High Court’s Continuing Jurisdiction Over Child Arrangement Orders Despite Consent to District Court Variation

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the High Court of Ireland (Family Law) in R.N. v J.K. (child arrangements; jurisdiction; remittal; terms of settlement) [2025] IEHC 688 (Jackson J., 3 November 2025).

The judgment arises from child abduction proceedings under the Hague Convention and the Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act 1991, which were compromised on terms that the child would remain in Ireland and that future disputes about access would be litigated in the District Court. When disputes later arose, the left-behind parent (the applicant father) sought to re-enter the High Court proceedings to enforce and vary the earlier child arrangement orders. The respondent mother objected, arguing that the High Court had, in effect, divested itself of jurisdiction in favour of the District Court.

The decision is significant because it clarifies:

that the High Court’s constitutional “full original jurisdiction” in family law matters cannot be ousted by consent or procedural arrangements vesting future litigation in lower courts;
that a consent order stipulating that variation applications “shall be dealt with” in the District Court does not, without proper remittal, strip the High Court of jurisdiction over its own orders;
how courts should distinguish between true remittal of proceedings and an agreement that any future applications will be commenced elsewhere; and
that, in a child welfare context, questions of jurisdiction and forum choice must be approached through the lens of the child’s best interests and the need for expedition.

2. Background and Procedural History

2.1 The Hague proceedings and compromise

In 2022, the applicant father commenced proceedings in the High Court seeking the return of his child, C.N., to the State of the child’s asserted habitual residence, a foreign jurisdiction (redacted in the judgment), under:

the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction; and
the Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act 1991.

He alleged that the respondent mother had wrongfully removed or retained the child in Ireland. The proceedings were compromised and the settlement was ruled by Gearty J. on 30 March 2023. Crucially:

the parties agreed that the child would remain living in Ireland with the respondent mother;
the Special Summons was amended to include reliefs under s.11 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 (“the 1964 Act”) so that the High Court could make child arrangement orders (custody, access, welfare directions);
the terms declared the child habitually resident in Ireland; and
the terms expressly provided that the Hague/1991 Act reliefs relating to abduction were to be struck out.

2.2 The jurisdiction clause in the Terms of Settlement

The Terms of Settlement, at clause 14, contained a forum clause:

“Further, additional and or other access can be agreed between the Parties in particular as C.N. gets older. In default of agreement on further and future access, matters shall be litigated in relation to access matters in the district court local to whether the Respondent is residing with the Child in Ireland.”

Thus, the settlement anticipated that future access disputes, if not resolved by agreement, would be taken to the local District Court.

2.3 The original and amended High Court order

When Gearty J. ruled the settlement on 30 March 2023, the perfected High Court order did more than simply mirror clause 14. It originally stated:

“IT IS ORDERED that the enforcement of the present terms of settlement and any future applications to vary arrangements in relation to the child named herein shall be dealt with by the relevant District Court having jurisdiction local to where the child resides.”

This formulation:

went beyond clause 14 (which focused on access and did not expressly mention “enforcement”); and
purported to send both enforcement and future variation matters to the District Court.

When the case later came before Jackson J., it was pointed out that this did not accurately reflect the Terms of Settlement. An application was then made to “speak to the minute”, and on 30 July 2025, Gearty J. ordered an amendment under Order 28 rule 11 RSC. The perfected amended order (15 August 2025) deleted the original clause and substituted:

“IT IS ORDERED that any future applications to vary arrangements in relation to the child named herein shall be dealt with by the relevant District Court having jurisdiction local to where the child resides.”

Notably:

Enforcement is no longer mentioned in the amended order.
The operative consent-based direction relates only to future variation applications.

2.4 The 2025 motion and re-entry

On 25 March 2025, the applicant issued a Notice of Motion seeking to re-enter the proceedings, alleging breaches of the 2023 orders by the respondent. The motion sought:

Enforcement orders under s.18A of the 1964 Act;
orders under s.31(1) of the 1964 Act for a welfare report;
a variation of the primary care and control provisions (essentially seeking to transfer primary care to the applicant); and
further s.11 orders concerning custody, access and welfare.

