Mandatory Domestic-Violence Aggravation and the Limits of Taking Offences into Consideration:
A Commentary on The People (DPP) v Mountassir [2025] IESC 53

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Ireland’s decision in The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Mountassir [2025] IESC 53, with particular focus on the judgment of Collins J (concurring).

The case arises out of a sentencing review under s.2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (“the 1993 Act”) in a domestic violence context. The Supreme Court dismisses the defendant’s appeal and affirms the Court of Appeal’s upward revision of sentence. Yet, its significance lies less in the result and more in the sentencing principles it crystallises, in two main areas:

• The operation of s.40 of the Domestic Violence Act 2018 (“the 2018 Act”), which makes domestic/intimate-partner status a mandatory statutory aggravating factor in sentencing for certain offences.
• The legality and limits of “taking offences into consideration” (TICs) when sentencing, especially where the additional offences are already charged or have resulted in conviction.

Collins J largely agrees with the principal judgment of O’Malley J, but he elaborates on, and in some respects departs from, her reasoning in ways that are likely to shape Irish sentencing practice. The decision clarifies:

• The mandatory nature of s.40’s aggravating effect, the very high threshold of “exceptional circumstances” needed to avoid an uplift, and the extent to which courts must visibly structure sentences to demonstrate compliance.
• A structured, principled framework for when it is (and is not) lawful or appropriate to deal with other offences by way of TICs rather than by imposing discrete sentences.

2. Background and Procedural Context

The detailed factual and procedural history is set out in the (unavailable) principal judgment of O’Malley J and is expressly adopted by Collins J. From his judgment, however, the broad outline can be inferred:

• The appellant, Mr Soufiane Mountassir, was convicted in the Circuit Court of serious offences against his then intimate partner. The offences fell within the definition of “relevant offences” under s.40 of the 2018 Act and the victim was a “relevant person” (a current or former intimate partner).
• One assault offence was not sentenced discretely but was instead taken into consideration when sentencing on another (more serious) count, as part of a single sentencing package for what was essentially one incident involving multiple serious offences against the same victim.
• The Director of Public Prosecutions applied under s.2 of the 1993 Act to have the sentence reviewed as unduly lenient. The Court of Appeal agreed, increased the sentence, and expressly applied:
  • an uplift for the additional assault taken into consideration; and
  • an uplift to reflect the mandatory aggravation required by s.40.
• The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging aspects of the Court of Appeal’s approach, engaging questions about:
  • the proper construction and application of s.40 of the 2018 Act; and
  • the lawfulness and limits of taking other offences into consideration in sentencing.

The Supreme Court (Charleton, O’Malley, Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ) unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeal’s order. Collins J concurred, giving a detailed elaboration on key issues in sentencing law.

3. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

3.1 Outcome

• The appeal by Mr Mountassir was dismissed.
• The Court of Appeal’s revised sentence was upheld as a correct assessment of the seriousness of the offending and of the proper application of:
  • s.40 of the Domestic Violence Act 2018; and
  • the principles governing the taking of offences into consideration.

3.2 Key Holdings on Section 40 DVA 2018

Collins J’s main propositions regarding s.40 are:

• Mandatory statutory aggravation: Where an offence is a “relevant offence” and the victim is a “relevant person” (spouse, civil partner or current/former intimate partner), the court must treat that relationship as an aggravating factor and, under s.40(2), must impose a greater sentence than would have been imposed if the victim were not a relevant person.
• Exceptional circumstances: The only basis for not imposing a higher sentence is the existence of “exceptional circumstances”, a deliberately high bar that will rarely be satisfied, particularly where the intimate relationship is a central, rather than peripheral, feature of the offending.
• No fixed tariff: Section 40 does not impose a fixed uplift, a mandatory custodial sentence, or an across-the-board tariff. The quantum of uplift is a matter for the sentencing court, subject to proportionality and totality.
• Required transparency: Although s.40 does not explicitly say so, the sentencing judge must structure the sentence in a way that demonstrates compliance with s.40(2) and allows the parties, the victim and any appellate court to see the actual impact of the statutory aggravation. This will typically require either:
  • identifying a specific uplift in the sentence; or
  • making clear that the offence has been placed in a higher band, or at a higher point within a band, by reason of s.40.

