DPP v Dermody [2025] IEHC 620 – District Court Power to Dismiss Where Court Infrastructure Prevents Trial

District Court Power to Dismiss Criminal Charges Where Court Infrastructure Prevents Trial:
Commentary on Director of Public Prosecutions v Dermody [2025] IEHC 620

Court: High Court (Ireland), Judicial Review List

Judge: Phelan J

Date: 13 November 2025

Citation: Director of Public Prosecutions v Dermody [2025] IEHC 620

1. Introduction

This judgment addresses an increasingly important procedural question in Irish criminal justice: what are the limits of the District Court’s power to dismiss a criminal charge where the prosecution cannot proceed, not because of prosecutorial fault, but because the court system itself lacks the necessary facilities on the hearing date?

The case arose from a summary prosecution for assault causing harm under s. 3 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997. The complainant, having suffered serious head injuries in the alleged assault, later became medically incapacitated in an unrelated incident and was residing in a medical facility. The District Court had specially fixed the case for hearing in Galway so that the complainant could give evidence by video link. On the trial date, however, no courtroom with video-link facilities was available. The prosecution sought an adjournment; the accused objected; the District Judge refused the adjournment and dismissed the charge.

The Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) sought judicial review of that dismissal order, arguing that the District Court judge had exceeded her jurisdiction by dismissing the case without conducting an adequate enquiry and without giving rational reasons, especially where the failure to proceed stemmed from the unavailability of court facilities, not any prosecutorial failure.

The High Court (Phelan J) rejected the DPP’s challenge. The judgment is significant for at least three reasons:

  1. It reaffirms and develops the District Court’s power to dismiss charges without hearing evidence where the prosecution is unable to proceed at a fixed trial date.
  2. It clarifies what kind of “enquiry” and balancing exercise is required before that power is exercised: such an enquiry need not be elaborate, but it must be real, rational and include consideration of relevant factors.
  3. It confirms that the inability to proceed — even where caused by court infrastructure problems rather than the DPP’s fault — can legitimately justify a dismissal, provided the judge has regard to the rights of the accused and the competing public interest in the prosecution of crime.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The underlying criminal charge

The respondent, Mr Owen Dermody, was charged by summons dated 4 October 2021 with assault causing harm, contrary to s. 3 of the 1997 Act. The allegation was that on 8 March 2021 he struck his neighbouring farmer with a stick, causing serious head injuries requiring stitches. The incident arose against the backdrop of longstanding neighbour disputes. The allegations were expected to be contested, with conflicting statements made to An Garda Síochána.

2.2 District Court proceedings and repeated adjournments

The procedural history is central to the High Court’s reasoning.

  • 27 January 2022 – First return date (Clifden District Court): The summons was returnable to Clifden. Consent to summary disposal was indicated and the District Court accepted jurisdiction. Thus, the case proceeded as a summary trial.
  • 26 May 2022 – First trial listing: After disclosure was completed, a summary trial date was fixed. The case could not proceed because the complainant was absent.
  • Adjournment to 26 January 2023 (Clifden): The case was adjourned to facilitate the complainant, who had become medically incapacitated and was residing in a medical facility after being transferred from the National Rehabilitation Hospital.
  • 26 January 2023 – Transfer and video-link order: The complainant remained medically incapacitated and unable to attend in person. The District Court (Judge Fahy) ordered that he be allowed to give evidence by video link. Because Clifden Courthouse had no video-link facilities, the case was specially fixed for hearing on 25 April 2023 at Galway Courthouse, which did have such facilities.

Importantly, by the time of this special fixture, more than two years had passed since the alleged offence.

2.3 The failed trial date of 25 April 2023

In advance of the April hearing, the prosecuting Garda did a dry run of the video link using a link provided by the Courts Service to ensure that remote evidence could be taken.

However, on the morning of 25 April 2023, when the matter came before Galway District Court (Judge Keane):

  • The two courtrooms equipped with video-link facilities were already in use (Circuit Court and a heavy family law list).
  • The specially fixed District Court list was allocated to Court No. 3, which had no video-link capability.
  • The court clerk informed the parties that a video link could not be provided for the hearing.

