Everyday Finance DAC v Farrell [2025] IEHC 722:
Summary Possession, Assignment of Mortgages, and the Limits of Defences in Mortgage Enforcement

1. Introduction

The decision of Gillane J. in Everyday Finance Designated Activity Company v Farrell [2025] IEHC 722 is a significant addition to the now substantial body of Irish case law on:

Summary possession proceedings under s.62(7) of the Registration of Title Act 1964;
The effect of the conclusiveness of the Land Registry folio under s.31 of the 1964 Act;
The standing of loan purchasers, assignees, and “vulture funds” to enforce security;
The legal irrelevance of certain frequently-encountered “freeman on the land/sovereign citizen”-style arguments; and
The limited range of legally cognisable defences in possession-only proceedings, particularly regarding overcharging, alleged reckless lending, and regulatory issues.

The case arose as an appeal from a Circuit Court order granting possession of an investment property in Tallaght, Co. Dublin, originally secured in favour of AIB Mortgage Bank and later transferred to Everyday Finance DAC (“Everyday”). The defendant, Mr Paul Farrell, a litigant in person, mounted a broad and complex resistance, filing eight affidavits and raising an array of arguments ranging from overcharging and reckless lending to securitisation, alleged lack of standing, regulatory status, receiver misconduct and, most notably, a series of elaborate “trust” and “promissory note” contentions drawing on pseudo-legal concepts.

The High Court dismissed all of these defences and affirmed Everyday’s entitlement to an order for possession, subject only to the question of whether a stay should be granted in light of the property now being a family home. The judgment consolidates and applies recent authority from the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, and High Court, and it gives clear, practical guidance to courts and practitioners dealing with similar defences in mortgage enforcement litigation.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The loan and mortgage

In January 2007, AIB Mortgage Bank offered to advance €828,000 to the defendant under loan account 77590044, to be secured by a mortgage over:

the property at 16 Cairnwood Court, Tallaght (the “Property”); and
two other Cairnwood properties.

Key loan conditions included:

An obligation to repay by monthly instalments;
An “acceleration” clause providing that all secured monies would become immediately due if payments were not made when due; and
A broad assignment clause (Condition 14(1)) whereby the borrower irrevocably consented to transfer/assignment of the agreement and “Total Debt” to third parties.

The defendant, legally advised, accepted the offer and, on 6 February 2007, executed a mortgage deed in favour of AIB Mortgage Bank and Allied Irish Banks plc, incorporating AIB Mortgage Conditions. These conditions included:

Power to accelerate the “Total Debt” on an event of default (Condition 3.2);
A wide consent to transfer/assignment of the mortgage (Condition 9.7); and
Ranking provisions which made clear that AIB Mortgage Bank’s interest had priority and that, up to a defined “Release Date,” only AIB Mortgage Bank could enforce the mortgage.

The mortgage was registered on the folio of the Property (Dublin Folio 35498F) in May 2007, showing AIB Mortgage Bank as owner of the charge.

2.2 Default and enforcement

The defendant defaulted on his obligations. A receiver (Jim Stafford) was appointed over the secured properties in March 2013 pursuant to the all-sums mortgage’s power of appointment.

In July 2017 AIB Mortgage Bank formally demanded payment of €567,827.28 (principal and interest). Possession was demanded by solicitors in December 2017, followed by a further letter in January 2018 indicating an intention to issue proceedings but with a willingness to engage on “workable solutions”.

2.3 Transfer to Everyday Finance DAC

In 2019 AIB Mortgage Bank and AIB entered into a global deed of transfer with Everyday Finance DAC. The defendant’s loan and associated security were expressly included. The defendant received:

a “goodbye letter” from AIB confirming the sale; and
a “hello letter” from Everyday confirming that Link ASI would service the loan.

By order of the Circuit Court in December 2022, Everyday was substituted as plaintiff in the possession proceedings.

2.4 Circuit Court and appeal

The Circuit Court granted Everyday an order for possession of the Property in March 2025. The defendant appealed to the High Court, continuing to act in person and filing extensive affidavits with large exhibits, including a late 60+ page affidavit and a further affidavit on the eve of hearing, which Gillane J accepted de bene esse to avoid delay.

