In re Y (Adoption): Late Applications, Mature Children’s Wishes and the Threshold for Dispensing with Parental Consent under Section 54(2A) of the Adoption Act 2010

1. Introduction

This High Court judgment, delivered ex tempore by Jordan J on 30 July 2025 ([2025] IEHC 563), concerns an application for a non-consensual adoption order in respect of “Y”, a young person born in November 2007, who is just a few months short of turning 18. The application is brought under section 54 of the Adoption Act 2010 (as amended), in conjunction with the general “best interests” provision in section 19.

The key issues are:

• Whether the statutory conditions in s.54(2A) for dispensing with parental consent to adoption are satisfied in relation to Y’s birth father, “N”.
• How the court should weigh the best interests and expressed wishes of a nearly adult child against the constitutional and Convention rights of a birth parent.
• How the Supreme Court’s decision in the so‑called B case ([2023] IESC 12, Hogan J) governs the application of s.54(2A) in long-term foster care situations.
• Whether the late timing of the application—on the cusp of Y’s majority—is so unfair to the birth father that it should influence or prevent the making of an order.

The parties are:

• Applicants: The Child and Family Agency (CFA) and the long‑term foster carers “A and H”, who seek to adopt Y.
• Respondents: The Adoption Authority of Ireland (1st respondent), Y’s birth mother “E” (2nd respondent, who now consents to the adoption), and Y’s birth father “N” (3rd respondent, who opposes the dispensing of his consent).

Y has lived with A and H since infancy and has been the subject of a full care order since 2014. Two of Y’s step‑siblings have previously been adopted by A and H. Y herself actively wishes to be adopted by them, and has written to the court making an emphatic plea in support of the adoption. The main legal obstacle is N’s refusal to consent.

Jordan J ultimately authorises the making of an adoption order and dispenses with the consent of any person whose consent is required, including N. In doing so, he conducts a structured analysis of the statutory criteria in s.54(2A) and s.54(3), read with the best‑interests framework in s.19, and applies the principles distilled by Hogan J in the Supreme Court’s B decision.

The judgment does not radically remake the law, but it is important in three respects:

1. It shows how the B case is to be operationalised in day‑to‑day High Court practice, especially where the child is almost 18.
2. It highlights the weight to be given to the wishes of a near‑adult child who has lived her entire life with the prospective adopters.
3. It delivers a strong and practical judicial warning about the unfairness and systemic problems associated with “last‑minute” adoption applications brought just before a child reaches majority.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Jordan J begins by criticising the late initiation of the proceedings. The application was issued on 25 June 2025, with an initial return date of 27 June, even though Y turns 18 in November 2025. The judge emphasises that such last‑minute timing is unfair to all concerned—birth parents, the child, prospective adopters, and the court.

The birth mother’s position is straightforward: she has now executed a corrected affidavit of consent to the adoption. The core dispute is with Y’s birth father, N, who travelled some distance to attend court and contest the dispensing of his consent.

The judge then:

• Sets out the statutory framework:
  • Section 19 – requiring the court to treat the best interests of the child as the “paramount consideration”, but not the sole factor, and to consider a non‑exhaustive list of welfare factors.
  • Section 54(2A) – setting the threshold conditions for dispensing with parental consent to adoption.
• Systematically applies the s.19 best‑interests factors to Y’s situation, emphasising:
  • Her age and maturity (nearly 18; capable of forming her own views).
  • Her psychological difficulties (notably anxiety) and long period out of formal education.
  • The reality that A and H have fulfilled all day‑to‑day parental functions since infancy.
  • Her clear, repeatedly expressed wish to be adopted.
• Moves through each limb of s.54(2A), and finds them all satisfied:
  • s.54(2A)(a): For over 36 months, Y’s parents have failed in their duty to such an extent that her safety or welfare is likely to be prejudicially affected – because all effective parental duties have in fact been exercised by A and H since infancy.
  • s.54(2A)(b): There is no reasonable prospect that N will be able to care for Y in a way that would not prejudicially affect her safety or welfare, given her age, vulnerabilities, and the risks inherent in any attempt to relocate her to a new home environment.
  • s.54(2A)(c): The failure constitutes an “abandonment” of parental rights in the technical legal sense explained in earlier case law, not a moral condemnation.
  • s.54(2A)(d) & (f): The State, as guardian of the common good, should supply the place of parents, and adoption by A and H is a proportionate means of doing so.
  • s.54(2A)(e): Y has been in the custody and home of A and H for far longer than the required 18 months.

