Express Motor Assessors Ltd (In Liquidation) v Revenue Commissioners [2025] IEHC 733: The Duty of the Tax Appeals Commission to Identify the “Prime Records” Underpinning its Findings on Emoluments

1. Introduction

This High Court judgment in Express Motor Assessors Limited (In Liquidation) v Revenue Commissioners [2025] IEHC 733 is an appeal by way of case stated from a determination of the Tax Appeals Commission (“TAC”). The appeal arose under s.949AQ of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (“TCA 1997”) and concerned whether certain sums characterised as “motor expenses” or “mileage” paid or accrued to a director of Express Motor Assessors Limited (“Express Motors”) constituted taxable emoluments subject to PAYE, PRSI, USC and employer’s PRSI.

While the substantive tax issue related to the treatment of directors’ mileage/motor expenses for 2015 and 2016, the true significance of the judgment lies elsewhere. Mr Justice Conor Dignam:

reaffirmed the well-established allocation of the burden of proof in Irish tax appeals (resting squarely on the taxpayer), and
identified a discrete error of law in the TAC determination: the Commissioner relied on unspecified “prime records” but did not identify them, thereby depriving the taxpayer (and the High Court) of knowledge of the evidential basis for key findings.

Because of that omission, the Court held that it could not properly perform its supervisory function on a case stated and therefore remitted the matter to the TAC under s.949AR TCA 1997. In doing so, the Court largely upheld the Commissioner’s approach to the burden of proof, to the evaluation of evidence, and to the classification of the disputed payments as emoluments, but considered that one crucial step in the evidential chain was opaque and legally insufficient.

This commentary explains:

the background facts and the tax dispute,
the structure and outcome of the High Court decision,
the precedents and legal principles applied,
the reasoning on evidence, burden of proof, and “emoluments”, and
the broader implications for tax litigation, TAC practice, and company directors’ expense claims.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Background and the Issues

Express Motors was a motor assessor company whose business was accident damage reporting. The company’s directors were Mr Donal G. Daly and Mrs Mary Daly, and both Mr Daly and his daughter, Ms Annette Grayson, were employees. The company entered voluntary liquidation on 11 November 2016 and Mr Stephen Doran was appointed liquidator.

Following a Revenue audit for 2014–2016, Revenue raised additional assessments in respect of VAT and PAYE/PRSI/USC for 2015 and 2016. After the TAC hearing, Revenue accepted there was no additional VAT liability. The remaining live issue before the TAC concerned PAYE/PRSI/USC in relation to alleged mileage/motor expenses for the director, in the net amounts of:

€5,939 in 2015; and
€21,008 in 2016.

The TAC determined that both amounts were emoluments paid to Mr Daly and were accordingly subject to PAYE, PRSI, USC and employer’s PRSI. The liquidator, on behalf of the company, appealed that determination to the High Court by way of case stated. The stated question was whether the Appeal Commissioner was “correct in law” in treating those net amounts as emoluments subject to PAYE etc.

2.2 Outcome

The High Court’s core conclusions can be summarised as follows:

Burden of proof remains on the taxpayer in tax appeals. The TAC correctly applied this principle (paras 6–7, 29, 41–43).
On most criticisms of the TAC’s handling of evidence (e.g. the treatment of “motor expenses” as “mileage”, failure to adjourn, use of “Appendix A”, the inference that the amounts were emoluments), the High Court held that:
- the Commissioner’s findings were open to him on the evidence,
- his reasoning did not adopt an incorrect view of law, and
- his inferences were not ones which “no reasonable Commissioner could draw”.
However, the determination explicitly stated that the Commissioner had examined unspecified “prime records” beyond the nominal ledger and accounts (paras 37–38 of the determination), and that these records formed part of the basis of his conclusion. The Commissioner:
- did not identify which documents constituted those “prime records”, and
- did not say what in those records led him to his conclusion regarding the 2015 and 2016 amounts (para 50).
This omission prevented both the company and the High Court from understanding the evidential foundation of the decision.
That failure amounted to an error of law, because on a case stated the Court must know the evidential basis for the TAC’s findings in order to decide whether there was “no evidence” for them or whether the inferences drawn were unreasonable.
Exercising its power under s.949AR TCA 1997, the High Court therefore:
- remitted the matter back to the TAC,
- with the Court’s opinion on the other issues raised,
- leaving it to the TAC to decide whether to reconsider the matter or issue a revised determination (para 53).

