to pass and repass over a route on private land at all times, without needing permission. It seriously limits the landowner’s exclusive control.
Private right of way (easement)
A right enjoyed by specific land (and its owners/occupiers) to use a route over neighbouring land, typically created by deed or long usage. It benefits a limited class, not the public.
Public road
A road which the law recognises as part of the public road network. It is maintained by the road authority, and the public has a right of way over it. Conversion to a public road generally requires a valid statutory process.
User “as of right”
Use of land that is:
- nec vi – without force or violence;
- nec clam – openly, not in secret; and
- nec precario – without permission.
Only this type of user can support an inference of a public right of way.
Animus dedicandi
Latin for the landowner’s “intention to dedicate” a way to the public. Dedication is usually inferred, not express; courts look at all the circumstances (use, maintenance, objections, etc.).
Taking in charge
The process by which a local authority formally accepts responsibility for a road as a public road, under statutory powers (e.g. section 2 of the 1953 Act or section 11 of the 1993 Act).
General public utility
A statutory test requiring the authority to consider whether declaring a road to be public serves the general public interest, not just the convenience of a small group.
Reserved function
A decision that must be taken by the elected members of a council (e.g. passing a resolution), rather than by officials. Declaring a road to be a public road is such a function.
Road schedule
An internal list maintained by a local authority of roads it regards as public. It is useful evidence but does not itself convert a private road into a public one.
Section 11(5) certificate
A document issued by a road authority under section 11(5) of the Roads Act 1993 certifying that a road is a public road. It is prima facie evidence of that fact, but can be challenged and given little weight if unsupported.
Presumption of regularity (omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta)
A legal presumption that official acts were properly carried out in accordance with required formalities, unless there is evidence to the contrary. McDaid limits its use where there is no evidence at all of compliance with key statutory conditions.
Laches
An equitable defence arguing that a claimant waited too long to bring a claim, and that this delay makes it unfair or unconscionable to grant relief.
Estoppel
A doctrine preventing a party from denying the truth of a previous representation or from acting inconsistently with past conduct, where another has reasonably relied on it to their detriment. It cannot, however, be used to override statutory requirements or create public rights contrary to law.

7. Conclusion

McDaid v Monaghan County Council is a detailed and careful judgment that substantially clarifies how Irish law distinguishes public roads and public rights of way from private farm access in a rural setting. It does so by:

Reaffirming and applying the principles in Walsh, Walker and Morrin on dedication and user “as of right”.
Confirming that limited neighbourly use and courtesy do not suffice to create public rights of way.
Insisting that statutory formalities for taking roads in charge are real safeguards, not mere technicalities capable of being presumed into existence.
Restricting the reach of the presumption of regularity and the evidential force of section 11(5) certificates and road schedules when the underlying legal basis is missing.
Rejecting attempts to use estoppel to achieve what the statutory regime does not permit.

Ultimately, the Court declared that the Disputed Road is not a public right of way and not a public road. While the judgment does not positively declare the precise private legal structure (for example, the exact configuration of private easements among Donaghy descendants), it firmly removes the road from the realm of public highway law.

The decision will likely be cited in future disputes over rural lanes, farm access routes and historic roads, and will serve as a warning to local authorities that assumptions and internal classifications cannot substitute for documented compliance with the legislative framework governing public roads.