Clarificatory Addenda to Preliminary References and the Role of Declaratory Relief in Keeping EU Law Questions Live: Massey v An Bord Pleanála & Ors (No. 5) [2025] IEHC 709

1. Introduction

This decision of the Irish High Court (Massey v An Bord Pleanála & Ors (No. 5), [2025] IEHC 709, Humphreys J, 9 December 2025) is procedurally modest but doctrinally important. It is an addendum to an existing request for a preliminary ruling in Case C‑356/25 Massey before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

The judgment addresses two interlinked themes:

the ability of a national court, after sending a preliminary reference and after receiving written observations from the European Commission, to issue a clarificatory addendum without becoming a “party” to the CJEU proceedings; and
the continued existence of a live EU law dispute where coercive relief (quashing of a development consent) is res judicata, but a claim for purely declaratory relief remains pending in judicial review proceedings.

The case arises from a planning and environmental judicial review brought by Mr Paddy Massey against An Bord Pleanála (the national planning appeals board), Ireland and the Attorney General, and the notice party, Curns Energy Limited. A development consent has been upheld at national level; however, issues concerning alleged breaches of the Habitats Directive (Directive 92/43/EEC) as applied to the Birds Directive (Directive 2009/147/EC) remain relevant to a claim for a declaratory remedy and to the pending CJEU reference.

The judgment does not re‑open the merits of the planning decision. Instead, it clarifies:

the procedural posture of the main proceedings in Ireland;
the scope and relevance of the preliminary question already sent to the CJEU; and
the national legal framework for granting declarations without quashing decisions.

These clarifications are given in direct response to points raised by the European Commission in its written observations to the CJEU, especially as regards mootness and the role of the referring court.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Humphreys J issues an addendum to the earlier preliminary reference to the CJEU in Case C‑356/25, with the express intention of assisting the CJEU and the parties by:

Clarifying that:
- although the High Court’s refusal to quash the development consent is now final and has res judicata effect,
- a separate, freestanding claim for declaratory relief alleging breach of EU environmental law remains pending and live before the High Court; and
- this live declaratory issue means the case is not moot and the referred EU law question remains pertinent.
Explaining that Irish law permits merely declaratory relief in judicial review proceedings, without coercive orders, and giving a concise summary (from B v The Child & Family Agency [2025] IESC 2) of the three‑part test for granting such relief.
Identifying a series of recent Irish planning and environmental cases in which declarations of illegality were made without quashing the impugned decisions, to demonstrate that such relief is a real and practical outcome, not a theoretical residual.
Contesting the Commission’s suggestion that:
- the “substantive question” has already been adjudicated; or
- the reference is hypothetical or bears no relation to the purpose of the main proceedings.
Justifying, by reference to the CJEU’s own case law and Recommendations, the legitimacy of a clarificatory addendum by a referring court, while accepting that the court is not a “party” and cannot “reply” to the parties’ observations.
Ordering that the addendum be transmitted to the CJEU as part of the reference.

In doing so, the judgment lays down a clear statement of Irish practice and principle on:

the interface between Article 267 TFEU and domestic procedural autonomy; and
the use of declaratory relief as a mechanism to keep EU law issues justiciable even after final refusals of coercive remedies.

3. Legal and Procedural Background

3.1 The underlying planning dispute and prior decisions

The core domestic dispute concerns a planning permission granted to Curns Energy Limited, which Mr Massey challenged in judicial review proceedings on environmental law grounds, including alleged non‑compliance with the Habitats and Birds Directives.

The High Court ultimately refused to quash the permission. Attempts to appeal that refusal were exhausted:

leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was refused on 30 May 2025 (Massey [2025] IEHC 309); and
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused on 16 October 2025 ([2025] IESCDET 126).

Accordingly, as para. 6 of the judgment makes clear, the refusal to quash has become final and enjoys res judicata status as to that form of relief.

However, Humphreys J underlines that the High Court has not decided whether a breach of the Habitats/Birds Directives has actually occurred. Instead, the earlier judgment determined that even if there had been a breach, it would not justify quashing the consent in the particular circumstances. That leaves open – and still pending – a claim for a judicial declaration that EU law has been breached.