The transcript of proceedings (the DAR transcript) is central. It shows:

  • The accused was present, with his privately retained solicitor (not legally aided), ready to proceed.
  • The defence solicitor emphasised repeatedly that his client was present and that the case had been specially transferred for video-link evidence because the complainant was incapacitated.
  • The Garda Inspector sought an adjournment, suggesting the following Thursday (two days later), stating that a courtroom with video-link facilities would then likely be available.
  • The defence solicitor indicated that Thursday was inconvenient due to a substantial court list in Castlebar and that the case had already been before the court the fifth if not sixth time ... through no fault of the accused.

After a short enquiry, during which the judge clarified that:

  • the charge was a contested s.3 assault;
  • the case had been listed on multiple prior occasions, including a failed hearing date;
  • the accused and his solicitor were present and ready to proceed;
  • the problem was the non-availability of a suitable courtroom with video-link facilities;

the District Judge refused the adjournment and dismissed the charge, observing:

“I have to dismiss it. There was adequate opportunity given here and there wasn’t the arrangements … In those circumstances I shall dismiss the charge.”

2.4 The District Court order

A formal District Court order, signed on 14 June 2023, recorded that the complaint be dismissed. This is critical: a dismissal simpliciter is treated as final, unlike a mere strike-out.

2.5 The judicial review proceedings

The DPP instituted judicial review proceedings seeking to quash the dismissal. The timeline is instructive.

  • 13 July 2023: Statement of Grounds and a grounding affidavit (by the Garda Inspector) were filed.
  • 17 July 2023 (Hyland J): Leave application opened; liberty granted to amend the Statement of Grounds; leave adjourned to October.
  • 9 October 2023 (Owens J): Leave granted to seek judicial review of the District Court’s dismissal.

The Garda Inspector’s grounding affidavit claimed that:

  • the adjournment application on 25 April 2023 was made on consent of the defence; and
  • the District Court Judge had been informed that the adjournment was by agreement.

This factual premise turned out to be wrong.

In a replying affidavit (13 November 2023), the respondent’s solicitor robustly contradicted this, confirming:

  • he had not consented to the adjournment;
  • he did not tell the District Court that he was consenting;
  • he had, in fact, opposed the adjournment and indicated he and his client were present to meet the case.

Once the DAR transcript was obtained, it corroborated the respondent solicitor’s account and showed the Inspector’s recollection to be inaccurate. The Inspector later described this as a miss-recollection.

Phelan J was critical of the misleading factual basis presented at leave stage, but, in circumstances where:

  • the mistake was acknowledged;
  • the DAR had been flagged as the ultimate arbiter of what occurred;
  • the parties now accepted the transcript as accurate;

she decided not to dwell further on this issue and proceeded to determine the case on the now undisputed factual record.

3. The Legal Issues Before the High Court

The “net legal issue”, as identified by the Court (para. 1), was whether the District Court was lawfully entitled to dismiss the summary charge when the prosecution could not proceed because the courtroom lacked video-link facilities on the specially fixed hearing date.

More specifically, three interlocking questions arose:

  1. Jurisdiction to dismiss without hearing evidence: Does the District Court have jurisdiction to dismiss a charge in circumstances where the prosecution cannot proceed because key evidence (here, the complainant’s video-link evidence) is unavailable due to infrastructural constraints?
  2. Requirement of prior “enquiry” and balancing: Even if such a jurisdiction exists, did the District Judge fail to conduct a sufficient enquiry and balancing of interests before exercising it, as required by case law (notably DPP v Paget and DPP v Ní Chondúin)?
  3. Rationality of the decision: Was the decision to dismiss irrational or disproportionate, particularly given that:
    • the failure to proceed was due to court infrastructure, not prosecutorial neglect; and
    • less drastic alternatives (adjournment, strike-out without prejudice) were available?

A further, background issue concerned the effect of the misstatement of fact at the leave stage, but this ultimately did not determine the outcome, though it prompted explicit judicial concern.

