Limits on Mandatory Interlocutory Injunctions in Cross‑Border Competition Investigations:
Commentary on Ryanair DAC & Ryanair Holdings plc v CCPC [2025] IEHC 637

1. Introduction

This judgment of Barrett J in the High Court of Ireland concerns an attempt by Ryanair to use Irish injunctive relief to influence the conduct of an ongoing abuse of dominance investigation by the Italian competition authority (AGCM), where the Irish competition authority (CCPC) had merely executed a request for assistance under Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

Ryanair sought, on an interlocutory basis:

• An order compelling the CCPC to procure from the AGCM:
  • the return of all documents seized under an Irish District Court search warrant on 8 March 2024, and
  • written confirmation that those documents would not be used in the Italian investigation or any related proceedings;
• and, if necessary, a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the EU under Article 267 TFEU.

The application sits at the intersection of several important legal themes:

• the distinction between mandatory and prohibitory interlocutory injunctions and the associated standard of proof;
• the doctrine of legitimus contradictor and who is the correct defendant in public law litigation;
• the limits of domestic jurisdiction where a foreign competition authority is investigating alleged breaches of EU/Italian competition law;
• the effect of the EU law principles of effective judicial protection and sincere cooperation on domestic procedural rules;
• and the consequences of cross‑border “dawn raids” under Article 22 of Regulation 1/2003.

The judgment is important for two broad reasons. First, it firmly re‑asserts the “strong case likely to succeed at trial” standard for mandatory interlocutory injunctions in Ireland (per Lingam v HSE) and rejects attempts to dilute that test under the guise of the “least risk of injustice” approach. Secondly, it draws a clear line around the ability of the Irish courts to grant interim relief which would, in substance, restrain or control the conduct of another Member State’s competition authority acting within its own jurisdiction.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Barrett J refused all interlocutory relief sought by Ryanair, and declined to make any Article 267 TFEU reference.

The core points are:

• The relief sought is, in substance, a mandatory injunction against the CCPC, because it would oblige the CCPC to take positive steps (writing to the AGCM to procure the return and non‑use of documents) rather than merely refraining from action (paras 27–34, 48–49).
• As a matter of binding Supreme Court authority (Lingam v HSE, endorsed in Charleton v Scriven and Clare County Council v McDonagh), a party seeking a mandatory interlocutory injunction must establish a strong case likely to succeed at trial (paras 30–42, 55–56). Ryanair did not meet that threshold (para 56, 80–88).
• The CCPC, whose only role was to execute a request for assistance under Article 22(1) of Regulation 1/2003, is not the correct target for an injunction effectively aimed at controlling the AGCM. Ryanair is, in substance, suing “the wrong body in the wrong jurisdiction” (paras 21–25, 121–122).
• There is no remedial lacuna: alleged unlawfulness in Italy must be litigated in Italy; alleged unlawfulness in the Irish warrant process is justiciable in Ireland. EU law does not require Irish courts to expand their interim jurisdiction in the way Ryanair proposes (paras 26, 61–67, 95, 125).
• Even if the merits were stronger, the balance of convenience and adequacy‑of‑damages analysis weigh heavily against relief: the CCPC cannot compel the AGCM; any order would risk being futile, unenforceable and would improperly intrude into a foreign investigation and the functioning of the European Competition Network (paras 89–99, 104–117).
• Ryanair’s asserted urgency was undermined by its own delay in seeking relief and its failure to pursue available remedies in Italy in a timely way (paras 118–120).
• No question of EU law arose which required a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU; the issues were pure questions of national procedure and jurisdiction (paras 123–126).

The Court nonetheless emphasised its willingness to facilitate a speedy hearing of the substantive proceedings and stressed that nothing in the interlocutory judgment pre‑judges the outcome of the full challenge to the warrant and related issues (paras 127–129).

3. Factual and Procedural Background

3.1 The Italian investigation and the Article 22 request

The AGCM opened an inquiry into Ryanair on 14 September 2023 following complaints about alleged abuse of dominance in the Italian market (para 6). On 27 February 2024, the AGCM requested the CCPC’s assistance under Article 22(1) of Regulation 1/2003 (para 7).

Article 22(1) allows a national competition authority (NCA) to ask the NCA of another Member State to undertake investigative measures on its behalf, such as inspections or requests for information, when necessary for enforcing Articles 101 or 102 TFEU.

3.2 The Irish search and seizure

On 8 March 2024, the CCPC applied ex parte to the District Court for a search warrant, supported by an information sworn by a CCPC officer. The District Judge, having considered the information and additional evidence in camera, granted the warrant the same day (paras 8–9).