He emphasises that:

• This is not a “rubberstamping exercise” – he has read and considered a lever‑arch folder of evidence (around 160 pages), and consciously disregards affidavits served at the very last minute as potentially unfair to N.
• He avoids, so far as possible, making findings of individual blame, and instead focuses on the objective factual reality of who has parented Y.
• He is acutely aware of Y’s impending majority, but considers that this timing issue, while relevant, does not outweigh the statutory tests once they are satisfied and the child’s best interests clearly favour adoption.

Finally, on a human level, the judge directly addresses N, acknowledging his disappointment and underlining three consolations:

1. N did not walk away: he came to court to voice his opposition out of genuine concern for his daughter.
2. No order of the court can change the fact that N remains Y’s biological father.
3. Y’s happiness at the granting of the order is likely to be significant, whereas refusal would probably cause her deep distress and seriously damage any future possibility of repair in the father–daughter relationship.

He then makes:

• An order under s.54(2) authorising the Adoption Authority to make an adoption order in favour of A and H; and
• An express order under s.54(2) dispensing with the consent of any person whose consent is required (including N).

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Statutory Framework and Constitutional Context

(a) Section 19 – Best Interests of the Child

Section 19 of the Adoption Act 2010, as quoted in the judgment, governs the approach of both the Adoption Authority and the courts. Two key points emerge:

• Paramount consideration: Under s.19(1), in any matter or proceedings under the Act, the child’s best interests must be the “paramount consideration”. Jordan J carefully notes that this does not mean the child’s best interests “trump all other considerations”, but that they guide and dominate the ultimate resolution once all factors have been assessed.
• Multifactorial inquiry: Section 19(2) lists non‑exhaustive factors, including the child’s age and maturity, physical, psychological and emotional needs, the likely effect of adoption, and the child’s views. The judge methodically works through these in Y’s specific context.

(b) Section 54 – Non-Consensual Adoption and Dispensing with Consent

Section 54 deals with the High Court’s power to authorise an adoption order and dispense with parental consent in circumstances where the statutory conditions are met. Section 54(2A) (as amended, following the 31st Amendment and the Adoption (Amendment) Act 2017) sets out the key threshold tests which the judge must consider one by one.

Section 54(3) further requires the court to:

• Have regard to the constitutional and other rights of the persons concerned, including the child’s natural and imprescriptible rights; and
• Give due weight to the views of any child capable of forming his or her own views, having regard to age and maturity.

The judgment illustrates that serious adoption applications now involve a two‑stage analytical structure:

1. A global best‑interests analysis under s.19, which sets the overall welfare context.
2. A threshold analysis under s.54(2A) and (3), which asks whether the legal preconditions for a non‑consensual adoption (including proportionality and parental “failure” or “abandonment”) are met.

(c) Constitutional and ECHR Overlay

Throughout, Jordan J is operating against a background shaped by:

• Article 42A of the Constitution (children’s rights), which expressly contemplates adoption of any child where the constitutional thresholds are met, and empowers the Oireachtas to legislate accordingly.
• Article 41 (the protection of the family), which historically made adoption of children of married parents highly restricted until the 31st Amendment.
• Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, guaranteeing respect for family life, and the Strasbourg case law on severance of birth family ties and non‑consensual adoption.

The judge explicitly aligns his view with Hogan J’s ECHR analysis in B, paras 86–94, concluding that the making of an adoption order in this case would be Convention‑compliant.

3.2 Precedents Cited

(a) The B Case – [2023] IESC 12 (Hogan J)

Jordan J identifies the Supreme Court’s decision in the B case as the principal authority. While he does not recite it at length, he states that:

• The B judgment comprehensively sets out “the law and how the law should be applied” under s.54(2A).
• He has “considered the entire judgment of the Supreme Court”, especially para 77 and following, and is directly applying its approach.

