Exhaustion of Remedies and Public‑Policy Objections under Brussels I Recast: Commentary on Scully v Coucal [2025] IESC 51

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Ireland’s decision in Scully v Coucal [2025] IESC 51 lies at the intersection of EU private international law and the EU’s ongoing concerns about the rule of law and judicial independence in certain Member States. The Court was asked to decide whether an Irish court may refuse to recognise judgments of a Polish appellate court under Article 45(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 (“the Brussels I Recast Regulation”) on the basis that one member of the foreign appellate panel was a seconded judge whose status was later criticised in EU case law.

The judgment of Murray J (with whom the rest of the Court concurred on this point) goes beyond the specific controversy about Polish judicial secondments. It articulates a general and important principle: a party resisting recognition of a judgment under Article 45(1)(a) will normally be precluded from relying on a public‑policy objection that could and should have been raised before the courts of the Member State of origin. Only in narrow, exceptional circumstances—where raising the issue in the State of origin was impossible or unduly difficult, or where it was raised but dealt with in a manner that itself offends public policy—will such objections be entertained by the courts of the Member State addressed.

The case thus crystallises, in Irish Supreme Court authority, an “exhaustion of remedies” requirement for public‑policy defenses under the Brussels I Recast, with particular consequences for objections based on the composition or independence of the foreign tribunal.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The Polish proceedings

The underlying litigation was conducted in Poland. A decision was given by the Regional Court in Warsaw on 25 July 2018. The respondent before the Supreme Court, Michael Scully, appealed to the Court of Appeal in Warsaw.

The appeal was heard by a three‑judge panel. One of those judges, Judge Anna Strączyńska, was not a permanent judge of the Court of Appeal but a judge of the Regional Court in Warsaw who had been seconded to the Court of Appeal by the Polish Minister for Justice pursuant to Article 77 of the Law of 27 July 2001 on the Organisation of the Ordinary Courts [para. 1].

Murray J notes several factual matters about this secondment regime and its manifestation in this case:

The identity of the three judges hearing the appeal was known or ascertainable before the hearing [para. 1].
It was a matter of public record that Judge Strączyńska was a seconded judge from the Regional Court [para. 1].
Judges in civil cases were allocated randomly by an IT tool; the composition of the panel was apparent from the court file and docket; and where a seconded judge had been assigned, this was made clear in the records [para. 1].
It was “generally the practice” for lawyers to check the composition of the panel prior to the appellate hearing [para. 1].

Crucially, it was also “a matter of law” that the secondment:

could be made on the basis of criteria that were not made public,
was for an indeterminate period, and
could be revoked at any time [para. 1].

The Warsaw Court of Appeal delivered orders on 10 June 2021 and 7 July 2021. One of these orders (relevant for the Irish proceedings) refused a stay on the execution of the lower‑court judgment [para. 9].

2.2 The Irish recognition proceedings

The appellant in the Supreme Court, Coucal Limited, sought recognition and enforcement in Ireland of the Polish appellate decisions under:

Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 (“the Recast Regulation”),
Order 42A rule 23(4) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, and
S.I. No. 9/2016 (which implements aspects of the Recast Regulation in Irish procedural law).

Michael Scully resisted recognition, invoking Article 45(1)(a) of the Recast Regulation, which allows the court of the Member State addressed (here, Ireland) to refuse recognition if recognition would be manifestly contrary to public policy in that State.

His objection centred on the presence of Judge Strączyńska on the appellate panel. He argued that her secondment—particularly in light of later EU case law criticising aspects of the Polish system of judicial secondments—undermined the independence and impartiality of the tribunal and thereby his right to a fair trial. That, he contended, engaged Irish and EU public policy to such a degree that recognition of the resulting appellate judgments must be refused.

A critical feature of the case is that no objection to Judge Strączyńska’s participation was raised before the Warsaw Court of Appeal itself. This failure became the focal point of Murray J’s analysis.

3. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

3.1 The central question

The Court framed the issue in direct terms:

“The question now arises as to whether the respondent, not having objected to Judge Strączyńska participating in the disposition of his appeal … can now invoke Article 45(1)(a) … as a basis on which the courts in this jurisdiction should refuse to recognise the resulting orders of the Appeal Court … on the ground that they were contaminated by Judge Strączyńska’s membership of the panel that decided his appeal.” [para. 2]

Murray J described the proposition that such an objection could first be raised in Ireland, rather than in Poland, as “on its face … a surprising one” [para. 3].

3.2 The Court’s core holding

The Court held, in substance, that:

Under the Recast Regulation, and in light of the principle of mutual trust, public‑policy objections under Article 45(1)(a) must, as a general rule, be raised before the courts of the Member State of origin if that is possible.
The enforcement court (Ireland) should normally only entertain a public‑policy challenge to a judgment of another Member State where either:
(a) the challenge could not have been raised before the court issuing the judgment, or
(b) the challenge was raised, but for reasons which themselves represent a public‑policy objection to enforcement, it was rejected by the trial court in a manner that cannot be remedied on appeal in the Member State of origin [para. 7].
In the present case, Scully could have raised an objection to the composition of the appellate panel (including Judge Strączyńska’s secondment) before the Warsaw Court of Appeal, but did not do so.
None of his proposed explanations for that failure satisfied the Court that he fell within either of the exceptional categories in para. 7.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the respondent was precluded from relying in Ireland on the alleged unlawfulness of the secondment to resist recognition of the Polish appellate judgments.

Murray J added that, in any event, he agreed with Hogan J that the secondment did not, for the reasons set out in Hogan J’s separate judgment, affect the validity or enforceability of the Warsaw Court of Appeal’s judgment [para. 11]. Thus, even on the merits, the public‑policy objection failed.

3.3 The new procedural filter

The most significant doctrinal innovation is Murray J’s articulation of a procedural filter on Article 45(1)(a) objections. The Court essentially translates CJEU authority and prior Irish case law into a clear, jurisdiction‑specific rule:

“… courts should normally only entertain a public policy challenge to such a judgment where either (a) the challenge could not have been raised before the court issuing the judgment, or (b) that challenge was raised but for reasons which themselves represent a public policy objection to enforcement they were rejected by the trial court, that refusal not being capable of being remedied on appeal in the courts of the Member State of origin.” [para. 7]

This is the new precedent of general application that emerges from Scully v Coucal.

4. Precedents and Authorities Relied Upon

4.1 The Brussels I Recast Regulation (Regulation 1215/2012)

The Court’s reasoning is anchored in the structure and purposes of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, which governs jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters between EU Member States.

Key features relevant here include:

Automatic recognition: Article 36(1) provides that a judgment given in a Member State “shall be recognised in the other Member States without any special procedure being required”.
Swift enforcement: Articles 39–44 facilitate direct enforcement with minimal formalities.
Limited grounds for refusal: Article 45(1) sets out an exhaustive list of grounds on which recognition may be refused. The two relevant provisions are:
- Article 45(1)(a): manifest contrariety to the public policy of the Member State addressed.
- Article 45(1)(b): specific protection for defendants not properly served in default‑of‑appearance judgments.
Mutual trust: The Recast reflects the principle that Member States’ courts trust one another to provide equivalent levels of justice, so judgments circulate freely.

Murray J emphasises that refusal of recognition under Article 45 must be wholly exceptional, given the Regulation’s design and purpose [para. 3].

4.2 CJEU authority: Meroni and Diageo Brands

4.2.1 Meroni v Recoletos Ltd (Case C‑559/14)

In Meroni, the Court of Justice considered the recognition in Spain of a UK judgment. It held that the Recast Regulation (and its predecessors) is “based on the fundamental idea that individuals are required, in principle, to use all the legal remedies made available by the law of the Member State of origin” [para. 5, quoting para. 48 of Meroni].

