Interlocutory Injunctions: Duty to Expedite Proceedings and Appellate Oversight

Introduction

Tweedswood Ltd & anor v Power [2025] IESC 18 is a landmark Supreme Court of Ireland decision that clarifies the obligations of a party who obtains an interlocutory injunction and the power of appellate courts to discharge such orders when the underlying proceedings are not pursued promptly. The dispute began in 2009 when Ulster Bank appointed a receiver over commercial premises owned by Tweedswood Ltd, in receivership following insolvency. Martin Power, sole shareholder of Tweedswood, resisted hand-over of possession, alleging invalidity in the debenture and the bank’s conduct in the original property transaction. The High Court granted an interlocutory injunction in May 2010, effectively putting the receiver in possession. Fifteen years later, with the plenary proceedings still untried and the property derelict, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the injunction must stand in light of the inordinate delay.

Summary of the Judgment

Chief Justice O’Donnell, writing for a five-judge bench, allowed the appeal and discharged the interlocutory injunction. The Court held:

An interlocutory injunction is a temporary remedy “pending the final hearing” and imposes a duty on its beneficiary to bring the substantive proceedings to trial without undue delay.
An appellate court may set aside or discharge such an injunction solely on grounds of the beneficiary’s failure to expedite the underlying litigation.
Where, as here, the injunction effectively granted final relief (mandatory possession of premises), the duty to proceed promptly is particularly strong.
The receiver’s prolonged inaction—despite repeated calls by this Court in 2010 to advance the case—warranted discharge of the injunction even though its removal did not change the practical custodianship of the property (the company was in liquidation and the receiver remained in possession).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court relied on and developed existing authority on interlocutory injunctions:

Charleton & Cotter v Scriven [2019] IESC 28 (Clarke C.J.): Held that a party who secures an interlocutory injunction “is under particular duty not to rest on their laurels but to bring the matter on for full hearing,” because the remedy is “merely a stepping stone” to trial.
Taite v Beades [2019] IESC 92 (Irvine J.): Reinforced that interlocutory injunctions should not function as a summary judgment device; emphasised the duty to move to trial.
Clare County Council v McDonagh [2022] IESC 2 (Hogan J.): Echoed the “merely a stepping stone” principle and warned against using interlocutory relief to bypass a full hearing.
Betty Martin Financial Services Ltd v EBS DAC [2019] IECA 327 (Court of Appeal): Stated that “the beneficiary of an interlocutory injunction is under particular duty to take all reasonable steps to ensure a timely trial.”
O’Dwyer v Grogan [2024] IEHC 688 (High Court): Demonstrated in practice a court discharging an injunction where a receiver failed to advance proceedings.

These authorities shaped the Court’s articulation of a new, bright-line principle: persistent delay by the injunction-holder in bringing the case to trial can, on appeal, justify discharge of the injunction.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in three stages:

Nature of Interlocutory Injunctions: Injunctions are interim orders preserving the status quo pending final determination. Even where they yield practical finality—such as mandatory possession—they remain temporary in law.
Duty to Expedite: Drawing on the precedents, the Court held that securing interlocutory relief imposes a “particular duty” to pursue the case diligently. This duty is even more acute if the order grants full possession or equivalent relief.
Appellate Power and the Facts of This Case: The Court recognised its power to entertain delay as a standalone ground for appeal. Here, neither receiver nor plaintiff meaningfully advanced the underlying claims for 15 years, despite multiple invitations by this Court. The paralysis prevented sale or reuse of the premises and generated unnecessary costs. On balance, the discretion favored discharging the injunction.

Impact

The decision will have significant consequences:

Case Management and Procedural Reform: Courts and practitioners must now treat interlocutory injunctions as conditional on expeditious progress. This may reshape pre-trial timetables, listing priorities, and use of expedited motions.
Receivership Practice: Receivers and secured lenders will face pressure to conclude enforcement litigation quickly or risk losing interim relief. They must plan for prompt High Court hearings and prioritize appeals.
Appellate Oversight: Appeals against interlocutory orders will regularly include scrutiny of post-order conduct. Delay alone can prompt discharge without a substantive re-examination of the original merits.
Borrower-Lender Dynamics: The ruling reinforces the need for speed and finality in enforcement, balancing lenders’ security rights with economic and social costs of stalled properties.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Interlocutory Injunction: A court order made at an early stage to preserve the position of parties until final judgment. It is “interim,” not “final.”
Mandatory vs. Prohibitory Injunction: A prohibitory injunction stops a party from doing something, whereas a mandatory injunction compels a party to take specific action (e.g., hand over possession).
Balance of Convenience: The test to decide whether granting or refusing an injunction will cause less harm to the parties.
Debenture and Receiver: A debenture is a security instrument under which a lender can appoint a receiver to take control of assets if the borrower defaults. The receiver’s duty is to secure and, if possible, sell the assets for the lender’s benefit.
Rule in Foss v Harbottle: A principle barring individual shareholders from suing on behalf of a company; the claim belongs to the company, enforceable by its liquidator once in winding up.

Conclusion

Tweedswood Ltd & anor v Power establishes a new precedent on the temporariness of interlocutory injunctions and the proactive obligation they place on recipients. The Supreme Court’s willingness to discharge an injunction solely for culpable delay underscores that such relief cannot become a de facto summary victory. Secured parties, litigants and the courts themselves must now ensure that once interim relief is granted, the march to a full hearing begins immediately. The judgment serves both as a procedural lesson and a reminder: justice delayed may lead not merely to delay of justice, but to the undoing of interim remedies themselves.