From the context of the present judgment and the known features of B, several key principles from B are clearly being applied:

• Concrete welfare, not abstract capacity: As Jordan J quotes, s.54(2A)(b) is not concerned with parental capacity “in the abstract”, but with the concrete welfare of the child in question. The test is child‑specific and contextual.
• Status and lifelong nature of adoption: Hogan J described adoption as an institution meeting “deep‑seated human needs for family stability, security and the ties of love”, and emphasised that adoption is not just about care during minority; it has lifetime consequences. Jordan J reproduces and adopts this reasoning.
• Proportionality and constitutional anchoring: Adoption is recognised and supported by the Constitution (Article 42A and Article 37.2), and once the statutory tests are met, adoption can be a proportionate means of meeting a child’s welfare needs, even where this severs the legal relationship with birth parents.
• ECHR compliance: Hogan J in B reconciled Irish adoption law with Article 8 ECHR. Jordan J explicitly states that his own view coincides with Hogan J’s reasoning at paras 86–94 on this point.

In effect, this judgment is a model application of the B framework in a factual scenario involving:

• Long‑term foster care from infancy;
• A contest over dispensing with consent; and
• The child’s impending majority and clearly expressed views.

(b) Southern Health Board v JH [2000] 1 IR 165

This seminal case (Denham J) concerned the constitutional threshold for State intervention and the interpretation of “abandonment” and “failure in duty” in earlier adoption legislation. Jordan J cites Denham J for the proposition that:

• The word “abandonment” has a special legal meaning in adoption law; it is not used in its ordinary, emotionally loaded sense.
• Its ordinary meaning is distressing and should not be read as a moral condemnation of parents.

Jordan J leverages this to reassure N that when the law speaks of “abandonment of all parental rights”, it does not imply physical desertion or moral failure; it refers to the legal reality that parental rights have not been exercised in practice over a sustained period.

(c) Northern Area Health Board v LM [2002] 4 IR 252

McGuinness J in this case similarly interpreted “abandonment” in a technical sense under earlier adoption legislation. Jordan J cites both Denham J and McGuinness J together, reinforcing:

• That “abandonment” is a juridical conclusion drawn from sustained non‑exercise of parental functions, not a label of moral guilt.
• That this interpretation carries over to the current statutory framework (now framed in s.54(2A)(c)).

(d) European Court of Human Rights, Article 8 Jurisprudence

Although no specific Strasbourg authorities are named, Jordan J records that:

• He is familiar with the Article 8 case law on family life and adoption.
• His view in the present case coincides with Hogan J’s detailed Convention analysis in B (paras 86–94).

The key ECHR principle in play is that non‑consensual adoption and severance of family ties require particularly compelling justification, and that the measure must be necessary and proportionate to protect the child’s welfare. Jordan J is satisfied those conditions are met here.

3.3 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) Best Interests Analysis under Section 19

Jordan J structures his welfare assessment explicitly around s.19(2)’s factors. In relation to Y:

• Age and maturity (s.19(2)(a)):
  • Y is “almost 18” and clearly capable of forming her own views.
  • The judge accepts she is a mature young person, albeit with difficulties such as anxiety.
  • This high level of maturity means her views are entitled to substantial weight under both s.19(2)(d) and s.54(3)(b).
• Physical, psychological and emotional needs (s.19(2)(b)):
  • Y suffers from anxiety, is reluctant to take prescribed medication, and prefers CBT and other supportive approaches.
  • She has been effectively out of formal education for some years, a difficulty noted as increasingly common among Irish children more generally.
  • Despite these issues, her emotional needs have been consistently met by A and H, who have cared for her on a daily basis since infancy.
• Likely effect of adoption (s.19(2)(c)):
  • Y wants to be adopted and feels aggrieved that two step‑siblings were adopted earlier despite her longer residence with the family.
  • The judge finds adoption is likely to have a positive effect on Y, giving her a sense of belonging and security.
  • Conversely, refusal of adoption, in the face of her clearly expressed wishes, would likely have a significant negative impact and “set her back significantly”.
• Child’s views (s.19(2)(d); s.19(3); s.54(3)(b)):
  • Y has written two letters to the court pleading for the adoption to proceed.
  • N suggests that her views have been influenced by the foster parents, but the judge accepts this influence is an inevitable by‑product of the fact that they have been her parents in practice since infancy.
  • Her views are therefore genuine and to be given “due weight” in light of her age and maturity.
• Social, intellectual and educational needs (s.19(2)(e)):
  • Y’s “only home she has been in for all of her life” is with A and H.
  • Her social needs are met within that familiar family and community context.
  • Although she is out of formal education, the judge notes this in broader context, avoiding unfairly singling her out.
• Upbringing and care (s.19(2)(f)):
  • Y has been brought up since infancy by A and H.
  • All practical parenting has been done by them over many years, including care, emotional support, and decisions about education and health.
• Relationship with parents and relatives (s.19(2)(g)):
  • Contact with both birth parents has been difficult and problematic over the years.
  • Access with N, despite his best intentions, “simply was not working out”.
  • The judge is careful not to allocate blame, but notes this factual reality as part of the welfare picture.