3.3 Key Holdings on Taking Offences into Consideration (TICs)

On the practice of taking other offences into consideration when sentencing, Collins J’s principal conclusions are:

• Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 was designed for uncharged offences and, after its 1997 amendment (requiring DPP consent), is effectively a “dead letter” in situations where the additional offences have been charged or resulted in a conviction. It has little, if any, application to the kind of situation presented in this case.
• In principle, and “strictly speaking” (following Finlay CJ in Higgins and O’Malley’s treatise), a court should impose a separate sentence for each offence of conviction, subject to the limited exceptions allowed by statute (e.g. Probation of Offenders Act 1907).
• Nonetheless, the widespread modern practice of taking certain offences into consideration – especially in multi-count cases (fraud, historical sexual abuse etc.) – is acknowledged as useful and now embedded in the system.
• In the absence of clear statutory authority, any non‑statutory power to take already-charged offences into consideration must be tightly confined. Collins J sets out a detailed list of twelve limiting principles governing when and how such a practice may lawfully and appropriately be used.
• Particular emphasis is placed on:
  • not using TICs to avoid mandatory penalties or consequences;
  • avoiding TICs for serious violent or sexual offences, particularly where there are multiple victims; and
  • the need for sentencing judges to be transparent about how any offences have been taken into consideration and whether (and by how much) this has increased the sentence.

3.4 Application to Mr Mountassir

Applying those principles, Collins J agrees that:

• The Circuit Court’s original sentence was unduly lenient, justifying intervention by the Court of Appeal under s.2 of the 1993 Act.
• It was not necessarily wrong, in the special circumstances, for the Circuit Court to take the additional assault into consideration, given that:
  • the offences were committed against the same victim and as part of effectively a single incident; and
  • this is not a case involving multiple victims or separate episodes in time.
• The Court of Appeal was correct to apply:
  • a clear and proportionate uplift for the assault taken into consideration; and
  • a separate and appropriate uplift for the s.40 domestic-violence aggravation.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Section 40 of the Domestic Violence Act 2018: A Mandatory Statutory Aggravating Factor

4.1.1 Structure and Operation of Section 40

Section 40 of the 2018 Act creates a structured form of “statutory aggravation” where certain offences are committed against a current or former intimate partner. In outline:

• Relevant offences: These include:
  • specified offences under the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997;
  • any offence involving violence or the threat of violence (other than coercive control under s.39); and
  • a range of serious sexual offences (including rape and sexual assault).
• Relevant persons: A person who is:
  • the spouse or civil partner of the victim; or
  • is or was in an intimate relationship with the victim.
• Subsection (1): For a “relevant offence” against a “relevant person”, the fact of that intimate relationship must be treated as an aggravating factor.
• Subsection (2): The sentencing court “shall impose a sentence which is greater than that which would have been imposed” if the victim had not been a relevant person – i.e. a mandatory uplift.
• Subsection (3): The above duty does not apply if there are “exceptional circumstances” justifying non-application of s.40(2).

Collins J emphasises that this is not merely a direction to treat domestic/intimate status as one aggravating factor among many; it is a statutory command to impose a higher sentence than would otherwise have been imposed, unless exceptional circumstances exist.

4.1.2 Comparison with Other Statutory Aggravations

Collins J situates s.40 within a broader family of Irish sentencing provisions in which the Oireachtas has singled out particular circumstances as mandatory aggravating factors, such as:

• Section 11 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 (as amended): committing an offence while on bail.
• Section 10(10) of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 (as amended): harassment by a person previously convicted of an offence against the same or a connected person.
• Section 74A of the Criminal Justice Act 2006: offences committed as part of the activities of a criminal organisation.
• Sections 3A and 4A of the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998: offences committed by public officials in the course of their duties.
• Section 8(4) of the Criminal Justice (Offences Relating to Information Systems) Act 2017: misuse of personal data for identity-related offences causing prejudice.
• Section 10(2) of the Criminal Justice (Smuggling of Persons) Act 2021: endangering life or safety or subjecting the person to exploitation or inhuman or degrading treatment.
• Section 8 of the Criminal Justice (Hate Offences) Act 2024: hatred based on protected characteristics as an aggravating factor for almost all criminal offences.

Although they vary in scope and in the nature of the aggravating factor, these provisions share the same basic architecture:

• A defined factor (e.g. being on bail, acting as a public official, hate motivation) is designated as an aggravating factor.
• The sentencing court is directed to treat that factor as making the offence inherently more serious.
• The court is mandated, in the absence of exceptions, to impose a greater sentence than would have been imposed absent the factor.