3.2 The preliminary reference in Case C‑356/25 Massey

In parallel with the domestic proceedings, the High Court referred a question (or questions) to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU in Case C‑356/25 Massey. The precise wording of the referred questions is not reproduced in this addendum, but the context clearly indicates that:

the reference concerns the correct interpretation and application of the Habitats Directive as applied to the Birds Directive in relation to development consent; and
the answer will be necessary for the High Court to determine whether a declaration as to breach of EU law should be granted.

3.3 The Commission’s written observations and the perceived need for clarification

After the reference was made, the European Commission filed written observations in Case C‑356/25, and those observations were notified to the High Court in line with the Commission’s own Recommendations (C/2024/6008).

The Commission appears to have raised, in particular:

a concern that the substantive question in the domestic proceedings had already been decided by the referring court; and
a suggestion that the referred question might be moot or hypothetical, given that the development consent could no longer be quashed.

The Commission also expressed reservations, in the related case of Drumakilla (C‑58/24), about the practice of referring courts issuing “addenda” after receiving submissions, as this might be seen as turning the national court into a “party” to the preliminary reference procedure.

Humphreys J responds to these concerns by way of this carefully framed addendum, which he stresses is not a “reply” to the Commission’s arguments, but an effort to clarify national law and the procedural context so as to enable the CJEU to furnish a “useful reply” as contemplated by the CJEU’s own Recommendations.

4. Key Issues Addressed in the Addendum

4.1 Can a national court issue an addendum clarifying a preliminary reference?

Yes, according to Humphreys J, subject to the views of the CJEU. The judgment distinguishes between:

impermissible conduct – the referring court “replying” to the written observations of the Commission or other participants, thereby behaving as a party in the CJEU proceedings; and
permissible conduct – the referring court clarifying facts, national law or procedure that are part of the context “as defined by the referring court” and that may assist the CJEU to deliver a useful answer.

The court relies on:

para. 11 of the Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ C 380, 8.11.2019) stating that the CJEU “take[s] into account the legal and factual context of the dispute in the main proceedings, as defined by the referring court”; and
para. 35 of the same Recommendations, emphasising the need for a “useful reply”.

It is in that spirit of cooperative judicial dialogue that the High Court issues the addendum.

4.2 Is the referring court a “party” to the Article 267 proceedings?

The High Court accepts the Commission’s position that:

the referring court is not a “party” to the preliminary ruling procedure; and
it would be inappropriate for the national court to “reply” to the observations of the Commission or any other participant.

Nonetheless, invoking the CJEU’s description of Article 267 as establishing a “dialogue” between courts (see Royal Football Club Seraing v FIFA, C‑600/23, para. 77), the High Court contends that non‑party status does not preclude clarifying information designed to make that dialogue effective.

4.3 Res judicata, mootness and the existence of a “live” dispute

A central concern of the Commission appears to have been whether the national proceedings still had any purpose, given that the refusal to quash the development consent was final.

The High Court answers this in two steps:

Yes, the refusal to quash is res judicata.
As para. 6 confirms, the judgment refusing to quash the permission is final – all appeals have been refused.
No, that does not exhaust the main proceedings.
As para. 7 explains, the court has not yet determined whether there was a breach of the Habitats/Birds Directives. That determination is directly relevant to a freestanding claim for a declaration, which remains “pending and live”.

Therefore:

the “main action” (for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU) comprises not only the quashing claim but also the declaratory claim; and
the referred question plainly “bears a relation” to the purpose of that main action and is not hypothetical (para. 13).

4.4 The role of declaratory relief in keeping EU law issues justiciable

Irish law permits purely declaratory relief in judicial review without any accompanying coercive order. This is not a residual or symbolic jurisdiction but one that is:

recognised and structured by the Supreme Court; and
commonly used in planning and environmental litigation.

The judgment cites:

B v The Child & Family Agency [2025] IESC 2 (Hogan J at para. 46), which sets out a three‑part test for granting declarations; and
several High Court decisions in which declarations of illegality were made without quashing the underlying administrative acts.

This practice is crucial because it allows:

EU law issues to be ventilated and resolved even when the practical or proportionality considerations preclude quashing the decision; and
subsequent enforcement action by the European Commission, which – as para. 12 notes – generally treats such declarations as a basis for action despite their non‑imperative character.

5. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

5.1 The nature of the preliminary‑ruling “dialogue”

Humphreys J places considerable emphasis on the CJEU’s description of Article 267 TFEU in Royal Football Club Seraing v FIFA, C‑600/23, para. 77, as establishing:

“a dialogue between one court and another, specifically between the Court of Justice and the courts of the Member States”.

From this, he draws a principled inference: if the preliminary reference procedure is a dialogue, then it must allow the referring court to:

define and, where necessary, refine the legal and factual context of the dispute; and
do so in a way that responds to misunderstandings or gaps highlighted by the participants, without directly “contesting” their legal arguments.

This view aligns closely with the CJEU’s own insistence (in its Recommendations) that:

the usefulness of its answers depends on the clarity and completeness of the national court’s description of law and fact; and
the CJEU “takes into account the legal and factual context … as defined by the referring court” (emphasis added).

Thus, far from “denaturalising” the preliminary reference, a structured clarificatory addendum may in fact enhance its proper functioning.

5.2 Limits on “replying” to parties vs permissible clarification

The High Court accepts the Commission’s apprehension that if referring courts systematically “replied” to written observations, they might effectively become a litigant in the CJEU, undermining the neutral, judicial nature of the reference.

To avoid that, Humphreys J explicitly:

disclaims any intention to “reply” to the observations (para. 3); and
treats the Commission’s comments as a trigger to identify points of fact and national law/procedure that require clarification, rather than as arguments to be contested.

The judgment therefore sketches a workable distinction:

Impermissible: engaging the Commission on the merits of its EU law arguments, or advocating for a particular interpretation of EU law before the CJEU.
Permissible: explaining the national legal framework (e.g. declaratory relief), clarifying what has and has not been decided domestically, and identifying which heads of relief remain live.

This distinction respects:

the institutional position of the national court as the CJEU’s interlocutor, not a litigant; and
the CJEU’s primary responsibility to interpret EU law on the basis of facts and national law supplied by that interlocutor.

5.3 Declaratory relief as a distinct head of relief in judicial review

The most substantive element of the judgment is the exposition of declaratory relief in Irish judicial review.

At para. 8, Humphreys J refers to B v The Child & Family Agency [2025] IESC 2. There, Hogan J synthesised a three‑part test for the grant of a declaration (paraphrased from the quotation in the judgment):

There must be a good reason to seek a declaration of the kind requested.
There must be a real and substantial issue to be determined.
There must be a party who has a real interest in opposing the grant of the declaration.

This framework reveals that the Irish courts view declaratory relief not as an academic exercise but as a remedy grounded in:

practical interest (a real issue, real opposition); and
judicial economy (a good reason to determine the point).

Para. 9 references Save The South Leinster Way v An Coimisiún Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 541, especially para. 119, where declaratory relief is discussed in further detail. Although the addendum does not quote that passage, the reference indicates that:

the High Court has consciously developed an approach to declarations in complex planning and environmental reviews; and
this includes recognising their role in shaping future conduct and regulatory practice, even when immediate coercive measures are not ordered.

Crucially, para. 10 details five recent High Court cases in which declarations of illegality were granted without quashing:

Byrne v Fingal County Council [2025] IEHC 204;
Eco Advocacy CLG v An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 15;
Kennedy v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 570;
Carrownagowan Concern Group v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 300; and
Reid v An Bord Pleanála (No. 7) [2024] IEHC 27.

Even without knowing the full details of each case, the point is clear: the High Court has established a line of authority whereby declarations of breach can coexist with the survival of the impugned decision. In EU law terms, this is a powerful mechanism to reconcile:

national concerns about legal certainty, finality, and proportionality; with
the need to acknowledge and remedy violations of EU law in some form.

5.4 Res judicata and the scope of the “main proceedings”

The Commission’s concern – that the High Court had already decided the “substantive question” – reflects a common tension in Article 267 practice: once a national court has finally disposed of a certain head of relief, can the EU law question still be said to be “necessary to give judgment”?