In substance, the Court confirms and reinforces:

that taxpayers bear a heavy evidential burden in challenging Revenue assessments, and
that the TAC must clearly identify the documentary basis (“prime records”) for its findings when those records are said to underpin the determination.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Procedural Framework: Tax Appeals and Case Stated

Two procedural regimes frame the judgment:

Tax appeals to the TAC: These are statutory appeals where the taxpayer challenges an assessment. The TAC conducts an enquiry, not a full-blown civil trial, and the burden of proof lies on the taxpayer to show that the assessment is excessive or that the relevant tax is not payable (para 7; Menolly Homes).
Case stated to the High Court (s.949AQ, s.949AR TCA 1997): The TAC may state a case for the opinion of the High Court on a question of law only. The High Court:
- cannot re-try the case or reweigh evidence as if on appeal de novo,
- can intervene if the TAC misdirects itself on the law, misinterprets documents, or draws inferences that no reasonable commissioner could draw, or
- can remit the case back to the TAC (s.949AR) if necessary.

These principles are drawn from well-established case law:

Mara (Inspector of Taxes) v Hummingbird Ltd [1982] ILRM 421;
DA MacCarthaigh v Cablelink Ltd [2003] 4 IR 510;
Ó Culacháin v McMullan Brothers [1995] 2 IR 217;
Proes v Revenue Commissioners [1998] 4 IR 174.

The High Court therefore approached the TAC’s determination along two axes:

Were the legal principles applied correctly (burden of proof, concept of “emolument”, year of assessment)?
Were the inferences from the primary facts ones that a reasonable Appeal Commissioner could draw, on an identified evidential basis?

3.2 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

3.2.1 Menolly Homes v Appeal Commissioners [2010] IEHC 49

Charleton J’s decision in Menolly Homes is central (para 7). It establishes that:

in tax appeals, the burden of proof that “the amount due is excessive” is on the taxpayer;
the appeal is an enquiry by the Appeal Commissioners as to whether the taxpayer has shown that the tax is not payable, not a plenary civil hearing;
Revenue may be obliged, under their own Customer Service Charter, to provide information enabling taxpayers to understand their obligations, but this does not translate into a right to discovery in the usual civil litigation sense.

This precedent underpins the High Court’s insistence that:

Express Motors had to show, with evidence, that the disputed sums were not taxable emoluments; and
complaints about lack of fully reconciled Revenue explanations or reconciliations did not shift that evidential burden back onto Revenue.

3.2.2 T.J. v Criminal Assets Bureau [2008] IEHC 168

Cited via Menolly Homes, Gilligan J’s decision in T.J. v CAB emphasised the self-assessment nature of the Irish tax system and the limited role of discovery in tax appeals. Taxpayers are presumed to know their own income and gains and to be best placed to prepare computations.

In this case, that rationale works against Express Motors. Because:

Mr Daly and Ms Grayson were internal actors with direct knowledge of the expense and mileage systems,
yet they were not called (or not called on the relevant issues) before the TAC,
the liquidator’s reconstruction from records and hearsay discussions with the accountant was inherently weaker.

This reinforced the Commissioner’s and the Court’s view that the taxpayer had not discharged the burden of proof.

