Granting Leave to Amend as a Procedural Safeguard before Strike‑Out; Collateral Attacks Will Be Dismissed; Tailored Isaac Wunder Orders to Protect Court Administration — Nowak v Courts Service of Ireland [2025] IEHC 484

Introduction

In Nowak v The Courts Service of Ireland [2025] IEHC 484, the Irish High Court (Nolan J.) addressed two pivotal procedural applications arising out of a long-running dispute in which Mr. Peter Nowak, a former PwC employee and litigant in person, sought to litigate grievances against the Courts Service. The Court faced:

A plaintiff’s motion to amend his Statement of Claim so as to import broad declaratory and damages claims that had featured in earlier judicial review proceedings; and
A defence motion to strike out the proceedings as frivolous and vexatious under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and Order 19, rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, coupled with an application for an Isaac Wunder order restricting further litigation without leave.

The case is rooted in Mr. Nowak’s 2009 dismissal from PwC, his success before the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) and, later, the Circuit Court, and his attempted High Court appeal. He alleged that the Central Office (part of the Courts Service) mishandled case filings and later obstructed his statutory appeals on data protection matters under section 26 of the Data Protection Acts 1988–2003. Prior judicial review proceedings challenging the Central Office’s handling had been dismissed (O’Donnell J., March 2024) for extreme delay and lack of merit. The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal on procedural grounds (failure to seek a time extension), and the Supreme Court (2025 IESCDET 56) confirmed that it was unnecessary for the Court of Appeal to engage with substantive grounds in those circumstances.

Against that backdrop, the High Court in the present plenary action delivered a structured ruling that clarifies when leave to amend should be granted as a procedural safeguard, how abuse of process and collateral attacks are policed through strike‑out jurisdiction, and when a tailored Isaac Wunder order will be fashioned to protect the administration of justice from vexatious litigation.

Summary of the Judgment

Leave to Amend: The Court permitted the plaintiff to amend his Statement of Claim, adopting a pragmatic, generous approach so that the strike‑out application could be decided on the fullest formulation of the case and to avoid a potential ground of appeal premised on denial of amendment.
Strike‑Out Granted: Having considered the amended pleading, the Court struck out the entirety of the action as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. It found the claims devoid of evidence, bound to fail, and, in material part, an impermissible collateral attack on prior decisions of the High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court.
Three Issues Rejected on the Merits:
- Alleged “intermeddling” by the Central Office with an earlier appeal file: no factual basis; contemporaneous records disproved the claim.
- Statutory appeals against data protection orders: the plaintiff had been assisted with proper templates and a path to regularise filings; his refusal to comply and failure to seek an extension of time was fatal.
- Attempt to relitigate judicial review grounds via plenary proceedings: a collateral attack on concluded litigation, which is impermissible.
Isaac Wunder Order: The Court imposed a tailored order restraining Mr. Nowak from issuing further proceedings against the Courts Service without the prior leave of the President of the High Court (or a judge nominated by the President), balancing the right of access to courts against the need to prevent abuse.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Dormer v Allied Irish Bank plc [2017] IECA 199 (Ryan J.) and Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100
The Court relied on the generous approach to amendments articulated in Dormer. Notably, Ryan J. connected the Henderson rule—ordinarily a restraint on successive litigation—to a rationale for permitting amendments so that all issues can be brought forward, avoiding defeat on technical pleading grounds. Nolan J. used this logic to allow the plaintiff to advance the amendments first, then adjudicate the strike‑out motion on the comprehensive, amended pleading. This step neutralised any later claim that the plaintiff had been procedurally hamstrung.
Scotchstone Capital Fund Ltd v Ireland [2022] IECA 23; Lopes v Minister for Justice and Equality [2014] 2 IR 301
These authorities confirm that the strike‑out jurisdiction, whether inherent or under O.19 r.28, is to be exercised sparingly, but the threshold the plaintiff must surmount is only to have a “statable case,” not a prima facie case. The Court found even that low threshold unmet; the claims were unstateable.
Duffy v Permanent TSB [2021] IEHC 511 (Twomey J.)
Duffy emphasises that wide‑ranging, serious allegations that are entirely unsupported by evidence can properly be struck out as frivolous and vexatious. Nolan J. drew a clear parallel, describing Mr. Nowak’s repeated allegations of fraud and bad faith against the Courts Service as “completely unsubstantiated.”
Dublin Bus v Data Protection Commissioner [2012] IEHC 339
While invoked by the plaintiff, reliance on Dublin Bus was rejected as inapplicable; O’Donnell J. had already addressed this authority in the 2024 judicial review and found it did not assist Mr. Nowak. The present Court endorsed that conclusion.
Kearney v Bank of Scotland [2020] IECA 224 (Whelan J.); also see Osborne v Gorey Business Park (Ramstown) Ltd [2024] IEHC 356
Kearney sets out the factors governing Isaac Wunder orders. The order must go no further than necessary to prevent abuse; the court weighs the litigant’s constitutional access to courts against the public interest in finality and the avoidance of vexatious proceedings; and a compelling case history is required. Nolan J. considered Mr. Nowak’s extensive litigation history—including 19 sets of proceedings—and crafted a targeted restraint concerning the Courts Service.
Supreme Court determination: Nowak v Courts Service of Ireland [2025] IESCDET 56
The Supreme Court confirmed that the Court of Appeal was correct to dispose of the judicial review appeal on procedural grounds (failure to seek extension of time under O.84 r.21) without addressing substantive merits, and that using the court’s inherent jurisdiction in that way did not compromise fair trial rights. The present judgment reflects and applies that procedural strictness and finality.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds in three substantive issues, preceded by the decision to allow an amendment.