On 8 April 2025, O’Donnell J. ordered that the matter be re-entered and transferred from the Hague/Luxembourg list to the Family Law list. Counsel on both sides were heard. Jackson J. notes that any core challenge to jurisdiction could and arguably should have been made at that re-entry stage; nonetheless, the jurisdiction objection was eventually taken before her and had to be determined.

The respondent’s core position was that, in light of the 2023 order (as later amended), any application for enforcement or variation should now be brought exclusively before the local District Court.

3. Core Legal Issues

The judgment centres on three interrelated questions:

Jurisdictional effect of the consent order: Does the clause and order sending “future applications to vary arrangements” to the District Court deprive the High Court of jurisdiction to hear the 2025 motion?
Remittal vs. new proceedings: Did the 2023 order in substance remit the existing High Court proceedings to the District Court, or did it merely contemplate that any future variation would be commenced there as a new case?
Discretion to exercise jurisdiction: Even if the High Court retains jurisdiction, should it decline to exercise that jurisdiction in favour of the District Court?

Underlying these issues are broader constitutional and procedural questions:

the scope of the High Court’s “full original jurisdiction” under Article 34.3.1;
the interaction between concurrent jurisdiction in family matters and forum clauses; and
the extent, if any, to which a lower court can vary or effectively supersede orders made by a higher court in its original jurisdiction.

4. Summary of the Judgment

Jackson J. held that:

The High Court retains jurisdiction to hear the applicant’s motion despite the 2023 consent order directing future variations to the District Court.
The 2023 order did not effect a legal remittal of the existing High Court proceedings to the District Court. No statutory or rules-based steps for remittal were taken.
The current motion is, in substance, not purely an enforcement application; it includes a significant variation element (seeking to transfer primary care and control). Thus it falls within the sphere covered by the consent clause and order, but that does not oust High Court jurisdiction.
Even though the District Court has statutory jurisdiction and the parties envisaged that future variations would be dealt with there, the High Court has a constitutional full original jurisdiction and retains a concurrent power to deal with such matters unless and until the proceedings are validly remitted or the Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise its jurisdiction.
Having regard to:
- the origin of the matter in contested Hague abduction proceedings;
- the child’s best interests (Article 42A);
- the advanced stage of the High Court motion (affidavits complete, ready for hearing);
- the delay already occasioned by the jurisdictional dispute; and
- the general undesirability of splitting enforcement and variation across two fora,
the High Court should exercise, and not decline, its jurisdiction in this case.
The Court expressly declined to decide, as unnecessary and insufficiently argued, the broader and important issue of whether a lower court (District Court) can vary orders of a higher court (High Court) in family law contexts where there is concurrent jurisdiction.
The question of costs is reserved until the conclusion of the substantive hearing, with Jackson J. noting that using a higher court than necessary may be reflected in costs.

The Court therefore fixed the matter for substantive hearing in the High Court, holding that jurisdiction existed and should be exercised.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Role

5.1 Tormey v Ireland and PM v VH – the High Court’s “full original jurisdiction”

The applicant’s central argument rested on the High Court’s constitutional position under Article 34.3.1. He relied on:

Tormey v Ireland [1985] 1 IR 289; and
PM v VH [2018] IECA 4 (Whelan J.).

In Tormey, Henchy J. held that:

the High Court’s “full” original jurisdiction in Article 34.3.1 means that, subject only to express constitutional limitations, all justiciable matters and questions fall within its original jurisdiction;
the Oireachtas may create exclusive jurisdiction in lower courts (under Article 34.3.4 and Article 36), but this does not exclude those matters from the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction; rather, it means the High Court will not itself try them in the ordinary way, but its jurisdiction remains to ensure legality (through judicial review, habeas corpus, injunctions, declaratory relief etc.); and
save where the Constitution itself requires otherwise, no justiciable matter can be removed from the High Court’s original jurisdiction.

In PM v VH, Whelan J. applied these principles to family law and international child welfare issues, stressing:

the High Court’s role where foreign orders concerning a child are to be recognised and enforced;
that the High Court’s involvement may be justified even where statutory schemes locate substantial family jurisdiction in the District and Circuit Courts; and
that, in cases involving cross-border child welfare and comity, the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction may be autonomously engaged.