4. Summary of the High Court’s Decision

Phelan J dismissed the DPP’s application for judicial review. Her core conclusions can be summarised as follows:

  1. The District Court has jurisdiction to dismiss a charge, without hearing evidence, where the prosecution cannot proceed at a fixed trial date. This includes cases where the inability to proceed arises from infrastructural failures (such as the non-availability of video-link facilities) rather than prosecutorial fault. The Court expressly endorsed the line of authority in DPP v Ní Chondúin and Cleary v DPP.
  2. A prior enquiry and balancing exercise is required, but need not be elaborate. On the facts, the District Judge did conduct an enquiry: she established that the accused was ready to proceed; that there had been multiple prior listings and delay; that the complainant could not be heard as planned; and that the defence objected to the adjournment. She gave the parties an opportunity to be heard. This was sufficient.
  3. The decision was rational and within the range of lawful responses. The judge legitimately concluded that adequate opportunity had been afforded for the case to be prosecuted and that, against the background of repeated non-progression through no fault of the accused, justice required finality. The High Court stressed that the existence of alternative options (adjournment or strike-out) did not render the chosen option (dismissal) unlawful.
  4. No prosecutorial culpability is required for a lawful dismissal in such circumstances. The critical fact is that the prosecution cannot proceed, not why this is so. Even if responsibility lies with the Courts Service or general resource constraints, a District Judge may still decide that dismissal is required to vindicate the accused’s right to an expeditious conclusion of proceedings.
  5. Given the already lengthy delay, and the nature of summary proceedings, it would in any case have been problematic to remit the matter for trial. Although it was unnecessary to decide the point, Phelan J remarked that prosecuting a summary offence nearly five years after the alleged incident would rarely be compatible with constitutional justice.

The application for certiorari was therefore refused, and the District Court’s dismissal order stands.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Precedents and prior case law

Both sides relied on a series of District Court/judicial review cases, many of which concern the power of the District Court to dismiss proceedings without hearing evidence and the relationship between such dismissals and the District Court Rules.

5.1.1 DPP v Ní Chondúin [2008] 3 IR 498

This was the key authority for the respondent. In Ní Chondúin, charges were dismissed where the prosecution could not proceed on a second hearing date because necessary witnesses were unavailable. The DPP sought judicial review, arguing that, in the absence of excessive delay or prejudice, dismissal was irrational.

MacMenamin J refused certiorari and made several important findings, quoted and adopted by Phelan J:

  • The District Court’s jurisdiction includes the power to dismiss a case finally, even without a formal adjudication on the merits, where the prosecution cannot proceed (Ní Chondúin, para. 67, 70).
  • A District Judge is under a constitutional duty to ensure fair procedures and to prevent invasion of the accused’s rights, which may require dismissing a case where the prosecution is persistently unable to proceed, even if no specific prejudice is shown.
  • The judge must balance the public interest in prosecuting crime with the public interest in ensuring that justice is administered expeditiously and finally.

Phelan J treats Ní Chondúin as a foundational authority confirming the District Court’s power to dismiss without evidence if the prosecution cannot proceed and as setting the template for the required balancing exercise.

5.1.2 Cleary v DPP [2013] 2 IR 48

In Cleary, the applicant had been summarily prosecuted for assault causing harm. When no one appeared for the prosecution on the hearing date, the District Court dismissed the case. The DPP later sought to prosecute the same matter on indictment, contending that the District Court’s dismissal was ultra vires and could effectively be ignored.

The Supreme Court (Hardiman J) rejected that argument and held that the District Court’s dismissal order was an order of a court of competent jurisdiction which could not simply be bypassed. Although the lawfulness of the dismissal itself was not directly in issue and some of the comments were technically obiter, the Supreme Court accepted in principle that a District Court may make a final dismissal order in circumstances where the prosecution is unable to proceed.

Phelan J explicitly notes that Ní Chondúin was approved by Hardiman J in Cleary (para. 43) and therefore takes these two decisions together as strong Supreme Court-endorsed authority that:

  • the District Court’s power to dismiss simpliciter exists notwithstanding the silence of the District Court Rules on that precise form of order; and
  • such dismissals have real legal effect and cannot simply be ignored by the prosecution.

5.1.3 DPP v Paget [2016] IEHC 559

Paget was relied upon heavily by the DPP. It concerned a District Court decision to strike out proceedings at a pre-trial stage, where the prosecution had failed to comply with disclosure obligations and jurisdiction to deal with the offence had not yet been formally accepted. The High Court quashed the District Court’s decision, holding that the dismissal was premature and that proper consideration of the appropriate balancing exercise had not been carried out.