Thus, the legislative “policy choice” is clear: certain contextual features are thought to increase the wrongfulness or harmfulness of the offending (to the victim and to society) and so must ordinarily attract tougher penalties. In the case of s.40, this reflects the Oireachtas’ judgment about the levels of harm and risk inherent in intimate-partner violence, and the need both to punish and to deter such offending.

4.1.3 The “Exceptional Circumstances” Threshold

Section 40(3) allows a court not to impose a higher sentence under s.40(2) where there are “exceptional circumstances”. Collins J adopts the Sentencing Guidelines and Information Committee’s observation that the concept of “exceptionality” is inherently open-ended: it cannot be fully codified in advance. Yet:

• The use of the term “exceptional” clearly signals a high threshold.
• Where the intimate relationship is central to the offending (as was the case in Mountassir), it will be “difficult to see” how any exception could arise.
• Only where the former relationship is peripheral or coincidental – for example, where the relationship had ended long ago and is not part of why the victim was targeted – might a court conclude that exceptional circumstances justify disapplying s.40(2).
• Where a court does consider that exceptional circumstances exist, it should say so expressly and identify the circumstances.

In Mountassir, there was no suggestion that s.40(3) applied: the relationship was a central feature of the offending, and neither side argued that exceptional circumstances existed.

4.1.4 No Tariff, but a Duty to Demonstrate the Uplift

Collins J is clear that s.40:

• does not fix a particular “uplift”;
• does not require a custodial sentence in all such cases;
• does not introduce any universal minimum or statutory tariff.

The sentencing judge retains discretion, subject to ordinary principles of proportionality and totality, but that discretion is exercised against the backdrop of a mandatory duty to increase the sentence.

The crucial point, and one where Collins J explicitly parts company with O’Malley J, is transparency:

• O’Malley J considered it not necessary (and possibly undesirable) for the trial judge to quantify the increase attributable to s.40.
• Collins J, “with some hesitation”, disagrees. In his view, the effective implementation of s.40(2) implies that courts must structure the sentence in a way that demonstrates compliance and clarifies the section’s actual impact.

He suggests that this can be done in (at least) two ways:

1. Specific uplift: The judge may identify a base or “unaggravated” sentence, then state the additional period imposed because the victim is a relevant person (as the Court of Appeal did in this case).
2. Higher headline: Alternatively, the judge may place the offence in a higher sentencing band or at a higher point within a band explicitly “by reference to s.40(2)”.

In both approaches, the guiding idea is that the defendant, the DPP, the victim and any appeal court should be able to see what s.40 actually did to the sentence. A mere statement that the court “has taken section 40 into account” is insufficient, given that the Oireachtas has mandated a greater sentence.

4.1.5 Comparative Guidance: English Case Law and Sentencing Council Practice

Collins J draws on English authorities dealing with statutory aggravation, particularly in the context of racially aggravated offences and hate crime:

• R v Saunders [2000] 2 Cr App R (S) 71;
• R v Morrison [2001] 1 Cr App R (S) 5; and
• R v Kelly & Donnelly [2001] 2 Cr App R (S) 73.

In Kelly & Donnelly, the Court of Appeal endorsed the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s advice that judges should state what the sentence would have been had the offence not been racially aggravated. The Court observed that this:

“will lead to transparency in sentencing, which will be of benefit to the public and, indeed, to this Court, if subsequently the sentence passed is the subject of challenge.”

Collins J notes that this approach has been carried into the Sentencing Council’s guidance on the equivalent statutory aggravation in s.66 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (hate crime). He considers that the same logic applies to s.40 DVA 2018: clear identification of the uplift promotes transparency, fairness, and effective appellate review.

4.2 Taking Offences into Consideration (TICs)

4.2.1 The Traditional Rationale and Section 8 of the 1951 Act

Historically, at common law, courts had a power to take uncharged offences into consideration at the time of sentencing. The rationale was practical and two-fold:

• It enabled offenders to “wipe the slate clean” by admitting other offences, with the assurance that they would be taken into account in the current sentence and would not be prosecuted later.
• The State benefitted by resolving additional offences without further investigation or separate trials, saving resources and securing some form of punishment.

Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 codified and modified this practice. In essence:

• It applies where, on being convicted of an offence, a person “admits himself guilty of any other offence”.
• The court may “take the other offence into consideration” in determining sentence.
• Section 8(2) then bars a future prosecution for the offence taken into consideration (subject to the underlying conviction remaining in place).