Taken together, these factors strongly support the conclusion that Y’s best interests lie in confirming and securing in law the family reality she has always known, by permitting adoption by A and H.

(b) Threshold Tests under Section 54(2A)

The judgment is particularly valuable for its careful traversal of each limb of s.54(2A).

(i) Section 54(2A)(a): 36-Month Failure in Duty

The court must be satisfied that, for at least 36 continuous months immediately preceding the application, the parents have “failed in their duty” towards the child to such an extent that the child’s safety or welfare is likely to be prejudicially affected.

Jordan J’s reasoning:

• Recognises the emotional difficulty for N in hearing such language, but stresses the court’s obligation to assess facts objectively.
• Notes that “all of the decisions throughout her life, from infancy … had been taken by the applicants for adoption”.
• Concludes that all practical parental duties have been exercised by A and H over many years.
• On the basis of a substantial evidential record (160‑page lever‑arch file), he is satisfied that the statutory test in (a) is clearly met.

This is a functional reading of “failure in duty”: not as moral delinquency but as the absence of effective parenting by the birth parents over the relevant period, with the consequence that the child’s welfare is bound up in the foster family.

(ii) Section 54(2A)(b): No Reasonable Prospect of Non-Prejudicial Parental Care

Here the focus is on forward‑looking prospects: is there a reasonable prospect that the parents will be able to care for the child in a manner that would not prejudicially affect his or her safety or welfare?

Applying Hogan J’s guidance in B that this is not about parental capacity in the abstract, but about the concrete reality of the particular child, Jordan J reasons that:

• Y has known only one home—A and H’s—since she was weeks old.
• She has recognised vulnerabilities: anxiety, out of education, near adulthood.
• Any attempt to radically re‑arrange her living environment at this stage would be “fraught with risk” and amount to a “very significant rupture in her life”.
• It is “completely unrealistic” to believe that a sudden transfer to N’s care could occur without prejudicially affecting her safety or welfare, even with N’s best intentions.

The judge uses a vivid hypothetical: N arriving at the foster home and saying “You’re my daughter, you’re coming with me,” and attempting to take Y to his home. This scenario, he explains, is simply unworkable and likely harmful, underscoring that the test in (b) is clearly satisfied.

(iii) Section 54(2A)(c): Abandonment of Parental Rights

This subsection is often the most emotionally charged because of the word “abandonment”. Drawing on Southern Health Board v JH and Northern Area Health Board v LM, and echoing Hogan J in B, Jordan J:

• Stresses that “abandonment” has “gloomy overtones” in ordinary language and is distressing for parents.
• Clarifies it does not necessarily mean physical abandonment or deliberate rejection of the child.
• Explains that in law it refers to the abandonment of parental rights vis‑à‑vis the child, meaning that those rights have not been exercised in any real or sustained way.

On the facts, Y has been reared and brought up by A and H since infancy; they have exercised all parental rights and responsibilities. In this legal sense, the court finds that N and the birth mother have abandoned their parental rights, even if they retain emotional concern or have made efforts at contact.