Leave to Amend as a Procedural Safeguard
Although the defence urged that amendment be refused, Nolan J. allowed the plaintiff’s amendment, expressly to avoid a further ground of appeal and to ensure that the strike‑out application would be assessed on the plaintiff’s fullest pleaded case. This decisional sequence is notable. It shows the Court’s willingness to be procedurally generous while remaining substantively firm: permitting the amendment did not signal any view that the amended case was viable; rather, it cleared away any claim of procedural unfairness before a robust strike‑out assessment.
Issue 1 — Alleged Central Office “intermeddling” with the PwC statutory appeal file
The plaintiff contended the Central Office removed his notice of appeal and improperly processed PwC’s motion to strike out. The Registrar’s affidavit exhibited the plaintiff’s stamped notice of appeal dated 26 October 2016 and a system printout proving its lodgement. The Court found as fact that no “intermeddling” occurred and emphasised the Central Office’s independence in listing and processing filings. Further, the plaintiff’s conscious choice to boycott the 2017 hearing undermined his position. Any challenge to Noonan J.’s 2017 strike‑out order was beyond the present court’s remit. The claim was found to disclose no reasonable cause of action, to be bound to fail, and to be an abuse of process.
Issue 2 — Data protection statutory appeals refused for non‑compliant form and absence of time extension
On section 26 Data Protection Act appeals, the Central Office had explained the deficiencies, provided the correct template, and signposted the need for an extension of time. The plaintiff refused to regularise. O’Donnell J. had already held (2024) that the appeals were out of time by a large margin and that the substantive complaints lacked merit even if time were extended; the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court did not disturb that procedural resolution. Nolan J. agreed that, on both the facts and the law, there was no viable cause of action against the Courts Service. The plaintiff’s attempt to revisit these issues by plenary action was treated as a direct re‑run of his judicial review, and therefore an abuse.
Issue 3 — Collateral attack via plenary proceedings on matters decided in prior JR and appeals
The amended pleading sought to re‑litigate the very claims dismissed in judicial review and on appeal, including declarations about the applicability of Order 61 RSC to section 26 appeals and sweeping declarations against the Courts Service. The Court characterised this as an impermissible collateral attack on concluded litigation and struck it out. Independently, the Court held the allegations were unparticularised and unsupported by evidence, and thus “frivolous and vexatious.” The Court also censured the plaintiff’s attempt to procure declarations affecting third parties (such as PwC) who were not before the court, describing such relief as legally impossible in this action.

Finally, having found the proceedings abusive, the Court granted a tailored Isaac Wunder order to restrain future proceedings by Mr. Nowak against the Courts Service without prior leave. The order was calibrated in accordance with Kearney, focused only on what was necessary to prevent further abuse and expressly preserving access for any legitimate claim via an application to the President of the High Court (or nominee).