3. Summary of the Judgment

Gillane J held that:

Everyday had established the two primary proofs required under s.62(7) of the Registration of Title Act 1964, as articulated in Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v Cody:
- It was the owner of the charge (by virtue of the registered charge originally in favour of AIB Mortgage Bank and the exhibited deed of transfer); and
- The right to possession had arisen and was exercisable, given the default and the demands made.
The Land Registry folio was conclusive evidence of the registered charge under s.31 of the 1964 Act, and its correctness could not be challenged in these possession proceedings.
None of the defendant’s many arguments – overcharging, alleged reckless lending, contributory negligence, complaints about the receiver, securitisation, supposed lack of standing or regulation, or the promissory-note-and-trust theories – disclosed a legally sustainable defence that would justify sending the matter to a plenary hearing.
Overcharging, even if proven, is not a defence to a possession claim where default is clear; the issue in possession proceedings is default, not the amount.
Irish law does not recognise a tort of negligent or reckless lending, and contributory negligence concepts under the Civil Liability Act 1961 cannot be used as a shield against a straightforward debt/possession claim.
A receiver is the agent of the mortgagor, not of the lender; complaints about a receiver’s conduct do not undermine the lender’s entitlement to possession (though they can be litigated separately).
An assignee with legal title to the loan and security (such as Everyday) may sue in its own name; beneficial ownership arising from securitisation or funding structures is irrelevant to standing.
The defendant’s promissory note and arguments about a separate “estate/trust” linked to his legal persona were legally incomprehensible and, in any event, could not discharge or vary the existing loan contract.
Everyday was therefore entitled to an order for possession.

Although the Property was originally an investment property (and not a “family home”), the defendant maintained that it now constitutes his family home. As there was no evidence to the contrary, the judge indicated he would hear the parties on whether a stay should be placed on the possession order in light of its current status.

4. Legal Analysis

4.1 The statutory framework: s.62(7) and s.31 of the Registration of Title Act 1964

The core statutory provisions are:

Section 62(7) – allows the registered owner of a charge, when the principal has become due, to apply to court “in a summary manner” for possession. If the court thinks it proper, it may order possession, and the applicant is then deemed a “mortgagee in possession”.
Section 31(1) – provides that the register “shall be conclusive evidence” of the title of the owner to the land and any burden appearing on it, subject only to actual fraud or mistake. Challenges to the correctness of the register require appropriate rectification proceedings; they cannot be raised incidentally as a defence in s.62(7) possession applications.

Applying these provisions, Gillane J draws directly on the Supreme Court’s guidance in Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v Cody [2021] 2 I.R. 381 and on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Tanager DAC v Kane [2018] IECA 352; [2019] 1 I.R. 385:

The summary possession process is justified by the conclusiveness of the register;
Production of the folio showing the plaintiff (or its predecessor) as registered owner of the charge is, absent fraud or mistake, sufficient proof of title; and
The correctness of the register cannot be challenged as a defence in such proceedings.

This underpins the judge’s central conclusion that everyday summary possession applications are not a “shortcut” in a pejorative sense, but a legitimate, efficient process anchored in the statutory conclusiveness of the register. However, that process still requires:

Proof that the plaintiff is (or claims via) the registered owner of the charge; and
Proof that the right to possession has accrued (typically via default and demand).

In Farrell, these proofs were supplied via:

The executed mortgage deed;
The folio showing the registered charge in favour of AIB Mortgage Bank; and
The exhibited deed of transfer from AIB/AIB Mortgage Bank to Everyday including the defendant’s loan and related security, accompanied by correspondence (“goodbye” and “hello” letters) and a substitution order in the Circuit Court.

4.2 Overcharging and the “tracker scandal” as a defence

The defendant contended that he had been subject to systematic overcharging, including alleged manipulation of benchmark interest rates and references to the broader “tracker scandal”. He argued that this contributed to a “bona fide defence” to possession.