(iv) Section 54(2A)(d) and (f): State Supplying the Place of Parents and Proportionality

Subsection (d) asks whether, by reason of the failure, the State, as guardian of the common good, should supply the place of parents. Subsection (f) then asks whether adoption by the applicants is a proportionate means of supplying that place.

Jordan J treats these two limbs together, consistent with modern proportionality analysis:

• He notes that Y was placed with A and H when just a few weeks old, in December 2007, because of “the upheaval that existed in the life of her birth parents” and especially her birth mother.
• Placement in foster care was at that time necessary to protect Y’s welfare.
• Adoption is then addressed via Hogan J’s description: adoption meets deep‑seated human needs for family stability and security; it creates a new family relationship of legal status, not merely a transfer of care.
• Adoption has lifelong consequences, recognised by the Oireachtas since the 1952 Act and anchored in the Constitution (Article 37.2, Article 42A).

On these facts, allowing A and H to adopt Y is not a disproportionate or extreme measure; rather, it is a natural consolidation of the family life she already enjoys, and a proportionate response to the long‑term non‑exercise of parental responsibilities by the birth parents.

(v) Section 54(2A)(e): Custody and Home with the Applicants

This is largely a factual threshold: the child must be in the custody and home of the applicants at the time of the application, and must have been so for a continuous period of at least 18 months immediately beforehand.

In Y’s case, this is easily met: she has been with A and H continuously since infancy—far in excess of 18 months. Jordan J treats this requirement as straightforwardly satisfied.

(c) Section 54(3): Rights of the Persons Concerned and the Child’s Views

Under s.54(3)(a), the court must have regard to:

• The rights of the persons concerned, including the natural and imprescriptible rights of the child; and
• Any other matter the court considers relevant.

Jordan J specifically identifies the persons concerned as:

• N, whose constitutional and Convention rights as a parent he acknowledges and considers; and
• Y, whose welfare is the “paramount consideration” and whose own rights (to care, protection, and stability) are engaged.

He emphasises:

• This is not a “rubberstamping exercise”. The court is conscious of the seriousness of extinguishing parental rights and granting an adoption order.
• He has read N’s replying affidavit carefully, recognises that there are factual conflicts, and proceeds without making unnecessary findings of blame.
• The factual findings he does make are sufficient to satisfy s.54(2A) without resolving every disputed detail.

Under s.54(3)(b), he must, so far as practicable, give due weight to Y’s views. This interacts with:

• s.19(3), which similarly requires ascertaining and giving due weight to the child’s views; and
• Y’s particular status as a near‑adult with clearly articulated wishes.

Jordan J accepts that Y’s views—expressed in her letters and in the evidence before the court—are strong, consistent and rational in light of her life experience, and he accords them substantial weight.

(d) Evidential Fairness and Late Filing of Affidavits

A noteworthy procedural aspect is Jordan J’s handling of late‑served affidavits. He indicates that:

• Additional affidavits were filed and served only the day before the hearing.
• In the context of an already late application, such very late evidence is “potentially unfair”, particularly to a parent like N who is opposing the application.
• He therefore disregards these late affidavits, relying instead on the substantial body of pre‑existing evidence.

This reflects a commitment to procedural fairness within the accelerated and often pressured landscape of child and family law, and it sends a clear signal to practitioners and agencies that last‑minute evidential ambushes will not be favoured by the court.

(e) Late Timing of the Application and Near-Majority of the Child

Jordan J repeatedly criticises the systemic issue of applications brought at the “cusp” of majority:

• He notes Y will be 18 in November 2025 and that the application was issued only in late June 2025.
• He labels such timing as “unsatisfactory”, “undesirable”, and “potentially unfair”, specifically “inimical or contrary to the interests of any parent opposing an application for adoption”.
• He strongly suggests that such delays “need to be addressed”, echoing prior expressions of judicial concern.

However, he expressly holds that:

• This timing issue, while relevant under s.54(3)(a)(ii) as “another matter” the court considers, is not sufficient to tip the balance against making the adoption order.
• In particular, for a child on the verge of adulthood who strongly wants to be adopted by the only parents she has known, the interest in securing legal status and stability remains pressing and legitimate.

Thus, the case stands as a warning about late applications but also as authority that they will not automatically defeat an otherwise meritorious adoption application, especially where the child’s best interests clearly favour the order.