As Collins J points out:

• The wording of s.8(1) – especially the phrase “any other offence” – is naturally read as referring to offences not already the subject of a conviction in the proceedings before the court.
• The bar on future prosecution in s.8(2) makes sense for uncharged offences, but not for offences that are already the subject of a conviction (which cannot in any event be prosecuted again).

In 1997, s.8 was amended to require the consent of the DPP before an offence can be taken into consideration under that section. This makes sense for uncharged or not-fully-prosecuted offences, but, as Collins J observes, “makes little or no sense” if applied to offences that have proceeded to conviction.

4.2.2 Key Irish Authorities: From Higgins to Rakovac

Collins J undertakes a detailed survey of Irish case law, highlighting a lack of coherent principle and some tension between older and more recent authorities.

(a) DPP v Higgins (Supreme Court, 1985)

In Higgins, after a jury trial resulting in multiple convictions, the trial judge imposed a sentence on one count and took the others into consideration. Though the issue was not central to the appeal, Finlay CJ (for a five-judge court) strongly criticised this practice:

“Appropriate sentence should, in my view, be imposed on all counts in respect of which an accused person is convicted by a jury.”

Collins J notes that this statement can be read as indicating that there is no power to take offences into consideration once a jury has returned guilty verdicts, and by extension casts doubt on doing so in judge-alone trials.

(b) DPP v Grey [1986] IR 317 (Supreme Court)

Grey concerned revenue betting offences prosecuted summarily. The accused pleaded guilty to one offence and admitted others; the District Court took the others into consideration under s.8. The Supreme Court held that s.8 does not apply where the predicate offence carries a mandatory penalty, as the court cannot “genuinely and bona fide” take account of admissions to other offences when it has no discretion as to the penalty on the conviction offence.

From Grey, two core propositions emerge (endorsed by Collins J):

• If the conviction offence carries a mandatory penalty, other offences cannot be taken into consideration when sentencing for that offence.
• Likewise, an offence carrying a mandatory penalty or mandatory consequence (e.g. automatic driving disqualification) cannot itself be taken into consideration when sentencing for another offence.

These constraints apply independently of whether s.8 is used or a non‑statutory TIC power is claimed.

(c) People (DPP) v McAuley & Walsh [2001] 4 IR 160 (CCA)

In McAuley & Walsh, the Special Criminal Court sentenced two defendants for manslaughter (the killing of Detective Garda Jerry McCabe) and, with DPP consent, took other serious offences into consideration under s.8. On a leniency review, the DPP argued that the manslaughter sentences were unduly lenient because they did not add any extra punishment for the TIC offences.

The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected that argument, holding that, while a trial court may increase a sentence because of serious offences taken into consideration, there is nothing in Grey or Batchelor requiring it to do so. In context, the manslaughter sentences were already among the longest ever imposed for that offence, and the “unduly lenient” threshold was not met.

Collins J suggests this outcome is best understood on its particular facts; ordinarily, one would expect serious TIC offences to lead to some uplift.

(d) People (DPP) v Casey [2018] IECA 121; [2018] 2 IR 337 (CA)

In Casey, the defendants pleaded guilty to three burglary offences and one criminal damage offence committed in a “spree”. The trial judge sentenced on one burglary, gave shorter concurrent sentences on the other burglaries, and took the criminal damage into consideration. The DPP appealed for leniency.

Birmingham J (as he then was), for the Court of Appeal, drew heavily on Finlay CJ’s criticism in Higgins and on O’Malley’s treatise, concluding that:

• It is “preferable” not to have recourse to TICs where discrete offences of conviction are involved, especially in a “spree” situation.
• There is a risk that taking offences into consideration can give the impression that the offender gets a “free ride” for certain offences – a perception that can undermine confidence for both offender and victim.

The Court of Appeal found the sentences unduly lenient and resentenced with higher terms and a discrete sentence for the criminal damage.

(e) People (DPP) v Lennon [2021] IECA 30 (CA)

In Lennon, the trial judge sentenced on a less serious assault offence and took more serious witness intimidation charges into consideration. Donnelly J, for the Court of Appeal, expressed doubts about whether it is permissible at all to take convicted offences into consideration, in light of Casey and Higgins, but proceeded on the assumption that it might be allowable.