However, even in quashing the dismissal, Paget acknowledged that the District Court does have a jurisdiction to dismiss for want of prosecution where a previously fixed summary trial cannot proceed. It insisted, however, that a judge must:

  • enquire into the reasons for non-availability of the prosecution case; and
  • weigh the public interest in prosecution against the accused’s rights to fair trial and timely resolution.

In Dermody, the DPP relied on Paget to argue that the District Judge here had failed adequately to enquire or balance. Phelan J, however, accepted Paget only to the extent that it sets out the need for an enquiry and a balancing exercise, but found those requirements were satisfied on the facts.

5.1.4 Shannon v District Judge McGuinness [1999] 3 IR 274

Shannon confirmed that the expression “hearing” a complaint in the District Court does not necessarily mean that the court must have heard oral evidence. The District Court may dismiss a case without taking testimony in certain circumstances. Phelan J treats Shannon as confirming, rather than limiting, the District Court’s power to dismiss without evidence (para. 47).

5.1.5 DPP v District Judge Brennan and related authorities

In Brennan, the District Court dismissed burglary and criminal damage charges after a late-arriving solicitor contested the lawfulness of the defendants’ detention. That dismissal was quashed on judicial review because the judge had effectively ruled upon legality in a summary fashion without hearing evidence and contrary to due process.

The DPP invoked Brennan to argue for tight constraints on dismissal powers. Phelan J distinguished it on the basis that Brennan involved a kind of premature merits determination (based on a legal argument about unlawful detention), whereas Dermody concerned a straightforward practical inability to proceed at a second, specially fixed hearing date (para. 46). In other words, the two scenarios are structurally different: one involves summary resolution of a legal objection, the other an assessment of repeated non-progression of the prosecution.

5.1.6 Other authorities

The Court also notes:

  • Minister for Employment Affairs and Social Protection v OCS Operations Ltd (in liquidation) [2019] IEHC 569; and
  • Richards v His Honour Judge O’Donoghue [2017] 2 IR 157,

among others, as part of the body of case law confirming that judicial powers (including dismissal powers) must be exercised judicially, rationally and proportionately, and that judicial review examines legality and rationality, not the merits of the underlying prosecutorial decision.

5.2 The Court’s legal reasoning

5.2.1 Existence and scope of the dismissal power

The DPP did not dispute that the District Court has a jurisdiction to dismiss criminal proceedings. The argument concerned how that power should have been exercised here. Nevertheless, Phelan J took care to reaffirm that this power is well established in Irish law, particularly where the prosecution cannot proceed.

She emphasised (para. 51):

“I am quite satisfied that the District Court Judge has a power to dismiss proceedings without hearing evidence when the prosecution is not able to proceed on the assigned hearing date (D.P.P v. Ní Chondúin). It seems to me that the power to dismiss in circumstances where facilities adequate to allow a case to proceed are not available is a necessary part of the Court's armoury in ensuring fair process…”

This passage is especially important. It does two things:

  1. It ties the inability to proceed to the broader constitutional imperative of fair procedures and the efficient administration of justice.
  2. It explicitly recognises that court infrastructure failures (e.g. absence of video link) may be treated, for these purposes, like other reasons why a prosecution cannot go ahead.

On the District Court Rules, the DPP tried to argue that because the Rules mention powers to strike out, dismiss without prejudice or adjourn, but not a plain dismissal simpliciter, the judge should have opted for a less final disposition.

Phelan J rejected the notion that the Rules exhaust the District Court’s jurisdiction (paras. 39–40, 70):

  • She notes that the jurisdiction to dismiss is already recognised in Ní Chondúin and Cleary, and was exercised in circumstances similar to this case.
  • The absence of an explicit reference in the Rules does not negate that jurisdiction, which arises from the District Court’s constitutional role in administering justice in accordance with fair procedures.

5.2.2 The required “enquiry” and balancing exercise

The DPP’s central argument was procedural: that a dismissal of such finality must be preceded by a sufficiently robust enquiry into the competing interests, including:

  • the public interest in prosecution of crime and vindication of victim’s rights; and
  • the accused’s rights to fair trial, timely justice and finality.

The High Court accepted that:

  • such an enquiry is indeed required (drawing on Ní Chondúin, Paget and general principles of fair procedures); and
  • there must be some explicit or implicit balancing of the public interest in prosecution against the accused’s rights.