Jackson J. draws on this line of authority to affirm that:

the High Court always retains constitutional original jurisdiction in child welfare matters, including guardianship, custody and access;
statutory allocation of jurisdiction to the District and Circuit Courts does not exclude the High Court’s jurisdiction; and
a consent-based or procedural direction that future applications be taken in the District Court cannot constitutionally divest the High Court of its inherent power to ensure justice in the underlying matter.

5.2 Marques v Brophy and concurrent jurisdiction – lower court varying higher court orders?

The judgment cites Marques v Brophy [2010] IEHC 339 (Irvine J.) concerning maintenance orders under the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976. There, the High Court held:

The District Court and Circuit Court both have originating jurisdiction to make maintenance orders.
The District Court cannot vary or revoke a maintenance order made by the Circuit Court in the exercise of its own original jurisdiction (but can vary orders made by the Circuit Court on appeal).
Even where the District Court has made a maintenance order, the Circuit Court retains concurrent original jurisdiction to make a fresh maintenance order, which, in effect, supersedes the District Court’s order from the date it is made.

This authority is invoked to highlight:

the complexity of how concurrent jurisdiction interacts with the power to vary or supersede orders of another court; and
that lower courts’ jurisdiction to adjust higher-court orders is not straightforward and is often limited or indirect (e.g. via exercise of their own original jurisdiction to make a new order rather than formally “varying” a higher court’s order).

Jackson J. signals that similar questions arise in the context of guardianship and child arrangements where there is concurrent jurisdiction between the High Court and lower family courts, but she deliberately refrains from resolving them in this case.

5.3 L(K) v Judge Ní Chonduin & Anor and C v C – multiple courts and overlapping relief

The Court also references L(K) v Judge Ní Chonduin & Anor [2015] IEHC 617 (Baker J.), which considered:

overlapping maintenance proceedings in the District and Circuit Courts; and
the principle that two applications for “identical relief” ought not to proceed simultaneously in different courts at first instance.

Baker J. held that:

both District and Circuit Courts have statutory jurisdiction to make maintenance orders;
a party who initiates proceedings for a given type of relief in one court should not pursue identical relief in another court, absent appropriate undertakings or the legislative mechanisms allowing a higher court to adopt or decline to adopt lower court orders (e.g. under s.44 of the Family Law Act 1995 when granting ancillary relief on judicial separation); and
the legislative framework anticipates scenarios where orders may be adopted or refused by another court, but this is subject to specific statutory powers.

Barrett J.’s decision in C v C [2020] IEHC 691 is also mentioned as relevant in this area, further illustrating the complexities of managing overlapping or sequential family law applications in different courts.

Together, these authorities underpin Jackson J.’s caution: the question of a lower court’s competence to vary a higher court’s family law order is an important systemic issue, and should not be decided in a case where it is unnecessary to the outcome and has not been fully argued.

5.4 Other authorities

GMcG v DW (No. 2) [2000] 4 IR 1 – cited by the respondent for the proposition that jurisdictional orders may have a final, exhaustive character. Jackson J. acknowledges the principle of finality but distinguishes it in the context of variable child arrangements and the nature of the order at issue here.
JEN v MEN [2007] 3 IR 517 – confirms that variation of orders under the 1964 Act must be centred on the welfare of the child. This supports Jackson J.’s emphasis that even jurisdictional and procedural questions in child cases must be viewed through the welfare lens.
R v R [1984] IR 296 (Gannon J.) – referenced for the proposition that the High Court retains jurisdiction to hear a matter unless and until it is remitted to a lower court, or the High Court decides not to exercise its jurisdiction.

6. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

6.1 No effective remittal of the High Court proceedings

A key conceptual distinction in the judgment is between:

remittal of existing proceedings to a lower court; and
a direction that any future applications should be begun in the lower court.

Jackson J. sets out in detail the legislative and procedural framework for remittal:

Courts of Justice Act 1924, s.25 – empowers the High Court to remit an action that could have been commenced in the Circuit (or, in appropriate cases, the District) Court.
Courts of Justice Act 1936, s.11 – refines s.25, including:
- time limits (after appearance and before service of notice of trial);
- grounds for remittal, including that it was not reasonable to have commenced in the High Court; and
- special rules for liquidated claims.
Courts of Justice Act 1953, s.13 – allows the Master of the High Court to exercise the remittal power on consent.
RSC, Order 70A, rule 15 – specific remittal rule for family law proceedings, requiring the High Court to consider whether transfer is “in the interests of justice”.
District Court Rules, Order 39, rule 15 – sets out what must happen procedurally when a case is remitted or transferred to the District Court: lodging a copy of the remittal order and relevant documents within 14 days, entry and listing of the action, etc.

