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Suffolk Coastal District Council v. Hopkins Homes Ltd & Anor
Summary of Judgment: [2017] UKSC 37
Factual and Procedural Background
The case consolidates two planning appeals arising from proposed housing developments:
- The Yoxford Site – An application by Respondent Developer 1 for 26 dwellings in a village within the administrative area of Appellant Council 1. Planning permission was refused by the council, refusal upheld by a planning inspector, quashed by the High Court, and the quashing upheld by the Court of Appeal.
- The Willaston Site – An application by Respondent Developer 2 for up to 170 dwellings on land designated as “open countryside/green gap” within the area of Appellant Council 2. The council failed to determine the application; an inspector allowed the appeal and granted permission. The High Court quashed that decision, but the Court of Appeal reinstated it.
Both councils appealed to the Supreme Court. The appeals focused on how paragraph 49 of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) interacts with paragraph 14 (the “tilted balance”) and the statutory development plan.
Legal Issues Presented
- What constitutes “relevant policies for the supply of housing” in paragraph 49 of the NPPF—should the term be interpreted narrowly, widely, or on an intermediate basis?
- How do paragraphs 49 and 14 of the NPPF interact when a local planning authority cannot demonstrate a five-year supply of deliverable housing sites?
- Whether the inspectors in the Yoxford and Willaston appeals lawfully applied the correct interpretation of those paragraphs.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant Councils’ Arguments
- Advocated a narrow reading of paragraph 49, limiting it to policies that positively allocate housing land or set housing numbers.
- Contended that restrictive countryside or gap-protection policies should not be deemed “out-of-date” merely because of a housing-land shortfall.
- Maintained that the inspectors in both cases misdirected themselves by treating non-housing policies as housing supply policies.
Respondent Developers’ Arguments
- Supported at least a wider (if not intermediate) reading: any policy that in practice affects the supply of housing—by allocation or by restraint—falls within paragraph 49.
- Argued that once a five-year shortfall is shown, restrictive policies should attract reduced weight under the “tilted balance.”
- Defended the inspectors’ approaches as consistent with emerging case law and with the purpose of boosting housing supply in paragraph 47 of the NPPF.
Respondent Secretary of State’s Position
- Accepted that the Yoxford inspector had erred but otherwise supported a reading that emphasises planning judgment under paragraph 14 rather than rigid categorisation of policies.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| City of Edinburgh Council v Secretary of State for Scotland [1997] 1 WLR 1447 | Primacy of development plan subject to material considerations; distinction between policy interpretation and planning judgment. | Used to explain that section 38(6) enhances the status of the plan but leaves weighing of considerations to the decision-maker. |
| Pioneer Aggregates v Secretary of State for the Environment [1985] AC 132 | Planning system is wholly statutory. | Supported the view that the Secretary of State’s policy-making powers derive from statute, not prerogative. |
| R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU [2017] 2 WLR 583 | Statutory schemes supersede any overlapping prerogative power. | Reinforced that NPPF is issued under statutory authority, not prerogative. |
| Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74 | Historic limit on prerogative powers. | Cited illustratively on planning-related proclamations. |
| R (Cala Homes) v Secretary of State [2011] 1 P & CR 22 | NPPF (then draft) is material consideration but cannot displace the development plan. | Underlined that NPPF guidance must not distort the statutory scheme. |
| Secretary of State v AH (Sudan) [2008] 1 AC 678 | Court deference to specialist tribunals. | Invoked in cautioning against over-legalisation of planning policy interpretation. |
| William Davis v Secretary of State [2013] EWHC 3058 (Admin) | Early High Court view that only positive housing-allocation policies fall within paragraph 49. | Contrasted with later, broader interpretations. |
| South Northamptonshire Council v Secretary of State (Barwood Land) [2014] EWHC 573 (Admin) | Advocated an “intermediate” approach, including policies significantly affecting housing numbers or distribution. | Provided background to inspectors’ reasoning and later debate. |
| Cotswold DC v Secretary of State [2013] EWHC 3719 (Admin) | Treated out-of-date policies as carrying minimal weight. | Cited to show earlier assumption that paragraph 49 almost disapplies policies. |
| Crane v Secretary of State [2015] EWHC 425 (Admin) | Introduced flexible weighting even for out-of-date policies. | Demonstrated evolution towards discretionary balancing. |
| Bloor Homes East Midlands v Secretary of State [2014] EWHC 754 (Admin) | Explained operation of the “tilted balance” in paragraph 14. | Relied on by Supreme Court when analysing paragraph 14. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
- The Court examined the statutory scheme (Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004) confirming the primacy of the development plan and that national policy (NPPF) is guidance and a “material consideration.”
- It rejected the Court of Appeal’s “wider” construction of paragraph 49, holding that “policies for the supply of housing” are those whose purpose is housing supply, not every policy that incidentally affects housing.
- However, the Court emphasised that the critical mechanism is paragraph 14. When the housing policies are out-of-date (e.g., no five-year supply), the “tilted balance” applies, and decision-makers can give reduced weight to restrictive policies without labelling them out-of-date.
- Applying that approach, the Court upheld the inspector’s permission for the Willaston site. Even though he mis-categorised certain policies, his overall planning balance under paragraph 14 was lawful and rational.
- For the Yoxford site, the inspector’s emphasis on the recently adopted settlement boundary—and the belief it was an “up-to-date” policy—misdirected the paragraph 14 balance. The decision therefore had to be quashed, albeit the Court disagreed with lower-court criticism of his heritage-asset analysis.
- The Court stressed that over-legalisation of policy wording should be avoided; interpretation issues suitable for courts must be distinguished from planning judgment reserved to inspectors.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Both appeals by the councils are DISMISSED.
Implications:
- The permission for the Willaston development remains in force.
- The Yoxford inspector’s decision remains quashed; the application must be re-determined.
- The Supreme Court clarifies that only policies whose objective is housing supply fall within paragraph 49. Decision-makers should focus on paragraph 14’s “tilted balance” when housing policies are out-of-date, rather than artificially branding other restrictive policies as out-of-date.
- No new precedent is set regarding statutory interpretation, but significant guidance is provided on the practical application of the NPPF in development-control decisions.
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