However, crucially, the Court held that the enquiry need not be prolonged or elaborate (para. 65). What matters is that the judge establishes the relevant facts and gives the parties a fair opportunity to be heard. On the DAR transcript, Phelan J found that the District Judge had:

  • ascertained the nature of the charge (summary s.3 assault, contested);
  • noted the case had been before the court 5 or 6 times, including at least one previous fixed hearing date;
  • appreciated that earlier non-progression was due to the complainant’s incapacity, not any fault of the accused;
  • recognised that the case had been specially fixed to accommodate the complainant by video link;
  • been informed that, despite three months’ notice, no video-link courtroom was available on the day;
  • known the accused was present, privately represented, and ready to proceed; and
  • heard that the proposed new date (Thursday) was inconvenient for defence counsel, and no alternative fair and prompt solution emerged despite a second call of the case.

These factors are summarised by the Court at para. 54 and described as “relevant considerations each of which informed the balancing exercise”.

The Court concludes (para. 64) that the judge’s reference to “adequate opportunity” having been given to the prosecution demonstrates that some level of balancing had indeed taken place:

“… I am nonetheless satisfied that the Judge considered whether and to what degree weight ought to have been accorded to the public interest in ensuring that crime is prosecuted. This much is clear from her reference to ‘adequate opportunity’ having been afforded.”

Thus, even a relatively brief, informal enquiry can suffice, provided it addresses the key points:

  • why the case cannot proceed;
  • who is at fault, if anyone;
  • how often the accused has been brought to court; and
  • whether any further adjournment can realistically vindicate both sets of interests.

5.2.3 Fault versus inability to proceed

The DPP argued that dismissing the prosecution in these circumstances was irrational because:

  • the failure to provide video-link capable facilities was the responsibility of the Courts Service, not the DPP; and
  • it was wrong in principle to treat this as if it were prosecutorial neglect, as suggested (it was said) by the judge’s remark that the situation did not look “very capable”.

Phelan J decisively rejected the idea that prosecution fault is a prerequisite to dismissal (paras. 68–69):

“It is not a feature of the case-law that the D.P.P. must be responsible for the fact that the case cannot proceed if a dismissal of proceedings is to be rationally justified. The critical consideration is that the case cannot proceed...”

And further:

“In exercising a power to dismiss, I do not construe the decision of the District Court as importing culpability to the D.P.P.… Rather the Court relied on the incontrovertible fact that, due to the lack of video facilities, the prosecution could not proceed, yet again, despite the case having been specially fixed.”

The lesson is that, in this context, the constitutional obligation is to ensure that justice is not indefinitely delayed, regardless of whether the cause of delay is prosecutorial, administrative, or infrastructural.

5.2.4 Judicial review and rationality: not a re-hearing on the merits

Another key theme is the nature of judicial review. The DPP effectively invited the High Court to substitute its own view for that of the District Judge, contending that a reasonable judge would have adjourned rather than dismissed.

Phelan J firmly reiterated that judicial review is not an appellate jurisdiction on the merits (paras. 70–71):

  • The existence of other lawful options (such as adjournment or strike-out) does not render the choice of dismissal unlawful, provided the judge had jurisdiction and acted rationally.
  • The High Court will not intervene simply because a different judge might have made a different decision on the same facts.

On the facts, the decision was rational because:

  • the case had already been delayed for over two years at District Court level;
  • there had been at least one previous aborted hearing and several listings;
  • the accused was present and blameless in the delay;
  • the crucial evidence (complainant’s testimony) still could not be heard on the specially fixed date; and
  • there was no clear, fair and prompt route to having the case heard if adjourned.

In this context, a decision to prioritise finality and the accused’s right not to be kept under indefinite threat of prosecution was within the range of lawful outcomes.

5.2.5 Delay and the discretionary nature of relief

In her “Final Observations” (paras. 74–76), Phelan J highlights that:

  • more than two years had elapsed between the alleged assault (March 2021) and the District Court’s dismissal (April 2023); and
  • by the time of the High Court hearing, over four and a half years had passed since the incident.