The warrant was executed that day at Ryanair’s Dublin headquarters. CCPC officials, accompanied by AGCM personnel (who were designated as CCPC officers for the purposes of the operation), conducted what is described as an “extensive search and seizure” (para 10). Late that evening, AGCM officials left the premises with 222 documents and took them to Italy (para 11).

Ryanair alleges, inter alia, that:

• the CCPC’s information to the District Court omitted important material facts and thus breached the duty of candour (paras 8–9, 80–85);
• there had been an arrangement that unresolved issues about privilege and relevance would be addressed at a further meeting before the search concluded, but the documents were removed without that meeting taking place (paras 11–13);
• documents over which privilege was asserted were among those seized and transferred (para 13).

3.3 Undertakings given by the AGCM and subsequent developments

The AGCM was initially a party to the Irish proceedings, but was released by order of 21 May 2024, upheld on appeal on 31 January 2025 (para 14). In the course of those proceedings the AGCM gave a series of assurances to the Irish courts and to Ryanair:

• If the Irish courts held the warrant invalid, it would return the documents (para 14).
• If the warrant was held invalid, it would “remove the documents obtained during the inspection and refrain from using them in any way” (para 14).

Ryanair contended that these assurances reasonably implied that the AGCM would not reach or publish decisions based on the disputed documents pending the Irish courts’ determination of the warrant challenge (para 15). Barrett J expressly declined to rule on that disputed interpretation, stating that “the undertakings say what they say, and no more” (para 15).

Subsequently:

• Privileged material was returned from Italy to the CCPC and then to Ryanair, following correspondence, despite the AGCM no longer being a party (para 16).
• Italian courts initially ordered the AGCM not to use the disputed documents, but that order was later set aside by the Council of State, which allowed the AGCM to use the material, noting that:
  • the lawfulness of the Irish inspection was a matter for the Irish courts; and
  • questions about access to the request for assistance were for the Irish courts alone (para 17).
• The CCPC’s own application to stay the Irish proceedings pending the Italian outcome was refused on 31 July 2025 (para 18).
• On 8 October 2025, the AGCM issued a Notice of Investigative Findings, reaching a provisional finding of abuse and scheduling its internal timetable towards a final decision (paras 19, 118).

It was this Notice, and the looming Italian deadlines, that Ryanair presented as creating an urgent need for interlocutory relief from the Irish court (paras 19–20, 118).

4. Key Legal Issues

The judgment addresses several interlocking issues:

1. Characterisation of the relief: Whether the order sought is mandatory or prohibitory, and thus what legal threshold applies.
2. Legitimus contradictor: Whether the CCPC is an appropriate defendant to an application that is, in substance, directed at the AGCM.
3. Standard for mandatory interlocutory injunctions: Application of Lingam v HSE, Charleton v Scriven, and Clare County Council v McDonagh.
4. EU law and effective remedies: Whether EU principles of effectiveness and sincere cooperation require relaxation of domestic procedural standards or expansion of jurisdiction.
5. Futility and extraterritorial impact: Whether any injunction could be effective when the CCPC has no power over the AGCM’s use of documents in Italy.
6. Balance of convenience / adequacy of damages: Weighing Ryanair’s alleged harms against the prejudice and institutional risks of ordering the CCPC to act.
7. Delay and urgency: Whether Ryanair moved sufficiently promptly given its knowledge of the Italian investigation timeline.
8. Article 267 TFEU reference: Whether a preliminary ruling from the CJEU was necessary to resolve any issue of EU law in the interlocutory application.

