Feeney v Groves [2025] IEHC 633: Clarifying the Threshold for Seanad Recounts under Rule 14(2) of the 1947 Act

Feeney v Groves [2025] IEHC 633: Clarifying the Threshold for Seanad Recounts under Rule 14(2) of the 1947 Act

1. Introduction

This High Court judgment by O’Higgins J in Angela Feeney v Groves & Ors ([2025] IEHC 633) is a significant development in Irish electoral law, particularly in relation to:

  • the legal test for challenging Seanad panel elections under s.132(5) of the Electoral Act 1992, and
  • the interpretation of Rule 14(2) of the Second Schedule to the Seanad Electoral (Panel Members) Act 1947 (the “1947 Act”) governing recounts in Seanad panel elections.

The petitioner, Angela Feeney, a Labour Party councillor, contested the Agricultural Panel in the 2025 Seanad general election. She was excluded on the 23rd count, missing out with a margin of 116 votes, equivalent to approximately one ninth of a ballot, given that each ballot has a nominal value of 1000 in Seanad panel counts.

She challenged the result by election petition on two grounds:

  1. Refusal of a full recount by the Seanad Returning Officer (the first respondent, Martin Groves), notwithstanding the exceptionally tight margin; and
  2. Alleged lack of transparency in the counting process, on the basis that the votes were not counted “in the presence of” candidates and agents in the manner required by the 1947 Act.

She contended that each ground, separately and cumulatively, constituted a “mistake or other irregularity which is likely to have affected the result of the election” within the meaning of s.132(5) of the Electoral Act 1992 (the “1992 Act”).

The case put squarely in issue:

  • how far candidates’ rights of presence and observation at Seanad counts extend, and
  • whether a narrow margin combined with a refusal of a full recount can, in itself, amount to a justiciable irregularity.

Although the petition was ultimately dismissed, the judgment is important for the precise way in which it interprets Rule 14(2) and for the court’s articulation of the evidential threshold required to impugn an election on “transparency” or recount-related grounds.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Outcome

The High Court dismissed the petition. O’Higgins J held that:

  • The petitioner failed to prove any “mistake or other irregularity” within s.132(5) of the 1992 Act.
  • It was therefore unnecessary to consider the second limb of s.132(5) – whether any such irregularity was “likely to have affected the result of the election”.
  • The court consequently refused to exercise its power under Rule 7 of the Third Schedule to the 1992 Act to direct a recount for the purposes of the trial.

2.2 Core legal holdings

  1. Interpretation of Rule 14(2) of the Second Schedule to the 1947 Act
    The court held that:
    • Rule 14(2) confers a discretion on the Seanad returning officer to recount ballot papers “either once or more often”, but only “in any case in which he is not satisfied as to the accuracy of any count”.
    • The condition of “not being satisfied as to the accuracy of any count” applies to all recounts under Rule 14(2), whether it is a first recount or a subsequent recount.
    • The petitioner’s alternative “disjunctive” interpretation — that the returning officer has an unconditional discretion to order a first full recount and that the “not satisfied” threshold only applies to further recounts — was rejected as inconsistent with the text, structure, and legislative context.
  2. Transparency and “presence” at the count
    The court:
    • Accepted that candidates and agents had imperfect line-of-sight to the “inner” counting table and to the calculations table, particularly given the cramped Members’ Restaurant layout.
    • Nevertheless found that these issues did not amount to a legally cognisable “mistake or irregularity”. No on-the-spot complaint was made; the difficulties were intermittent; and the count was conducted carefully and professionally.
    • Held that the petitioner had not demonstrated that she was actually prevented from being present at the count or from observing the count to such an extent as to breach s.53(1) and Rule 13 of the 1947 Act.
  3. Reasonableness of refusal to grant a full recount
    The judge held that:
    • On the facts, the returning officer was entitled to be satisfied as to the accuracy of the count.
    • The decision to refuse a full recount was taken bona fide, was not unreasonable in the legal sense, and was factually sustainable (applying Hogan J’s “triple requirement” in Ni v Garda Commissioner).
    • Even accepting the extremely narrow margin, the petitioner had not shown that no reasonable returning officer could have made the decision to refuse a full recount.