Given that the underlying charge is a summary offence, she signals serious concern about the prospect of prosecuting such a matter at such a remove in time, even if she had found the District Court order to be ultra vires:

“It is therefore a matter of concern and relevant to the exercise of a discretionary power to grant relief by way of judicial review, that the relief sought in these proceedings must be for the purpose of continuing with the prosecution of a summary offence which occurred nearly five years ago... Such a long period of time clearly raises an issue as to whether a trial at this remove could be in accordance with the requirements of constitutional justice in this case.”

She ultimately finds it unnecessary to rule upon this discretionary point, given her conclusion that the District Court acted within jurisdiction. But the observation is a clear warning:

  • the High Court’s power to grant judicial review is itself discretionary; and
  • very long delays in prosecuting summary offences will rarely be acceptable, even if some irregularity at District Court level were established.

5.3 Impact and significance

5.3.1 For District Court practice

The judgment solidifies and clarifies the practical reach of District Court powers:

  • District Judges may dismiss criminal proceedings without hearing evidence where the prosecution cannot proceed at a previously fixed hearing date, even where the reason is lack of court resources rather than prosecutorial fault.
  • Judges must conduct a brief but real enquiry, eliciting:
    • the history of the case;
    • the reasons for non-progression;
    • the position of the accused (presence, readiness, representation, expense, etc.); and
    • the feasibility and fairness of any further adjournment.
  • That enquiry does not require formal evidence or lengthy submissions, but there must be a discernible balancing between:
    • the public interest in prosecution; and
    • the accused’s constitutional right to timely, fair determination and finality.

This gives District Judges a clearer and more confident legal foundation when confronted with persistent adjournments and structural obstacles to trial, including video-link issues, listing problems, and court resource constraints.

5.3.2 For the DPP and prosecution practice

For prosecutors, the case carries several key messages:

  • The DPP cannot assume that a court will adjourn proceedings simply because a witness or facility is unavailable, particularly where:
    • the matter has already been adjourned multiple times; and
    • the accused has consistently appeared ready to meet the case.
  • Infrastructure and listing issues do not immunise the prosecution from the risk of final dismissal. From a fairness perspective, the accused’s experience of repeated futile attendances is central.
  • In judicial review, the DPP bears the burden of showing that a dismissal was outside jurisdiction or irrational. It is not enough to show that another judge could have chosen differently.
  • The case underscores the importance of accurate and careful affidavit evidence at the leave stage: material misstatements (such as an erroneous claim that an adjournment was on consent) risk undermining the credibility of the application, even if, as here, the mistake is later acknowledged and corrected.

5.3.3 For defence practitioners

From the defence perspective, Dermody is a powerful reinforcement of the accused’s right to:

  • not be required to attend court repeatedly without progress through no fault of his own; and
  • seek finality where the prosecution proves unable to proceed at repeated trial listings.

The case also illustrates effective advocacy:

  • The defence solicitor did not formally move an application to dismiss, but repeatedly emphasised:
    • that my client is here and ready to proceed;
    • that the case had been in the list five or six times;
    • that the accused was blameless in the delay; and
    • that previous concessions (such as the transfer to Galway) had been made to facilitate the prosecution.
  • These points collectively invited the court to exercise its dismissal power and played a clear role in the judge’s balancing exercise.

5.3.4 For court administration and the Courts Service

Although the Courts Service was not a party, the judgment has important systemic implications:

  • Courts administration decisions (e.g. which courtroom to allocate, what technology is installed or available) can directly affect the viability of criminal prosecutions.
  • Persistent or repeated failures to provide necessary infrastructure can and will lead to final dismissals of prosecutions, not merely adjournments.

In this sense, the case is a reminder that the constitutional duty to administer justice is not satisfied merely by summoning parties to court; it requires providing a functioning environment in which hearings can actually take place.

6. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

6.1 Judicial review vs. appeal

Judicial review is concerned with the legality and rationality of the decision-making process, not with the substantive correctness of the decision. The High Court in Dermody was not deciding whether it agreed or disagreed with the District Judge’s choice to dismiss. It was deciding whether the judge:

  • had jurisdiction to make such an order; and
  • exercised that jurisdiction rationally and in accordance with fair procedures.

An appeal would ask: “Was the decision right?” Judicial review asks: “Was the decision lawfully reached?”

