Finality in LSRA Complaints: The Scope of Review Committee Powers under s.62(5)(b) and the Effect of High Court Remittal Orders
Commentary on Cooney v Legal Services Regulatory Authority [2025] IEHC 640

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the High Court of Ireland (Barrett J) in Cooney v Legal Services Regulatory Authority [2025] IEHC 640, a case that clarifies two important aspects of the complaints and disciplinary regime under Part 6 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”):

The extent of the Review Committee’s powers under s.62(5)(b), particularly its power to remit a complaint with a direction to close the file; and
The consequences of a High Court remittal order for procedural steps under s.62(5), especially the requirement to give the parties an opportunity to make written submissions.

The judgment also re‑affirms, by reference to L.L. v Legal Services Regulatory Authority [2023] IEHC 315, the narrow scope of appeals from the LSRA’s Review Committee to the High Court: such appeals are confined to demonstrating a “serious and significant error” (or a series of such errors) on the part of the Review Committee.

The decision is practically significant for:

Clients and legal practitioners engaged in the LSRA complaints process;
The LSRA and its Review Committee in structuring and documenting their decision‑making; and
Lawyers advising on, or conducting, statutory appeals under s.63 of the 2015 Act.

2. Factual Background

2.1 The parties

Appellant: Ms Breda Cooney, a client who had engaged a solicitor and who subsequently complained about the quality of legal services provided.
Respondent: The Legal Services Regulatory Authority (“the Authority” / “LSRA”), the statutory body responsible for handling complaints and disciplinary matters under Part 6 of the 2015 Act.

2.2 Chronology of events

Initial complaint and first determination
Ms Cooney lodged a complaint with the LSRA regarding inadequate legal services provided by her solicitor.
A Complaints Resolution Officer upheld her complaint by decision dated 8 January 2024.
First Review Committee decision
The solicitor sought an internal review of that decision. A Review Committee of the LSRA, by decision dated 16 April 2024, disagreed with the Complaints Resolution Officer and thus did not uphold the complaint.
Appeal to the High Court (first time) and remittal
Ms Cooney appealed that Review Committee decision to the High Court under s.63. The LSRA acknowledged that there had been a procedural error in dealing with the review application and consented to the impugned decision being remitted for fresh consideration by a newly constituted Review Committee.

The High Court accordingly made an order remitting the matter to the LSRA “to be reconsidered by a freshly constituted Review Committee.” Importantly, the order did not direct that the process recommence ab initio.
New Review Committee and second decision
A freshly constituted Review Committee considered the complaint and, on 14 January 2025, concluded that the services provided to Ms Cooney had not been inadequate.

Exercising its powers under s.62(5)(b), the Committee:
- remitted the complaint to the LSRA; and
- directed that the file be closed.
Appeal to the High Court (present proceedings)
Dissatisfied with the new outcome, Ms Cooney appealed again to the High Court. She represented herself.

2.3 The appellant’s central complaints

Barrett J distilled three core complaints made by Ms Cooney regarding the conduct and decision of the reconstituted Review Committee:

Failure to seek submissions: The reconstituted Review Committee allegedly failed to “invite a submission” from her, contrary to s.62(5) of the 2015 Act.
Improper closure of the complaint: The Committee allegedly acted unlawfully under s.62(5)(b) in remitting the matter to the LSRA with a direction that the file be closed.
Substantive error: The Committee’s conclusion that the legal services were not inadequate was said to be wrong on the merits.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court (Barrett J) dismissed the appeal in its entirety.

On the failure to seek new submissions, the Court held that:
- Ms Cooney had already been given an opportunity to make a written statement in February–March 2024 before the first Review Committee; and
- The High Court’s prior order required reconsideration by a different committee, not a full restart of the review process. The LSRA complied with that order in a manner consistent with s.62(5).
On the power to close the file under s.62(5)(b), the Court held that:
- Section 62(5)(b) does permit a Review Committee to remit a complaint to the Authority with a direction that the complaint be effectively closed.
- It is not correct to interpret the section as requiring that every remittal must trigger a full recommencement of the complaints process under s.60 or s.61.
- The contrary view would create a “never‑ending cycle” of complaints, which could not have been intended by the Oireachtas.
On the substantive correctness of the Review Committee’s decision, the Court:
- Emphasised, following L.L. v LSRA, that an appeal to the High Court is narrowly confined to identifying “serious and significant error” by the Review Committee.
- Noted that the substantive merits were not really argued by Ms Cooney, and that in any event the alleged errors (procedural and interpretative) failed.
- Found no error—procedural, legal, or otherwise—tainting the Review Committee’s decision.