Gillane J rejected this, relying on a strong line of authority:

Start Mortgages DAC v Doyle [2024] IEHC 561, where O’Donnell J (as he then was) described overcharging claims in possession cases as, at best, “bald assertions” and reiterated that:
“in a case for possession, default is the issue, not the amount.”
Bank of Ireland v Blanc [2020] IEHC 18 (O’Regan J), which emphasised that the court in possession-only proceedings is not asked to adjudicate on the precise amount due, but simply to decide whether there was sufficient default at the time proceedings commenced to trigger the contractual right to possession.
Anglo Irish Bank PLC v Fanning [2009] IEHC 141 (Dunne J), which coined the now-settled formula that “default is the issue, not the amount” in possession cases.

The judgment in Farrell endorses and applies these principles:

Even if overcharging exists, it does not negate the fact of default where non-payment far exceeds any arguable overcharge;
Any dispute as to quantum or interest calculation is to be pursued separately (for example, by complaint to the Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman or by damages proceedings), not as a defence to repossession; and
In this case, the defendant was informed of an internal investigation and of his right to complain to the Ombudsman, but had not done so when these proceedings were initiated.

The Court thus firmly reiterates that alleged overcharging (including tracker-related issues) is not, without more, a legally cognisable defence to a possession-only claim.

4.3 Alleged reckless lending and contributory negligence

The defendant argued that the bank was, in effect, responsible for his default through:

Reckless or negligent lending;
Removal of an invoice discounting facility leading to cashflow problems; and
“Annihilating” his business, thereby causing the arrears.

Relying on Launceston Property Finance DAC v Walls [2018] IEHC 610 (Noonan J), the Court rejected this as a matter of principle:

Irish law does not recognise a tort of negligent or reckless lending;
Section 34 of the Civil Liability Act 1961 (contributory negligence) applies only where a plaintiff has suffered “damage” as defined (loss of property, personal injury, etc.);
A straightforward claim for money due on foot of a loan agreement is not a claim for “damage” within s.34; and
It would be anomalous if a borrower, unable to sue for negligent lending, could nonetheless deploy the same allegation as a defence to non-payment.

Farrell thus confirms:

There is no free-standing “reckless lending” defence to a money claim or possession claim;
Contributory negligence is conceptually inapposite to such proceedings; and
Alleged lender fault in advance or withdrawal of facilities does not absolve the borrower from repayment obligations under a valid loan and mortgage contract.

4.4 Complaints about the receiver

The defendant raised extensive complaints about the appointment and conduct of the receiver, including suggested privacy violations and allegations that the receiver “caused” or exacerbated the default.

The Court analysed these points as follows:

The receiver’s appointment was expressly provided for in the mortgage and followed the defendant’s default; the chronology made clear that default preceded, and justified, the appointment.
Under well-established principles, a receiver appointed under a mortgage is the agent of the mortgagor, not of the lender. This doctrinal point is important: it means any misfeasance by the receiver is not, without more, attributable to the lender so as to undermine the lender’s security or its right to possession.
The receiver appears to have collected rent from a tenant but was never in physical possession of the Property; and in any event, arrears vastly exceeded that rent.
Any legitimate grievances about a receiver’s conduct may be pursued in separate plenary proceedings (and indeed, the Court was told that the defendant has issued such proceedings), but they do not constitute a defence to the lender’s possession claim.

This approach carefully distinguishes:

The right to possession, arising from default under the mortgage; from
Allegations about how that right is exercised by a receiver or mortgagee in possession, which may ground separate claims but do not negate the underlying entitlement to possession.

4.5 Assignment, securitisation and standing of Everyday Finance DAC

A major strand of the defendant’s case was that:

Everyday Finance DAC was not the true owner of the loan;
The “beneficial owner” (various third parties suggested by the defendant) was the appropriate plaintiff; and
The structure of the “mortgagee relationship” required joint participation or consent of AIB and AIB Mortgage Bank to any enforcement, despite express contractual provisions to the contrary.