(f) Human-Focused Judicial Communication

A distinctive feature of this ex tempore judgment is its direct and empathetic address to the birth father, N:

• The judge acknowledges the emotional difficulty of hearing terms like “failure in duty” and “abandonment”.
• He makes clear that his task is not to punish or stigmatise N, but to assess Y’s welfare and the statutory criteria objectively.
• He offers N realistic “consolations”—emphasising his continued biological relationship, his courage in not walking away, and the possibility of future improvement in their relationship.

This human‑centred mode of delivery is not legally determinative, but it is important context: it reflects an emerging judicial practice in family law to explain decisions in terms accessible to the parties themselves, not only to lawyers and appellate courts.

3.4 Impact and Future Significance

Although grounded in well‑established principles from B and earlier case law, this judgment has several forward‑looking implications.

(a) Consolidation of the Post‑B Framework

The case consolidates the Supreme Court’s guidance in B as the default interpretative lens for s.54(2A) applications:

• High Court judges are expected to work systematically through each statutory criterion.
• They must focus on the real lived experience of the child—who has actually parented the child, what the risks of change are, and what the child wants.
• They must articulate why adoption is a proportionate means of meeting the child’s needs, in light of constitutional and Convention rights.

Practitioners should expect that High Court adoption decisions will routinely follow this kind of structured analysis.

(b) Near-Adult Children and the Weight of Their Wishes

The judgment is particularly significant for cases involving older children or those near majority:

• It underscores that a 17‑year‑old’s views about adoption are likely to carry very substantial weight.
• When such a young person, who has lived their entire life in foster care, emphatically wants adoption, the court will be slow to frustrate those wishes without compelling reasons.
• Conversely, in other cases where an older child opposes adoption, this logic suggests that their opposition could be very difficult to override.

This case thus strengthens the emerging trend that children’s agency and expressed wishes play a central role in adoption decisions, especially for teenagers.

(c) Critique of Late Applications and Systemic Practice

Jordan J’s strong language about “last‑minute” applications may influence:

• CFA and Adoption Authority practice: encouraging earlier identification of children in long‑term care who may require adoption, and earlier initiation of the necessary High Court proceedings.
• Judicial case management: courts may become more assertive in requiring timely preparations and in criticising administrative delay.
• Policy debate: the judgment may be cited in discussions about resource allocation and procedural reforms to avoid placing children and parents in compressed, high‑stakes timelines shortly before majority.

(d) Clarification of “Abandonment” and Non-Blameworthy Failure

By reiterating that “abandonment” and “failure in duty” are legal, not moral concepts, the judgment:

• Helps reduce the stigma sometimes associated with such findings, especially where birth parents have had genuine personal difficulties.
• Provides clearer guidance that courts will look to who has effectively been parenting the child, rather than moral fault.
• May influence how practitioners explain these concepts to parents to ensure informed participation in proceedings.

(e) ECHR Article 8 and Proportionate Severance of Ties

By explicitly aligning itself with Hogan J’s Article 8 analysis in B, the judgment:

• Reaffirms that non‑consensual adoption is permissible under the Convention where domestic law’s stringent conditions are met and the decision is carefully reasoned.
• Provides an example of Convention‑compliant reasoning that may be instructive to both Irish courts and potentially Strasbourg.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 “Paramount Consideration” – Does the Child’s Best Interests Always Win?

Section 19 says the child’s best interests are the “paramount consideration”. That does not mean:

• The court may ignore the rights of the parents; or
• Any outcome that is arguably good for the child automatically trumps everything else.

Instead, it means:

• The child’s best interests are the most important factor in the balance.
• Other rights and interests (parental rights, Convention rights, etc.) must be considered, but if there is a true conflict once the statutory thresholds are met, the child’s welfare prevails.

4.2 “Failure in Duty” and “Abandonment of Parental Rights”

These phrases sound harsh in everyday language, but in this legal context they mean:

• Failure in duty: Over a long period, the parents have not been providing the care, protection and guidance which the child requires, such that the child’s welfare has depended on others.
• Abandonment of parental rights: The parents have, in practice, ceased to exercise their legal rights and responsibilities vis‑à‑vis the child, so that others have effectively filled the parental role.