5. Precedents and Authorities Cited

5.1 Injunctions: mandatory vs prohibitory and the applicable tests

• Campus Oil v Minister for Industry and Energy (No. 2) [1983] IR 88:
  The foundational Irish authority for interlocutory injunctions, requiring:
  1. a fair or serious issue to be tried;
  2. inadequacy of damages as a remedy; and
  3. a balance of convenience or justice favouring the grant of the injunction (para 53).
• Lingam v Health Service Executive [2005] IESC 89:
  The Supreme Court held that where an interlocutory injunction is mandatory in substance, the applicant must show “at least… a strong case that he is likely to succeed at the hearing of the action” (para 55). This is the key binding authority applied by Barrett J.
• Merck Sharpe & Dohme v Clonmel Healthcare [2019] IESC 65:
  O’Donnell J re‑articulated the Campus Oil principles and emphasised flexibility in structuring the interlocutory inquiry, but maintained the enhanced threshold for mandatory injunctions (paras 54, 44).
• Charleton v Scriven [2019] IESC 28:
  Clarke C.J. reiterated that the duty of the court is to minimise the risk of injustice and confirmed that the strong‑case test for mandatory orders is itself an expression of that “least risk of injustice” principle (para 43).
• Clare County Council v McDonagh [2022] IESC 2:
  The Supreme Court described the standard for mandatory interlocutory relief as requiring a “particularly strong and powerful” case (para 56).
• Ó Murchú t/a Talknology v Eircell Ltd [2001] IESC 15:
  Geoghegan J observed that some injunctions labelled as mandatory are in substance preservatory, and that in such cases the ordinary Campus Oil test can still apply (para 33). Barrett J holds that this does not apply here as the relief entails positive action by the CCPC (para 34).
• Shelbourne Holdings v Torriam Hotel [2010] 2 IR 52:
  Kelly J expressed sympathy with Hoffmann J’s “least risk of injustice” approach in Rover International v Cannon Film Sales [1987] 1 WLR 670 (para 37), but did not resolve the conflict with the strong‑case line of authority. Barrett J treats Shelbourne as non‑binding and subordinate to Lingam (paras 37–39).
• Rover International v Cannon Film Sales [1987] 1 WLR 670:
  Hoffmann J emphasised that the central question is which course carries the lower risk of injustice, and that semantic arguments about whether an injunction is mandatory or prohibitory are “barren” (para 35). Barrett J accepts this as a useful articulation of the underlying objective, but insists that in Irish law it operates within the mandatory/prohibitory distinction laid down by the Supreme Court (para 36).
• Dunnes Stores v McCann [2017] IEHC 700:
  Barrett J’s own earlier decision acknowledging that High Court judges are bound to maintain the distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions and to apply the strong‑case test to the former (para 41).

5.2 Privacy and search powers

• CRH plc & Irish Cement Ltd v CCPC [2017] IESC 34:
  The Supreme Court applied Article 8 ECHR proportionality to competition inspections, relying on the Strasbourg judgment in Vinci Construction, and emphasised the need for seizures to be “precise, circumscribed and proportionate” (para 68). Barrett J accepts these principles but considers them to go to the merits, not to justify mandatory interim relief (paras 68–74).
• Meta Platforms Ireland v European Commission (T‑451/20):
  A General Court decision illustrating the sensitivity of searches of large digital entities. Cited by Ryanair as part of broader privacy arguments (para 59).
• ECHR cases:
  • Niemietz v Germany (1993) 16 EHRR 97;
  • Vinci Construction and GTM Génie Civil et Services v France, App. 60567/10;
  • Janssen-Cilag SAS v France, App. 33931/12;
  • Sérvulo & Associados v Portugal, App. 27013/10.
  These support the need for strict safeguards where searches invade professional and corporate premises. Barrett J acknowledges their relevance but treats them as addressed by existing proportionality analysis rather than as a trigger for extraordinary interim relief (paras 59–60, 72–74).

5.3 Duty of candour in ex parte warrant applications

• Redknapp v Commissioner of the City of London Police [2008] EWHC 1177 (Admin):
  Latham LJ stressed that obtaining a search warrant is never a formality; all necessary material should be placed before the judge, and any additional oral information should be recorded (para 81).
• DPP v Quirke [2023] IESC 5:
  Charleton J traced the “ancient principle” of candour, requiring investigators to fairly summarise relevant material when seeking intrusive orders (paras 82–83).
• Bula Ltd v Tara Mines Ltd (No. 2) [1987] IR 95:
  Authority for the proposition that mandatory orders must be precise and clear enough that the respondent knows exactly what is required and breaches can readily be identified. This underpins Barrett J’s concern that Ryanair’s proposed order lacked sufficient precision (para 2).

5.4 Extraterritoriality and supervision of ongoing activities

• Co-operative Insurance Society v Argyll Stores (Holdings) [1998] AC 1:
  House of Lords authority reflecting courts’ reluctance to grant injunctions that require continuous supervision and impose uncertain, ongoing obligations. Cited by analogy to the problematic nature of supervising how the CCPC should react to various possible AGCM responses (para 113).
• Ryanair DAC v Skyscanner Ltd [2022] IECA 64:
  Court of Appeal authority highlighting the need for caution with orders having extraterritorial effects. Barrett J invokes this in assessing the impact of any injunction on a foreign regulator and the European Competition Network (para 111).
• South Bucks v Porter [2003] 2 AC 558:
  Lord Bingham’s dictum that courts do not grant injunctions contemplating disobedience, relied on by Ryanair to argue that the court should assume compliance by the AGCM. Barrett J accepts the general point but stresses that he cannot order the CCPC to do something it cannot in law or fact guarantee (paras 89–93).