Humphreys J answers by reframing the “substance” of the main proceedings:

The “substantive question” is not exhausted by the fate of the development consent; rather, substance also encompasses whether EU law was breached and whether a declaration of breach should be made.
The main proceedings, for Article 267 purposes, are therefore still pending because one material head of relief (declaratory relief) has not been adjudicated.

In support, he invokes a close analogy with the CJEU’s judgment in Hellfire Massy v An Bord Pleanála, C‑166/22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:545 (para. 11). In that case:

the Irish courts had already upheld a development consent; yet
the CJEU dismissed objections to the admissibility of a subsequent reference because an “element of the case remained live” (para. 27 of the CJEU judgment).

By aligning Massey with Hellfire Massy, the High Court emphasises that:

the CJEU accepts references from national courts even after final decisions on particular heads of relief, provided some aspect of the dispute remains genuinely at issue; and
the precise definition of what “remains at issue” is, in the first instance, a matter for the referring court’s own national law of remedies and procedure.

Accordingly, res judicata as to quashing does not extinguish the relevance of the EU law question to the remaining declaratory claim.

5.5 Relevance and non‑mootness of the referred question

At paras. 12–13, the High Court directly confronts the Commission’s suggestion that the question is moot, or that it “bears no relation to the purpose of the main action”.

The court’s position can be summarised as follows:

The answer to the referred question will not affect the validity of the permission – that part of the case is over. The Commission is right on that narrow point.
But the “substance” of the case is not limited to validity. It includes the live claim for a declaration, which depends directly on whether EU law has been breached.
Moreover, a declaration has tangible consequences:
- it can influence costs in the domestic proceedings (as the cited examples illustrate); and
- it provides a platform for Commission enforcement, since the Commission “by default” acts on such declarations in subsequent cases, even though the declaration is not itself coercive (para. 12).
All parties before the national court agree that the matter is not moot, and none objected to the addendum (para. 13).

The High Court is effectively telling the CJEU: this is not an effort to obtain an advisory opinion on abstract EU law; rather, the answer will shape a real, outstanding judicial decision with legal and practical implications.

This approach dovetails with the CJEU’s established presumption that:

questions referred by national courts are presumed relevant; and
the CJEU will reject them only if it is manifest that the interpretation requested is unrelated to the actual facts or subject‑matter of the main action or that the problem is hypothetical.

Humphreys J goes beyond that presumption by:

explicitly identifying the outstanding remedy; and
documenting the consensus of the parties as to the continuing reality of the dispute.

6. Precedents and Authorities Cited

6.1 CJEU Recommendations to national courts

The judgment relies on the Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (2019 version, OJ C 380, 8.11.2019, p. 1, and the 2024 update C/2024/6008).

Key points drawn from those Recommendations include:

the CJEU considers the legal and factual context “as defined by the referring court” (para. 11); and
national courts should provide the CJEU with all the information required to give a “useful reply” (para. 35).

By invoking these provisions, the High Court situates its addendum as a fulfilment rather than an extension of its obligations under Article 267.

6.2 Drumakilla (C‑58/24)

In Drumakilla (C‑58/24), the referring national court had previously provided an addendum to clarify aspects of its request for a preliminary ruling. The Commission, in its observations on that addendum, warned that:

“the practice to notify the written submissions to the referring court … has the objective to provide a useful reply … However, in the Commission's opinion, that practice should not be construed as allowing referring courts to reply … That would render, in practice, the referring court one of the parties to the preliminary procedure, which would in turn denaturalize the nature and goal of the preliminary reference.”

Humphreys J acknowledges that concern but contends that clarification – as distinct from reply – is not only permissible but often necessary. The reference to Drumakilla therefore frames this judgment as part of an emerging practice of structured post‑reference clarification by Irish courts.

6.3 Royal Football Club Seraing v FIFA (C‑600/23)

The Grand Chamber’s judgment in Royal Football Club Seraing is cited at para. 5 for its characterisation of Article 267 as a “keystone” of the EU judicial system and a “dialogue” between courts.

Although that case concerned football regulations rather than environmental planning, its broader description of the preliminary reference mechanism is of general application. The High Court uses it to support the idea that an ongoing, clarificatory exchange – short of advocacy – is consistent with the spirit of Article 267.

