Introduction

This commentary analyzes the decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Szobollodi [2025] EWCA Crim 1204, delivered on 22 May 2025 by the Vice-President. The case concerns a prospective juror who declined, on principle, to participate in jury service. The Crown Court imposed a fine for contempt. The appeal raised procedural fairness in contempt proceedings, the proper interaction between section 20 of the Juries Act 1974 and the court’s inherent contempt jurisdiction, and the correct method of recording a contempt decision.

The central issues were:

• Whether the prospective juror’s conduct fell within section 20 of the Juries Act 1974 (specifically, being “not available when called on to serve as a juror”) or could be treated as contempt under the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
• Whether the Crown Court complied with the Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR) Part 48 safeguards for contempt proceedings, in particular informing an unrepresented respondent of the right to legal advice and explaining the procedure.
• How a contempt outcome should be recorded—namely, as a “finding of contempt” rather than a criminal conviction or sentence—and the real-world consequences of administrative misrecording.

The case arrived at the Court of Appeal four days out of time, prompted in part by the court office’s erroneous recording of the outcome as a criminal conviction under an irrelevant statute, which jeopardized (and in fact caused the loss of) the appellant’s employment as a licensed door supervisor.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Court of Appeal granted a short extension of time and allowed the appeal.
• The Court quashed the finding of contempt and the £700 financial penalty.
• The Court held that the Crown Court committed serious procedural errors by:
  • Failing to inform the unrepresented appellant that he could obtain legal advice (CrimPR 48.5(2)(a)(vi)) and to allow a reasonable opportunity to do so (CrimPR 48.5(2)(b)); and
  • Failing to explain what the procedure at the contempt enquiry would entail (CrimPR 48.8(1)(b)).
• The Court reiterated that contempt outcomes must be recorded as findings of contempt, not as convictions or sentences (citing R v Yaxley-Lennon [2018] 2 Cr App R 30). The administrative misrecording here was wrong and had serious consequences.
• Given the procedural unfairness (not of the appellant’s making), the Court refused to order a rehearing; the fine, already paid, is recoverable.
• The Court expressly left open substantive questions about the reach of section 20 Juries Act 1974 and the use of inherent jurisdiction for juror refusal, which had not been argued below due to the appellant’s lack of representation.

Detailed Analysis

A. Legal Framework and Core Questions

The Crown Court possesses inherent power to deal with contempt of court. Specific statutory powers regarding jurors are found in section 20 of the Juries Act 1974. For present purposes, section 20(1)(b) penalizes a person who, “after attending in pursuance of a summons, is not available when called on to serve as a juror,” and section 20(2) allows such conduct to be punished either on summary conviction or “as if it were criminal contempt of court committed in the face of the court.” Contempt proceedings in the Crown Court are governed procedurally by CrimPR Part 48, including:

• Rule 48.5: requiring the court to explain the conduct in question, its powers to punish, the right to legal advice, and to allow reasonable time to reflect and obtain advice; and
• Rule 48.8: requiring an explanation of the procedure at the enquiry and other safeguards before punishment.

Two interrelated substantive questions arose in Szobollodi:

• Whether the appellant’s principled refusal to participate made him “not available when called on to serve” within section 20(1)(b), and if so at what stage (when the panel is brought to court; when a juror is about to be sworn; etc.).
• If not within section 20, whether the court’s inherent jurisdiction nevertheless encompasses such conduct as contempt of court. The Court of Appeal observed that it could see no reason of principle why it could not, but it left the point open.

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

• R v Yaxley-Lennon [2018] 2 Cr App R 30:

  The Court relied on Yaxley-Lennon to reaffirm a critical recording principle: a contempt outcome is not a criminal conviction or “sentence.” It must be recorded as a “finding of contempt.” This point had immediate relevance because the court office in Szobollodi wrongly recorded the outcome as a conviction under an irrelevant statute (section 17 CPIA 1996), thereby causing significant collateral harm, including job loss. Yaxley-Lennon provides the authoritative basis for correcting such misrecording.

• R v Crown Court at Guildford, ex parte Siderfin (1990) 90 Cr App R 192:

  Cited by the appellant to show that an adjournment for legal advice can and should be granted where appropriate in contempt proceedings. The Court of Appeal accepted the thrust of this submission, holding that failure to tell an unrepresented respondent that they may take legal advice—legal aid being available in such situations—and to allow a reasonable opportunity to obtain it, was a serious procedural error vitiating the fairness of the hearing.