These arguments were dismissed, drawing on:

Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC v Jenkins [2018] IEHC 485 – where securitisation had resulted in the original lender holding legal title as bare trustee for a third-party (Windmill Funding Ltd). The High Court held:
- The courts will give effect to the structure intended by the parties;
- This did not prejudice borrowers’ rights; and
- The legal owner (even as trustee) was entitled to sue in its own name without joining the beneficial owner.
Mars Capital Finance Ireland DAC v Phelan [2025] IECA 117 (as summarised in Permanent TSB v Donohoe), where the Court of Appeal held that:
- The identity of the funder of the loan purchase (e.g. “Panelview”) is immaterial; the Deed of Transfer made clear that legal title was assigned to the loan purchaser;
- Even if the purchaser holds on trust for the funder, it remains the legal owner; and
- In litigation, the appropriate plaintiff is the trustee (legal owner), not the beneficiary.
Permanent TSB v Donohoe [2025] IECA 222, where Costello J confirmed that the court is concerned with legal title, not beneficial ownership, and that Mars Capital v Phelan correctly states the law.

Applying these principles, Gillane J held:

The mortgage contract expressly allowed assignment/transfer (Conditions 14(1) and 9.7);
The Deed of Transfer to Everyday clearly included the defendant’s loan and mortgage, with no relevant redactions;
Everyday, as legal owner of the loan and security, had full standing to sue;
Any beneficial ownership by another entity (if it existed) was immaterial; and
There was no obligation to join or disclose any such beneficial owner in order to enforce the mortgage.

In addition, the judge dealt with allegations about regulatory status. The defendant claimed Everyday was “unregulated” or insufficiently capitalised to have purchased the loan. The Court noted:

Evidence showed Everyday is in fact regulated by the Central Bank as a retail credit firm/home reversion firm and credit provider;
But even if there had been regulatory non-compliance, Permanent TSB v Donohoe makes clear that:
- Breaches of Central Bank authorisation requirements do not render credit agreements or their enforcement void;
- The regulatory regime is self-contained; sanctions lie within the regulatory framework, not via private-law defences to enforcement; and
- Contract law governs enforceability of the loan and security, not the Central Bank Acts.

This is a robust reaffirmation that:

Loan purchasers and securitisation vehicles with legal title are the proper plaintiffs in enforcement actions;
Borrowers cannot defeat possession claims by challenging the identity of behind-the-scenes funders or beneficial owners; and
Regulatory authorisation issues, real or alleged, do not of themselves provide a defence to repayment or repossession.

4.6 The “promissory note” and “freeman/sovereign citizen” style arguments

Perhaps the most striking part of the judgment is the Court’s treatment of the defendant’s later arguments, which mirror “freeman on the land” or “sovereign citizen” style theories increasingly encountered in debt enforcement proceedings. These included:

A lengthy affidavit in which the defendant:
- Described himself as “Paul-edward; living man” occupying the “Office of the Executor of the PAUL FARRELL Estate/Trust”; and
- Insisted he was not the “PERSONA (legal fictional entity) referred to as ‘PAUL FARRELL’” in the proceedings.
Assertions that he is “secured party creditor” and “beneficial steward” of various private trusts;
References to a “birth certificate bond number” and securitisation of his legal persona;
Production of a “Securitization Research Report With CUSIP research for the Corporation PAUL FARRELL PERSONA”; and
A promissory note dated 30 September 2024, promising to pay €1,938,070.74 to Everyday, signed in his purported capacity as “Occupier of the Office of the Executor of the PAUL EDWARD FARRELL Estate/Trust; Attorney in Fact; Authorised Creditor”, with payment in €2,000 monthly instalments.

The defendant argued:

That this promissory note settled or discharged the debt; and
That because of the alleged trust structure and separation between “living man” and “legal persona”, he was not personally liable as the party named in the mortgage.

Gillane J’s response is clear and instructive:

The Court candidly acknowledges having “real difficulty” in understanding the meaning or relevance of these trust/estate/bond arguments and, implicitly, finds them devoid of legal substance.
On orthodox principles of negotiable instruments and contract law:
- A promissory note must be unconditional to be valid in law; and
- A borrower cannot use such a document unilaterally to alter repayment terms already agreed in the original loan contract.
Far from discharging the debt, the promissory note could itself be treated as an admission of indebtedness to Everyday.
The mortgage was entered into and signed by the defendant as “Paul Farrell” when legally advised, and there is “no basis whatsoever” for arguing he is not the person bound by that agreement or for recognising a “special” or “limited” appearance based on pseudo-legal distinctions between natural person and legal persona.