2.3 Issues deliberately left open

The court expressly declined to decide a number of important legal questions, reserving them for future cases, including:

  • Whether a petitioner is confined, under s.53(2) of the 1947 Act, to the specific grounds raised in the written objection lodged with the returning officer before declaration of the result.
  • Whether a pure error of law (e.g. misinterpretation of a counting rule) can, without more, justify a recount by election petition in the absence of positive proof of effect on the result.
  • The precise scope of the statutory right of candidates to be “present at the counting of the votes” and what, if anything, that implies about active scrutiny or participation.
  • The proper construction of s.125 of the 1992 Act governing Dáil recounts.
  • Whether, as a matter of practice, the Members’ Restaurant is a suitable venue for future Seanad panel counts.

3. Precedents and Statutory Framework

3.1 Statutory test: s.132(5) of the 1992 Act

Section 132(5) of the 1992 Act provides that a Dáil election may be questioned on the grounds of a:

“mistake or other irregularity which is likely to have affected the result of the election.”

By virtue of the legislative scheme and prior case law, this dual requirement also applies mutatis mutandis to Seanad election petitions:

  1. The petitioner must show the occurrence of a mistake or irregularity, and
  2. that such mistake or irregularity was likely to have affected the result.

In this case, O’Higgins J found that the petitioner failed at the first limb, so the second limb did not fall for determination.

3.2 Kiely v Kerry County Council [2016] 2 IR 1

Kiely is the leading Supreme Court authority on election petitions. It concerned a local election where the returning officer wrongly treated certain ballots with preferences starting at “4” (due to concurrent European elections) as first preferences. The candidate lost by two votes.

Key points from Kiely adopted or applied in this case:

  • The petitioner bears the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities that:
    • a mistake in law occurred (in Kiely, misinterpretation of what counts as a “mark clearly indicating a first preference”), and
    • the error was likely to have affected the result.
  • Even where the court cannot say with certainty that the election result would have been different, it is enough if there is a realistic possibility that it might have been.
  • McKechnie J’s formulation (quoted in full by O’Higgins J) stressed that a mere “possible” effect is insufficient; the petitioner must identify consequences that are “not electorally inconsequential”.

Although the factual posture in Kiely involved identifiable miscounted ballots, it underpins the High Court’s insistence in this case on clear and cogent evidence of a specific mistake or irregularity, rather than general unease or perceived unfairness.

3.3 Jordan v Minister for Children and Youth Affairs [2015] 4 IR 232

Jordan concerned a challenge to the Children’s Referendum, where the Supreme Court developed the concept of when irregularities are sufficiently serious that a reasonable person can no longer trust the outcome of the poll.

Important strands taken up by O’Higgins J include:

  • O’Donnell J’s emphasis on the sovereign will of the electorate and the judiciary’s consequent restraint in setting aside results.
  • The test that a referendum must be rerun when there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome could have been different (material effect test).
  • The notion that elections or referenda must be rerun when a reasonable person would be “in doubt about, and no longer trust” the provisional outcome.

O’Higgins J emphasised that this “materially affected” test is higher than the “likely to have affected” standard applicable in election petitions, but the conceptual framework about trust, legitimacy and transparency is still instructive when considering whether an alleged irregularity undermines confidence in the result.

3.4 Dillon-Leetch v Calleary (Supreme Court, 31 July 1974)

Henchy J famously stated that courts will not allow an “electorally ineffective” breach of electoral principles to be used to set aside the validly exercised constitutional rights of other voters. O’Higgins J cites this to underscore:

  • the need for a compelling basis before overturning election results, and
  • the notion that minor or non-material errors cannot justify invalidation.

3.5 Heather Hill Management Company CLG v An Bord Pleanála [2022] 2 ILRM 313

Heather Hill is not an electoral case but sets out the modern Irish approach to statutory interpretation: the “text in context” method. The Supreme Court stressed:

  • The primacy of the statutory text as enacted by the Oireachtas.
  • The duty to interpret the words by reference to their ordinary and natural meaning in their statutory and legislative context, including related provisions and the evident legislative purpose.
  • The onus on a party contending for a meaning contrary to that ordinary sense.

This interpretive framework is central to the court’s rejection of the petitioner’s inventive reading of Rule 14(2), and to its comparative analysis of the Seanad recount rule with s.125 of the 1992 Act (Dáil recounts).

3.6 Ni v Garda Commissioner [2013] IEHC 134

Hogan J’s analysis of what it means for a statutory decision-maker to be “satisfied” was invoked:

“It imports the triple requirement that the decision must be taken bona fide, that it be not unreasonable and is factually sustainable.”

