Genuine belief that proceedings were served, absent unusual external factors, is “mere inadvertence” and does not satisfy the Order 8 r.1(4) “special circumstances” gateway

Commentary on Hadnett v Joyce [2025] IEHC 599 (High Court of Ireland, Ferriter J, 5 November 2025)

Introduction

This judgment addresses when an Irish court may renew an unserved personal injuries summons under Order 8 rule 1(4) of the Rules of the Superior Courts (RSC), which allows renewal only where “special circumstances” are shown. The plaintiff, Ms Jacinta Hadnett, alleges negligence in the defendant consultant gynaecologist’s failure to detect erosion of a vaginal mesh during a 2017 examination. A personal injuries summons was issued on 21 July 2023 but was not served within the 12 months permitted by the rules; service was effected on 6 August 2024, i.e., after expiry on 20 July 2024. The plaintiff sought renewal of the summons; the defendant opposed and separately moved to set aside service. Both applications came before Ferriter J, who prioritised the renewal motion, because if renewal failed the proceedings were, in effect, at an end.

The essential issue was whether the plaintiff demonstrated “special circumstances” to justify renewal, particularly where the failure to serve arose from the plaintiff’s solicitor’s mistaken belief that service had already occurred and, later, from an assumption that an assistant had served the summons after the defendant’s solicitors had expressly stated they had not been served. The plaintiff also invoked estoppel based on defence correspondence confirming authority to accept service.

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court refused to renew the summons. Applying the Court of Appeal’s line of authority (especially Murphy v HSE [2021] IECA 3; Nolan v Saint Mary’s Diocesan School [2022] IECA 10; and Power v CJSC Indigo Tajikistan [2024] IECA 47), Ferriter J held:

“Special circumstances” is a threshold (“gateway”) requirement. Only if that gateway is passed does the court balance prejudice/interests of justice.
Inadvertence by a solicitor, even where a genuine belief of prior service exists, will “rarely” amount to special circumstances; absent unusual or external factors, it remains mere inadvertence.
The plaintiff’s estoppel argument failed. Defence solicitors’ standard-form correspondence confirming authority to accept service, coupled with their express statement in April 2024 that they had not been served, could not estop them from relying on the late service.
On the facts, there were two periods of inadvertence—before and after the defence solicitors’ 23 April 2024 letter clarifying no service—neither supported by unusual or unpredictable facts outside the solicitor’s control.
Had special circumstances been shown, the interests of justice would have favoured renewal (no identified defence prejudice and likely limitation consequences for the plaintiff). But the “gateway” was not crossed, so renewal was refused.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Outcome

The court anchored its approach in the modern Order 8 jurisprudence, which replaced the prior “good reason” test with the higher “special circumstances” standard:

Murphy v HSE [2021] IECA 3 (Haughton J): The seminal authority interpreting “special circumstances.” It holds that “special” means something beyond the ordinary (para 72), that a case-specific assessment is required (para 70), and that interests of justice (including prejudice) are considered—but only after “special circumstances” are established (para 74). Crucially, Haughton J emphasised that a solicitor’s inadvertence will “rarely” constitute special circumstances, especially given professional awareness of the 12-month service limit (para 77).
Nolan v The Board of Management of Saint Mary’s Diocesan School [2022] IECA 10 (Noonan J): Confirms that special circumstances and justification for renewal integrate within the broader interests-of-justice assessment, but the threshold question is whether special circumstances exist; only then is prejudice evaluated (paras 25–26).
Power v CJSC Indigo Tajikistan [2024] IECA 47 (Allen J): Approves the High Court’s description of “special circumstances” as a “gateway” requirement that must be satisfied before any prejudice balancing arises (para 100).
Moynihan v Dairygold Co-operative Society Ltd [2006] IEHC 318 (Peart J): Under the former “good reason” regime, inadvertence generally did not suffice, and the court warned practitioners to pay close attention to service deadlines. This warning carries even more force under the higher “special circumstances” standard.
Nolan v Trustees of Bridge United AFC [2021] IEHC 333 (Barr J): Explains why mere inadvertence cannot be “special” (para 78), yet recognises rare cases where inadvertence is caused by special/unusual external events (para 79)—e.g., serious accident, calamity, or comparable disruption—potentially meeting the threshold.
Murphy v Depuy [2023] IEHC 220 (Barr J): An example where inadvertence was excused by a “perfect storm” of internal and external disruptions (staff absences, COVID-era difficulties), evidencing the type of unusual scenario that can elevate inadvertence into special circumstances.
Rajauskiene v Swords Barbers Ltd and Steckys [2023] IEHC 249 (Bolger J): Special circumstances found where a mistaken mode of service combined with staff maternity leave and subsequent COVID obstacles to personal service—again, a constellation of unusual factors beyond ordinary inadvertence.
SW v HSE [2025] IEHC 526 (Cahill J): Reiterates that it is only in “rare” cases that a solicitor’s mistake can be special circumstances, likely requiring unpredictable, unusual facts outside the adviser’s control (para 58).
Brereton v The Governors of the National Maternity Hospital [2020] IEHC 172 (Hyland J): Found special circumstances pre-Murphy where inadvertence combined with other factors (pre-expiry intimations, intention to serve, absence of prejudice). Ferriter J acknowledges Brereton but emphasises that Murphy recalibrates the threshold; post-Murphy, solicitor inadvertence alone—without exceptional features—will rarely qualify.

Taken together, these authorities impose a stringent gateway: courts will not reach the prejudice balancing unless genuinely “special” and unusual circumstances—commonly external to ordinary office error—are demonstrated.

Legal Reasoning

The plaintiff advanced two routes to “special circumstances”: (1) estoppel, and (2) genuine mistaken belief of service coupled with pre-action communications and prompt post-expiry steps.

Estoppel rejected

The court rejected estoppel outright. The defence solicitors’ letters were standard and clear: they confirmed authority to accept service (Sept 2023), but when chased for a defence they explicitly stated on 23 April 2024 that they were not on record because proceedings had not been served. They never suggested service had been effected; they never waived, or agreed not to rely on, the time limit; and they did not conduct themselves as if served (no appearance, no record requests). On these facts, there was no representation, waiver, or conduct upon which an estoppel could be built (para 37).

“Two periods of inadvertence,” neither supported by unusual circumstances

Ferriter J identified two distinct windows of non-service:

First period (Sept 2023 to 23 April 2024): The plaintiff’s solicitor believed the summons had been served after the defendant’s solicitors were nominated. But there was no explanation of the internal office system for directing, recording, and verifying service; no evidence of disruption, calamity, or unusual externalities. The court accepted the sincerity of the belief but characterised it as “mere inadvertence” (para 43).
Second period (23 April 2024 to 20 July 2024): After the defence solicitors’ explicit notice that they had not been served, the plaintiff’s solicitor asked an assistant to serve and assumed it was done, yet still no service occurred before expiry. Again, no unusual or unpredictable external factor was identified. The court viewed this as “textbook mere inadvertence,” compounding the earlier lapse (para 44).

In both periods, the absence of “special” facts—beyond ordinary office error—proved fatal. The court also treated the pre-action letter, the plaintiff’s known intention to sue, the relatively short delay beyond expiry, and a reasonably prompt renewal motion as insufficient on their own to convert inadvertence into “special circumstances” (para 45).

The gateway and the interests-of-justice balance

Consistent with Murphy and Nolan, the court applied the gateway strictly. It accepted that, had special circumstances been shown, the interests of justice would have favoured renewal because the defendant could not identify specific prejudice and refusal would likely render the claim statute-barred (para 47). But without crossing the gateway, the court could not engage in that balance, and renewal was refused (paras 46–48).