This part of the judgment is particularly important in practice. It:

Reinforces that courts will not entertain pseudo-legal constructions attempting to separate individuals from their legal obligations by invoking private trusts, fictional estates, or invented jurisdictional concepts;
Clarifies that a promissory note cannot be used as a unilateral device to rewrite or extinguish a pre-existing loan contract; and
Provides a clear doctrinal basis for rejecting similar arguments promptly in future cases.

4.7 Summary process and the threshold for remitting to plenary hearing

Throughout, the judge recognises the need to balance:

The efficiency of the s.62(7) summary procedure; and
The defendant’s right to a fair hearing, particularly as a litigant in person.

The Court:

Considered eight affidavits and extensive exhibits;
Accepted a late, lengthy affidavit on a de bene esse basis to avoid delay;
Explicitly acknowledged that summary procedure is not “a shortcut or a less satisfactory administration of justice” (per Cody); and
Systematically examined each category of defence to assess whether any warranted a plenary hearing.

The operative test is that, once the plaintiff establishes the basic proofs (title to the charge and right to possession), the defendant must demonstrate a real, arguable defence that could succeed at trial. Mere assertions, or complaints which—even if true—would not defeat the plaintiff’s entitlement to possession, do not meet this threshold.

On that basis, the Court held that no defence advanced by Mr Farrell justified remitting the matter for plenary hearing.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.1 Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v Cody [2021] 2 I.R. 381 (Supreme Court)

Cody is the leading Supreme Court authority on s.62(7). It clarifies:

The plaintiff must prove:
1. Ownership of the registered charge; and
2. That the right to possession has arisen and is exercisable.
Summary possession is legitimate and desirable, but not a “shortcut” at the expense of fairness.
The conclusiveness of the register (s.31) underpins the summary process: production of the folio is generally sufficient proof of title.

In Farrell, Cody serves as the foundational authority for:

The two-proof test; and
The insistence that, once proofs are made, only a substantial defence can prevent summary order for possession.

5.2 Tanager DAC v Kane [2018] IECA 352; [2019] 1 I.R. 385 (Court of Appeal)

Tanager established that:

The register’s correctness cannot be collaterally attacked in a s.62(7) defence;
Proper challenges to the register must be made via rectification proceedings based on actual fraud or mistake; and
The court may grant possession at the suit of the registered owner of the charge once satisfied of title and entitlement.

Gillane J cites Tanager (via Cody) to:

Reject any suggestion that the defendant could undermine Everyday’s title by disputing the validity or correctness of the registered charge; and
Reinforce that producing the folio suffices to show the original charge in favour of AIB Mortgage Bank.

5.3 Bank of Ireland v Blanc [2020] IEHC 18; Anglo Irish Bank PLC v Fanning [2009] IEHC 141; Start Mortgages DAC v Doyle [2024] IEHC 561

These cases are central to the treatment of overcharging:

Fanning (Dunne J) – in possession-only actions, “default is the issue, not the amount”.
Blanc (O’Regan J) – the court does not adjudicate on the sums due; its focus is whether there was default sufficient to justify invoking the contractual right to possession.
Doyle (O’Donnell J) – reinforces these principles and describes overcharging in that context as a “bald assertion” that, even if arguable, does not negate the right to possession where default is substantial.

In Farrell, these cases are applied to:

Reject the “tracker scandal” and overcharging complaints as defences;
Clarify that quantum disputes or miscalculation of interest belong in separate forums (e.g. the Ombudsman); and
Confirm that the presence of arrears and non-payment over time is sufficient to ground possession, irrespective of alleged overcharging.

5.4 Launceston Property Finance DAC v Walls [2018] IEHC 610

Launceston (Noonan J) is the authoritative statement that:

There is no tort of negligent or reckless lending in Irish law;
Section 34 of the Civil Liability Act 1961 (contributory negligence) does not apply to straightforward loan enforcement because the claim is not for “damage” as defined; and
To allow contributory negligence to be used as a defence would create an anomaly where claims unsustainable as actions could nonetheless operate as shields.

Gillane J applies this reasoning to dismiss the defendant’s attempt to characterise the bank’s behaviour as contributory negligence or reckless lending, affirming that such arguments cannot operate as a defence to a claim for repayment or possession.