O’Higgins J applied this “triple requirement” in confirming that Mr Groves’ refusal of a recount was lawfully within his discretion under Rule 14(2).

4. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.1 The “Catch-22” and the role of recounts in election petitions

The petitioner faced a structural problem: her case did not challenge specific ballots or a quantifiable misallocation of votes. Instead, she argued that:

  • the count was not sufficiently transparent, and
  • the refusal of a full recount was itself an irregularity.

Without a recount, she could not say what the “true” vote totals were; yet to get a recount via the High Court, she first needed to show some mistake or irregularity likely to have affected the result. This was characterised by the court as a potential “catch‑22”.

She sought to resolve this by relying on Rule 7 of the Third Schedule to the 1992 Act, which empowers the court, during a petition, to order ballots to be “counted afresh”. The petitioner characterised such an order as an interlocutory evidential step rather than a final determination, arguing that the court could — and should — use this power even before both limbs of s.132(5) were proven.

The respondents insisted that:

  • Rule 7 is not a free-standing discovery tool.
  • It may only be invoked once a mistake or irregularity is established, as part of working out the effect on the result.

O’Higgins J sidestepped this controversy by holding that, in any event, the petitioner had failed to establish a mistake or irregularity. Therefore the question of using Rule 7 did not arise.

4.2 Interpretation of Rule 14(2): the central legal issue

4.2.1 Text of the rule

Rule 14(2) of the Second Schedule to the 1947 Act provides:

“The Seanad returning officer may at his discretion recount ballot papers either once or more often in any case in which he is not satisfied as to the accuracy of any count.”

4.2.2 Petitioner’s “disjunctive” interpretation

The petitioner advanced an imaginative reading:

  • “may at his discretion recount ballot papers either once” — an unqualified discretion to grant a first full recount, and
  • “or more often in any case in which he is not satisfied…” — the “not satisfied” condition applies only to further recounts.

On this view:

  • every candidate has an effective entitlement to one full recount, at the returning officer’s discretion but not contingent on his doubt about accuracy; and
  • the more restrictive “not satisfied” language merely limits second and subsequent recounts.

This would align Seanad practice closer to the Dáil regime under s.125(3) of the 1992 Act, where each candidate is entitled to one complete re-examination and recount.

4.2.3 Respondents’ and notice parties’ interpretation

The respondents and notice parties contended that the natural reading is that:

  • the clause “in any case in which he is not satisfied as to the accuracy of any count” qualifies the entire power to recount “either once or more often”; and
  • therefore, all recounts under Rule 14(2) — first and subsequent — require that the returning officer is not satisfied as to the accuracy of some count.

In support, they pointed to:

  • the structure and punctuation of the sentence (or lack of sub-clauses),
  • the Irish language version of the provision, which clearly indicates a single condition attached to the whole power, and
  • the analogous wording of s.125(2) of the 1992 Act for Dáil recounts.

4.2.4 The Court’s “text in context” analysis

Applying the Heather Hill approach, O’Higgins J held:

  1. Plain text: The absence of punctuation or any syntactic break after “either once or more often” indicates that the precondition applies to the entire phrase. The petitioner’s reading required inserting punctuation or restructuring the sentence, which is not permissible.
  2. Context within the 1947 Act:
    • Rule 14(1) gives candidates an unconditional right to request a re-examination and recount of ballot papers in the last count only.
    • Rule 14(2) then gives the returning officer a conditional discretion to recount any ballot papers (including those from earlier counts) where he is not satisfied as to the accuracy of any count.
    • The interplay suggests a deliberate legislative balance:
      • candidate’s right to check the immediate preceding count, and
      • returning officer’s controlled power to rerun earlier or broader segments of the count.
  3. Comparison with Dáil recounts (s.125):
    • s.125(2) of the 1992 Act uses almost identical language to Rule 14(2) regarding recounts “either once or more often in any case in which he is not satisfied as to the accuracy of any count”.
    • s.125(3), however, separately creates an express right to one complete re-examination and recount for each Dáil candidate.
    • If the petitioner’s reading of Rule 14(2) were correct, s.125(2) would already confer such a right, rendering s.125(3) duplicative, confusing, and potentially contradictory.
    • The structure of Dáil recount law thus supports reading the “not satisfied” condition as governing all Rule 14(2) recounts.
  4. Legislative history & policy choice:
    • In 1963, Dáil legislation was amended to confer an express right to one full recount per candidate (now s.125(3)), but no similar change was made for Seanad panel elections.
    • This indicates a conscious legislative choice to keep Seanad recount powers more restricted; the court should not “bridge” a perceived policy gap by re‑engineering the text.