Applying these rules, the Court concludes:

No formal application for remittal was made.
No order of remittal in the statutory sense was drawn up.
No party complied with the District Court Rules by lodging documents and orders in the District Court within the prescribed time.
The 2023 proceedings were in fact compromised and concluded in the High Court; there were no “ongoing” proceedings capable of being remitted in the ordinary sense.

Accordingly, the 2023 order was not a true remittal of the original High Court proceedings. At most, it reflected a consent-based intention that future variation applications be commenced in the District Court. The original High Court proceedings remained capable of re-entry (as indeed occurred in 2025).

6.2 Characterisation of the current motion – enforcement vs variation

The applicant argued that the 2025 motion was primarily about enforcement of existing High Court orders, and that even the amended 2023 order did not purport to allocate enforcement jurisdiction to the District Court.

Jackson J. rejects the idea that the motion is purely or even predominantly enforcement in nature. The reliefs sought include:

orders under s.18A GIA 1964 (enforcement); and
a substantive application “varying Paragraph 4” of the 2023 orders to transfer primary care and control of the child to the applicant, plus consequential variations.

This is not simply a matter of compelling compliance with existing terms; it seeks a major alteration of the child’s living arrangements and primary care. The judge therefore treats the motion as both enforcement and variation. The applicant’s attempt to rely on an “enforcement only” characterisation, in order to escape the reach of the “future variation” clause, is seen as artificial.

However, this does not determine the jurisdiction issue, because:

the District Court’s jurisdiction to vary does not exclude the High Court’s jurisdiction to vary; and
the consent clause and order cannot override the High Court’s constitutional authority.

6.3 The High Court retains jurisdiction despite the consent clause

On jurisdiction, the Court’s reasoning can be summarised as follows:

The High Court has full original jurisdiction in all matters, including guardianship, custody and access, by virtue of Article 34.3.1, subject only to express constitutional limitations.
Statutory vesting of jurisdiction in the District and Circuit Courts in relation to the 1964 Act does not deprive the High Court of jurisdiction; it merely creates parallel forums.
The parties, by consent, cannot oust the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction. They may indicate a preferred forum or agree that any future applications will be made in a certain court, but the High Court’s power to act remains.
The High Court has in fact already exercised its 1964 Act jurisdiction in this matter by making the original child arrangement orders. The proceedings were properly commenced in the High Court due to the Hague Convention context, and the parties amended the summons to seek GIA 1964 reliefs there.
The 2025 proceedings were re-entered by order of the High Court (O’Donnell J.). No remittal has taken place. Thus, the proceedings remain “alive” in the High Court.
Consequently, the High Court does have jurisdiction to hear and determine the applicant’s enforcement and variation motion.

6.4 Should the High Court exercise that jurisdiction?

Having established jurisdiction, the Court turns to the question whether it should exercise it or instead decline and remit/strike out.

Key considerations include:

Constitutional imperatives: Article 42A(4) requires the child’s best interests to be the paramount consideration in custody and access matters. That welfare lens must colour even procedural and jurisdictional decisions where they impact the child’s situation.
Origins in child abduction litigation: The case arose from Hague proceedings concerning wrongful removal/retention and habitual residence. The father had abandoned his return claim in reliance on agreed child arrangements ruled by the High Court. A claim that those arrangements have been breached justifies continued High Court oversight, at least for this motion.
Stage of the current motion: Affidavits were complete and the matter was ready for hearing. Substantial time had already been lost to the jurisdictional dispute and to clarifying the 2023 order. Starting afresh in the District Court would add further delay.
Expedition in children’s cases: Disputes over a young child’s living arrangements must be dealt with promptly; avoidable procedural delay is inconsistent with the child’s welfare.
Forum efficiency: It would be “entirely inefficient” to litigate enforcement in one forum and variation in another. Given that both elements are intertwined in the present motion, splitting them is undesirable.
Costs and proportionality: While hearing cases in the lower courts is normally more economical, any overuse of higher courts can be reflected in costs orders at the end of the case (by reference to s.169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015). Thus, jurisdictional misuse can be addressed ex post by costs, without undermining the High Court’s constitutional role.

