Anonymized Summary of Opinion (Vice‑Presidential Opinion)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 22 April 2024, at the Crown Court sitting in The City, the Appellant was found to be in contempt of court and ordered to pay a financial penalty of £700. The Appellant had been summonsed for jury service and expressed a principled refusal to participate in jury decision‑making on the basis that his country of origin does not use the jury system. He sent a note to the recorder stating that he did not believe in the jury system and "will not participate on any decision making" and that he "can't read the affirmation in the courtroom" — which he later explained meant only that his principles precluded him from giving the affirmation, not that he lacked linguistic ability.

The recorder arranged for the Appellant to appear before a senior judge (referred to in the hearing as "the judge") to investigate. The recorder considered whether section 20 of the Juries Act 1974 applied and whether the common law offence of contempt was engaged, and ultimately referred the matter to the resident judge. The Appellant appeared unrepresented before the resident judge later the same day. The judge addressed the Appellant, warned him that refusal to participate could result in punishment by way of a financial penalty for contempt, invited him to reflect, and asked whether he wished to change his stance. The Appellant persisted in his principled refusal.

The judge ruled that the Appellant's stance — that he would not participate in decision‑making even if required to remain in court for several days — amounted to contempt of the court and imposed a fine of £700 with directions for payment. The Appellant was then discharged from further attendance at court.

Subsequent administrative errors in the court office wrongly recorded the judge's decision as a criminal conviction and, in addition, recorded the contempt as a breach of an unrelated statutory provision. The mistaken recording apparently led to the Appellant losing his employment because he believed (and the record reflected) a criminal conviction.

The Appellant commenced an appeal four days after the expiry of the ordinary time limit for appeal. Had he appealed within time, he would have had an appeal as of right. He applied for a short extension of time (four days) to seek leave to appeal against both the finding of contempt and the penalty. The Appellant was later represented on the appeal by Attorney Wainwright. Company A (the prosecution service) was not formally a party, though the court received written submissions and oral assistance from Attorney Robottom acting at the instruction of Attorney [Last Name].

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Appellant's conduct fell within the scope of section 20 of the Juries Act 1974 (i.e. whether a person who, after attending in pursuance of a summons, "is not available when called on to serve as a juror" can include refusal at the stage before being sworn or formally required to take their place in the jury box).
2. If the conduct did not fall within section 20, whether the conduct could nonetheless be treated as contempt of court under the Crown Court's inherent jurisdiction.
3. Whether there were procedural defects in the hearing before the resident judge (notably failure to explain the right to legal advice and the procedure at an inquiry) such that the Appellant did not receive a fair hearing, warranting quashing of the contempt finding and penalty.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Attorney Wainwright)

• The matter was dealt with as a contempt of court, but it was unclear whether this was under the court's inherent jurisdiction or under section 20 of the Juries Act 1974; it should not have been recorded or treated as a criminal offence in the sense of a conviction and sentence.
• The Appellant's conduct did not amount to contempt under section 20 of the 1974 Act; the statutory wording ("is not available" when "called on to serve as a juror") should be read narrowly and may require the juror to have been placed in the jury box and called to take oath/affirmation before the subsection applies.
• There were fundamental procedural defects in the hearing: the Appellant was not told he could seek legal advice (for which Legal Aid may have been available), was not given a clear explanation of the precise basis on which his actions were said to amount to contempt, and was not afforded a final opportunity to apologise before punishment. Attorney Wainwright relied on precedent (Precedent B) to support that an adjournment for legal advice could have been available.

Submissions made by Attorney Robottom (instructed by Attorney [Last Name] / on behalf of Company A)

• Strict compliance with Rule 48 of the Criminal Procedure Rules is not necessarily an essential prerequisite for a fair hearing; minor departures may not vitiate fairness provided the substance of the protections has been observed.
• The judge substantially set out the relevant conduct and twice offered the Appellant an opportunity to reflect and to advance reasons why punishment should not be imposed; the conduct was not disputed.
• However, Attorney Robottom acknowledged that the failure to inform the Appellant of his right to take legal advice was a more significant omission and accepted that this omission might be regarded as material to fairness.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out the applicable legal framework: the specific statutory scheme in relation to jurors found in section 20 of the Juries Act 1974 and the Criminal Procedure Rules (in particular Rules 48.5 and 48.8) that govern how courts must proceed where conduct potentially constituting contempt is observed or reported.