The Court held that:

• It was an error to take the more serious offences into consideration while sentencing only for the lesser assault.
• The serious intimidation charges should carry discrete sentences, particularly to mark their severity and impact on the victim.
• Related, lesser offences (criminal damage/possession of an article) could appropriately be taken into consideration, as they were part of the same intimidation.

(f) People (DPP) v Rakovac [2022] IECA 233 (CA)

In Rakovac, the defendant pleaded guilty to a s.15A drugs offence and to a money laundering offence (s.7 of the 2005 Act). The Circuit Court sentenced on the drugs offence and took the money laundering count into consideration. The Court of Appeal (Edwards J) held:

• The s.7 offence was a “stand-alone” offence and not directly related to the drugs count.
• This was not a case where the defendant could seek to avail of s.8 of the 1951 Act: the money-laundering was a charged offence, a count on the indictment in its own right.
• Absent direct relatedness, there should have been a discrete sentence, and taking it into consideration was an error, rendering the sentence unduly lenient.

Crucially, Rakovac assumes that there is some non-statutory power to take charged offences into consideration where they are “directly related” to the conviction offence, although it does not identify the doctrinal source of that power.

4.2.3 Collins J’s Framework: Twelve Limiting Principles

Against this somewhat confused jurisprudential background, Collins J accepts that:

• Strictly, a separate sentence should be imposed for each offence of conviction (subject to the Probation of Offenders Act and statutory TIC under s.8).
• Nevertheless, the practice of taking certain offences into consideration has become sufficiently embedded, and is accepted by both prosecution and defence, that it cannot simply be dismissed; instead it must be disciplined by clear limits.

He therefore articulates twelve guiding principles that should govern any non‑statutory use of TICs (paragraph numbers in brackets below refer to his judgment):

1. Jurisdiction (para 40(1)): The court may only take into consideration an offence that it has jurisdiction to deal with. This is usually satisfied where the offence is already properly before the court.
2. No TIC where conviction offence has mandatory penalty (para 40(2)): If the offence for which sentence is being imposed has a mandatory penalty (or mandatory consequence), other offences cannot be taken into consideration in sentencing for that offence (following Grey).
3. No TIC of an offence that itself carries mandatory penalty or consequence (para 40(3)): An offence that carries a mandatory sentence or mandatory effect (such as automatic disqualification) cannot itself be taken into consideration when sentencing for another offence (again, consistent with Grey and R v Simons [1953] 1 WLR 1014).
4. Sentencing capacity must be adequate (para 40(4)): An offence should not be taken into consideration if, because of the maximum penalty or other constraints on the court’s sentencing powers for the predicate offence, it would be impossible to impose a sentence that properly reflects the totality of the offending.
5. Only lesser offences may be TICed (para 40(5)): The court must identify the most serious offence before it (by reference to actual conduct and seriousness, not merely maximum statutory penalty) and sentence for that offence. Only less serious offences should be taken into consideration.
6. Minor/regulatory offences (para 40(6)): It is unobjectionable to take into consideration minor or regulatory offences likely to be punished only by a financial penalty, especially where they arise incidentally.
7. Avoid TICs for serious offences in general (para 40(7)): Serious criminal offences, particularly those that would ordinarily attract a significant custodial sentence if considered alone (e.g. serious violence, sexual offences), should ordinarily not be disposed of as TICs but should carry discrete sentences, echoing Lennon.
8. No TIC across multiple victims (para 40(8)): Where an offender has committed offences of violence or crimes against the person against multiple different victims, discrete sentences should be imposed for each victim. Taking offences into consideration in such a context risks giving victim B the sense that the offence against them has received a “free ride” or has been subsumed into the offence against victim A. Collins J considers this wholly inconsistent with modern understandings of victims’ rights.
9. General rule against TIC for temporally separated violence against the same victim (para 40(9)): As a general rule, violence or offences against the same victim that are separated in time should not be taken into consideration; they should normally attract separate sentences, and may justify consecutive terms (cf. People (DPP) v FE [2019] IESC 85; [2021] 1 IR 217).
   Exception: In cases of numerous similar offences over a prolonged period, it may be appropriate to proceed on representative or sample counts, with the remaining offences taken into consideration, provided the overall sentence properly reflects the totality and gravity of the pattern of abuse.
10. Structuring sentences does not require longer total terms (para 40(10)): Imposing separate sentences for multiple offences need not increase the overall sentence; the court can still respect the totality principle by making sentences concurrent or partly concurrent as appropriate.
11. Single-incident multiple offences against the same victim (para 40(11)): Where multiple serious offences are committed against the same victim in what is essentially a single incident, there is somewhat greater scope for taking one or more offences into consideration, provided the other principles are respected.
12. Transparency about TICs (para 40(12)): Whenever a sentencing judge decides to take an offence into consideration:
    • this should be stated clearly on the record; and
    • the judge should ordinarily state whether any uplift has been applied and, if so, identify its amount.
    There may be practical exceptions (e.g. where an indictment contains a multiplicity of similar counts), but in general, the judge should explain how TICs have been used. The failure to do so in the present case is identified by Collins J as an error, even though not one justifying intervention at this stage.