On this basis, the court held that Rule 14(2) requires the returning officer to be “not satisfied” as to accuracy before exercising any recount power, whether for the first time or subsequently.

4.3 Application: was the refusal of a recount unlawful or unreasonable?

Once the meaning of Rule 14(2) was fixed, the question became whether the returning officer’s refusal to order a full recount was:

  • ultra vires (i.e. a misapplication of the rule), or
  • so unreasonable that no reasonable returning officer could have come to that view.

The court emphasised:

  • No specific error in the count was identified at the time, or in the petition, beyond the narrow margin itself.
  • Narrow margins are commonplace in Seanad counts; several other candidates had been excluded by margins smaller than a single ballot’s value, without recounts being ordered.
  • The count was conducted:
    • at a slow, careful pace,
    • with repeated checks and rechecks,
    • by experienced staff under detailed oversight,
    • with no previous counts revealing any error.
  • The returning officer:
    • paused proceedings to consider the recount request;
    • consulted senior counsel;
    • took the narrow margin into account, while recognising that margin alone is not evidence of error;
    • had already granted and conducted a recount of the 23rd count under Rule 14(1) with no discrepancy emerging.

Applying Hogan J’s “triple requirement” from Ni v Garda Commissioner, the court held that the decision:

  • was taken bona fide;
  • was not legally unreasonable/irrational given the evidence; and
  • was factually sustainable.

The petitioner’s fallback contention — that no reasonable returning officer would have refused a recount on such a narrow margin at such a decisive stage — was rejected. The court noted that:

  • Different returning officers may reasonably adopt different approaches within a lawful margin of appreciation; and
  • The court’s role is not to substitute its own judgment for that of the returning officer but to ensure the decision stays within legal bounds, analogously to the deference discussed in Kiely.

4.4 Transparency and the right to be present at the count

4.4.1 The legal provisions

  • Rule 13 of the First Schedule, 1947 Act:
    “The Seanad returning officer and his assistants, any candidate and any agent appointed by a candidate, and no other person, except with the permission of the Seanad returning officer, may be present at the opening of the Seanad ballot box or the counting of the votes.”
  • s.53(1) of the 1947 Act:
    “… the returning officer shall, in the presence of such candidates as may be in attendance, ascertain separately, in accordance with this Act and, in particular, the rules contained in the First and Second Schedules to this Act, the result of a Seanad general election…”

The petitioner argued that:

  • “in the presence of” and “be present at” must be given a purposive reading compatible with transparency;
  • it is not enough that candidates are physically in the room; they must be able to meaningfully observe the counting;
  • because most counts took place at an “inner table” 8–10 feet away, often with obstructed views, candidates were effectively excluded from oversight.

The respondents countered that the statutory language guarantees only physical presence, not a detailed right to scrutinise individual ballots or to participate in the process to a Dáil-style extent.

4.4.2 Factual findings on transparency

The court found that:
  • The Members’ Restaurant was cramped and the space for candidates and agents narrow.
  • Counts were conducted at:
    • an outer table (first preferences and repositories),
    • an inner table (subsequent count operations), and
    • a calculations table (complex quota and transfer computations).
  • At the first count, candidates and agents could see ballot papers being placed face up and checked; visibility was good.
  • During later counts, particularly at the inner and calculations tables:
    • candidates’ and agents’ line-of-sight was often obstructed or distant;
    • there was evidence of people “craning” to see what was happening;
    • no one raised a formal complaint or objection with the returning officer or staff at the time;
    • if such concerns had been raised, the returning officer was open to taking practical steps to ameliorate them.
  • The count was livestreamed online and to large screens in the room; media were present; results were continuously published.
  • All witnesses — including the petitioner — accepted that the count was conducted with care, diligence, integrity, and professionalism by experienced staff.