5.5 EU law and effective remedy

• Regulation (EC) No 1/2003:
  Ryanair relied on recitals and Articles 11, 12, 16 and 22 to argue that the Regulation creates a tightly integrated enforcement network with obligations of cooperation and respect for fundamental rights (paras 63–66). Barrett J agrees about the cooperative framework but holds that it does not enlarge national courts’ interim powers or authorize them to restrain other Member States’ investigations (paras 64–66, 94–96).
• Unibet (London) Ltd v Justitiekanslern, C‑432/05:
  Establishes that national procedural rules must not render the exercise of EU rights “impossible or excessively difficult”. Ryanair invoked this to argue that the strong‑case test and refusal of relief breached effectiveness. Barrett J rejects that, noting that Ryanair retains full access to substantive remedies both in Ireland and Italy (paras 45, 51, 61–62, 66–67).
• Les Verts v European Parliament, Case 294/83, and Hungary v Parliament and Council, C‑156/21:
  Cited by Ryanair as emblematic of rule of law and effective judicial protection in EU law. Barrett J finds these principles already satisfied by the availability of domestic and Italian remedies; they do not justify indirect interference with a foreign regulator (paras 61–62, 99).
• X Internet Unlimited Co v Coimisiún na Meán [2025] IEHC 442:
  Relied on by Ryanair for general interpretative principles (interpret EU legislation in light of wording, context, objectives) (para 63).

6. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

6.1 Characterisation as a mandatory injunction

Ryanair sought to characterise the order as essentially prohibitory or preservatory, because its purpose was to prevent use of the documents and preserve the status quo pending trial. Barrett J rejected this as a matter of substance:

• The order would require the CCPC to take positive steps—to write to the AGCM and possibly to take further consequential actions depending on the response (paras 27–29).
• The fact that the ultimate aim is prohibitory (to prevent use of documents) does not change the nature of the mechanism (para 29(i)).
• Invoking “status quo” is not enough where maintaining it involves compelled action, not passivity (para 29(ii),(iv)).
• The AGCM’s absence as a party does not turn a mandatory order routed via the CCPC into a prohibitory one (para 29(iii)).

Accordingly, the injunction is mandatory in substance, regardless of its description, triggering the enhanced test.

6.2 The applicable test: strong case and the “least risk of injustice” principle

Ryanair advanced a sophisticated argument that the court should apply the ordinary Campus Oil “fair issue to be tried” test, relying on:

• Ó Murchú v Eircell (status quo injunctions);
• Kelly J’s reasoning in Shelbourne and Hoffmann J’s “least risk of injustice” approach in Rover International;
• Merck’s emphasis on flexibility, and
• the EU principle of effectiveness.

Barrett J deals with these arguments systematically (paras 30–42):

• He holds that Lingam is binding: all mandatory interlocutory injunctions require a strong case likely to succeed at trial (paras 30, 40–42, 55–56).
• He acknowledges Hoffmann J’s “least risk of injustice” principle but emphasises that in Irish law it operates within the mandatory/prohibitory framework set by the Supreme Court: the strong‑case threshold is itself the way the Irish courts minimise the risk of injustice in mandatory cases (para 36, 43).
• He treats Shelbourne as a High Court decision that cannot override Supreme Court authority, and notes its comments are essentially obiter (paras 37–39).
• He rejects the notion of two equal “strands” of authority: if divergence exists at High Court level, the Supreme Court’s position controls (para 42).
• EU law’s principle of effectiveness (Unibet) does not give national courts licence to lower domestic procedural thresholds; the strong‑case requirement does not make the exercise of EU rights impossible or excessively difficult, since substantive remedies remain available (para 45, 51).

This section of the judgment is an unequivocal restatement that, in Irish law, a party seeking a mandatory interlocutory injunction must clear the “particularly strong and powerful” threshold articulated in Clare County Council v McDonagh, and cannot circumvent it by invoking general notions of flexibility or least risk of injustice.

6.3 Legitimus contradictor: suing the “wrong body in the wrong jurisdiction”

The doctrine of legitimus contradictor concerns who is entitled, and appropriate, to participate as a formal respondent to legal proceedings (para 21). Its function is to ensure that:

• only parties with a real stake are drawn into litigation; and
• the court is not asked to determine matters that cannot be effectively resolved as between the parties actually before it.

Barrett J notes:

• The CCPC:
  • acted solely to execute an Article 22(1) request for assistance;
  • has no power or control over the AGCM;
  • was not involved in the undertakings given by the AGCM; and
  • has no role in the substance or timing of the Italian investigation (paras 23–25).
• The relief is “in substance, directed towards securing the return of documents held by the AGCM, an Italian authority, in Italy” (para 25).