4.2.4 Victims’ Rights and the Public Perception of “Free Rides”

A recurring concern, drawn from Casey and echoed by Collins J, is the risk that taking offences into consideration can appear to give offenders “a free ride” for some offences:

• From a victim’s perspective, an offence that does not attract a separate sentence can feel as though it has been overlooked or treated as insignificant, particularly where they are not the same victim as in the “lead” offence.
• From a rule-of-law and transparency perspective, unexplained TICs can undermine confidence in sentencing by obscuring the true scope of the criminality the court is addressing.

This is why Collins J is particularly firm about prohibiting TICs across multiple victims and about the need for explicit reasoning when TICs are used at all.

4.3 Leniency Reviews and the Role of Appellate Courts

The case arises under s.2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, which empowers the DPP to apply to the Court of Appeal to review a sentence on the ground that it is unduly lenient. The Court of Appeal and, in limited circumstances, the Supreme Court must then assess whether the sentence represents a “substantial departure” from the range of sentences appropriate to the offending (McAuley & Walsh).

The practical importance of the transparency requirements advocated by Collins J – both for s.40 aggravation and for TICs – is that they directly facilitate effective appellate review:

• The Court of Appeal can only properly review whether a sentence is unduly lenient or unduly severe if it can see:
  • what the trial judge considered the “base” sentence to be; and
  • what uplift (if any) was applied for statutory aggravation or for offences taken into consideration.
• Likewise, the DPP and defence need that transparency to make informed judgments about whether an appeal or review should be brought.
• Victims also have a “vital interest” (Collins J’s phrase) in understanding how the court has taken account of statutory aggravation (e.g. s.40) and of other offences that affected them.

By insisting that sentencing judges structure their sentencing decisions to reveal these elements, the Supreme Court promotes consistency, reviewability and victim-centred justice.

5. Complex Concepts Explained in Plainer Terms

5.1 “Statutory Aggravating Factor”

An aggravating factor is something about an offence or an offender that makes it more serious and therefore usually justifies a higher sentence (e.g. using a weapon, attacking a vulnerable victim). A statutory aggravating factor is one that the Oireachtas has explicitly written into law, requiring the court to treat it as making the offence more serious. Section 40 DVA 2018 is an example: violence against a current or former intimate partner is, by law, more serious than the same conduct against a stranger.

5.2 “Exceptional Circumstances”

“Exceptional circumstances” is a legal term that signals that only very unusual situations will qualify. It does not mean merely that the case is serious or unusual; it means that, in all the circumstances, it would be unjust to apply the ordinary rule (such as imposing a higher sentence under s.40(2)). By definition, such cases should be rare, and when they arise, courts are expected to explain precisely why.

5.3 “Headline Sentence” and “Uplift”

• The headline sentence is the court’s assessment of the sentence that would be appropriate for the offence before mitigation (e.g. before considering a guilty plea, co‑operation, personal circumstances etc.).
• An uplift is the added amount of punishment imposed due to an aggravating factor (such as s.40 domestic/partner status), or due to additional offences taken into consideration, or both.

By separating the headline sentence, uplifts, and discounts for mitigation, the court creates a transparent, step-by-step sentencing analysis.

5.4 “Totality Principle”

The totality principle requires that the full sentence for multiple offences be proportionate to the overall criminality and not simply the mechanical sum of individual sentences. For example:

• Two offences each meriting 3 years might not justify a total of 6 years if that would be out of proportion to the combined wrongdoing.
• Courts use concurrent or partly concurrent sentences to achieve a fair total.

Collins J emphasises that imposing discrete sentences for multiple offences is fully compatible with totality; it does not necessarily mean the overall sentence must be longer.