3.2.3 Mara v Hummingbird Ltd; Cablelink; Ó Culacháin; Proes

The Court set out and adopted the orthodox approach to case stated appeals (paras 9–11), particularly the distinctions drawn by Kenny J in Mara v Hummingbird and by Blayney J in Ó Culacháin, endorsed by the Supreme Court in Cablelink:

Primary facts: Findings on basic factual matters are not to be disturbed unless there is “no evidence whatever” to support them.
Inferences from facts (mixed law and fact):
- if based on document interpretation, the High Court is in as good a position as the TAC and may substitute its own view on meaning,
- if the inferences drawn are ones which no reasonable commissioner could have drawn, the Court may intervene,
- if the conclusions show a wrong view of the law, they must be set aside.

These principles shaped the Court’s restraint in revisiting most of the Commissioner’s factual findings. The only substantial intervention arose not from disagreement with the inferences themselves, but from the Commissioner’s failure to identify the evidential materials (prime records) which informed those inferences.

3.3 Factual Matrix and Evidence Before the TAC

3.3.1 The 2015 amount: €5,939

The TAC found that:

a payment of €5,939 was made to Mr Daly in February 2015,
it was recorded in the nominal ledger as a debit to “motor expenses” (though the Commissioner mistakenly said “cheque” rather than “DD”),
the company owned the car used by Mr Daly for business, and bore all acquisition and running costs,
the company did not demonstrate that this payment was anything other than a tax-free mileage/motor expense, and hence it was an emolument (paras 39–42, 22–21 of the case stated).

The company’s position was that:

the ledger entry did not prove this was a “mileage” payment (it was labelled “motor expenses”),
the payment may have related to accruals for earlier periods,
the Commissioner had mischaracterised the nature and timing of the payment.

3.3.2 The 2016 amount: €21,008

For the 2016 year, the controversy centred not on an actual cash payment in-year but on an accrual of €21,007.73 (rounded to €21,008) recorded in the nominal ledger as “motor expenses owed” to Mr Daly. According to the company’s evidence (primarily via the liquidator):

this journal entry was an incorrect accrual intended to update unclaimed subsistence and other expenses (including, but not exclusively, mileage),
it over-accrued motor expenses by €17,304,
the over-accrual was reversed post year-end (reflected in amended corporation tax computations),
there was no drawdown of the over-accrued amount by the directors,
in fact, on liquidation Mr Daly had to pay the liquidator €14,198 for the purchase of his car, as there were insufficient director’s credits to offset the price.

The TAC, however, concluded that:

the accounts for the year ended 30 April 2016 recorded a liability of €21,008 to Mr Daly under “motor expenses”,
this liability was discharged by way of a contra entry in Mr Daly’s director’s current account in November 2016, when he purchased company assets on liquidation,
the subsequent overdrawn director’s account was then settled by Mr Daly’s payment in March 2018,
accordingly, Mr Daly had been paid untaxed motor/mileage expenses, and the company had not discharged the burden of showing otherwise (paras 58–65 of the determination; 22–25 of the case stated).

3.3.3 Nature of the evidence and notable absences

The only live witnesses before the TAC were:

the liquidator, Mr Doran, for the company,
Ms Grayson (but only in respect of her own mileage), and
Mr Peter Wall for Revenue.

Critically, the following were not called to give evidence on the key disputed matters:

Mr Donal Daly, the director whose mileage and account entries were in issue, despite Revenue’s assessment having been based on meticulous mileage records said to have been kept by him (para 41);
the company’s accountant, who had allegedly explained to the liquidator the nature of the accrual errors; and
Ms Grayson, in her capacity as bookkeeper/“previous accountant”, regarding the treatment of the disputed expenses and the alleged reversal of accruals.

Instead, the liquidator’s evidence relied heavily on:

his own analysis of the nominal ledger and other records, and
what he had been told by the accountant (i.e. hearsay not tested in cross-examination).

The TAC (and later the High Court) attached great significance to this evidential deficit when assessing whether the company had discharged the burden of proof.