This principle supports:

The finality and authority of judgments of the Member State of origin;
The expectation that challenges to validity and fairness will be pursued (primarily) in the originating jurisdiction; and
The narrow scope of the grounds for refusing recognition in the Member State addressed.

Murray J expressly invokes this rule in para. 5 as a central plank of his reasoning.

4.2.2 Diageo Brands BV v Simiramida‑04 EOOD (Case C‑681/13)

In Diageo Brands, the CJEU reiterated and elaborated on the same idea. At para. 64 (quoted in para. 5 of Murray J’s judgment), it stated that:

“… save where specific circumstances make it too difficult or impossible to make use of the legal remedies in the Member State of origin, the individuals concerned must avail themselves of all the legal remedies available in that Member State with a view to preventing a breach of public policy before it occurs. That rule is all the more justified where the alleged breach of public policy stems … from an alleged infringement of EU law.”

Two aspects of this passage are fundamental:

Exhaustion principle: Parties must normally use all available remedies in the State of origin to prevent breaches of public policy.
“Too difficult or impossible” exception: Only if using those remedies is too difficult or impossible can a party circumvent that rule.

Murray J translates this directly into the Irish procedural context of Article 45(1)(a) challenges.

4.3 CJEU authority: WB and Others v Prokuratura Krajowa (Joined Cases C‑748/19 to C‑754/19)

WB and Others concerned the compatibility of certain aspects of the Polish system of judicial secondment with EU requirements of judicial independence. Although Murray J does not rehearse the entire CJEU reasoning, he notes that:

The decision “condemned the provisions enabling the secondment of judges in at least some cases” [para. 8].
It was delivered in November 2021, after the conclusion of the proceedings before the Warsaw Court of Appeal.

Scully argued that at the time of his appeal, the secondment scheme had a “lawful and valid” basis under Polish law, and only after WB and Others was it clear that such secondments were problematic under EU law. Murray J rejects this contention: the CJEU judgment may have confirmed the correctness of arguments that could have been made earlier, but it did not create the basis of the objection for the first time [para. 8].

Thus, EU law rights on judicial independence and fair trial existed prior to the CJEU’s interpretive clarification; they were not contingent on that decision. A party cannot justify inaction in the original proceedings simply on the ground that the CJEU had not yet spoken.

4.4 Irish authority: the Gwyn‑Jones v McDonald trilogy

Murray J also relies on his own earlier Court of Appeal judgments in the Gwyn‑Jones v McDonald series:

Gwyn‑Jones v McDonald (No. 1) [2021] IECA 206;
Gwyn‑Jones v McDonald (No. 2) [2021] IECA 303; and
Gwyn‑Jones v McDonald (No. 3) [2022] IECA 5.

In those cases, the Court of Appeal set out the contours of Article 45(1)(a) within Irish law, stressing that:

The public‑policy exception is exceptional in nature;
The principle of mutual trust between Member States’ courts demands deference to the originating court’s procedures and judgments;
Enforcement should be swift and efficient; and
The court of origin, applying its own law and procedures, is generally best placed to resolve issues touching the merits [para. 4, referring to specific paragraphs in Gwyn‑Jones].

In Scully, Murray J imports these themes into the Supreme Court’s articulation of the exhaustion principle.

4.5 English commercial authorities

4.5.1 Interdesco SA v Nullifire Ltd [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 180

Murray J refers to Phillips J’s observation in Interdesco that the courts of the State of origin are generally better placed than those of another State to determine the legal issues in question [para. 6]. That includes the ability to make any necessary reference to the CJEU, tailored to the facts and domestic law context.