4.4.3 Legal assessment

While acknowledging that candidate oversight is an important facet of electoral transparency and “losers’ consent”, the court found:

  • The petitioner’s transparency evidence was “thin and uneven” and secondary to her grievance about the recount.
  • The fact that no issue was raised during the count or in later panels suggested that the difficulties were not perceived as fundamental at the time.
  • The petitioner herself accepted that it is not necessary to see every ballot being counted and that excessive close oversight could be “invasive” and disrupt the needed concentration at complex Seanad counts.
  • On a fair reading, the difficulties were intermittent and manageable, not a systematic exclusion from the count.

Accordingly, the court held that:

  • There was no breach of s.53(1) or Rule 13 proven.
  • The petitioner had not adduced “clear and cogent” evidence to demonstrate any “mistake or other irregularity” based on transparency.

Crucially, the court left open — for another case — the deeper question of how far the statutory right to be present at the count implies a right to active scrutiny or involvement in the process.

4.5 Court’s refusal to order a recount under Rule 7 (Third Schedule, 1992 Act)

Given its finding that no mistake or irregularity had been established, the court held that it would be wrong to order a recount on a “what-harm-could-it-do” or quasi-discovery basis:

  • Rule 7 is not a mechanism for a general recount on demand.
  • To trigger it, a petitioner must first establish an irregularity in the conduct of the election.

As this “initial hurdle” was not met, the court refused the application to count the votes afresh for the purpose of the trial.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 “Mistake or other irregularity likely to have affected the result”

To upset an election, a petitioner must show:

  1. A problem occurred — “mistake” (error in law, procedure or counting) or “other irregularity” (departure from the legal rules or sound practice); and
  2. The problem mattered — it was likely (more than merely possible) to have affected the result, i.e. it was not electorally trivial.

Mere suspicion, dissatisfaction, or speculation — especially where there is:

  • no identified counting error, and
  • no breach of a clear legal rule,

will normally be insufficient.

5.2 “Material effect” vs “likely to have affected”

  • Referenda (Jordan): the complainant must show the irregularity materially affected the result — essentially that there is a reasonable possibility the outcome could have been different.
  • Elections (s.132): the test is that the irregularity was likely to have affected the result — a somewhat lower threshold, but still requiring more than a remote or trivial possibility.

In both contexts, courts ask whether a reasonable person would continue to trust the result.

5.3 Recounts: Seanad vs Dáil

There are three main mechanisms:

  1. Candidate-requested recount of last count only:
    • Seanad (Rule 14(1), 1947 Act): a candidate may, as of right, ask for a re-examination and recount of all or any ballot papers dealt with during the last completed count. The RO must do this.
    • Dáil (s.125(1), 1992 Act): substantially the same.
  2. Returning officer’s recount discretion:
    • Seanad (Rule 14(2)): the RO can recount ballot papers (from any count) “either once or more often” only if he is not satisfied as to the accuracy of any count.
    • Dáil (s.125(2)): materially identical condition.
  3. Candidate’s right to one full recount (Dáil only):
    • Under s.125(3), each Dáil candidate has a right to one complete re-examination and recount of all parcels of ballot papers, subject to limited exceptions (e.g. frivolous/vexatious requests).
    • There is no equivalent provision for Seanad panel elections — a critical distinction confirmed in this judgment.

5.4 “Satisfaction” and judicial review of returning officers

Where legislation says an officer must be “satisfied” (e.g. about accuracy of a count), courts do not second-guess that decision merely because they might have decided differently. They will only intervene if:

  • the decision was not bona fide, or
  • was unreasonable in the sense of being beyond what any reasonable decision-maker could conclude, or
  • was factually unsustainable.

This “triple requirement” moderates the scope of judicial review, reflecting the idea of deference to returning officers on operational judgments, provided they stay within the legal framework.

5.5 “Losers’ consent”

“Losers’ consent” is a political science concept described by the expert witnesses:

  • Democracy depends not only on winners claiming victory, but also on losers accepting the result as legitimate.
  • Transparent counting processes and the availability of recounts where appropriate are important tools to secure this consent.

O’Higgins J acknowledges this normative importance but makes clear that legal rules and thresholds remain controlling: recounts and petitions cannot be granted purely to satisfy a disappointed candidate’s wish for additional reassurance, absent a qualifying mistake or irregularity.