The Court expressed sympathy for the personal circumstances that led Ms Cooney to engage a solicitor, and recognised her disappointment with the outcome, but concluded that the decision of the reconstituted Review Committee was lawful, procedurally fair in the relevant sense, and free from the kind of error that would warrant High Court intervention.

4. Statutory Framework: Part 6 of the 2015 Act

4.1 Overview

Part 6 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 establishes a comprehensive framework for:

handling complaints about inadequate services (s.60) and excessive costs (s.61);
dealing with professional misconduct (ss.68–82); and
disciplinary and appellate procedures involving the LSRA, the Complaints Committee, the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal, and the courts.

Barrett J appends to his judgment a diagrammatic overview (Diagram 1), stepping through ss.49–94. This serves both as a roadmap to the statutory scheme and as an explanatory tool—especially useful where a litigant is self‑represented.

4.2 The key provisions engaged in this case

The core provisions for present purposes are:

s.60: Resolution of complaints about inadequate legal services.
s.61: Resolution of complaints about excessive costs.
s.62: Establishment and powers of the Review Committee.
s.63: Appeal to the High Court against a Review Committee determination.

4.2.1 Section 62(5)(b)

Section 62(5) governs how the Review Committee conducts its review function. The judgment reproduces the following key portion:

“The Review Committee shall consider reviews requested and, having given both the client and the legal practitioner an opportunity to make a statement in writing to it as to why the determination of the Authority under section 60 or 61, as the case may be, was incorrect or unjust, determine the review by … (b) remitting the complaint to the Authority, with such directions as the Review Committee considers appropriate or necessary, to be dealt with again under section 60 or 61, as the case may be…”

The interpretive dispute centred on:

Whether the Review Committee must always require the Authority to deal with the complaint again under s.60 or s.61 when acting under s.62(5)(b); and
Whether the Committee could, as here, remit the complaint with a direction that effectively ends the Authority’s involvement by closing the file.

4.2.2 Section 63: Appeal to the High Court

Section 63 allows a party dissatisfied with a Review Committee determination to appeal to the High Court. The judgment, relying on L.L. v LSRA, makes clear that this is a limited appeal, not a full rehearing on the merits: the High Court is concerned with errors by the Review Committee, and only those which are “serious and significant” or form a serious series of errors.

5. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

5.1 Issue 1 – Was the Review Committee obliged to seek fresh submissions under s.62(5)?

5.1.1 The statutory requirement

Section 62(5) obliges the Review Committee, before determining a review, to give both the client and the legal practitioner:

“an opportunity to make a statement in writing to it as to why the determination of the Authority under section 60 or 61 … was incorrect or unjust…”

The appellant’s argument was straightforward: the newly constituted Review Committee never wrote to her to invite a submission. Therefore, the statutory condition precedent to a valid review determination had not been met.

5.1.2 The factual context: prior opportunity to make a statement

The Court emphasised a key factual point:

The initial Review Committee had written to Ms Cooney on 16 February 2024 asking her to make a statement.
By letter dated 8 March 2024, she responded, indicating that:
- the basis of her complaint remained as originally set out; and
- she asked that that original complaint be taken as her statement.

The Court understood that:

this material was before both the originally constituted Review Committee; and
the same material was before the reconstituted Committee after remittal.

5.1.3 The effect of the earlier High Court remittal order

The crux of Barrett J’s reasoning lies in the interaction between the statutory text and the terms of the High Court’s previous order.

The order required the matter:

“to be reconsidered by a freshly constituted Review Committee.”

As the Court stresses:

The order did not require that the matter be dealt with ab initio (from the very beginning); and
The LSRA accordingly convened a new Review Committee, which considered the same underlying material and reached a fresh determination.

Barrett J states that once the High Court had made its order, the “key element” became what that order required. The Authority complied with the order by:

putting the existing material (including Ms Cooney’s written statement) before a newly constituted Committee; and
having that Committee arrive at a new decision.

5.1.4 Reconciling s.62(5) with remittal: “opportunity” versus repetition

On a natural reading of s.62(5), the statutory obligation is to give an opportunity to make a written statement. The section does not say that:

the same opportunity must be formally re‑offered every time a procedural defect leads to remittal; or
a new Review Committee must issue a fresh invitation, irrespective of whether a written statement already exists and remains apt.

The Court effectively adopts the view that:

The “opportunity” had already been afforded; and
There was no unfairness in the reconstituted Committee relying on the same written material, especially where the appellant herself had indicated that her position was as already stated.