The court noted that Rule 48 requires the court, unless impracticable, to explain in terms the respondent can understand the conduct alleged, the possible sanctions (including imprisonment or a fine), that the respondent may explain the conduct, apologise, and take legal advice, and to allow a reasonable opportunity to reflect and take advice. Rule 48.8 requires the court at an inquiry to explain the procedure, ask whether the respondent admits the conduct, and, if proven or admitted, to give the respondent an opportunity to make representations relevant to punishment and a final opportunity to apologise, and to explain the reasons for its decision.

The court identified two difficult jurisdictional issues that arose on the facts: (1) whether the Appellant's conduct fell within the ambit of section 20 of the 1974 Act — specifically whether "is not available when called on to serve as a juror" can be satisfied before the juror has been called into the jury box and sworn or affirmed; and (2) if not within section 20, whether the court's inherent jurisdiction could nonetheless treat such conduct as contempt. The court regarded these as difficult questions of law but observed that they were not considered or decided by the resident judge, because no submissions on those legal points were made before him.

The court therefore focused on the procedural fairness of the hearing. It found that the judge had erred by failing at the outset to explain to the Appellant that he could take legal advice and that, if he wished, a reasonable opportunity to obtain such advice would be given (contrary to rule 48.5(2)(a)(vi) and (b)). The judge also failed to explain what the procedure at the inquiry would be (contrary to rule 48.8(1)(b)). While the court accepted that, in substance, the judge had set out the conduct and had given the Appellant some opportunities to reflect and to state reasons against punishment, those departures were not minor in this case because the Appellant was unrepresented and therefore deprived of the safeguard of being told of the availability of legal advice and of a clear explanation of what was being alleged and how the inquiry would proceed.

Because these procedural errors were made by the judge at the outset (and not by the Appellant), they deprived the judge of the opportunity to hear submissions on the important jurisdictional and legal questions identified and denied the Appellant safeguards which should have been afforded before imposing a significant finding and financial penalty. The court concluded that the finding of contempt and the penalty could not stand on that basis.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court granted the short extension of time sought, allowed the appeal, and quashed the finding of contempt and the imposition of the financial penalty. The core ruling is thus: THE APPEAL IS ALLOWED; THE FINDING OF CONTEMPT AND THE FINANCIAL PENALTY ARE QUASHED.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

• The Appellant's payment of the £700 fine will be recoverable.
• The court noted that the Appellant had suffered loss of employment as a consequence of the incorrect court record; the administrative recording error (which recorded a conviction and invoked an irrelevant statutory provision) was a decisive factor in that employment loss.
• The court considered it would be unjust to require the Appellant to face a rehearing of the issue of contempt given the circumstances; no rehearing was ordered.

Broader implications:

• The court did not resolve the difficult substantive questions about the scope of section 20 of the Juries Act 1974 or the limits of the court's inherent jurisdiction in this context; those points were noted as difficult and interesting but were not decided because of the procedural defects in the original hearing. Therefore, no new substantive precedent on those jurisdictional questions was established by this opinion.
• The opinion underscores the importance of compliance with the procedural protections contained in Rules 48.5 and 48.8 where a court contemplates dealing with conduct as contempt and particularly the need to explain the right to legal advice and the procedure at the inquiry, especially where the respondent is unrepresented.

Administrative and Anonymization Note

This summary has been produced using only information contained in the provided opinion and has been fully anonymized: party names, individual personal names, and institutional identifiers have been replaced with generic placeholders (for example, "Appellant," "Judge [Last Name]," "Attorney Wainwright," "Company A") in accordance with the instructions provided.