4.5.2 Smith v Huertas [2015] EWHC 3745 (Comm)

He also cites Cooke J in Smith v Huertas, who described as “highly unattractive” the situation in which:

“… a defendant [does] not rais[e] points which he could have raised in the original jurisdiction … and only [seeks] to raise those matters when the judgment is exported to an enforcing jurisdiction … as matters of public policy for that Court.” [para. 6]

This concern about procedural ambush and fairness to the judgment creditor underpins the Supreme Court’s insistence that such issues be raised at the earliest stage possible.

5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

5.1 Mutual trust and the exceptional nature of Article 45(1)(a)

Murray J begins by setting out the foundational premise of the Brussels I Recast system:

Judgments given in one Member State are to be recognised in others without special procedure, and
They are to be treated as if they had been given in the Member State addressed [para. 3].

This system is an institutional expression of mutual trust and confidence among Member States’ courts. Its corollaries are:

Enforcement should be efficient and expeditious [para. 3]; and
The grounds to refuse recognition are “wholly exceptional” [para. 3].

Article 45(1)(a) – the public‑policy exception – is therefore to be interpreted narrowly. It is not a general appellate mechanism allowing the courts of the Member State addressed to correct or revisit alleged defects in the proceedings of the Member State of origin.

5.2 From CJEU principles to an “exhaustion of remedies” rule

Starting from Meroni and Diageo Brands, the Court reasons:

EU law requires that individuals in principle use all legal remedies in the Member State of origin [para. 5].
They must seek to prevent a breach of public policy in that State before it occurs, by deploying those remedies [para. 5].
Only if “specific circumstances make it too difficult or impossible” to do so can this obligation be relaxed [para. 5].

Murray J then adapts these general EU principles into a concrete procedural rule for Irish courts dealing with Article 45(1)(a) challenges:

“… courts should normally only entertain a public policy challenge to such a judgment where either (a) the challenge could not have been raised before the court issuing the judgment, or (b) that challenge was raised but for reasons which themselves represent a public policy objection to enforcement they were rejected by the trial court, that refusal not being capable of being remedied on appeal in the courts of the Member State of origin.” [para. 7]

This formulation:

General rule: Public‑policy objections must be litigated in the Member State of origin.
Exception (a): Where it was objectively impossible or too difficult to raise them there (e.g., no procedural avenue, or genuine risk of immediate sanction making the remedy illusory).
Exception (b): Where the originating court’s rejection of the challenge represents such a grave departure from fundamental standards (itself a public‑policy problem) that it cannot be cured on appeal.

The second category is tightly framed: it is not enough that the foreign court erred; the error must itself be of such a nature that its handling of the objection offends public policy, and there is no realistic appellate remedy.

5.3 Why composition and procedural objections should generally be raised in the State of origin

Murray J singles out procedural complaints and objections to the composition of the tribunal as paradigmatic examples of issues that should normally be resolved in the originating jurisdiction [para. 7].

His reasons include:

Institutional competence: The court of origin is applying its own procedural law and is best placed to evaluate whether a judge’s appointment or secondment complies with domestic and EU standards. It is also better positioned to frame any reference to the CJEU, with full knowledge of local law, practice, and context [para. 6].
Procedural fairness to the judgment creditor: It is unfair to the party seeking enforcement to face, for the first time in the enforcing State, technical objections that could have been raised and resolved earlier [para. 6].
System logic: The structure of Article 45(1)(b)—dealing specifically with default‑of‑appearance and lack of service—already requires that certain challenges be directed to the courts of origin. It would be incongruous if other, arguably more intricate, objections (such as tribunal composition) could be “saved” for the enforcement stage [para. 4].

In this way, the Court treats the failure to object in the State of origin as a form of procedural preclusion: not exactly “waiver” in a domestic sense, but a bar arising from the architecture of the Recast Regulation.

5.4 Application to the facts: the three arguments advanced by Scully

Murray J then tests Scully’s position against this framework.

