Executive Discretion and “Good Reason” in Security Policy: R (The Duke of Sussex) v SSHD

Introduction

R (The Duke of Sussex) v Secretary of State for the Home Department ([2025] EWCA Civ 548) is a Court of Appeal judgment concerning Prince Harry’s challenge to the legality of protective security arrangements provided to him on visits to the United Kingdom after he stepped back from royal duties and moved overseas. The Claimant sought a declaration that the Executive Committee for the Protection of Royalty and Public Figures (“RAVEC”) had unlawfully departed from its published Terms of Reference 2017 (the “ToR 2017”) by failing to commission a fresh risk analysis before withdrawing his standard protection in early 2020 and substituting ad-hoc, “bespoke” arrangements for subsequent visits. The Home Secretary, responsible for national security and personal protection, defended the decisions taken by RAVEC and its Chair, Sir Richard Mottram.

Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on two principal grounds: (1) whether RAVEC misapplied or irrationally departed from its own policy by not treating the Duke of Sussex as part of the “Other VIP Category” or analogous to it; (2) whether there was a “good reason” to ignore the ToR 2017 requirement for a risk analysis by RAVEC’s Risk Management Board. The High Court dismissed the claim; the Duke appealed, but the Court of Appeal has now upheld the dismissal.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Sir Geoffrey Vos P, Bean LJ, Edis LJ) affirmed that RAVEC’s ToR 2017 and successor documents were justiciable but not “hard-edged” policies; departures from them required a “good reason” test, flexible and informed by context.
Sir Richard and RAVEC’s subsequent Chairs gave contemporaneous evidence showing that, when the Duke ceased to be a full-time working royal and relocated abroad, it was reasonable to replace standard cohort-based risk analyses with case-by-case, bespoke arrangements for his occasional UK visits.
The Court placed substantial weight on the expertise and constitutional responsibility of RAVEC, emphasising deference in national security decisions.
There was no public law error in declining fresh risk analyses after February 2020; the bespoke governance arrangements constituted a “good reason” to depart from the ToR 2017.
The appeal was dismissed and the earlier judicial review refused.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Several leading authorities on policy, legitimate expectation and review standards were discussed:

R (Nadarajah) v SSHD [2015] EWCA Civ 1363 — public bodies must honour published policy unless there is a “good reason” to depart; rooted in fairness and “good administration.”
Mandalia v SSHD [2015] UKSC 59 — guidance documents carry significant weight; departures require “cogent reasons” spelled out clearly and convincingly.
R (Rehman) v SSHD [2001] UKHL 47 and Regina (Begum) v SIAC [2021] UKSC 7 — constitutional deference and separation of powers demand respect for executive expertise in national security.
Hopkins Homes Ltd v SSCLG [2017] UKSC 37 — specialist bodies are presumed to understand their policy framework, though that principle has limits outside planning.
Munjaz v Mersey Care NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 58 — policy guidance under statute is not binding but must be departed from only with cogent reasons scrutinised according to subject-matter sensitivity.
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury [1948] 1 KB 223 — traditional test of irrationality, but not the sole standard for reviewing departures from policy.
R (Good Law Project) v PM [2022] EWCA Civ 1580 — policies vary in formality and public-facing character; review depends on policy type and context.

Legal Reasoning

The Court of Appeal’s reasoning unfolded in stages:

It affirmed that RAVEC’s ToR 2017 and successor documents were justiciable policy statements: the court, not the decision-maker, decides their meaning.
It acknowledged a spectrum of policy formality and review intensity; non-public, expert-driven security policies attract significant deference.
It applied the “good reason” principle (per Nadarajah and Mandalia): departures from policy are permissible if objectively justified, with reasons adequate to the sensitivity of the subject.
Evidence showed that, when the Duke’s status changed and his UK visits became sporadic and unpredictable, conventional risk analyses by the Risk Management Board would have been of limited value. Instead, RAVEC adopted bespoke, case-by-case governance arrangements, documented in an email exchange of 26–27 February 2020 and in the decision letter of 28 February 2020.
The Chairs of RAVEC and the Homeland Security Group explained that bespoke arrangements allowed tailored assessments tied to the Duke’s actual travel plans and real-time threat intelligence from the Metropolitan Police—meeting the ToR’s aims in a different form.
Given RAVEC’s expertise, national security context and the contemporaneous rationale, the Court held that there was a “good reason” to depart from the ToR 2017 requirement for a fresh risk analysis, and no public law error arose.

Impact

This judgment clarifies how courts will review executive departures from internal policy in high-sensitivity areas:

It reinforces that policy statements—even unpublicized ones—are justiciable and set expectations, but are not absolute fetters on executive discretion.
It confirms that departures from policy require objective justification (“good reason”), with scrutiny calibrated to the policy’s formality and the decision’s subject-matter sensitivity.
It establishes that in national security and personal protection contexts, courts will afford considerable deference to executive expertise and avoid substituting their own judgments on risk management strategy.
Lower courts and public bodies must document and explain deviations from internal policies, especially where bespoke arrangements are substituted for standing procedures.
Future judicial reviews in areas such as counter-terrorism, immigration, benefits or planning will look to this decision for guidance on the interplay between policy compliance, deference and the “good reason” test.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Justiciable policy: a published or internal document setting out how decisions should normally be made, which courts can interpret and enforce.
Risk analysis vs threat assessment: a risk analysis (by RAVEC’s Risk Management Board) evaluates impact and likelihood in detail; a threat assessment gauges the current nature and immediacy of threats.
Good reason principle: public bodies must follow their own policies unless they have an objectively justified reason to depart, explained with clarity proportionate to the issue’s sensitivity.
Wednesbury irrationality: the traditional standard for challenging administrative decisions as so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have made them.
Deference: courts respect the specialized expertise and constitutional responsibilities of executive bodies, particularly in national security, and will not lightly override their judgment.
Separation of powers: the constitutional principle that courts should not usurp functions assigned to the executive, especially where Parliament has entrusted them with sensitive policy areas.

Conclusion

R (The Duke of Sussex) v SSHD confirms that:

Executive bodies must adhere to their own policies unless they can show a “good reason” to depart.
The intensity of judicial scrutiny varies with the policy’s character and the decision’s constitutional context.
In national security and personal protection decisions, courts will give weight to executive expertise and documented rationales for bespoke arrangements.
Agencies should ensure contemporaneous records of departures from policy and the justifications underpinning them.

The decision underscores the delicate balance between policy consistency, executive discretion and judicial oversight in matters of high public importance.