6. Impact and Significance

6.1 For future Seanad panel elections

This judgment is now the key authority on Seanad recounts under Rule 14(2). Its main practical effects are:

  • No automatic right to a full recount in Seanad panel elections.
    • Candidates have an as-of-right recount only of the immediately preceding count (Rule 14(1)).
    • A full or broader recount under Rule 14(2) is conditional on the RO being not satisfied as to the accuracy of some aspect of the count.
  • Narrow margins alone are not enough:
    • Even extraordinarily tight margins, equivalent to fractions of a ballot, do not by themselves establish a “mistake or irregularity”.
    • Nor do they, alone, oblige the RO to order a recount, though they are a legitimate factor in the overall judgment.
  • Emphasis on contemporaneous objections:
    • Candidates concerned about venue, layout, line-of-sight, or access to calculations should raise those issues during the count.
    • Failure to complain at the time makes it harder later to argue that matters were so serious as to constitute an irregularity.

6.2 For electoral transparency and venue selection

The court accepts that:

  • Transparency is a core democratic value.
  • Observer distance from counting tables can significantly affect effective oversight.
  • The Members’ Restaurant is “relatively limited” and cramped, as The Electoral Commission has also noted.

Although the court stopped short of declaring the venue unsuitable in law, it implicitly invites:

  • the Oireachtas and relevant authorities to reconsider the physical arrangements for Seanad panel counts; and
  • future returning officers to strike a more considered balance between:
    • accuracy and concentration at complex counts, and
    • meaningful visibility for candidates and agents.

6.3 For election petitions generally

The judgment reaffirms several broader principles:

  • High evidential threshold: Petitioners must adduce clear and cogent evidence of a relevant irregularity, not merely dissatisfaction or speculative concerns.
  • Judicial restraint: Courts remain slow to unsettle election results, in deference to the constitutional significance of voters’ choices.
  • Limits on the petition procedure:
    • The petition is not a backdoor mechanism to obtain a recount in the absence of a proven irregularity.
    • Rule 7 powers to order a fresh count are not a form of preliminary discovery.
  • Comparative analysis across electoral regimes (Dáil, Seanad, referendums) is legitimate but cannot override the clear text of the specific statutory provisions governing each.

6.4 Open issues likely to generate future litigation

Several unresolved questions flagged by the court are likely to generate further case law:

  • Scope of s.53(2) objections: Must every ground later pleaded in a petition have been explicitly included in the written objection served before declaration of the result?
  • “Presence” vs “scrutiny”: How far does the right to be “present” at the count extend? Does it guarantee:
    • a right to observe specific steps?
    • a right to inspect calculation sheets?
    • a right to object in real-time to particular operations?
  • Recount as a remedy for pure legal error: Can a candidate seek a recount on the basis of a pure misinterpretation of law (for example, misapplying a transfer rule) without showing an immediate factual impact?
  • Interpretation of s.125 (Dáil recounts): Given the parallel language, future litigation may clarify whether the Feeney reasoning about conditional RO discretion under Rule 14(2) carries across to Dáil recounts in full, and how this interacts with the explicit right to one complete recount in s.125(3).

7. Conclusion

Feeney v Groves is a landmark High Court decision for Irish electoral law, especially in the specialised domain of Seanad panel elections. Its key contributions are:

  • It definitively interprets Rule 14(2) of the 1947 Act as requiring that the returning officer be not satisfied about the accuracy of some count before any recount (first or subsequent) can be ordered under that rule.
  • It confirms that Seanad candidates do not enjoy the same statutory right to one full recount as Dáil candidates do under s.125(3) of the 1992 Act.
  • It underscores the high evidential threshold for election petitions: transparency concerns, venue criticisms, or narrow margins, without more, will rarely suffice to establish a “mistake or other irregularity”.
  • It affirms a measure of deference to returning officers on operational decisions — such as whether they remain “satisfied” as to the accuracy of a count — provided the legal framework is properly applied and the decision is bona fide, rational, and factually sustainable.

At the same time, the judgment recognises the democratic importance of transparency, candidate oversight, and recounts for the legitimacy of close contests and for “losers’ consent”. It signals, albeit cautiously, that improvements to venues, layouts, and procedural guidance may be desirable to enhance visibility and trust in Seanad counts.

In dismissing the petition, the court declined to decide several substantial questions on the scope of s.53 objections, the depth of the right to be present at counts, and the interpretation of Dáil recount provisions. These unresolved issues ensure that Feeney v Groves will not be the last word in this area, but it will be the starting point for any future litigation concerning recounts and transparency in Irish parliamentary elections.

Case Details

Comments