5.4.1 Argument 1: the timing of the CJEU’s WB and Others decision

Scully argued that:

The CJEU’s judgment in WB and Others v Prokuratura Krajowa (delivered November 2021) condemned features of the Polish secondment regime.
This post‑dated the proceedings before the Warsaw Court of Appeal (in 2021).
At the time of his appeal, the secondment scheme enjoyed a valid legislative basis in Polish law; only later did EU law cast doubt upon it.

Murray J rejects this on two levels [para. 8]:

Factual sufficiency: Scully was “equipped with all facts required” to make the same objection as was later advanced in WB and Others. The public law framework of secondment, its indefinite and revocable character, and the Minister’s discretion were all known and in the public domain [para. 1].
Legal sufficiency: The CJEU judgment did not create new rights or objections; it interpreted and applied existing EU law principles of judicial independence and fair trial. Thus, if the secondment was incompatible with EU law, that incompatibility existed at the time of Scully’s appeal; he could have advanced those arguments then and, if necessary, sought a reference to the CJEU.

A later decision confirming the validity of an argument is not, therefore, an excuse for failing to make it earlier.

5.4.2 Argument 2: ongoing proceedings before the Polish Supreme Court

Scully also noted that:

He was pursuing an appeal to the Polish Supreme Court.
Polish law did not preclude him from raising a complaint about the composition of the Appeal Court in that appeal.
He had in fact raised the objection there, contending that the Minister’s decisions delegating Judge Strączyńska were “formally incorrect” and resulted in the nullity of proceedings [para. 10].

Murray J accepts the factual premise but finds it irrelevant to the specific Irish question then before the Court:

The issue in Ireland was recognition of the Court of Appeal’s existing decision refusing a stay [para. 9].
Subsequent or parallel proceedings before the Polish Supreme Court do not retrospectively legitimise the failure to raise the objection before the Court of Appeal itself.
Such later developments might be relevant if and when Scully were to resist enforcement of the Polish decision pending the outcome of the Polish Supreme Court appeal, but not to recognition at the current stage [para. 9].

In other words, the existence of an appeal route now being used confirms, rather than undermines, the Court’s view that remedies were available in the State of origin from the outset.

5.4.3 Argument 3: the “muzzle law” and disciplinary risks for Polish judges

Finally, Scully relied on evidence of Polish law often described as the “muzzle law” [para. 10]. In summary, that evidence suggested:

Certain legal provisions in Poland expose judges to disciplinary liability if they question:
- the existence of another judge’s service relationship,
- the effectiveness of another judge’s appointment, or
- the authority of constitutional bodies of the Republic of Poland.
His expert stated that these provisions “could be applied to any attempt to question the status of a seconded judge in a specific case” [para. 10].

The argument, in essence, was that:

Due to the muzzle law, Polish judges would face disciplinary consequences if they engaged with challenges to the lawfulness of secondment.
As a result, it was effectively “too difficult or impossible” to raise such objections in Poland, within the meaning of Diageo Brands.

Murray J treats this submission with evident caution:

He notes the “tentative terms” in which the evidence is expressed—there is no concrete proof that the muzzle law would have been applied in this specific case [para. 10].
Crucially, there is “no suggestion that this factor did, in fact, play any part in the failure to raise an issue around the validity of the secondment” [para. 10]. In other words, even if the muzzle law created a chilling effect, Scully did not show that this is why he did not object.
Nor did his expert directly engage with or contradict the evidence of the opposing Polish law expert (Ms Petruczenko), who testified that it was open to Scully to object to the composition of the panel under Article 49 § 1 of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure [para. 10].

Moreover, the fact that Scully is now making before the Polish Supreme Court the argument that the delegation decisions were formally incorrect and caused nullity of the proceedings [para. 10] strongly suggests that:

Such objections are indeed procedurally possible in Poland; and
The muzzle law did not in practice prevent him from raising them.

On this evidence, the Court concludes that Scully did not fall within the “too difficult or impossible” exception under Diageo Brands. The muzzle law, at least on the facts presented, was insufficiently concrete and causally linked to his failure to object.