3.4 High Court’s Treatment of the Grounds of Appeal

3.4.1 “Appendix A” and alleged lack of probative value

The company argued that the Commissioner improperly relied on a table labelled “Appendix A”, which:

was not a prime record,
was prepared without the company’s input, and
allegedly had no probative value.

The Court rejected this (paras 25–26):

The Commissioner did not treat Appendix A as evidence. Rather, it was a summary document, setting out in tabular form his understanding of the evidence and his analysis.
The actual evidential basis lay in the nominal ledger and oral testimony; Appendix A simply encapsulated his conclusions.
Therefore, there was no error in preparing such a summary without the company’s participation.

3.4.2 Cheque vs direct debit; “motor expenses” vs “mileage expenses”

The company pointed out that:

for the 2015 amount, the nominal ledger showed a payment of €5,939 by “DD” (interpreted as direct debit), not by cheque; and
the ledger description was “motor expenses”, not “mileage expenses”.

The Court accepted the technical error about the method of payment (para 28) but considered it immaterial: the substantive issue was whether a payment was made, not whether it was by cheque or direct debit.

On the “motor vs mileage” distinction, the Court held (paras 29, 47):

There was ample evidence that:
- Mr Daly’s car was owned by the company and all running and acquisition costs were borne by the company (unchallenged), and
- Revenue’s assessment had been based on detailed mileage records meticulously kept by Mr Daly (para 33 of the determination).
In those circumstances, it was reasonable for the TAC to infer that the “motor expenses” credited to Mr Daly’s account were, in substance, mileage-type payments to him, rather than general car costs already borne by the company.
Accordingly, the Commissioner’s categorisation of the disputed amounts as emoluments was open to him on the evidence and did not disclose an error of law.

3.4.3 Identification of the “conflict of evidence”

The company complained that the Commissioner referred to a “conflict of evidence” (para 36 of the determination) without specifying what that conflict was. The Court dismissed this argument (para 30).

The conflict was plain:

Revenue’s witness said that Mr Daly kept meticulous mileage records and that the company’s accounts reflected mileage expenses calculated and credited to his director’s account; whereas,
the liquidator insisted that no mileage expenses were paid to Mr Daly in the relevant periods.

That was the very issue to be resolved, and the Commissioner had correctly identified it.

3.4.4 Failure to adjourn to investigate the €5,939 figure

The company argued that, because the specific figure of €5,939 had not been highlighted before the TAC hearing, the Commissioner should have adjourned the case and conducted a further enquiry (para 23(v)).

The Court noted (para 31) that:

the liquidator did not seek an adjournment for that purpose,
indeed, an adjournment was offered by the Commissioner for other reasons and was declined, and
although the TAC has the power to summon witnesses and further evidence, it is not obliged to conduct independent investigations in the absence of any request from the taxpayer.

Accordingly, there was no procedural error or breach of fairness in the failure to adjourn.

3.4.5 “Picture of what probably occurred”

The company criticised the Commissioner’s comment (para 40 of the determination) that “we have a picture of what probably occurred” in 2015, arguing that he did not in fact set out that picture.

The Court held (para 32) that the determination must be read holistically. When read with the surrounding paragraphs and the case stated, the Commissioner’s understanding of events can be discerned. Any lack of stylistic clarity did not amount to an error of law.

3.4.6 Reversal of accruals and the €21,008 amount

The company’s core arguments on the €21,008 amount (points (i)–(iii) at para 40) were that:

the Commissioner had misunderstood the accounting,
he failed to appreciate that the €21,008 was an erroneous over-accrual reversed after year-end, and
he wrongly found that the amount was included as an expense in the profit and loss account and paid/discharged to Mr Daly.

However, the Court considered that these criticisms suffered from a “fatal flaw” (paras 41–43): the company never called the primary witnesses who could have clarified the accounting treatment and the reality of any payments:

Mr Daly (the director and supposed recipient),
Ms Grayson (the “account keeper” and “previous accountant”), and
the company’s accountant (if different).

