Limiting Qualified Privilege Under Section 18(2):
Bird v Iconic Newspapers ([2025] IESC 30)

Introduction

Bird v Iconic Newspapers is the Supreme Court of Ireland’s leading decision on the scope of qualified privilege under the Defamation Act 2009. A local journalist erroneously identified William Bird as a tax defaulter in the Limerick Leader. The newspaper argued that, even though the statement was false, publication was protected by qualified privilege because the public has a “social interest” in tax-compliance news. The High Court and Court of Appeal rejected that defence; a jury awarded Mr Bird €75,000. The Supreme Court has now unanimously dismissed the publisher’s appeal, holding that:

• Section 18(2) does not extend qualified privilege to mass-media communications “to the world at large”.
• The traditional duty/interest reciprocity remains the touchstone; only narrow, historically recognised exceptions survive.
• The statutory “public interest” defence is found in section 26, not in section 18(2).
• Where a jury award falls a mere €1 below High Court jurisdiction, it is “exceptional” for costs purposes; a plaintiff should normally receive High Court costs.

Summary of the Judgment

Collins J (for a unanimous court) systematically reviewed Irish, UK, and Commonwealth authorities. He concluded that the newspaper’s proposed reading would:

• Radically rewrite section 18(2) without textual basis.
• Render sections 18(3) (reporting privilege) and 26 (fair & reasonable publication) largely redundant.
• Conflict with the constitutional duty to vindicate reputation under Art 40.3.2°.

Accordingly, the Court:

1. Affirmed liability and the award of €75,000.
2. Confirmed that no common-law or statutory qualified privilege covered the inaccurate article.
3. Upheld the Court of Appeal’s order granting Mr Bird High Court costs via a “special certificate” under the Courts Act 1981 s.17(2).

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• Hynes-O’Sullivan v O’Driscoll (1988): classic statement that mutual duty/interest defines qualified privilege; section 18(2)(a)(ii) legislatively relaxes (but does not abolish) that rule. Key backdrop.
• London Artists v Littler (1969) & Blackshaw v Lord (1984): English cases refusing to extend privilege to mass-media “public interest” stories. Relied on to show longstanding limits.
• Reynolds v Times (2001) & subsequent UK/CA/NZ/AUS jurisprudence: show that other jurisdictions developed wider public-interest defences, but always with reasonableness safeguards. Used to contrast with Iconic’s malice-only model.
• Kinsella v Kenmare Resources (2019 IECA 54): Court of Appeal remark that publication to all the world is privileged only in “exceptional circumstances”; Collins J adopts that reading.
• Reaney v Interlink (2018 IESC 13): influential on the costs point, endorsing flexible departure from default cost penalties when the result is “very close”.

2. Core Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Analysis. Section 18(2) mirrors the duty–interest formula; the only innovation is allowing a reasonable mistake about the recipient’s interest. Nothing suggests an intention to immunise broad publications.
2. Statutory Context. Extending s.18(2) as urged would:
   • Undercut s.18(3)’s “fair & accurate” requirement for reports of official documents such as the Tax-Defaulters List.
   • Nullify s.26, which already balances press freedom with reputation through a reasonableness test.
3. Constitutional Balance. Article 40.6.1° protects press freedom, but Article 40.3.2° requires the State to defend reputation. A malice-only shield for careless mass publication would tilt the scales unconstitutionally.
4. Policy & Comparative Law. Every common-law jurisdiction that has broadened media defences has paired them with objective safeguards (reliability, verification, urgency etc.). Iconic sought expansion without those safeguards.
5. Outcome on Costs. Section 17(2) exists to avoid harsh cost penalties where a plaintiff “marginally” misses High Court jurisdiction or where an exceptional legal issue justifies the higher forum. Both limbs applied here (€1 short & a novel privilege question). The trial judge’s refusal to certify was therefore in error; the Court of Appeal was entitled to intervene.

3. Likely Impact

• Media defendants can no longer invoke s.18(2) for routine public-interest articles; they must rely on s.18(3) (fair/accurate reports) or s.26 (fair & reasonable publication).
• The decision provides clear guidance for the upcoming Defamation (Amendment) Bill 2024, reinforcing the need for a robust, stand-alone public interest defence modelled on UK s.4.
• Cost certificates under s.17(2) will be more accessible where jury awards hover just below the jurisdictional threshold, reducing tactical “under-pleading” of damages.
• Editors and journalists will be under renewed pressure to verify facts, even when sourcing from official lists.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified Privilege: A legal shield allowing publication of defamatory material without liability if the communicator and recipient have a shared duty/interest, and no malice exists.
• Section 18(2) vs. 18(3):
  • 18(2) – classical duty/interest privilege (private-ish communications).
  • 18(3) – privilege for fair & accurate reports of specified documents or proceedings (e.g., Dáil debates, court cases, tax-defaulters lists).
• Malice: Not spite alone; it includes knowing falsity or reckless disregard. Honest (even negligent) belief defeats malice.
• Special Certificate (Courts Act 1981 s.17(2)): Judicial mechanism allowing a successful High Court plaintiff, whose award is just under the jurisdictional limit, to recover full High Court costs when justice demands.

Conclusion

Bird v Iconic Newspapers draws a bright line: the ordinary qualified-privilege defence remains relationship-based and does not automatically cloak inaccurate mass-media publications. Where publishers wish to report matters of public concern they must either:

1. Report fairly and accurately under s.18(3), or
2. Satisfy the objective criteria of the fair and reasonable publication defence in s.26 (soon to be replaced by a modern s.26).

The judgment reinforces constitutional commitment to reputation, clarifies the legislative architecture of the 2009 Act, and ensures that the legislature’s choice of defences is not sidestepped by creative pleading. For practitioners, it signals three practical lessons: verify official data, plead the correct defence, and—if damages hover near jurisdictional ceilings—seek or oppose a special certificate with well-prepared arguments.