Summary of Judgment — High Court

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment, delivered by Judge Barrett on 18 November 2025, concerns an interlocutory application brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendant. The Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, an order directing the Defendant to procure from Company A the return of documents seized under a search warrant executed at the Plaintiff's registered office on 8 March 2024 and written confirmation that those documents will not be used in Company A's ongoing investigation. The Plaintiff alternatively sought a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union under Art. 267 TFEU.

Key factual events described in the opinion (as presented to the Court) are as follows:

• On 14 September 2023 Company A commenced an inquiry into the Plaintiff's commercial practices in the State.
• On 27 February 2024 Company A requested assistance from the Defendant pursuant to Regulation 1/2003 (Art. 22(1)).
• On 8 March 2024 the Defendant applied ex parte to the District Court for a search warrant; the application was considered, including material heard in camera, and Judge Finan issued the warrant the same day.
• The warrant was executed at the Plaintiff's headquarters on 8 March 2024. Company A personnel participated in the operation; 222 documents were removed from the premises and taken to The State later that night.
• The Plaintiff contends that (i) the information in support of the warrant omitted material facts (breach of duty of candour), (ii) material over which privileged was asserted was seized and transferred, and (iii) the Defendant lacked power to transfer the materials in the manner alleged.
• Company A gave various undertakings in the domestic proceedings that, if the Irish court were to determine the inspection invalid, Company A would return or refrain from using the documents and destroy them. Company A was subsequently released from these proceedings.
• The Defendant later secured the return from The State of some material over which privilege had been claimed, by arrangement in correspondence between the Defendant and the Plaintiff's solicitors (Company B).
• Proceedings were also initiated in The State; an order initially restraining Company A's use of the documents was set aside by a State appellate body which permitted Company A to use the materials, observing that the lawfulness of the inspection measures is for determination by the courts in this jurisdiction.
• In July 2025 the Defendant applied to stay these proceedings pending the outcome of The State proceedings; that stay was refused by Judge Barrett on 31 July 2025.
• On 8 October 2025 Company A issued a Notice of Investigative Findings provisionally concluding anti‑competitive conduct; that Notice relied extensively on the disputed documents and identified procedural milestones in October–December 2025.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Court should grant mandatory interlocutory relief directing the Defendant to procure from Company A (i) the return of documents seized on 8 March 2024 and (ii) written confirmation that those documents will not be used in Company A's investigation.
2. Whether the relief sought is properly characterised as mandatory (thus attracting the higher "strong case likely to succeed at trial" threshold) or prohibitory/preservatory (attracting the conventional Campus Oil/American Cyanamid type test).
3. Whether, if necessary, the High Court should refer questions of EU law to the Court of Justice of the European Union under Art. 267 TFEU.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Plaintiff contends the search engaged rights under domestic constitutional law, Article 7 of the EU Charter, and Article 8 ECHR and that the warrant was obtained and executed without adequate disclosure of material matters (breach of the duty of candour).
• The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant unlawfully transferred seized material to Company A, contrary to Art. 12 of Regulation 1/2003 and the domestic statutory provision (s.37(2) of the Act of 2014), and that immediate transfer prevented proper review for privilege and relevance.
• The Plaintiff submits urgency exists because Company A had issued a Notice of Investigative Findings relying on the disputed documents and that, absent interim relief, irreversible reputational and commercial harm could follow.
• The Plaintiff contends the relief sought would preserve the status quo and reflect undertakings and assurances given by Company A to the domestic courts; it also argues EU principles (effectiveness, sincere cooperation) support relief and that a reference to the CJEU may be appropriate if questions of EU law arise.