This omission was particularly stark because:

the Revenue’s assessment itself was based on information said to have been provided by Mr Daly; yet,
no explanation was given for his absence as a witness.

The Court stressed (para 42) that in situations where:

there is a challenge to documentary records (nominal ledger entries, accounts), and
the taxpayer claims there were errors in those records and subsequent reversals,

the appropriate way to discharge the burden of proof is to adduce evidence from those who:

created or approved the entries, or
received or did not receive the alleged payments.

In the absence of that “best available” evidence, and given there was documentary support (nominal ledger; mileage records) for the Commissioner’s conclusions, the Court held:

the TAC was entitled to find that the company had not discharged the burden of proof, and
the company had not shown that the Commissioner’s inferences were unreasonable.

3.4.7 Objection to the general ledger / reversal evidence

The liquidator complained that he had been prevented from introducing evidence (emails/general ledger) proving the reversal of accruals. The Court found (para 45) that this was factually inaccurate:

Revenue objected to the admission of the evidence at the time,
the Commissioner indicated that it could be revisited later (“if you can see if we can reintroduce it in the afternoon or at a later stage”),
the liquidator himself then chose not to pursue it: “Okay, so we won’t have it. It’s fine.”

Thus, there was no ruling excluding the evidence by the Commissioner. The failure to adduce it was effectively the taxpayer’s decision, not a procedural unfairness.

3.4.8 Use of conditional “if the director…”

The company criticised the Commissioner’s phrasing: “If the director Mr Daly purchased the company assets…” (para 61 of the determination), arguing that this indicated no actual finding was made.

The Court regarded this as a drafting point only (para 48):

The Commissioner was clearly summarising the liquidator’s accepted account of what happened on liquidation.
The “if” signalled logical reasoning (“if X happened as described, then Y follows”), not doubt about whether X actually occurred.
There was therefore no failure to make findings of fact.

3.5 Burden of Proof and Failure to Call Primary Witnesses

A striking feature of the judgment is the Court’s strong emphasis on the taxpayer’s evidential obligations in tax appeals, beyond the mere citation of Menolly Homes. Three points stand out:

Burden remains on the taxpayer throughout. The Commissioner had correctly framed the issue as whether the taxpayer had shown that the disputed payments were not emoluments. The High Court endorsed this approach repeatedly (e.g. paras 29–30, 64).
Failure to call key witnesses is a serious tactical and evidential error. The Court pointedly described the absence of evidence from Mr Daly and Ms Grayson as “particularly striking” (para 41), especially given that:
- they were available,
- one of them (Ms Grayson) was actually present and did give limited evidence on other matters, and
- an adjournment had been offered to secure Mr Daly’s attendance and was declined.
Where the best evidence is inexplicably withheld, tribunals may rely more heavily on documentary records and Revenue’s case. The Court observed that decision-makers sometimes must determine matters on imperfect evidence; but, as a first step, there must be an explanation for why the best evidence is not available (para 42). Here there was no explanation.

This confirms a practical rule for future tax appellants: if you intend to argue that your own accounting records, ledger entries, or self-reported mileage are incorrect or misinterpreted, you must:

call the persons who prepared or authorised those records, or
at least explain why they cannot be called.

Absent such evidence, the High Court is unlikely to find an error of law in the TAC’s preference for the written records and Revenue’s interpretation.

3.6 The Identified Error of Law: Failure to Identify the “Prime Records”

The critical legal error identified by the High Court, applicable to both the 2015 and 2016 amounts, is procedural and evidential rather than substantive.

3.6.1 What did the Commissioner say?

At paras 37–38 of his determination, the Commissioner stated:

that he had examined “nominal ledger entries from books of first entry used to support the annual accounts”, and
that it was “necessary to examine the make-up of these amounts from the prime records submitted to TAC”.