6.4 Hellfire Massy (C‑166/22) and the Irish Supreme Court’s decision

The judgment draws a pointed comparison with Hellfire Massy v An Bord Pleanála (C‑166/22), which itself followed the Irish Supreme Court’s decision in Hellfire Massy v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 38, [2024] 1 I.R. 386.

In Hellfire Massy:

the Irish courts had already upheld a development consent; yet
the CJEU held a subsequent reference admissible because some aspect of the dispute remained live (para. 27 of the CJEU judgment).

Humphreys J cites this as a precedent confirming that:

Article 267 references need not be confined to cases where the primary coercive remedy is still at stake; and
a surviving issue – such as a claim for declaratory relief – is sufficient to sustain the reference’s admissibility.

6.5 B v The Child & Family Agency [2025] IESC 2

This Supreme Court decision is the principal national authority on declaratory relief relied upon. Hogan J’s three‑part test (para. 46) is central:

a good reason to seek the declaration;
a real and substantial issue to be determined; and
an opposing party with a real interest in contesting the declaration.

This test underpins the High Court’s insistence that the declaratory claim in Massey is neither academic nor hypothetical, but a genuine dispute requiring resolution, provided that EU law is clarified by the CJEU.

6.6 Recent Irish planning and environmental cases on declaratory relief

The following High Court cases are cited as examples where declarations were issued without quashing the decision:

Byrne v Fingal County Council [2025] IEHC 204;
Eco Advocacy CLG v An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 15;
Kennedy v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 570;
Carrownagowan Concern Group v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 300; and
Reid v An Bord Pleanála (No. 7) [2024] IEHC 27.

The details of these decisions are not elaborated in the addendum, but their cumulative effect is to show a consistent pattern: where appropriate, the High Court will acknowledge a breach of law while allowing the impugned decision to stand. This is especially relevant in environmental and planning contexts where the disruption caused by quashing may be disproportionate.

From an EU law perspective, this line of authority strengthens the argument that:

national courts can comply with the principle of effectiveness (by recognising and declaring breaches); while
also respecting domestic concerns about finality and the public interest in major infrastructure or energy projects.

7. Simplifying Key Concepts

7.1 Preliminary rulings under Article 267 TFEU

Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union allows (and in some cases obliges) national courts to ask the CJEU questions about:

the interpretation of EU treaties and legislation; and
the validity of acts of EU institutions.

The national court:

stays its proceedings;
sends a written order with the questions and a description of the case; and
resumes and decides the case after receiving the CJEU’s ruling.

It is not an appeal; rather, it is a judicial dialogue. The CJEU does not decide the domestic dispute; it provides binding guidance on EU law, which the national court then applies.

7.2 Res judicata

Res judicata is the principle that a final judgment on a particular claim or issue is conclusive and cannot be re‑litigated between the same parties. In this case:

the refusal to quash the development consent is final and cannot be reopened; but
that does not prevent the court from deciding a remaining claim for a declaration, which was never finally resolved.

Thus, res judicata applies to one head of relief (quashing) but not to another (declaratory relief).

7.3 Declaratory vs coercive relief

In judicial review, remedies can broadly be:

Coercive/imperative – such as orders of certiorari (quashing a decision), mandamus (compelling performance of a duty), or injunctions (prohibiting or requiring conduct).
Declaratory – a formal court statement that a decision, act or omission is unlawful or in breach of a particular legal norm.

A declaration does not in itself compel anyone to act, but in practice it:

carries considerable moral and legal authority;
may influence future decision‑making by public bodies;
can be relied upon in subsequent litigation or enforcement; and
may affect the costs of proceedings.

In EU environmental law cases, it provides a way to recognise breaches while avoiding the disruption of undoing complex consents or projects.

7.4 Mootness and “live” controversies

A case is often described as “moot” if:

there is no longer any live dispute between the parties; or
the court’s decision can no longer have any practical legal effect.

In the Article 267 context, the CJEU will decline to answer questions that are purely hypothetical or that bear no relation to the outcome of the main proceedings.

In Massey (No. 5), the High Court explains that:

although one remedy (quashing) is no longer available, another remedy (a declaration) remains potentially available; and
the CJEU’s answer will directly determine whether that remedy is granted.