5.5 Pepper Finance Corp (Ireland) DAC v Jenkins [2018] IEHC 485; Mars Capital Finance Ireland DAC v Phelan [2025] IECA 117; Permanent TSB v Donohoe [2025] IECA 222

These cases govern assignment and securitisation:

Jenkins – confirms that where the original lender retains legal title as bare trustee under a securitisation structure, it can still sue in its own name without joining the beneficial owner.
Mars Capital v Phelan – clarifies that the source of purchase funds (e.g. a third-party funder) does not affect the fact that the assignee named in the deed holds legal title and is entitled to sue. Any trust in favour of the funder does not change this.
PTSB v Donohoe – endorses Mars Capital and emphasises that courts are concerned with legal, not beneficial, ownership in enforcement actions.

These cases directly influence Farrell by:

Validating Everyday’s standing as the legal assignee of the loan and security; and
Foreclosing the defendant’s repeated contentions that some unidentified beneficial owner was the “real” creditor who should be suing instead.

Donohoe further supplies the key principle on regulatory breaches, which Farrell imports:

Compliance with Central Bank authorisation and regulatory codes is a matter for regulators;
Sanctions for breach are contained in the regulatory scheme; and
Such breaches do not render credit agreements or enforcement actions void, nor create private-law defences to repayment or repossession.

6. Complex Concepts Explained in Plain Terms

6.1 Summary possession under s.62(7)

“Summary” possession is a faster form of court procedure, based largely on written evidence (affidavits), used where:

The law is clear; and
There is no substantial factual dispute requiring oral evidence.

Under s.62(7), once the registered owner of a mortgage charge shows:

That it holds the registered charge; and
That the borrower has defaulted so that the loan is due and payable,

the court can, if there is no real defence, grant an order for possession without a full trial.

6.2 Conclusiveness of the register (s.31)

The Land Registry folio is treated as the “official truth” about who owns land and what burdens (like mortgages) exist on it. Unless there is actual fraud or a provable mistake, you cannot dispute the folio’s correctness in ordinary proceedings. Instead, you must bring specific proceedings to rectify the register.

6.3 Legal vs beneficial ownership

Legal owner: the person whose name appears on the deed/folio as owner of the loan or mortgage. This person can sue and enforce security in court.
Beneficial owner: someone who benefits economically from the loan (e.g. an investment fund), often through a trust or securitisation structure, but whose name does not appear on the title.

In enforcement actions, the legal owner is the proper plaintiff. Who is beneficial owner is generally irrelevant.

6.4 Securitisation

Securitisation is a financial process where a lender bundles loans and transfers them to a special-purpose vehicle, which funds the purchase by issuing securities to investors. The legal title to loans may be separated from the beneficial interest. Courts accept this structure but treat the entity with legal title as the person entitled to sue.

6.5 Receiver

A receiver is a person appointed (usually by a lender under a mortgage) to take control of secured property, collect rents, and sometimes sell the property to recover the debt. Under standard Irish mortgage law:

The receiver is the agent of the borrower (mortgagor), not of the lender;
The receiver’s acts are treated as acts of the mortgagor, save where the mortgage says otherwise; and
Complaints about a receiver’s conduct may give rise to separate actions, but do not, without more, invalidate the bank’s right to enforce the security.

6.6 Promissory notes and variation of loan terms

A promissory note is a written, unconditional promise by one party to pay a certain sum of money to another. Key points:

It must be an unconditional promise to be treated as such in law;
It is simply another form of debt instrument – it does not automatically cancel earlier debts;
You cannot unilaterally change the repayment terms of an existing loan contract by issuing your own promissory note; any variation must be agreed by both lender and borrower.

6.7 “Freeman on the land” / “sovereign citizen” style arguments

These are pseudo-legal theories, common internationally, which typically assert:

A separation between a person’s “natural” identity and a “legal persona” created by the state;
That by certain declarations or trust documents, the individual can avoid being bound by contracts or statutes; or
That birth certificates, CUSIP numbers, or “bonds” held by the state are sources of secret funding or “settlement” of debts.