Crucially:

• This does not require proof that the parents intended to abandon the child in a moral sense.
• It is enough that, over time, the reality is that they are not functioning as parents and that someone else is.

4.3 Proportionality in the Adoption Context

“Proportionality” is a legal test asking whether a measure that interferes with rights is an appropriate, necessary and balanced way of achieving a legitimate aim. In adoption cases:

• The legitimate aim is protecting and promoting the child’s welfare.
• The interference is the extinguishing of the birth parents’ legal relationship with the child.

Adoption is proportionate where, for example:

• Less drastic measures (e.g. simple care orders, guardianship, or contact arrangements) are insufficient to secure the child’s long‑term welfare and stability.
• The child is deeply integrated into the prospective adopters’ family, and the legal status of adoption is needed to reflect and support this.

4.4 Non-Consensual Adoption and the Role of the State

Section 54(2A)(d) speaks of the State, as guardian of the common good, “supplying the place of parents”. This reflects:

• The constitutional idea that where parents cannot or do not provide proper care, the State may intervene to protect the child.
• That adoption is sometimes the way in which the State ensures that children have stable, legally secure family homes.

Non‑consensual adoption is only lawful where:

• The threshold tests (failure in duty, no reasonable prospect of restoration, etc.) are satisfied; and
• The interference with parental rights is strictly necessary and justified in the child’s interests.

4.5 Child’s Views and “Due Weight”

Under both s.19(3) and s.54(3)(b), the court must:

• Ascertain the child’s views, where the child is capable of forming them; and
• Give those views “due weight” having regard to the child’s age and maturity.

In practice:

• A very young child’s views may carry limited weight.
• An older child’s views—especially a teenager’s—may be determinative unless there are strong reasons to depart from them (e.g. risk of harm, clear misunderstanding of consequences).

In this case, at almost 18, Y’s clearly expressed wish to be adopted by A and H was entitled to very considerable weight.

4.6 Article 8 ECHR and Severance of Family Ties

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to respect for family life. Important points are:

• Severing legal ties between a child and birth parents is a serious interference with family life.
• It is permissible only where:
  • It is in accordance with law (here, the Adoption Act);
  • It pursues a legitimate aim (protecting the child’s welfare); and
  • It is “necessary in a democratic society”, meaning proportionate and based on relevant, sufficient reasons.

By following the structured domestic tests in s.54(2A) and giving detailed reasons, the High Court meets these Convention requirements.

5. Conclusion

This ex tempore judgment is a clear, careful and humane application of the post‑B adoption framework. Its key lessons are:

• Section 54(2A) requires a structured, criterion‑by‑criterion analysis, grounded in evidence and informed by constitutional and ECHR principles.
• The child’s best interests are the paramount consideration, but the court must still seriously engage with parental rights and procedural fairness.
• Long‑term foster care from infancy, where foster carers have in practice exercised all parental functions, will often satisfy the “failure in duty” and “abandonment of parental rights” tests, without attributing moral fault.
• For near‑adult children like Y, the court will attach particularly strong weight to their own wishes regarding adoption, and will be slow to deprive them of a desired legal family status, absent compelling contrary considerations.
• Late applications, especially those made on the verge of majority, are undesirable and potentially unfair, but they do not automatically prevent the making of an adoption order where the statutory tests are met and the child’s welfare plainly requires it.
• The judgment underscores that adoption is a status institution of lifelong significance, not merely an administrative tidying‑up of childhood care arrangements.

In the broader legal context, the case reinforces the trajectory of Irish child and family law towards:

• Greater recognition of children as rights‑holders with voices of their own;
• A functional understanding of parenthood, focused on who actually provides day‑to‑day care; and
• Rigorous but humane application of proportionality where adoption severs birth family ties.

For practitioners and agencies, the decision serves both as a practical template for s.54(2A) applications in long‑term foster care cases and as a warning to avoid unnecessary delay. For parents like N, it is a reminder that even where an adoption order is made against their wishes, the law recognises their continuing biological connection and leaves open the hope of future reconciliation with their child.