Therefore, the dispute is not moot; there is still a “live controversy” capable of being affected by the CJEU’s ruling.

8. Likely Impact of the Decision

8.1 On Irish judicial practice in preliminary references

This judgment is likely to be cited as authority for the proposition that Irish courts may:

issue clarificatory addenda to preliminary references after receiving the Commission’s written observations; provided that
they confine themselves to clarifying facts, national law, and procedure, and do not engage in argumentative responses to the parties’ submissions.

It strengthens a practice already seen in Drumakilla and aligns national practice with the CJEU’s emphasis on complete and accurate contextual information from referring courts.

8.2 On the use of declaratory relief in EU law‑related judicial review

By bringing together the Supreme Court’s guidance in B v The Child & Family Agency and a line of recent planning/environmental cases, this judgment:

consolidates the legitimacy of using declaratory relief as a primary remedy in judicial review; and
clarifies that such relief can sustain a preliminary reference even when coercive remedies are no longer available.

For future litigants and courts, this means:

challengers to administrative decisions can realistically seek and obtain EU‑law‑based declarations without automatically overturning the decisions; and
public authorities must reckon with the legal consequences of a declaration of breach, including costs exposure and the risk of EU enforcement, even where their decisions are not quashed.

8.3 On EU law enforcement and Commission practice

The judgment explicitly recognises the Commission’s practice of treating national declarations of illegality as a basis for its own actions (para. 12). This underscores:

the importance of declaratory judgments as a component of the EU’s decentralised enforcement system; and
the constructive interaction between national courts’ remedial choices and the Commission’s supervisory role.

If the CJEU accepts the admissibility of the reference in Massey and engages with the clarified context, that will further entrench the idea that non‑coercive national remedies can still fully activate the Article 267 mechanism.

8.4 On the doctrine of mootness in EU environmental litigation

The judgment also contributes to a growing body of case law (including Hellfire Massy) indicating that environmental disputes are not rendered moot simply because the project proceeds or the consent can no longer practicably be set aside.

Instead, courts may:

recognise the public interest in clarifying the legality of environmental decision‑making; and
use declaratory relief, supported by preliminary rulings, to ensure that EU environmental directives are properly interpreted and applied.

This is likely to encourage:

more references in cases where the remedial focus has shifted from undoing past decisions to shaping future ones; and
a more nuanced conversation between national courts and the CJEU about proportionality, legal certainty, and environmental protection.

9. Conclusion

Massey v An Bord Pleanála & Ors (No. 5) [2025] IEHC 709 may appear at first glance to be a short procedural footnote, but it articulates several important principles at the intersection of Irish judicial review and EU law:

Clarificatory addenda to preliminary references are permissible and can be valuable, provided they clarify context rather than advocate or “reply” to the parties’ EU law arguments.
The referring court is not a party to the Article 267 proceedings, yet it remains the architect of the factual and legal context within which the CJEU operates, consistent with the CJEU’s own Recommendations and its description of the reference procedure as a dialogue.
Res judicata in respect of one remedy (here, quashing the development consent) does not exhaust the substance of the case where a claim for declaratory relief remains pending.
Irish law recognises a structured jurisdiction to grant purely declaratory relief in judicial review, and this remedy is sufficiently concrete and consequential to sustain a preliminary reference, particularly in environmental and planning disputes.
In line with Hellfire Massy, a preliminary reference is not inadmissible merely because the impugned decision has survived; it is enough that some element of the dispute – here, the alleged breach of EU environmental law and the possibility of a declaration – remains genuinely at issue.

In the broader legal landscape, the judgment contributes to the evolving understanding of how national courts can:

balance finality and legal certainty with the effective enforcement of EU law;
make full use of declaratory remedies in environmental litigation; and
engage constructively with the CJEU in an ongoing, contextualised judicial dialogue.

Whether and how the CJEU responds in Case C‑356/25 Massey will further clarify the contours of this dialogue, but this High Court judgment already stands as a significant statement of national procedural law in the service of EU legal effectiveness.

Massey v An Bord Pleanála [No. 5] [2025] IEHC 709 – Clarificatory Addenda, Declaratory Relief and the Admissibility of Preliminary References