In light of these factors, Jackson J. concludes that this is an appropriate case in which to exercise the High Court’s inherent and full original jurisdiction. She emphasises that this does not mean the case should remain indefinitely in the High Court after determination of the present motion; she is open to hearing from the parties about what forum is appropriate going forward.

6.5 The unresolved issue: can a lower court vary a higher court’s family orders?

The judgment expressly declines to decide the broader and highly significant issue:

“…the issue of the jurisdiction of lower courts to vary the Orders of higher courts in the context of concurrent jurisdiction is a very important issue… it would be inappropriate for me to determine the issue at this time and particularly so in circumstances in which such determination is not necessary in the context of this application.”

This leaves open:

Whether, and on what basis, the District Court could vary or effectively supersede a High Court order concerning custody/access made in its original jurisdiction under the 1964 Act;
Whether the District Court could only exercise its own original jurisdiction to make new child arrangement orders, which might de facto replace earlier High Court orders, without formally “varying” them; and
What systemic limits are required to ensure legal certainty and to prevent inconsistent or overlapping determinations across courts.

Jackson J. flags this as a matter of considerable importance in family law, particularly given the prevalence of concurrent jurisdiction and the forthcoming reforms under the Family Courts Act 2024, but reserves it for a case where it is squarely raised and fully argued.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 Effect on forum clauses in family settlements

The decision sends a clear message about the legal status of “forum” or jurisdiction clauses embedded in family law Terms of Settlement:

Such clauses are relevant – the courts will take them into account when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction or remit a matter.
They are not determinative and cannot, by consent, strip the High Court of its constitutional jurisdiction.
In children’s cases, forum clauses must yield where enforcing them would undermine the child’s best interests or cause undue delay or procedural complexity.

Practitioners drafting family settlements, particularly in cases with an international or Hague dimension, should therefore:

avoid language that suggests the High Court is divested of jurisdiction;
frame forum provisions in terms of intended or preferred forum, subject to the court’s jurisdiction and the child’s best interests; and
be clear whether they are contemplating:
- formal remittal of an existing case (and if so, comply with statutory procedures); or
- the commencement of new proceedings in a lower court in the future.

7.2 Clarification of remittal practice in family law

The judgment is a valuable reminder of the technical requirements of remittal:

Remittal is not achieved by a simple statement in a court order that future matters “shall be dealt with” in another court.
True remittal requires compliance with:
- the Courts of Justice Acts (1924, 1936, 1953);
- Order 70A rule 15 RSC (for family cases); and
- Order 39 rule 15 DCR, including timely lodging of the remittal order and documents in the District Court.

In practice, this will be particularly important once the Family Courts Act 2024 commences. Section 66 of that Act (cited in the judgment’s footnote) expressly envisages systematic transfer of proceedings from the Family High Court to the Family Circuit or District Court. Jackson J.’s analysis anticipates and dovetails with that legislative scheme by emphasising that:

remittal must be formal and structured, not implicit; and
the receiving court must properly “receive” and list the case, rather than the matter simply being notionally “sent down”.

7.3 Managing concurrent jurisdiction and higher-court proceedings

The decision reaffirms that:

The High Court’s original jurisdiction co-exists with that of the District and Circuit Courts in family matters.
Resorting to higher courts where lower courts are adequate may be reflected in costs sanctions, sensitising practitioners to forum choice.
However, where a case has already been properly in the High Court (e.g., due to Hague abduction issues) and has progressed substantially, the High Court may quite properly retain jurisdiction for consequential or follow-on applications – particularly where immediate child welfare issues are at stake.

This balanced approach discourages unnecessary escalation to the High Court while preserving its crucial role in complex or cross-border child welfare disputes.

7.4 International child abduction compromises

The case is especially instructive for situations where:

Hague Convention proceedings are compromised;
the child remains in the requested State (often Ireland); and
child arrangement orders are made in the High Court as part of the compromise.