In this way, the High Court treats the remittal as a requirement that a new Committee reconsider the existing record, not as an automatic reset of every step (including the invitation to make submissions) unless expressly ordered.

5.1.5 Assessment

Doctrinally, this reflects two intertwined principles:

Finality and efficiency in procedural remittals
Where a decision is quashed or set aside for procedural defect and remitted, the default position is that:
- what has been properly done stands; and
- only the defective step(s) need be re‑performed, unless the court orders a complete restart.
Here, the defective aspect was acknowledged by the LSRA, the decision was set aside, and a new Committee was put in place; there is no indication that the prior opportunity to make submissions was itself defective.
Substance over form in satisfying statutory “opportunity” requirements
The legislative aim behind s.62(5) is to guarantee that both sides can explain in writing why the Authority’s determination was allegedly “incorrect or unjust”. That aim was fulfilled when:
- the appellant was invited to make a statement; and
- she confirmed in writing that her original complaint encapsulated her case.
No injustice arose from the reconstituted Committee relying on that material.

The Court’s approach reinforces a practical message: unless a court expressly orders a full restart, a remitted matter will usually proceed on the existing documentary record, with only the necessary corrective procedural steps being re‑taken.

5.2 Issue 2 – Can a Review Committee remit a complaint with a direction that the file be closed under s.62(5)(b)?

5.2.1 Competing interpretations

The interpretive dispute revolved around the concluding words of s.62(5)(b):

“remitting the complaint to the Authority, with such directions as the Review Committee considers appropriate or necessary, to be dealt with again under section 60 or 61, as the case may be…”

According to the Court’s summary, Ms Cooney contended that:

when the Review Committee relies on paragraph (b), its only legitimate role is to require the Authority to deal with the complaint again under s.60 or s.61; and
directing closure of the file is inconsistent with the statutory wording, because it does not involve “dealing with [the complaint] again” in the sense envisaged by those sections.

5.2.2 The Court’s reading of s.62(5)(b)

Barrett J rejects this restrictive reading. He parses s.62(5)(b) as comprising the following elements (paraphrased):

First: the Review Committee determines a review by remitting the complaint to the Authority;
Second: it may attach “such directions as [it] considers appropriate or necessary”;
Third: those directions may entail that the complaint is to be dealt with again under s.60 or 61, “as the case may be.”

In Ms Cooney’s case, the Committee:

remitted the complaint; and
directed that the file be closed.

Barrett J observes that in these circumstances:

“here neither such case [i.e. neither s.60 nor s.61] presents, given the direction in effect to close the file.”

In other words, where the Review Committee’s direction is to close a complaint, there is no occasion for the complaint to be “dealt with again” under s.60 or s.61. The phrase “to be dealt with again” is not read as an unyielding requirement that every remittal under (b) must lead to a new round of determination by the Authority; rather, it is one possible consequence that depends on the nature of the directions given.

5.2.3 Avoiding absurdity and “never‑ending cycles”

The Court supports its interpretation with a purposive and pragmatic argument. If the restrictive reading urged by the appellant were accepted:

every time a party remained dissatisfied with the outcome of the review, the complaint would have to be re‑commenced;
this would risk an endless loop of complaints, reviews, remittals and recommencements; and
finality in the complaints process would be seriously undermined.

Barrett J states that such a construction would create:

“a never‑ending cycle whereby a complaint, if adjudicated upon in a manner not to the satisfaction of one of the parties … would fall to be re‑commenced. Respectfully, I do not accept that this could be what the Oireachtas intended.”

This is a classic application of the principle that legislation should not be interpreted so as to create absurd or unworkable results, particularly where such a reading would contradict the evident policy of the statute—here, to create a structured, but ultimately final, complaints process.

5.2.4 Nature of the Review Committee’s role

The Review Committee under s.62 is:

a statutory body reviewing the LSRA’s determinations under ss.60 or 61; and
empowered to:
- confirm the Authority’s decision;
- substitute its own direction; or
- remit the matter with directions.

The Court’s interpretation underscores that paragraph (b) is designed to give the Review Committee a flexible remedial jurisdiction. Depending on its assessment, it may:

require the Authority to re‑engage with the complaint under ss.60 or 61 (for example, to consider fresh evidence or rectify procedural defects); or
in appropriate cases, direct the Authority to close the file, thereby bringing the complaint process to an end.

In practical terms, the latter is akin to the Review Committee deciding that the complaint should not proceed further—either because inadequate services or excessive costs are not established, or because there is some other reason why the complaint ought not to be pursued.