The Commissioner therefore indicated that:

he had gone beyond the nominal ledger and annual accounts; and
he had relied on some unspecified “prime records” (books of first entry) to verify and understand the “motor expenses” figures.

However:

he did not identify what those prime records were (e.g. invoices, bank records, mileage logs, petty cash books, etc.), and
he did not specify which entries or features within those records supported his ultimate conclusions.

There was also an apparent inconsistency: in the case stated (para 20), he appeared to base his conclusion regarding the €5,939 payment on the nominal ledger alone, whereas the determination pointed to yet further prime records (para 50).

3.6.2 Why does this matter in law?

On a case stated, the High Court must be able to identify:

the primary facts as found by the TAC, and
the evidence which supports those findings.

Only then can it apply the Mara v Hummingbird / Cablelink framework:

If there was no evidence capable of supporting a particular finding, that is an error of law.
If there was some evidence, but the conclusion drawn from it is so unreasonable that no reasonable commissioner could have drawn it, that too is an error of law.
Otherwise, the findings must stand.

But where the Commissioner says, in effect, “I have based my decision on certain key documents (prime records)”, yet does not identify those documents:

the taxpayer cannot know which evidence weighed against it,
the High Court cannot assess whether there was “no evidence” or insufficient evidence, and
the Court cannot meaningfully apply the Mara / Cablelink tests.

Dignam J therefore concluded (paras 50–52):

the Commissioner was entitled to rely on prime records, but
he was required to identify them and explain their relevance at least to the degree needed for appellate scrutiny, and
his failure to do so created an insuperable obstacle to the High Court’s case-stated review.

This failure is characterised as an error of law, not because the Commissioner’s factual conclusion is necessarily wrong, but because:

the legal requirement of reasoned, reviewable decision-making in a statutory appeal process was not met.

3.6.3 Remedy: remittal under s.949AR TCA 1997

Section 949AR empowers the High Court, on a case stated, to:

reverse, affirm or amend the TAC’s determination, or
remit the matter to the Commissioner with its opinion.

Given:

the absence of clearly identified prime records,
the impossibility of evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence relied on, and
the Court’s rejection of the company’s other challenges,

the High Court chose to remit the matter to the TAC (para 53), leaving the Commissioner to decide whether:

to reconsider the matter with proper identification of the underlying documents, or
to issue a revised determination clarifying the evidential basis.

This approach preserves:

the TAC’s primary fact-finding role, and
the High Court’s function as a supervisory court confined to questions of law.

3.7 The Concept of Emoluments and Mileage Payments

The substantive tax principle applied by the TAC, and approved in broad terms by the High Court, is straightforward but important for directors and companies.

3.7.1 Definition of “emoluments”

Regulation 112 of the Income Tax (Employments) (Consolidated) Regulations 2001 and s.983 TCA 1997 define “emoluments” to include anything assessable to tax under Schedule E (employment income).

The Commissioner and the Court accepted that:

“emoluments” can include salary, wages, fees, perquisites, and benefits-in-kind, and
expenses or allowances paid to an employee/director may be emoluments if they represent non-reimbursed income rather than a strict reimbursement of business costs.

3.7.2 Mileage and company cars

The Commissioner stated (para 41 of the determination, para 63 repeating in the context of 2016) that:

Payment made tax free to a director in the circumstances that the director when using a company car, the cost of its acquisition and running costs having being borne by the company, amounts to an emolument in the hands of the director.

The High Court saw no error of law in that statement. The logic is:

If a company:
- owns the car used by the director, and
- pays for all fuel, insurance, maintenance and other running costs,
then any additional mileage or “motor” payments to the director, not vouched as pure reimbursement of out-of-pocket business expenditure, are properly treated as taxable employment income.

In short, “mileage” or “motor expenses” paid in cash or credited to a director, where the company already bears all vehicle costs, will generally be emoluments unless the taxpayer proves otherwise.