In such scenarios:

the High Court remains the originating forum that supervised the compromise of serious international allegations (wrongful removal/retention, habitual residence);
if breaches are alleged, there is a strong argument that the High Court should be available to adjudicate on those claims, particularly where the left-behind parent relinquished return proceedings in reliance on those terms; and
forum clauses must be read in light of this background, rather than as absolute ouster clauses.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

8.1 “Full original jurisdiction” of the High Court

Under Article 34.3.1 of the Constitution, the High Court has “full original jurisdiction in and power to determine all matters and questions” legally justiciable, except where the Constitution itself provides otherwise.

In practical terms:

The High Court can, in principle, deal with any type of legal dispute, including all family law matters.
Even when statutes give certain kinds of cases to the District or Circuit Courts, the High Court’s jurisdiction remains constitutionally present. It may choose not to try them in the ordinary way, but can still intervene (e.g., judicial review) to ensure legality and fairness.
Private agreements or court orders cannot remove this constitutional jurisdiction.

8.2 Remittal of proceedings

“Remittal” is the process by which a higher court formally sends an existing case down to a lower court to be continued and decided there.

Key features:

It is done under specific statutory powers (e.g. s.25 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924) and court rules.
There are usually time limits and procedural steps – for example, lodging the remittal order and documents in the lower court.
Once properly remitted, the lower court then deals with the case “as if it had originally been commenced therein”.

By contrast, an agreement that “any future applications” will be brought to a lower court does not itself amount to remittal of the existing case.

8.3 Enforcement vs variation of child arrangement orders

Enforcement means compelling compliance with an existing court order (for example, by requiring a parent to adhere to access times, or by invoking statutory enforcement powers such as s.18A GIA 1964). It does not change the underlying order.
Variation means changing the terms of the order (e.g., altering where the child lives or expanding/reducing access). In children’s cases, orders are inherently variable because children’s needs and circumstances evolve.

In R.N. v J.K., the applicant’s 2025 motion combined both elements: it alleged non-compliance (enforcement), but also sought major changes to primary care arrangements (variation).

8.4 Habitual residence and Hague Convention context

In international child abduction law, a child’s “habitual residence” is the factual centre of their life – the place where they are ordinarily integrated in a social and family environment. The Hague Convention requires the prompt return of children wrongfully removed or retained away from their habitual residence, subject to limited exceptions.

In this case:

The father originally alleged wrongful removal/retention from the foreign State of habitual residence.
Those claims were never adjudicated because the case settled.
The father’s agreement to allow the child to remain in Ireland was tied to the child arrangement terms now said to have been breached.

This international background was an important factor in the High Court’s willingness to retain and exercise jurisdiction over the follow-on dispute.

9. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

R.N. v J.K. is an important and nuanced decision that clarifies jurisdictional and procedural issues at the intersection of:

international child abduction litigation;
child arrangements under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964; and
concurrent jurisdiction across the High Court and lower family courts.

The principal takeaways are:

The High Court’s constitutional full original jurisdiction in family matters cannot be ousted by consent or by an order directing that future applications be taken in the District Court.
A consent-based order that “future applications to vary arrangements” shall be dealt with by the District Court, without more, does not constitute a legal remittal of existing High Court proceedings; formal remittal requires compliance with statutory and rules-based procedures.
In children’s cases, even ostensibly procedural or jurisdictional issues must be approached through the prism of the child’s best interests and the need for expedition. Avoidable delay and fragmentation of proceedings across fora are to be avoided.
The High Court may properly exercise its jurisdiction to deal with follow-on disputes arising from compromises of Hague abduction cases, particularly where the left-behind parent alleges breach of the very terms on which he or she abandoned the return claim.
The complex and systemically important question of whether, and to what extent, lower courts can vary higher-court family orders in contexts of concurrent jurisdiction remains unresolved and is left for a more suitable case.
For practitioners, the judgment underscores:
- the need for precision when drafting forum clauses and orders purporting to send matters to lower courts; and
- the importance of using formal remittal procedures where it is genuinely intended that existing proceedings move to another court.

In sum, Jackson J.’s decision reaffirms the centrality of the High Court’s constitutional role, emphasises a pragmatic yet principled approach to forum and remittal in family law, and grounds jurisdictional analysis firmly in the child’s welfare and the practical realities of litigation following international child abduction disputes.

High Court’s Continuing Jurisdiction Over Child Arrangement Orders Despite Consent to District Court Variation – Commentary on R.N. v J.K. [2025] IEHC 688