• Senior Presiding Judge’s guidance on contempt; Law Commission Consultation Paper on contempt:

  These were referenced to contextualize the contemporary guidance and reform landscape regarding contempt, underscoring the importance of compliant, clear and fair process. They were not determinative authorities, but they emphasize best practices that align with the Court’s approach in this case.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court of Appeal’s reasoning proceeded in three main steps.

1. Procedural safeguards under CrimPR Part 48 were breached in serious respects.

   The judge did not tell Mr Szobollodi that he could seek legal advice (CrimPR 48.5(2)(a)(vi)), nor did he allow him a reasonable opportunity to do so (CrimPR 48.5(2)(b)). The judge also failed to explain what the procedure at the enquiry would be (CrimPR 48.8(1)(b)). These omissions were particularly significant because the appellant was unrepresented and the legal issues (including jurisdiction under section 20 and/or the inherent jurisdiction) were non-trivial.

   While the Court accepted that “minor departures” from the precise terms of rule 48 can occur without rendering a hearing unfair, these particular omissions were not minor. They went to the heart of a fair process in summary contempt proceedings, where the court invokes penal powers without a conventional criminal trial.

2. Fairness and the opportunity to be heard on jurisdictional issues.

   Because the appellant was not informed of his right to legal advice or the procedure, he was unable to obtain representation or to make submissions on the key jurisdictional questions (the reach of section 20 and/or the scope of inherent contempt as applied to jurors). The judge, correspondingly, was deprived of the opportunity to consider these points and to give a reasoned ruling on them. That absence of process infected the legitimacy of the finding.

3. Remedy and recording.

   The Court quashed the finding and financial penalty. It held that it would be unjust to order a rehearing given the errors were not the appellant’s fault, he had paid the fine (recoverable), and he had suffered job loss. On recording, the Court emphasized, consistently with Yaxley-Lennon, that contempt must be recorded as a “finding of contempt,” not as a criminal conviction or sentence. The court office’s erroneous entry—here, even referencing a wholly irrelevant statute—illustrated the serious collateral harm misrecording can cause.

D. The Unresolved Substantive Questions: Section 20 Juries Act and Inherent Jurisdiction

The Court identified, but did not decide, two difficult points:

• Timing and scope under section 20(1)(b).

  When is a juror “called on to serve” such that non-availability is established? Is it only when the individual is in the jury box and asked to take the oath/affirmation, or can it be earlier (e.g., when a panel is brought into court for empanelment)? The answer matters: it defines the trigger for section 20’s regime, including the “as if in the face of the court” contempt route under section 20(2).

• Inherent contempt jurisdiction for juror refusal.

  If section 20 does not apply on the facts, can the Crown Court still treat a principled refusal to serve as contempt under its inherent jurisdiction? The Court stated it could see no reason of principle why not, but—given the lack of submissions below—left the point open. A future case with full argument may supply authoritative guidance on both issues.

E. Impact and Practical Significance

Although narrow in outcome, Szobollodi has wide practical reach for judges, court staff, and practitioners dealing with contempt arising from jury service issues.

• Mandatory advisements in contempt proceedings—especially for unrepresented respondents.

  Courts must:

  • Inform respondents they may obtain legal advice (and that legal aid may be available).
  • Allow reasonable time to reflect and to secure such advice before any enquiry proceeds.
  • Explain the procedure and potential consequences (including fine/imprisonment) before finding contempt.
  • Invite an explanation and, where relevant, an apology; and consider whether to proceed, postpone, or take no action (CrimPR 48.5–48.8).

  Failure to meet these core steps—particularly the advisement of the right to legal advice and explanation of procedure—is likely to render a contempt finding unsafe.

• Accurate recording: “finding of contempt” is not a conviction.

  Court offices must record outcomes precisely in line with Yaxley-Lennon. Misrecording as a criminal conviction may produce severe collateral consequences (as here, employment/licensing loss) and invite appellate intervention.

• Juror management and the s.20/inherent jurisdiction interface.

  The decision signals that judges should consider, but not assume, the reach of section 20 when a juror expresses unwillingness to serve (especially on principle). Until appellate clarification, careful fact-finding and legal submissions are advisable before invoking either section 20(2)’s “as if contempt” route or the inherent jurisdiction.