3.7.3 Timing: s.985 TCA 1997

Section 985 TCA 1997 provides that salary and other payments earned in an earlier year but paid in a later year are taxed:

by way of deduction at source (PAYE, USC, etc.),
in the year of payment, not in the year when earned or accrued.

Thus:

the €5,939 payment (though said to relate to 2014 mileage) was taxable in 2015, when actually paid (para 19–21 of the case stated); and
the €21,008 accrual, if discharged by a contra entry in November 2016, would be taxable in 2016, as the year of “payment” within the PAYE system.

The Court endorsed the Commissioner’s application of this timing rule.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Some of the key legal and accounting concepts used in the judgment, explained in plainer language:

4.1 “Emoluments”

“Emoluments” means anything you get from your job that can be taxed like salary. It includes:

your regular pay,
bonuses, commissions, fees,
benefits like free housing or a company car, and
certain expense payments or allowances if they are not just reimbursement of business costs.

4.2 PAYE, PRSI, USC, Employer’s PRSI

PAYE (Pay As You Earn): income tax deducted by the employer from the employee’s pay.
PRSI: social insurance contributions payable by employees.
USC: Universal Social Charge, an additional tax on gross income.
Employer’s PRSI: the employer’s own social insurance contribution on the employee’s pay.

4.3 “Schedule E”

Under Irish tax law, income tax is divided into “Schedules”. “Schedule E” is the schedule that covers employment income – pay and benefits from an office or job, including directors’ fees and benefits.

4.4 “Case Stated”

A “case stated” is a formal way for a tribunal (here, the TAC) to ask the High Court for guidance on a point of law that arises in a case it has decided. The tribunal:

sets out the facts it has found,
sets out the evidence it relied on, and
asks the Court: “Was I right in law to decide as I did, on these facts?”

The Court does not re-hear the case or take new evidence. It only:

checks whether the tribunal applied the law correctly, and
checks that its factual conclusions had some evidence to support them.

4.5 Burden of Proof in Tax Appeals

In a tax appeal, the taxpayer has to prove that the tax assessment is wrong or too high. Revenue does not have to prove that the assessment is right at the outset. If the taxpayer does not bring good evidence, the assessment stands.

4.6 “Prime Records” vs “Nominal Ledger”

Prime records (or “books of first entry”) are the original documents where transactions are first recorded – for example:
- invoices, receipts, bank statements, mileage books, petty cash books, etc.
The nominal ledger is an accounting summary built from those prime records. It shows totals and categories (e.g. “motor expenses”) but not necessarily the underlying detail.

In this case, the Commissioner said he looked at prime records but did not say which ones. The High Court held that he should have identified them.

4.7 “Accruals” and “Contra Entries”

Accruals: amounts recognised in the accounts as expenses or liabilities even if they have not yet been paid. For example, if an employee has earned expenses but has not submitted a claim by year-end, the company may include an accrual for “expenses owed”.
Contra entry: an accounting entry where instead of paying cash, the company offsets one amount against another. For example, if a director is owed €10,000 for expenses but also owes the company €10,000 for buying a company car, the accounts may show:
- a debit (purchase of car) and
- a credit (expenses owed),
cancelling each other out. The director’s current account reflects this netting-off.

4.8 Liquidation and the Liquidator

Liquidation: the process of winding up a company, selling its assets, paying its debts, and distributing any remainder to shareholders.
Liquidator: the person appointed to manage that process. The liquidator does not personally know what happened before their appointment; they must reconstruct events from the company’s records and from talking to those previously involved.