Impact

This decision consolidates and sharpens the post-Murphy landscape in several practical ways:

Reinforced stringency of the “special circumstances” gateway: A genuine but mistaken belief that service occurred—even evidenced by correspondence chasing a defence—will not meet the threshold without unusual or external factors beyond ordinary office oversight.
Estoppel arguments face a high bar: Standard defence correspondence confirming authority to accept service, and explicit statements that no service has occurred, will not amount to a representation or waiver sufficient to estop reliance on the 12‑month limit. Plaintiffs cannot treat silence or routine confirmations as a shield against limitation/service defects.
Compound inadvertence is especially problematic: The court’s analysis of two periods of inadvertence demonstrates that a failure to act promptly even after receiving clear notice of non-service will undermine any plea to leniency. Post-notice inaction is particularly difficult to excuse.
Brereton’s diminished persuasive force post-Murphy: Attempts to rely on pre-Murphy cases where factors such as pre‑action correspondence and lack of prejudice sufficed are unlikely to succeed absent “unusual” circumstances of the Rajauskiene or Depuy type.
Procedural discipline and audit trails: Firms should expect courts to look for concrete evidence of a robust service process (tasking, docketing, acknowledgments, confirmations). Absent demonstrable systems failures caused by unusual, external events, a missed service deadline will not be excused.

For medical negligence litigation in particular—where pre‑action exchanges and insurer/MPS involvement are common—the decision underscores that early, verifiable service is essential; neither letters of claim nor “authority to accept service” correspondence will cushion non-compliance with Order 8.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Order 8 rule 1(4) RSC: The rule governing renewal of unserved summonses. It requires the court to be satisfied that “special circumstances” justify extension. This is a stricter test than the former “good reason” standard.
Special circumstances: Facts that are out of the ordinary—often unusual or unpredictable and frequently outside the control of the legal adviser (e.g., serious accident, office calamity, pandemic-related disruption). Routine office mistakes usually do not qualify.
Gateway requirement: A threshold issue. The court will only consider prejudice and the broader “interests of justice” if special circumstances are established first.
Mere inadvertence: Ordinary oversight, mistake, misdiarying, or assumption within a solicitor’s office. Post-Murphy, such inadvertence will “rarely” reach the special circumstances threshold.
Estoppel (in this context): A doctrine preventing a party from denying a state of affairs if, by representation or conduct, the party led the other to rely on it to their detriment. Here, no representation by the defence solicitors suggested that service had occurred or would be waived; on the contrary, they expressly said it had not occurred.
“On record” and “appearance”: A solicitor is “on record” for a party after formal steps (such as entering an appearance) are taken. If no appearance is entered, it is often because no valid service has occurred.
Statute-barred: If proceedings are not properly commenced within the statutory limitation period, the claim may be irretrievably time-barred. Here, refusal to renew likely means the claim cannot be pursued.
Affidavit of verification: A sworn statement verifying the content of pleadings; it does not itself effect service or substitute for valid service of a summons.

Conclusion

Hadnett v Joyce is a clear reaffirmation of the modern, strict approach to renewing expired summonses. The High Court held that a solicitor’s genuine belief that service occurred—without more—amounts to “mere inadvertence” and cannot meet the Order 8 r.1(4) threshold. The decision:

Confirms “special circumstances” as a strict gateway that must be crossed before the court weighs prejudice or the interests of justice.
Rejects estoppel based on routine defence correspondence confirming authority to accept service and expressly noting non‑service.
Illustrates the court’s scrutiny of office processes through its “two periods of inadvertence” analysis, especially where, after clear notice of non‑service, service still does not occur.

Practitioners should take the judgment as a compliance signal: in the absence of unusual, external disruptions demonstrably responsible for non-service, renewal will be refused—even if the delay is short, the defendant suffers no identified prejudice, and refusal extinguishes the claim. Murphy v HSE remains the lodestar; cases like Depuy and Rajauskiene mark the narrow corridor where inadvertence may be excused. Brereton cannot bear the weight urged upon it in the post‑Murphy era.