On that basis, Ryanair’s application appears to have been directed “against the wrong body in the wrong jurisdiction” (para 25). This conclusion supports:

• the refusal of the injunction (since the CCPC cannot lawfully or practically secure the relief sought); and
• the conclusion that what Ryanair is really attempting is a collateral attack on the AGCM’s investigation through proceedings against a different entity (paras 121–122).

6.4 Remedies in Italy and the absence of a lacuna

Ryanair argued that if interim relief could not be obtained in Ireland, and if the AGCM could proceed on the basis of disputed documents, there would be a “lacuna” in legal protection—no effective remedy in either Member State for the current harm (paras 61–62, 123–125).

Barrett J rejects this:

• He takes judicial notice that Italy is a “liberal democracy and a member state of the European Union, possessing a sophisticated court system committed to upholding the rule of law” (para 26).
• Ryanair accepts that an adverse AGCM decision can be reversed on administrative review, even if it maintains that such a decision could have serious practical consequences (para 26).
• Italian law offers a “comprehensive suite of remedies” (para 125), and Irish law offers a full challenge to the validity of the warrant and the CCPC’s conduct.

Therefore, there is no “remedy gap” that would trigger EU law’s principle of effectiveness or justify extraordinary interim measures. Any harm is either:

• addressable through ex post remedies; or
• too speculative to warrant intervention.

6.5 Assessment of the strength of Ryanair’s case

Barrett J then considers, at a high level only (given the interlocutory context), whether Ryanair’s substantive complaints display the kind of compelling strength required for a mandatory injunction (Section F).

6.5.1 Privacy and proportionality (Charter, Constitution, ECHR)

Ryanair argued that the search interfered with its rights under:

• Article 7 of the EU Charter (respect for private and family life);
• Article 8 ECHR; and
• corresponding constitutional protections.

It relied on the CRH proportionality framework and Strasbourg case law, arguing that:

• the District Court could not adequately assess proportionality without more fulsome disclosure (such as previous Italian judgments and Ryanair’s cooperation); and
• the search’s scale and consequences (including reputational impact on a listed company) rendered it disproportionate (paras 68–73).

The Court agrees that the search engaged important rights but considers:

• Interference alone does not demonstrate unlawfulness (para 60).
• The proportionality debates are better resolved at trial, where contested facts and competing inferences can be explored (paras 72–74).
• Even if arguable, they fall short of the clarity and strength required for mandatory interlocutory relief (para 74).

6.5.2 Reputational, structural and financial harm

Ryanair argued that without relief, it risked:

• a fine of up to 10% of global turnover (approx. €1.4bn);
• structural or behavioural remedies impacting its business model; and
• serious reputational harm, especially as a NASDAQ‑listed group (paras 26, 75–79, 101–103).

The Court notes:

• Financial penalties are, in principle, reparable by restitution and can be suspended pending appeal (paras 76, 101–102).
• The AGCM has expressly excluded structural and behavioural remedies; at most, a cease‑and‑desist order is contemplated, leaving Ryanair discretion as to compliance (para 76, 115).
• The basic facts of the investigation and the Notice of Investigative Findings are already public; Ryanair itself exhibited the Notice to its affidavit without seeking reporting restrictions, undermining claims of incremental reputational damage (para 77).
• Market actors generally understand that first‑instance competition decisions are not final and may be overturned on appeal (para 75).

Accordingly, reputational and commercial harms are seen as largely speculative and remediable at this stage, and do not justify mandatory interim relief (paras 78–79, 115).

6.5.3 Duty of candour and the lawfulness of the warrant

Ryanair maintains that the CCPC’s ex parte application failed the duty of candour by omitting material facts, including:

• earlier Italian judgments (said to uphold the lawfulness of Ryanair’s business model);
• Ryanair’s cooperation with the AGCM; and
• the details of the Request for Assistance (RFA) itself (paras 80–85).

Barrett J accepts the seriousness of the duty of candour, citing Redknapp and Quirke (paras 81–82), but concludes:

• Not every omission or disagreement about emphasis vitiates a warrant (para 85).
• Whether the duty was breached and, if so, the legal consequences, are fact‑sensitive matters for trial (para 85).
• Ryanair’s attempt to treat each alleged omission as independently fatal to the warrant “overstates the legal consequences of the duty” (para 85).

Again, the merits are arguable, but they do not amount to the “particularly strong and powerful” case needed for a mandatory interlocutory order.