• Extensions of time where administrative error causes prejudice.

  The Court’s readiness to grant a short extension—where misrecording led to delay and tangible prejudice—illustrates a pragmatic, fairness-oriented approach to time limits in this context.

• No automatic rehearing after procedural unfairness.

  Where procedural fault lies with the court and the respondent has already suffered loss (including paying a penalty and collateral job impacts), the Court may consider a rehearing unjust and opt to quash without remittal.

F. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Contempt of court: Conduct that interferes with or undermines the administration of justice. In the criminal courts, it can be punished by imprisonment or fine. It is not a criminal conviction but a finding that penal sanctions are warranted to protect the court’s authority and process.
• Inherent jurisdiction: The court’s power—independent of statute—to protect its processes and ensure justice is done. It includes dealing with contempts not specifically covered by legislation. Its use must be principled and proportionate.
• “In the face of the court” contempt: Contempt committed openly before the court (e.g., abuse of the judge, disruption), which the court can address immediately. Section 20(2) allows certain juror defaults to be treated “as if” they were such contempt, enabling swift action in the Crown Court.
• Section 20 Juries Act 1974: Provides offences and sanctions for juror non-compliance, including failing to attend and being “not available when called on to serve,” with a defence of “reasonable cause.” It offers two routes: summary conviction, or treatment “as if” contempt in the face of the court (with Crown Court powers).
• CrimPR Part 48 (Rules 48.5 and 48.8): The procedural framework for contempt in criminal courts. The court must explain the alleged conduct, the available penalties, the right to legal advice, and the procedure; allow time for reflection/advice; invite explanation and apology; and give reasons for any punishment. These safeguards are vital where contempt can be addressed summarily.
• Empanelment of a jury: The process of selecting jurors from a panel to form the trial jury, including calling prospective jurors into the box and taking the oath/affirmation. Whether “called on to serve” starts at this point or earlier remains an open question highlighted by this case.
• Recorder vs Resident Judge: A Recorder is a part-time judge sitting in the Crown Court; the Resident Judge is the senior permanent circuit judge responsible for managing a particular Crown Court centre.
• Finding of contempt vs conviction: The former is a judicial determination that contempt has occurred, attracting penal powers, but it is not a criminal conviction and must not be recorded as such. This distinction matters acutely for criminal records, regulatory checks, and employment.

G. Practical Checklists

For Judges faced with alleged juror contempt

• Identify the legal route: section 20 Juries Act (and at what point it is engaged) or inherent jurisdiction.
• Before any enquiry:
  • Explain the alleged conduct and potential sanctions (fine/imprisonment).
  • Tell the respondent they may take legal advice (legal aid may be available) and allow time to obtain it.
  • Explain the procedure to be followed at the enquiry.
• At the enquiry:
  • Confirm understanding of the allegation and the procedure.
  • Ask whether the conduct is admitted.
  • Hear evidence/submissions as required.
  • Invite explanation and apology, and consider whether to proceed, postpone, or take no action.
  • Give clear reasons, including findings of fact and the effect of any punishment.

For Court Staff

• Record the outcome as “finding of contempt” (not a conviction or sentence).
• Ensure the correct statutory/sources of power are referenced (avoid irrelevant provisions).
• Be alert to the collateral impacts of misrecording (DBS checks, licensing, employment).

Conclusion

R v Szobollodi is an important procedural fairness decision in the law of contempt, especially in the delicate context of juror defaults. The Court of Appeal makes two principles unmistakable:

• In contempt proceedings—particularly against an unrepresented respondent—the court must inform the person of the right to legal advice, allow time to obtain it, and explain the enquiry procedure. Failure to do so will ordinarily vitiate the contempt finding.
• Contempt is not a criminal conviction. It must be recorded as a “finding of contempt,” consistent with Yaxley-Lennon, to avoid serious collateral harm and to preserve legal accuracy.

The judgment also flags unresolved substantive questions about the ambit of section 20 of the Juries Act 1974 (notably, when a person is “called on to serve”) and the circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction may be used to sanction juror refusal. Those issues await authoritative resolution in a case where they are properly argued. Meanwhile, Szobollodi supplies a clear, practical template: rigorous adherence to CrimPR 48 safeguards is essential; administrative recording must be exact; and where procedural missteps occur, the Court will not hesitate to quash the outcome and, where unjust, decline a rehearing.