Impact and Significance

Procedural generosity paired with decisional finality
The judgment affirms a practical sequence: courts may allow amendments even when a strike‑out is likely, to eliminate claims of procedural unfairness and to ensure the strike‑out is determined on the most complete formulation of the case. Expect more instances where courts “amend first, strike‑out second,” especially in abusive litigation.
Clear boundary against collateral attacks
Litigants cannot use plenary proceedings to relitigate issues already disposed of by judicial review (or appeals), whether on procedural or substantive grounds. This strengthens finality, reduces duplicative litigation, and signals that dissatisfaction with appellate outcomes cannot be repackaged as new plenary claims against court administrators.
Protection of the Courts Service and court administration
The Court’s explicit recognition of the Central Office’s independence and the evidential rejection of “intermeddling” allegations offer reassurance to court staff assisting the public (especially litigants in person). Tailored Isaac Wunder orders will be deployed to shield court administration from repeated unmeritorious proceedings while preserving access to the courts for legitimate claims.
Litigants in person: compliance matters
The case underscores that even when courts and staff offer templates, guidance, and pathways (e.g., extensions of time), refusal to engage constructively will be fatal. Mailing incorrect forms from abroad without providing a local agent and refusing proffered regularisation opportunities is a litigation risk borne by the litigant.
Data protection appeals and procedural rules
Although not laying down a new doctrinal rule on Order 61 RSC, the judgment (consistent with O’Donnell J.’s prior decision) indicates that such statutory appeals are subject to the Rules’ procedural architecture, including formatting and timeliness requirements, and that objections on purely formalist grounds will not displace those requirements.
Declaratory relief against non‑parties
The Court’s firm rejection of declarations aimed at PwC within litigation solely against the Courts Service restates basic procedural fairness and party status principles: courts will not make orders affecting absent parties from separate litigation streams.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Inherent jurisdiction and O.19, r.28 RSC
Courts can strike out proceedings that disclose no reasonable cause of action or are frivolous, vexatious, or abusive. This power exists both under the Rules and at common law. It is used sparingly but decisively.
“Statable case” threshold
To resist strike‑out, a plaintiff need only show a case that is arguable (a “statable” case). Here, even that minimal threshold was not met.
Collateral attack
Suing again to challenge what has already been decided—especially via a different form of action (e.g., using plenary proceedings to challenge a concluded judicial review)—is prohibited as an abuse of process.
Isaac Wunder order
A court order restraining a person from initiating further proceedings without the court’s permission, used to prevent vexatious or abusive litigation. Orders are tailored to go no further than necessary and typically require leave from the President of the High Court or a nominated judge.
Order 84, rule 21(3) RSC (extensions of time in judicial review/appeal contexts)
If a litigant misses a deadline, an extension must be sought by proper motion and affidavit explaining the delay. Courts will only grant it for good and sufficient reasons, usually where circumstances were outside the litigant’s control.
Order 61 RSC (appeals from the Circuit Court)
Governs the procedure for appeals from the Circuit Court to the High Court. Compliance with form and time limits is mandatory. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that O.61 did not apply to his section 26 data protection appeals.
Section 26 Data Protection Acts 1988–2003
Provided for appeals on a point of law from Circuit Court decisions concerning data protection matters. Such appeals must comply with procedural rules, including form and time limits.
Henderson v Henderson principle
Parties should bring forward their entire case when they have the opportunity; they cannot serially litigate issues in piecemeal fashion. Paradoxically, this principle sometimes supports permitting amendments so that a party can present their full case in one proceeding.
Central Office role
An administrative office of the High Court that processes filings and assists court users. It is not a judicial decision-maker. Its staff can guide litigants on forms and process, but cannot decide the merits of cases.

Conclusion

Nowak v Courts Service of Ireland crystallises three important procedural messages. First, courts may grant leave to amend as a fairness safeguard even when a strike‑out is inevitable, thereby ensuring that subsequent dismissal cannot be criticised as having shut out arguable claims on technical grounds. Second, attempts to relitigate issues already disposed of, especially by transforming judicial review complaints into plenary proceedings, will be treated as impermissible collateral attacks and struck out as an abuse of process. Third, where a litigant persists in unsubstantiated allegations and repetitive litigation, a tailored Isaac Wunder order—focused on the relevant defendant and the recurring subject matter—will be imposed to protect court administration and the integrity of the justice system, while preserving access for any future legitimate claim by leave.

The judgment also underscores the practical stakes for litigants in person: procedural compliance matters. Using the correct forms, engaging with the Central Office’s assistance, and making timely applications for extensions are not optional. Conversely, the Courts Service is entitled to rely on the protection of the Rules and the courts’ supervisory powers when faced with abusive litigation.

Taken together with the Supreme Court’s determination in IESCDET 56, this decision promotes procedural rigor, finality, and the responsible use of scarce court resources, while modeling a fair but firm judicial response to serial, meritless claims.