6.5.4 Lawfulness of the transfer of seized documents

Ryanair advanced a detailed argument that the CCPC’s immediate transfer of seized material to the AGCM, without prior segregation of privileged or irrelevant documents, breached:

• section 37(2) of the 2014 Act (which empowers the CCPC to “seize and retain” documents); and
• Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 (governing intra‑ECN information exchange) (para 86–87).

It argued that:

• the CCPC had to “take possession” and review before transferring;
• irrelevant or privileged materials should have been removed pre‑transfer;
• immediate handover deprived Ryanair of post‑inspection rights and truncated the CCPC’s statutory obligations; and
• the transfer was ultra vires and rendered the documents “unlawfully obtained” (para 87).

Barrett J acknowledges the significance of these arguments but finds them too disputed and intricate for resolution at interlocutory stage:

• The interaction between s. 37(2) and Article 12, particularly in an Article 22 context, is “neither straightforward nor resolved” on the current materials (para 88).
• Ryanair’s propositions about pre‑transfer obligations and effects on remedies are unproven and challenged by the CCPC (para 88).
• Questions about the AGCM’s handling of the material and available remedies are for trial and/or Italian proceedings (para 88).

Thus, while the transfer issue is plainly important to the eventual merits, it does not carry the interlocutory application over the high threshold for mandatory relief.

6.6 Futility and extraterritorial impact

In Section G, Barrett J explains why the orders sought would be futile or inappropriate:

• The CCPC has no legal power to compel the AGCM to return or cease using documents (para 23, 90).
• Ordering the CCPC to use “reasonable endeavours” does not cure this: it would still leave a statutory body exposed to potential breach of a High Court order for outcomes it cannot control (paras 90, 108).
• Past voluntary returns of privileged material and AGCM courtesies do not create any enforceable capacity (paras 92–93).
• The EU principle of sincere cooperation does not enlarge the Irish High Court’s jurisdiction so as to impose on the CCPC a justiciable duty to secure particular actions by the AGCM (paras 94–96).
• Far from supporting the ECN, an injunction might “intrude into the conduct of a foreign investigation and risk disrupting the functioning of the European Competition Network” (para 97, 112).

Granting relief which a respondent objectively cannot fulfil would, in the Court’s view, compromise the integrity of the court’s own orders and the institutional position of the CCPC.

6.7 Balance of convenience and adequacy of damages

Although the absence of a strong case was sufficient to dispose of the application, Barrett J goes on to consider the Campus Oil factors (Section H).

On Ryanair’s side:

• Possible fines are monetary and reparable, and in practice may be suspended pending appeal (para 101, 115).
• Structural and behavioural remedies have been excluded; a cease‑and‑desist order leaves Ryanair significant autonomy (para 76, 101–102, 115).
• Reputational harm is partly self‑inflicted (by Ryanair’s own publication of the Notice) and largely speculative (paras 75–79, 115).

On the CCPC’s (and wider system’s) side:

• An injunction would impose obligations impossible to fulfil and expose a statutory body to potential contempt despite best endeavours (paras 108–109, 116).
• It would risk extraterritorial interference in a foreign investigation and ECN practice (paras 111–112, 116–117).
• It would require ongoing supervision, in circumstances where the precise steps required of the CCPC and the consequences of different AGCM responses are nebulous (para 113).

Balancing these factors, the Court concludes that the balance of convenience lies decisively against the grant of relief (para 115–117).

6.8 Delay and urgency

Ryanair contended that the AGCM’s 8 October 2025 Notice of Investigative Findings created sudden and exceptional urgency. Barrett J disagrees:

• The overall Italian timetable had been known since December 2024 (paras 19, 118).
• AGCM’s access to the seized documents had long been known (para 118).
• Ryanair took no steps in Italy to challenge or adjust the timetable or to obtain a stay pending the Irish warrant challenge, despite constantly corresponding with the AGCM (para 119).

The Court concludes that the asserted emergency is largely self‑created and that it “cannot be asked to fill a vacuum created by a party’s own inaction” (para 120). This delay is an independent ground to refuse extraordinary mandatory relief.

6.9 Collateral attack on the AGCM’s investigation

The Court characterises the application as an impermissible collateral attack on the AGCM’s conduct (Section J, paras 121–122):

• Complaints about the “scope, pace, or evidential foundations” of the AGCM’s investigation are matters exclusively for the Italian courts (para 122).
• The CCPC cannot be used as a “proxy” to obtain relief which is, in substance, directed against an absent foreign regulator (para 122).
• Granting such relief would invert the structure of Regulation 1/2003 and undermine mutual trust within the ECN (para 122).

6.10 Refusal of a preliminary reference under Article 267 TFEU

Ryanair proposed that an Article 267 reference would be appropriate in three scenarios (para 123), essentially where the interaction of Regulation 1/2003 and national remedies might reveal a remedial lacuna.