Irish courts, including in Farrell, regard such theories as legally unfounded. A person who signed a mortgage in his own name, when legally advised, cannot later avoid liability by claiming to be a different legal entity or by invoking unrecognised private “trusts” or “estates”.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 Consolidation of possession law

Everyday Finance DAC v Farrell consolidates and applies key strands of Irish possession law:

Reaffirming that s.62(7) is grounded in the conclusiveness of the Land Registry, with possession depending on proof of title and default, not the underlying financial structure of the lender or its funders;
Confirming that in possession-only proceedings, the relevant question is whether there was default sufficient to trigger the contractual right to possession, not whether the exact amount claimed is perfectly calculated; and
Clarifying that collateral complaints (overcharging, regulatory issues, alleged reckless lending, receiver conduct) do not, in themselves, constitute defences to the lender’s underlying entitlement to possession.

7.2 Security for assignees and loan purchasers

The judgment is particularly important for the secondary debt market (“vulture funds”, securitisation vehicles, and loan purchasers):

It confirms that assignees with legal title may sue in their own names, regardless of who provided the purchase funds or who holds beneficial ownership;
It significantly weakens borrower arguments alleging that only the “real” (beneficial) owner can enforce; and
It reinforces that compliance with Central Bank authorisation and regulatory codes, while important in its own sphere, does not generate private-law defences to contractual enforcement absent specific statutory provision.

7.3 Managing vexatious or pseudo-legal defences

By directly addressing the promissory-note-and-trust contentions and the “living man/legal persona” distinction, the judgment provides:

A clear statement that such arguments are not legally recognised;
A principled explanation that a promissory note cannot unilaterally alter loan terms; and
Precedential language that future courts can rely on to dismiss similar defences summarily, preserving judicial resources and protecting the integrity of the process.

7.4 Protection of procedural fairness

Although the Court ultimately rejected all of the defendant’s arguments, the judgment is also noteworthy for its measured approach:

It recognises the defendant’s status as a litigant in person and accepts late material on a de bene esse basis;
It carefully categorises and addresses the wide-ranging complaints rather than dismissing them out of hand; and
It acknowledges that certain matters (overcharging, receiver conduct) might be litigable in other forums or proceedings, even though they are not defences to possession.

This balances the imperative for efficient summary procedures with a genuine concern for fairness and the appearance of justice.

7.5 Family home considerations

Although the Property was an investment property at the time of mortgage and default, the defendant claimed it is now his family home. While this did not affect the entitlement to a possession order, the Court:

Accepted that there was no evidence contradicting its present use as a family home; and
Indicated a willingness to hear the parties on whether a stay should be placed on the order, balancing enforcement with the hardship of losing a family home.

This reflects a familiar judicial practice in Irish possession cases: even when the legal entitlement is clear, the court may moderate the timing or implementation of its orders to temper the social impact.

8. Conclusion

Everyday Finance DAC v Farrell is a comprehensive and carefully reasoned judgment that:

Reaffirms the basic architecture of summary possession proceedings under s.62(7) and s.31 of the Registration of Title Act 1964;
Confirms that, in possession-only actions, “default is the issue, not the amount”, and overcharging allegations ordinarily do not bar repossession;
Clarifies that there is no tort of negligent or reckless lending in Irish law, and that contributory negligence concepts cannot be used to resist loan enforcement;
Endorses the now-settled approach to assignment and securitisation: the legal owner of the loan and mortgage is the proper plaintiff, and beneficial owners or funders are irrelevant for standing;
Holds that alleged breaches of Central Bank authorisation or regulatory codes do not render credit agreements unenforceable in private law;
Firmly rejects pseudo-legal “freeman” style arguments, including attempts to rely on private trusts, estates, or promissory notes to evade contractual liability; and
Demonstrates a balanced approach to litigants in person, acknowledging the breadth of their complaints while keeping clear focus on what is, and is not, legally relevant in a possession claim.

In practical terms, the judgment equips courts and practitioners with clear, authoritative guidance on how to deal with a growing range of defensive strategies in mortgage enforcement proceedings, while confirming the centrality of registered title, contractual default, and the limited scope of defences in summary possession actions.

Everyday Finance DAC v Farrell [2025] IEHC 722: Summary Possession, Assignment of Mortgages, and the Limits of Defences in Mortgage Enforcement