5. Impact and Future Significance

5.1 For the Tax Appeals Commission

This judgment has direct implications for how the TAC drafts determinations and case-stated documents:

When a determination relies on documentary evidence – especially “prime records” – the Commissioner must:
- identify those documents with reasonable specificity, and
- explain, at least briefly, how they support the key findings.
Failure to do so may be treated by the High Court as an error of law justifying remittal, not because the factual conclusion is wrong, but because the court cannot perform its supervisory role.
Summary aids such as “Appendix A” are unobjectionable, but cannot replace a clear statement of what evidence underpins the summary.

Practically, TAC determinations (and especially case-stated documents) are likely to:

be drafted with more explicit cross-references to exhibits and pages,
link each critical finding to specific primary documents and/or witness testimony, and
avoid ambiguous references to “prime records” without specification.

5.2 For Taxpayers and Their Advisers

The judgment reinforces several strategic lessons for taxpayers:

Burden of proof is demanding. It is not enough to attack Revenue’s calculations or to suggest that accounts “might” be wrong; you must produce clear, primary evidence of the correct position.
Call the key witnesses. If an assessment is based on:
- a director’s mileage records,
- the company’s internal ledgers, or
- an accountant’s year-end journal entries,
then the director, bookkeeper, and/or accountant should usually be called to give evidence. If they are not called, an explanation should be given.
Do not assume the TAC will investigate for you. While TAC has powers to summon witnesses and documents, it is primarily for the taxpayer (who carries the burden) to marshal and present the evidence.
Document and prove any alleged accounting errors or reversals. If you claim that an accrual was a mistake or was later reversed, you should:
- produce the relevant general ledger entries,
- show the amended tax returns, and
- have the accountant explain the corrections in evidence.

5.3 For Directors’ Mileage and Company Car Arrangements

From a substantive tax perspective, the decision underscores:

Where a company owns the vehicle and pays all its running costs,
any additional cash or credited payments to the director under headings like “motor expenses” or “mileage” are high-risk from a PAYE perspective.

Unless the taxpayer can clearly demonstrate that such payments are:

pure expense reimbursements for business journeys made in a privately-owned vehicle, and
calculated and recorded in a compliant way,

they are likely to be treated as emoluments subject to PAYE/PRSI/USC and employer’s PRSI.

5.4 For Appellate Practice and Case Stated Appeals

Finally, the judgment illustrates the High Court’s approach to the boundaries of its role on a case stated:

The Court is reluctant to interfere with the TAC’s evaluation of evidence and inferences, provided they are reasonably open on an identified evidential basis.
However, the Court will intervene where:
- the decision-maker has not made it sufficiently clear what evidence they relied on, particularly where they refer to unnamed “prime records”, or
- their reasons are so sparse that appellate review is effectively impossible.

This sets a clear procedural standard for administrative and quasi-judicial tribunals whose decisions are subject to case-stated review.

6. Conclusion

Express Motor Assessors Ltd (In Liquidation) v Revenue Commissioners is not a dramatic re-shaping of Irish tax law on directors’ expenses; rather, it is an important clarification of the procedural obligations of the Tax Appeals Commission and the evidential burdens on taxpayers challenging assessments.

Key takeaways include:

The burden of proof in tax appeals firmly remains with the taxpayer. Assertions of accounting mistakes or non-payments must be backed by cogent evidence, including testimony from those directly involved.
The TAC’s classification of untaxed “motor” or mileage payments to a director – in circumstances where the company already bears all car costs – as emoluments aligns with established statutory definitions and was broadly endorsed by the Court.
Most significantly for future practice, an Appeal Commissioner who relies on “prime records” must identify those records and indicate how they support the findings. Otherwise, the High Court cannot properly discharge its role on a case stated, and the determination may have to be remitted.

The decision thus reinforces the dual imperatives of:

rigorous, transparent reasoning by tribunals, enabling meaningful appellate review, and
careful evidential preparation by taxpayers and advisers when seeking to overturn Revenue assessments, particularly in relation to directors’ expense claims and company accounts.

In combination, these principles will continue to shape the conduct of tax disputes in Ireland, both before the TAC and on appeal to the High Court.