Defendant's Arguments

• The Defendant maintains it has no power or control over Company A and cannot compel Company A to return or cease using documents; the Court should therefore not grant an order that would be futile or place the Defendant in breach of a Court order through no fault of its own.
• The Defendant submits the injunction sought is mandatory in substance and that the Plaintiff must therefore demonstrate a particularly strong case likely to succeed at trial; the Plaintiff has not met that threshold.
• The Defendant argues that remedies are available to the Plaintiff in The State and that the present application, in substance, attempts a collateral attack on Company A's investigation through the Defendant (the wrong body in the wrong jurisdiction).
• The Defendant contends the balance of convenience and the adequacy of damages both point against granting the mandatory relief, and that the practical and supervisory difficulties of the proposed order are acute.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a structured sequence:

1. Characterisation of the relief: The Court concluded the relief sought was mandatory in substance because it would oblige the Defendant to take positive steps (to write to Company A and pursue the return/non-use of documents). The substance, not the form, determines classification.
2. Applicable standard: Because the relief was mandatory, the Court held itself bound by Supreme Court authority to apply the higher "strong case likely to succeed at trial" threshold (the Lingam line of authority). The Court rejected submissions that it could apply a lower "fair issue" or purely "least risk of injustice" test to displace that binding precedent.
3. Legitimus contradictor and locus of proper defendant: The Court examined who properly stands as a party. It concluded the Defendant had facilitated assistance pursuant to Regulation 1/2003 but (i) had no power to compel Company A, (ii) had not controlled Company A's undertakings or the progress of the foreign investigation, and (iii) therefore was not in a position to provide the relief sought. The Court considered that the Plaintiff had, in substance, sued the wrong body in the wrong jurisdiction.
4. Strength of the Plaintiff's case: Applying the higher standard, the Court examined the Plaintiff's principal substantive arguments (breach of fundamental rights/proportionality, duty of candour, unlawful transfer of documents, and irreparable reputational/business harm). The Court found these issues to be factually contested, complex, and appropriate for trial; none established the degree of clarity or cogency required to satisfy the strong-case threshold on an interlocutory application.
5. Futility and practical capacity to perform the order: The Court analysed whether an order against the Defendant would be effective. It concluded the Defendant lacked legal capacity to compel Company A to return or cease use of documents held in The State. The prior voluntary return of some privileged material was recognised as achieved by comity, not enforceable power; undertakings by Company A did not convert the Defendant into a body able lawfully to ensure the sought result.
6. Balance of convenience and adequacy of damages: Even if the strong-case threshold were met, the Court found the balance of convenience favoured refusal. The Defendant would be exposed to the immediate and significant risk of being ordered to achieve what it could not; the asserted harms to the Plaintiff were speculative, remediable or compensable and did not amount to the irreparable prejudice required for mandatory relief.
7. Delay and procedural choices: The Court found the chronology militated against emergency relief: the Plaintiff knew the investigative timeline and did not pursue adequate or timely remedies in The State. This delay undermined any claim of exceptional urgency.
8. Collateral attack and respect for foreign processes: The Court determined the relief sought would in substance be a collateral attack on Company A's investigation and that the proper forum for challenging Company A's conduct was The State's courts. The Court was unwilling to intrude on a foreign investigatory process through an order against a domestic authority lacking control over that process.
9. Art. 267 reference: The Court concluded no question of EU law arose that was necessary to its determination of the interlocutory application and therefore declined to make a reference to the CJEU.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: For the reasons set out in the judgment, the Court declined to grant the mandatory interlocutory relief sought by the Plaintiff.

Implications:

• The Plaintiff's application for an order directing the Defendant to procure the return of seized documents and written confirmation that they will not be used was refused.
• The Court emphasised that the Defendant lacks power to compel Company A and that remedies for Company A's conduct are to be pursued in The State. The proceedings therefore continue against the Defendant on the substantive issues; the Court indicated willingness to facilitate an expedited substantive hearing where appropriate.
• The Court declined to refer any question to the CJEU under Art. 267 TFEU because it found no necessary question of EU law required to decide the interlocutory application.
• The decision, as presented in this judgment, does not purport to determine the merits of the substantive challenge; the Court expressly reserved any view on how the substantive proceedings will ultimately be decided.
• No new legal principle displacing existing authority was established; the Court applied existing interlocutory principles (including the strong-case threshold for mandatory relief) and clarified their application in the particular factual and jurisdictional context of cross-border assistance under Regulation 1/2003.

I will hear the parties as to costs.