5.2.5 Assessment

The decision establishes an important precedent on the scope of s.62(5)(b):

The Review Committee’s power to attach “such directions as [it] considers appropriate or necessary” is broad and includes the power to direct closure.
The words “to be dealt with again under section 60 or 61” do not require a full restart in every case; they operate where the Committee’s directions necessitate further s.60/61 action, but not where the directions themselves finally dispose of the matter.

This approach promotes:

finality – complaints can come to a definitive end following review; and
efficiency – unnecessary duplication of procedures is avoided.

5.3 Issue 3 – The scope of High Court appeals from Review Committee decisions

5.3.1 Reliance on L.L. v Legal Services Regulatory Authority [2023] IEHC 315

The judgment notes that Ms Cooney accepted the relatively narrow role that the High Court has on appeals under s.63, as identified in L.L. v LSRA. In that case, the High Court held that:

an appeal under s.63 is not a full rehearing of the complaint; rather, it is limited to reviewing the decision‑making of the Review Committee; and
to succeed, an appellant must show that the Review Committee’s decision is vitiated by a “serious and significant error”, or by a series of such errors.

In light of this, the High Court in Cooney approached the appeal as a challenge to whether:

the Review Committee had complied with the procedural requirements of s.62(5);
it had properly interpreted s.62(5)(b); and
its decision was free from serious error in law or process.

5.3.2 Limited engagement with the substantive merits

Barrett J records that the substance of the Review Committee’s determination—that the services were not inadequate—was not meaningfully argued before him. In any event, he indicates that his role is not to substitute his own assessment of the merits for that of the Review Committee, but to examine whether its conclusion is tainted by serious error.

Having rejected:

the alleged procedural defect (failure to seek new submissions); and
the alleged misinterpretation of s.62(5)(b),

the Court found that no such error had been established. The Review Committee’s determination stood.

5.3.3 Implications for future appellants

The combined effect of L.L. and Cooney is that:

An appeal to the High Court under s.63 is akin to a supervisory review on the record, focused on legal and procedural correctness rather than a re‑trial of the complaint.
Disagreements about the weight given to evidence by the Review Committee, or about its ultimate evaluative judgment (e.g. whether services were “inadequate”), will rarely suffice unless they disclose a serious legal error or irrationality.

For practitioners, the message is clear: grounds of appeal should be carefully targeted at demonstrable errors in law, procedure, or rationality, rather than an attempt to reargue the complaint in full.

6. Precedent and Authorities Cited

6.1 L.L. v Legal Services Regulatory Authority [2023] IEHC 315

While the full detail of L.L. is not reproduced in the judgment, its central holding as applied in Cooney is that:

the High Court’s jurisdiction on an appeal from the Review Committee is restricted; and
a party must show a “serious and significant error” on the part of the Review Committee.

This formulation closely resembles established administrative law concepts, where courts distinguish between:

appeals on the merits (which permit a fresh look at facts and law); and
appeals or reviews confined to error (which examine the correctness of the prior decision‑maker’s process and reasoning, not the underlying merits afresh).

By re‑affirming this standard, Cooney solidifies L.L. as the leading authority on the nature of appeals under s.63.

6.2 General interpretive principles

Although not expressly named, the judgment implicitly applies well‑known interpretive principles:

Purposive construction – s.62(5)(b) is interpreted in light of the overall purpose of Part 6, which is to create an effective but final complaints and disciplinary process, not a perpetual cycle.
Avoidance of absurdity – the Court rejects a reading that would generate a “never‑ending cycle” of complaints and reviews as inconsistent with the legislative intent.
Contextual reading – s.62(5)(b) is read in its statutory context, including the Review Committee’s role as an appellate/review body and the broader structure summarised in Diagram 1.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

7.1 “Remittal” versus “recommencement ab initio”

Remittal means that a court sends a matter back to the original decision‑maker (or a counterpart body) for reconsideration.
Recommencement ab initio means starting the entire process anew, as if nothing had happened, repeating all procedural steps from the beginning.

In Cooney, the High Court’s earlier order required the complaint to be reconsidered by a different Review Committee, but did not order that the process start again from scratch. Therefore:

only certain steps (such as the deliberation and decision of the Review Committee) had to be re‑done; and
other steps (like the written opportunity to make a statement) stood as valid and could be relied upon.

7.2 “Opportunity to make a statement” under s.62(5)

The law does not require a new letter inviting submissions every time a committee changes or a decision is set aside, provided that:

the party has previously been given a genuine and fair opportunity to present their position in writing; and
that written material is placed before the new decision‑maker.

The focus is on substance (were you heard?) rather than rigid form (did you receive a second, identical letter?).