Barrett J declines to refer (paras 125–126), holding that:

• The issues raised are about whether one NCA (CCPC) can be obliged to pursue a certain course of action at another party’s behest; no “question concerning the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity or interpretation of acts of the institutions” truly arises (para 126).
• In any event, a CJEU ruling is not “necessary to enable [him] to give judgment” on this interlocutory application; the matter can be decided fully by applying established domestic principles (para 126).

This reinforces the point that, at least at interlocutory stage, the controversy is principally about Irish procedural law and jurisdiction, not about the meaning of EU competition rules.

7. Complex Concepts Explained

7.1 Mandatory vs prohibitory injunctions and the Campus Oil framework

An interlocutory injunction is a temporary order granted pending a full trial. Irish courts typically apply the Campus Oil test:

1. Is there a fair or serious issue to be tried?
2. Would damages be an adequate remedy if no injunction is granted and the plaintiff later succeeds?
3. Where does the balance of convenience or justice lie?

A prohibitory injunction restrains a defendant from doing something (e.g. publishing a document). A mandatory injunction requires a defendant to positively do something (e.g. demolish a structure, reinstate an employee, hand back documents).

Because forcing positive acts at an early stage carries a higher risk of injustice—particularly if the plaintiff ultimately loses—the Supreme Court in Lingam has held that mandatory interlocutory injunctions require a strong case likely to succeed, not merely a fair issue.

7.2 The doctrine of legitimus contradictor

This doctrine asks: who is the proper opposing party? It ensures that:

• the court only deals with parties who have legal power over the matter in dispute; and
• orders are not made against bodies that cannot comply or are not truly implicated in the alleged wrong.

In this case, the doctrine underpins the conclusion that the CCPC, which implemented but does not control the AGCM’s investigation, is not an appropriate defendant for relief that would, in effect, regulate the AGCM’s future conduct.

7.3 Regulation 1/2003 and the European Competition Network

Regulation 1/2003 decentralises EU competition enforcement and establishes the European Competition Network (ECN). Key features include:

• National competition authorities (NCAs) and the Commission share duties to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
• Article 22(1) allows one NCA to ask another to carry out investigative measures on its territory.
• Article 12 regulates information exchange within the ECN and limits how shared information may be used.

The system is built on mutual trust and sincere cooperation: each authority acts under its own law and is primarily supervised by its own courts. Barrett J’s judgment reinforces that:

• cooperation does not collapse separate legal systems into one; and
• national courts must be careful not to intrude into another NCA’s ongoing investigation via domestic injunctions.

7.4 Duty of candour in ex parte applications

When one side seeks a warrant or injunction without notifying the other side (ex parte), the applicant owes a duty of “full and frank disclosure”. This is sometimes called the duty of candour. It requires:

• disclosing all facts that might reasonably be seen as relevant, favourable or unfavourable;
• fairly summarising the factual and legal context; and
• ensuring the judge is not misled by omission or advocacy.

If the duty is breached, the resulting order can be set aside. Whether the CCPC breached the duty in applying for the warrant here is a live issue for trial; at interlocutory stage the Court simply notes that this is not yet established and cannot form the foundation of mandatory interim relief.

7.5 Effective judicial protection and the principle of effectiveness

EU law requires that individuals have an effective remedy for breaches of EU rights. The principle of effectiveness provides that national procedural rules must not make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise EU rights.

However:

• EU law typically leaves the design of specific remedies and procedures to Member States, provided overarching standards are met.
• The existence of robust ex post remedies (judicial review, annulment, damages) usually satisfies the requirement.
• There is no general EU right to a particular interim remedy, nor to a relaxation of domestic thresholds for such relief.

In this judgment, Barrett J finds that access to Irish and Italian courts, plus the AGCM’s own undertakings, adequately secures effective protection, so the strong‑case test for mandatory injunctions is compatible with EU law.

7.6 Article 267 TFEU references

Article 267 allows, and in some cases requires, national courts to refer questions of EU law to the CJEU. Two conditions must be met:

1. A question about the interpretation of EU law or the validity of an EU act must arise; and
2. A ruling on that question must be necessary for the national court to give judgment.

Where the dispute turns primarily on:

• national procedural rules;
• allocation of jurisdiction; or
• application of uncontroversial EU principles to established facts,

a reference is not required. Barrett J concludes that the present application is resolved entirely by applying settled Irish law on injunctions and jurisdiction, and thus no question arises that needs a CJEU ruling.

