Introduction

The case of Thompson & Anor v An Bord Pleanala & Ors [No.4] ([2025] IEHC 161) before the High Court of Ireland revolves around a dispute concerning the proper computation of limitation periods for judicial review applications in the context of a planning permission decision. The applicants, distinguished scientists with backgrounds in academia and genetics, challenged a development consent granted by An Bord Pleanála for a scheme on Howth Road, Sutton, Dublin 13. They allege that the delay and irregular notification procedures used by the board resulted in a shorter period than legally intended for initiating judicial review proceedings. Central to this dispute is the interpretation of domestic planning law provisions in light of EU law, primarily concerning Articles 41 and 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Articles 6 and 11 of Directive 2011/92, as well as principles under the Aarhus Convention. The case brings into focus how the starting point for the limitation period – whether it runs from the decision's making or its notification – affects the right of individuals to effective judicial review.

Summary of the Judgment

Delivered on 21 March 2025 by Justice Humphreys J., the judgment primarily addresses the nuances of time computation in the context of judicial review applications under the Planning and Development Act 2000. The court scrutinizes the domestic rules that dictate that the limitation period for bringing a challenge runs from the date of the decision, despite the actual notice being provided with delays. In this case, although the board was required to notify the decision via multiple channels within specific timeframes, its tardy compliance effectively disadvantaged the applicants.

The judgment meticulously analyzes how domestic notification rules interact with EU law requirements for legal certainty and effective judicial protection. It sets before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) three preliminary questions aimed at determining whether notification periods should be expressly defined and whether compensatory mechanisms should apply to mitigate any detrimental effects caused by late notification.

Ultimately, the judgment orders that the relevant questions be referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, thus temporarily adjourning a decision on the substantive merits of the case but highlighting critical issues regarding procedural fairness and the right to an effective remedy.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

A number of precedents underpin the Court’s discussion. Prominent among these is Pelati v Republika Slovenija (2012), which established that in domestic law the time for filing challenges begins from the date of the decision, not its notification. Equally significant are the recent domestic cases Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v. The Health Products Regulatory Authority (2022) and Marshall v. Kildare County Council (2023), which underscore the strict application of the eight-week period for initiating judicial review despite the complexities of notification procedures. Internationally, the judgment references EU law fundamentals via Articles 41 and 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which concern good administration and the right to an effective remedy, and the provisions of Directive 2011/92 alongside the Aarhus Convention—especially Article 9(3)—to stress the importance of prompt and accessible public access to decision-making processes.

The judgment also employs the reasoning set forth in Stadt Wiener Neustadt v Niederösterreichische Landesregierung and Alain Flausch and Others v Ypourgos Perivallontos kai Energeias and Others to argue that a legislative regime must not prejudice access to judicial review by imposing differential limitation periods or by failing to provide compensatory extensions where procedural delays occur.

Legal Reasoning

Justice Humphreys J. engages in a layered analysis that contrasts the domestic legal framework with EU obligations. The reasoning is built on a fundamental principle: the need for legal certainty and fairness in administrative decision-making. The court reviews the mandatory nature of notification under sections 146 of the Planning and Development Act 2000, emphasizing that while the board may choose between various modes of notification (office inspection or online publication), the end result must be that public authorities communicate the decision effectively and in a timely manner.

At the core lies the argument that, even though domestic law sets the clock to begin at the decision’s making, such an approach conflicts with EU principles when the notification is delayed. The court is cautious to observe that any discretionary delay that impacts an applicant’s ability to invoke timely judicial review undermines the right to effective remedy and good administration. Consequently, the referral questions interrogate whether the procedural framework should mandate a “reasonably contemporaneous” notification or, alternatively, provide for a compensatory extension where delays occur.

Impact on Future Cases

The implications of this judgment are potentially far-reaching for Irish administrative and environmental law. Should the CJEU rule in favor of a requirement that the effective start of limitation periods be pegged to the actual date of notification—or that a compensatory mechanism must be provided—then domestic courts may be compelled to reinterpret or even reform the statutory framework governing judicial review time limits. This could result in:

• Enhanced procedural safeguards ensuring that all parties receive prompt and meaningful notice of decisions affecting their rights;
• A more harmonized approach with EU principles of legal certainty and effective judicial remedy;
• Potential invalidation or modification of sections of the Planning and Development Act 2000 that currently preclude compensatory extensions for delayed notifications.

Moreover, the decision may encourage a wider reconsideration of administrative notification requirements in other areas of law, reinforcing the EU imperative that administrative procedures must not disadvantage individuals due to internal inefficiencies or maladministration.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Several complex legal concepts emerge from the judgment:

• Limitation Period: This is the legally defined period within which an applicant must bring a challenge. In the current context, the controversy is about whether the deadline should start from the decision date or the notification date.
• Legal Certainty: An EU principle which requires that laws be clear, predictable, and accessible. The judgment argues that a variable start point for limitation periods undermines this principle.
• Good Administration and Effective Remedy: Derived from the EU Charter, these principles require administrative bodies to act fairly, provide timely decisions, and ensure individuals can challenge decisions that affect them.
• Compensatory Extension: A proposed mechanism that would extend the limitation period when administrative delays (such as tardy notification) prejudice a party’s ability to challenge a decision in a timely manner.

By clarifying these principles, the judgment reiterates that procedural fairness is not merely a technicality but a substantive right underpinning access to justice.

Conclusion

In summary, the Thompson & Anor v An Bord Pleanala & Ors decision brings to the forefront a new legal imperative—ensuring that notification of administrative decisions is prompt, effective, and aligned with EU principles of legal certainty and the right to an effective remedy. The case highlights that the domestic system’s practice of marking the limitation period from the decision date, despite delayed notifications, may infringe upon fundamental rights. The referral of detailed questions to the CJEU underscores the pressing need to reconcile national procedural rules with the overarching requirements imposed by EU law.

This judgment is a significant step toward reinforcing procedural fairness in planning and environmental matters. Its influence is anticipated to extend beyond the immediate case, potentially driving legislative and judicial reforms designed to safeguard the rights of individuals against administrative delays and ensuring that public participation is not impeded by technicalities that compromise access to justice.