5.5 Agreement with Hogan J on the merits

Finally, Murray J notes that he agrees “in full” with Hogan J that the secondment of Judge Strączyńska did not affect the validity or enforceability of the Warsaw Court of Appeal judgment [para. 11]. Although the reasons for that conclusion are set out elsewhere (in Hogan J’s judgment), Murray J’s own analysis adds a distinct and independent ground:

Even assuming that the secondment was problematic and could, in principle, engage public policy, Scully’s failure to raise the objection in Poland precludes him from deploying it at the recognition stage in Ireland.

Thus, both on a procedural and a substantive level, the public‑policy objection failed.

6. Complex Legal Concepts Explained

6.1 Recognition vs. enforcement

Recognition means the Irish legal system treats the foreign judgment as valid and binding as a matter of law—e.g., for purposes like res judicata or as a defence in later proceedings.
Enforcement means the judgment creditor can use the Irish courts’ enforcement machinery (e.g., execution, garnishment) to realise the judgment.

The Brussels I Recast aims to make both recognition and enforcement largely automatic between Member States, subject to limited exceptions.

6.2 Article 45(1)(a): the public‑policy exception

Article 45(1)(a) allows a Member State’s court to refuse recognition of a foreign judgment if such recognition would be “manifestly contrary to the public policy” of that State.

“Public policy” here refers to fundamental principles of the legal order—such as basic procedural fairness, the right to be heard, and core constitutional values. It is not a licence to correct ordinary legal errors or to impose domestic standards of justice on foreign courts.

The requirement that the contrariety be manifest underlines its exceptional nature. The threshold is intentionally high.

6.3 Mutual trust in EU judicial cooperation

“Mutual trust” is an EU legal doctrine whereby Member States presume that each other’s courts respect EU law, including fundamental rights. It underpins instruments such as the Brussels I Recast (civil and commercial judgments) and the European Arrest Warrant (criminal matters).

In this case, mutual trust means:

Ireland must start from the position that Polish civil courts are capable of delivering fair trials and administering EU law.
Only in extreme, well‑substantiated circumstances should Ireland refuse to recognise a Polish civil judgment on systemic rule‑of‑law grounds.

6.4 Secondment of judges

“Secondment” refers to the temporary assignment of a judge from one court to another—here, from the Regional Court in Warsaw to the Court of Appeal in Warsaw.

The concern, particularly highlighted in EU case law, is that secondment regimes administered by the executive (e.g., the Minister for Justice) on opaque criteria, for indeterminate durations and subject to revocation at will, may:

Compromise judicial independence (judges may fear adverse consequences if they decide cases contrary to the executive’s preferences); and
Undermine the right to have disputes determined by an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.

These concerns formed the basis of the CJEU’s scrutiny in WB and Others, and were at the heart of Scully’s public‑policy objection.

6.5 The “muzzle law”

The “muzzle law” is an informal label for certain Polish legislative provisions that:

Expose judges to disciplinary sanctions if they question the validity of other judges’ appointments or the authority of constitutional bodies.

Critics argue that such provisions:

Chill judicial speech and deliberation about the legality of judicial appointments; and
Interfere with the judiciary’s ability to ensure compliance with constitutional and EU standards of judicial independence.

In Scully, evidence was adduced suggesting that this law “could” apply to attempts to question a seconded judge’s status [para. 10]. However, the Supreme Court insisted on concrete proof that it actually rendered the remedy in Poland too difficult or impossible, and found none.

6.6 Exhaustion of remedies vs. waiver

The Court’s approach is akin to an exhaustion of remedies rule:

A party must first use the remedies on offer in the Member State of origin before turning to the public‑policy exception in the enforcing State.