8. Impact and Significance

8.1 For Irish injunctive jurisprudence

The judgment is a strong reaffirmation of the distinct treatment of mandatory and prohibitory injunctions in Irish law. Key points:

• It confirms that Lingam, as interpreted in Charleton v Scriven and Clare County Council v McDonagh, remains binding: a “strong case likely to succeed at trial” is required for mandatory interlocutory relief.
• It confines the “least risk of injustice” approach (per Rover International) to a meta‑principle operating within this framework; it cannot be used to lower the threshold.
• It clarifies that Shelbourne does not create an alternative line of authority; any perceived flexibility there must yield to Supreme Court precedent.
• It emphasises that the flexibility of the injunctive jurisdiction is not “judicial carte blanche” and cannot justify departures from well‑settled doctrine (para 57).

Practically, this reinforces a clear message to litigants: if your interim application compels public authorities or others to act, you must demonstrate a particularly strong case on the merits, not merely an arguable claim.

8.2 For cross‑border competition enforcement

In the specific context of Regulation 1/2003 and the ECN, the judgment establishes several important propositions:

• An assisting NCA (here, the CCPC) cannot be turned into a de facto appellate body over the requesting NCA’s investigation.
• Attempts to engineer foreign investigative outcomes through domestic injunctions against the assisting authority will be seen as collateral attacks on the foreign process and are unlikely to succeed.
• Domestic courts will assume that other Member States are capable of providing adequate remedies, absent concrete evidence to the contrary, consistent with mutual trust and the rule of law (para 26).
• The ECN’s cooperative framework does not abrogate the separation of jurisdictions: each NCA remains primarily answerable to its own courts.

This is likely to influence future strategies of undertakings faced with cross‑border dawn raids. It underscores the need to:

• pursue timely challenges both in the Member State of the raid and in the Member State of the investigating authority, as appropriate; and
• avoid over‑reliance on one jurisdiction to cure or forestall consequences primarily arising under another’s procedures.

8.3 For fundamental rights and search litigation

The judgment confirms that:

• Competition inspections engage EU Charter, ECHR and constitutional rights, but those rights are largely protected through:
  • pre‑search judicial warrant scrutiny;
  • post‑search challenges to warrants and seizure;
  • and appeal processes against substantive infringement decisions.
• Invoking privacy or effective‑remedy arguments does not, in itself, justify extraordinary interim relief that attempts to halt or reshape a foreign NCA’s investigation.

Future claimants will likely cite this case as confirming that fundamental rights considerations go primarily to the merits and structure of enforcement, not to an automatic right to interim relief of a mandatory character.

8.4 For corporate and regulatory litigation strategy

For large corporations under regulatory scrutiny, the decision offers some strategic lessons:

• If imminent harm is alleged, move promptly in the jurisdiction where that harm will materialise (here, Italy), rather than waiting and seeking to enlist another court closer to document location or corporate headquarters.
• Be realistic about what domestic courts can achieve: they cannot impose on regulators the obligation to secure outcomes that lie outside their effective control.
• When seeking mandatory orders against public bodies, ensure that:
  • the relief is precisely framed (per Bula);
  • the body has legal and practical capacity to comply; and
  • a truly strong substantive case can be demonstrated at interlocutory stage.

9. Conclusion

Ryanair DAC & Ryanair Holdings plc v CCPC [2025] IEHC 637 is a significant addition to Irish case law on interlocutory injunctions and on the interaction between national courts and cross‑border competition enforcement under Regulation 1/2003.

It establishes, or clarifies, several key propositions:

• Orders compelling a national authority to take positive steps—especially in relation to another Member State’s investigation—are mandatory injunctions and attract the stringent strong‑case requirement.
• The High Court will not re‑engineer investigative processes of a foreign competition authority via indirect orders against a domestic assisting authority; to do so would be to sue the “wrong body in the wrong jurisdiction”.
• EU law’s principles of effective judicial protection and sincere cooperation do not demand relaxation of domestic procedural thresholds for interim relief, nor do they create a power to restrain or dictate the conduct of another Member State’s regulator.
• Where robust ex post remedies are available in both jurisdictions, there is no remedial “lacuna” justifying extraordinary interlocutory intervention.
• Delay, speculative harm, and the practical impossibility of compliance will all weigh heavily against the grant of mandatory interlocutory injunctions.

At the same time, Barrett J is careful to stress that the substantive lawfulness of the warrant, the execution of the search, and the handling and transfer of documents remain open questions for trial. The decision is thus framed not as an endorsement of the CCPC’s conduct on the merits, but as a principled refusal to stretch Ireland’s injunctive jurisdiction beyond its proper limits in a sensitive cross‑border competition context.