7.3 “Serious and significant error” as a standard of appeal

When an appeal is confined to showing a “serious and significant error”:

The court is looking for:
- clear misinterpretation of the law;
- major procedural unfairness (e.g. failure to hear a party at all); or
- decisions that no reasonable decision‑maker could reach on the evidence.
The court is not there to fine‑tune or second‑guess reasonable evaluative judgments made by the Review Committee.

This is less intrusive than a full rehearing and more akin to judicial review, though it is framed as a statutory “appeal”.

7.4 The function of the Review Committee under Part 6

The Review Committee is a three‑member body (two lay members and one legal practitioner) with power to:

look again at LSRA determinations under s.60 (inadequate services) and s.61 (excessive costs);
confirm, vary, substitute, or remit those determinations; and
issue directions to the LSRA, including directions that a complaint be closed.

It acts as a built‑in “appeal layer” within the LSRA’s own structure but is distinct from a court.

8. Impact and Significance

8.1 For the LSRA and its Review Committee

The judgment gives clear guidance that:

The Review Committee may lawfully bring a complaint to finality by remitting it with a direction to close the file under s.62(5)(b).
When a matter is remitted by the High Court for reconsideration, and the court does not order a complete restart, the LSRA need not re‑invite written statements if:
- parties have already had a fair opportunity to make them; and
- those statements are before the reconstituted Committee.

This allows the LSRA to:

avoid unnecessary duplication of procedure;
ensure efficient use of resources; and
maintain the integrity of its processes while correcting identified procedural errors.

8.2 For complainants and legal practitioners

The case carries important messages for parties to LSRA complaints:

The Review Committee’s decision can be the end of the road for a complaint within the LSRA system, subject only to a limited appeal to the High Court.
If a complaint is remitted and a new Review Committee is convened, parties should not necessarily expect a fresh round of written submissions unless the court or the LSRA decides that fairness so requires.
Any appeal to the High Court must focus on , not merely dissatisfaction with the outcome.

8.3 For litigation strategy and access to justice

For practitioners advising clients:

Careful analysis of the Review Committee’s reasoning is crucial to determine if there is a plausible “serious and significant error” to ground an appeal.
Clients should be advised realistically as to the narrow remit of the High Court’s role, potentially avoiding fruitless litigation driven only by disappointment with the result.

At the same time, the appended diagram and the Court’s explanation of the structure of Part 6 reflect a judicial sensitivity to self‑represented litigants and the opacity of regulatory schemes. This can be seen as contributing positively to access to justice by making the statutory framework more transparent and comprehensible.

8.4 In the broader context of administrative and regulatory law

More broadly, Cooney sits within a recurring theme in administrative law:

Statutory appeals are often designed to be confined to error, not to replicate the entire decision‑making process.
Remittal orders will usually direct targeted re‑doing of flawed steps, not automatic full restarts.
Decision‑making bodies with review powers (like the LSRA’s Review Committee) are frequently granted flexible remedial powers, which courts will tend to interpret purposively to allow them to bring matters to finality.

9. Conclusion

Cooney v Legal Services Regulatory Authority [2025] IEHC 640 is a compact but important decision elucidating:

The scope of s.62(5)(b) LSRA 2015
The Review Committee:
- may remit a complaint with directions; and
- those directions may validly include a direction to close the file, thus bringing the complaint process to an end.
The words “to be dealt with again under section 60 or 61” do not require that every remittal under (b) trigger a full re‑run of the complaints process.
The effect of High Court remittal orders
When a matter is remitted for reconsideration, the decision‑maker must comply with the court’s order, but absent an express requirement to recommence ab initio:
- valid steps already taken (such as giving an opportunity to make written submissions) remain effective; and
- a newly constituted Review Committee can rely on existing written material in reaching a fresh decision.
The nature of appeals under s.63
Consistent with L.L. v LSRA, an appeal to the High Court from the Review Committee is limited. The appellant must show:
- a serious and significant error, or a series of such errors, by the Review Committee—not simply that they disagree with the outcome.

For the LSRA, the decision confirms the robustness and finality of its internal review mechanism. For complainants and practitioners, it clarifies both the power of the Review Committee to terminate complaints and the limited grounds upon which its decisions can be successfully challenged in the High Court. In the broader legal landscape, Cooney exemplifies a purposive, practicality‑driven approach to interpreting regulatory statutes in a way that balances fairness to individuals with the need for final, workable complaint‑resolution mechanisms.

Finality in LSRA Complaints: The Scope of Review Committee Powers under s.62(5)(b) and the Effect of High Court Remittal Orders Commentary on Cooney v Legal Services Regulatory Authority [2025] IEHC 640