This is conceptually distinct from, though related to, “waiver”:

Waiver in domestic law may depend on the party’s knowing and voluntary relinquishment of a right.
The exhaustion principle here is more structural: even without inquiring into subjective intention, EU law expects the party to litigate its objections where they properly belong (before the court of origin). If it does not, the enforcement court’s ability to refuse recognition is correspondingly curtailed.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 Consolidation of a strict pro‑enforcement stance

Scully v Coucal confirms—and strengthens—a firmly pro‑enforcement stance in Irish private international law under Brussels I Recast:

Article 45(1)(a) is available only in truly exceptional circumstances.
Defendants cannot hold back legal or factual objections in the Member State of origin and then deploy them at the enforcement stage abroad.
Even serious allegations concerning judicial independence and the rule of law will not, without more, justify refusal of recognition if the party had a realistic opportunity to ventilate those objections in the originating courts.

7.2 Practical consequences for litigants

For litigators and parties engaged in cross‑border disputes within the EU, the case has clear practical implications:

Early diligence: Parties must investigate procedural and institutional issues (such as panel composition and judicial status) during the original proceedings.
Prompt objections: Any doubts about the lawfulness of a judge’s appointment or independence should be raised immediately in the originating court, pursuant to local procedural mechanisms.
Use of appeals and CJEU references: If first‑instance challenges fail, parties should use domestic appeal routes and ask the originating court(s) to refer questions of EU law to the CJEU if necessary.
Limited second bite in the enforcing State: Failure to do so will gravely limit the possibility of later invoking public‑policy objections in the enforcing State.

7.3 Managing rule‑of‑law concerns within the Brussels I framework

The judgment also demonstrates how national courts of enforcement States navigate systemic rule‑of‑law concerns in other Member States:

On the one hand, it reaffirms mutual trust and the principle that foreign civil judgments should circulate freely and be respected.
On the other hand, it does not close the door entirely to public‑policy objections rooted in judicial independence: it acknowledges that there may be cases where it is “impossible” or “too difficult” to obtain effective remedies in the State of origin [paras. 5, 7].

However, the threshold for establishing such impossibility is high. Mere reference to systemic criticisms, without clear evidence of their impact on the specific case and on the availability of remedies, is insufficient.

7.4 Clarification of Irish procedural standards under Article 45

From an Irish law perspective, Scully v Coucal provides a clear and structured test for future Article 45(1)(a) cases:

Identify whether the alleged violation (e.g., unfair procedure, biased tribunal, defective appointment) could have been raised in the Member State of origin using local remedies.
If yes, ask whether the party actually did raise it there:
- If not, the enforcement court will normally decline to entertain it.
- If yes, consider whether the treatment of the objection itself so egregiously breaches fundamental principles (and is irremediable on appeal) that refusing recognition is justified.

This test will guide Irish courts in balancing efficiency, mutual trust, and fundamental rights in future cross‑border enforcement disputes.

8. Conclusion

Scully v Coucal [2025] IESC 51 is a significant development in the law governing recognition and enforcement of EU civil judgments in Ireland. The Supreme Court:

Reaffirmed the exceptional nature of the public‑policy exception in Article 45(1)(a) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation.
Translated CJEU case law into a clear Irish rule that public‑policy objections must normally be raised before the courts of the Member State of origin, with only narrow exceptions.
Clarified that:
- Later CJEU judgments confirming the unlawfulness of certain domestic arrangements do not excuse earlier failures to object.
- Systemic concerns (such as the Polish “muzzle law”) must be shown to render domestic remedies effectively unavailable in the concrete case.
Applied these principles to hold that Scully’s failure to challenge the participation of a seconded judge in the Warsaw Court of Appeal precluded him from invoking that issue in Irish recognition proceedings.

In doing so, the Court strengthened the pro‑enforcement orientation of the Brussels regime in Irish law, gave concrete effect to the principle of mutual trust among Member States’ judiciaries, and sent a clear procedural message: parties must take their opportunities to litigate objections in the originating forum, or risk losing them when a foreign judgment comes to be recognised abroad.