5.5 “No Separate Penalty” and TIC

In some systems (including England & Wales), courts record convictions for multiple offences but mark some as carrying “no separate penalty”, to show that they were taken into account in setting the overall sentence.

Irish practice in taking offences into consideration (without imposing a discrete sentence) is functionally similar, but Mountassir emphasises that such a practice must be:

• exceptional for serious offences;
• avoided for offences with mandatory penalties or across multiple victims; and
• accompanied by clear reasoning on the record.

6. Impact and Significance of the Judgment

6.1 Domestic Violence Sentencing and Section 40

The decision cements several important propositions for domestic violence cases:

• Offences against current or former intimate partners within the scope of s.40 must be treated as inherently more serious, with a mandatory uplift unless exceptional circumstances exist.
• Section 40 is not merely a codification of what courts might otherwise do; it is a directive from the Oireachtas that intimate-partner violence is to be punished more severely (within the normal boundaries of proportionality).
• Sentencing judges must explain the actual effect of s.40 in their sentencing remarks, either via a quantified uplift or by explicitly placing the offence higher in the sentencing range by reference to s.40.

This is likely to lead to:

• more consistent, and generally tougher, sentences for relevant domestic violence offences;
• enhanced victim confidence, since victims can see that their status as intimate partners has been meaningfully recognised; and
• increased appellate scrutiny of any case where s.40 is ignored, under‑applied or not transparently addressed.

6.2 Systematising the Law on TICs

Collins J’s structured framework for TICs is likely to be a key reference point in future sentencing:

• It narrows the circumstances in which judges may lawfully and appropriately take already‑charged offences into consideration instead of imposing discrete sentences.
• It emphasises that for serious offences, especially those involving violence, sexual wrongdoing or multiple victims, TICs are generally inappropriate.
• It aligns Irish practice more closely with modern conceptions of victims’ rights, ensuring that each victim’s harm is individually recognised.

At the same time, the decision preserves the useful flexibility of TICs for:

• uncharged offences admitted under s.8 (with DPP consent);
• minor or regulatory offences; and
• representative-charge cases (e.g. multiple similar offences over a long period) where prosecuting and sentencing on every count would be unwieldy and disproportionate.

6.3 Transparency, Appellate Review and Sentencing Culture

Beyond s.40 and TICs, the judgment promotes a general culture of structured, reasons-based sentencing in Ireland:

• Trial judges are encouraged to articulate headline sentences, uplifts and discounts, not merely to reach a global figure.
• This approach aligns Irish practice more closely with international best practice and with the work of bodies like the Sentencing Guidelines and Information Committee.
• For appellate courts, such structure simplifies the task of determining whether a sentence was unduly lenient or unduly severe.

7. Conclusion

The People (DPP) v Mountassir [2025] IESC 53 is a significant contribution to Irish sentencing law, especially in the domains of domestic violence and the treatment of multiple offences.

In relation to section 40 of the Domestic Violence Act 2018, the Supreme Court confirms that:

• domestic and intimate-partner status is an inherently aggravating factor for specified offences;
• there is a mandatory duty to impose a higher sentence absent exceptional circumstances; and
• sentencing judges must demonstrate, in a structured and transparent way, how that statutory aggravation has affected the sentence.

In relation to taking offences into consideration, Collins J’s concurring judgment clarifies that:

• section 8 of the 1951 Act is largely confined to uncharged offences (and, post‑1997, only with DPP consent);
• any non‑statutory power to take charged offences into consideration is strictly limited and must respect constraints relating to jurisdiction, mandatory penalties, seriousness, number of victims, and overall sentencing capacity; and
• transparency about the use of TICs and any associated uplifts is essential.

Taken together, these elements mark Mountassir as a key precedent:

• It strengthens the legal response to intimate-partner violence by insisting on meaningful, mandatory aggravation with visible consequences at sentencing.
• It protects both the integrity of sentencing and the rights of victims by limiting and clarifying the practice of taking offences into consideration.
• It advances a broader shift towards reasoned, structured, transparent sentencing in Ireland, aligning judicial discretion with legislative policy and the demands of appellate oversight.

In dismissing the appeal and upholding the Court of Appeal’s sentence, the Supreme Court thus uses the Mountassir case not only to resolve an individual dispute, but to provide authoritative guidance that will shape sentencing practice in domestic violence and multi-offence cases for years to come.