6.2 “Strike out” vs “dismiss” in District Court practice

The distinction between orders is important:

  • Strike out: Usually treated as a non-final disposal; the prosecution can often re-enter or recommence the case, particularly where the strike-out is for procedural reasons and explicitly “without prejudice”.
  • Dismiss / dismissal simpliciter: A final determination: the complaint is dismissed and cannot be simply revived. As Cleary confirms, such an order must be respected unless and until it is set aside by a higher court.

Although the District Court Rules do not use the precise language of “dismiss simpliciter” in the relevant provisions, Dermody, following Ní Chondúin and Cleary, confirms that such a jurisdiction does exist.

6.3 Summary prosecution vs. indictment

The offence here (s.3 assault causing harm) may be prosecuted either:

  • summarily in the District Court (where jurisdiction is accepted and the case is considered suitable for summary disposal); or
  • on indictment in the Circuit Criminal Court or Central Criminal Court, depending on classification.

A summary prosecution typically involves:

  • lesser penalties;
  • simpler procedures; and
  • an expectation of relatively rapid resolution.

This is one reason why Phelan J emphasised that prosecuting a summary assault nearly five years after the event would potentially be incompatible with constitutional justice.

6.4 Video-link evidence

Video-link evidence allows a witness who cannot physically attend court (for reasons such as medical incapacity) to give evidence remotely via a live audiovisual connection. Irish courts routinely use video-link technology in appropriate cases.

In Dermody:

  • the complainant was physically unable to attend due to serious medical incapacity and wheelchair use;
  • the District Court had specially fixed the case in Galway, specifically to accommodate video-link evidence;
  • the non-availability of a courtroom with such facilities on the hearing date was therefore a critical failure in the system’s ability to deliver a fair trial.

6.5 Intra vires and ultra vires

These Latin terms mean:

  • Intra vires: within the powers (lawful).
  • Ultra vires: beyond the powers (unlawful).

The DPP argued that the District Court’s dismissal was ultra vires because it was made without proper enquiry or a lawful basis. Phelan J concluded the dismissal was intra vires — within the jurisdiction of the court — because:

  • the legal power to dismiss in such circumstances is recognised by case law; and
  • the judge had conducted a rational enquiry and balancing exercise before doing so.

6.6 Rationality in judicial review

In judicial review, a decision is typically considered irrational (and thus quashable) only if it:

  • takes into account irrelevant considerations or ignores relevant ones; or
  • is so illogical or unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have come to it.

It is not enough that:

  • another judge might have decided differently; or
  • the reviewing judge would personally have made another choice.

In Dermody, the High Court stressed that the District Judge had considered relevant factors and that her decision lay within a range of reasonable responses. Therefore, it could not be characterised as irrational.

7. Conclusion: The Broader Significance of DPP v Dermody

Director of Public Prosecutions v Dermody [2025] IEHC 620 is an important affirmation of the autonomy and responsibility of the District Court in managing its criminal lists and ensuring the timely administration of justice.

The key takeaways are:

  1. District Court dismissal power reaffirmed: The District Court may dismiss a criminal charge, even without hearing evidence, where the prosecution cannot proceed on a fixed hearing date. This includes circumstances where the cause is a lack of court infrastructure (e.g. no video-link courtroom), not prosecutorial fault.
  2. Enquiry and balancing are required, but need not be elaborate: The judge must establish the salient facts and weigh the public interest in prosecuting crime against the accused’s rights to a fair and timely determination. A brief enquiry, as evidenced in the DAR transcript here, can suffice.
  3. No requirement of prosecutorial culpability: The central question is whether justice — for the accused and the public — requires finality where the case has repeatedly failed to progress. The presence or absence of blame on the DPP or Courts Service is relevant but not determinative.
  4. Judicial review respects first-instance discretion: The High Court will not quash a District Court dismissal simply because it might have chosen a different route or because other reasonable options (adjournment, strike-out) existed. So long as the District Judge acted within jurisdiction and rationally, the decision stands.
  5. Delays in summary prosecutions are constitutionally sensitive: The Court signals clearly that prosecuting a summary offence many years after the alleged incident is generally unacceptable. Even if a District Court order were found wanting, the High Court might still refuse discretionary relief where delay is extreme.
  6. Integrity in ex parte applications is vital: The Court’s unease at the inaccurate affidavit evidence at leave stage underscores the need for scrupulous care and candour on the part of prosecuting authorities when grounding judicial review applications.

In sum, DPP v Dermody underscores that the rights of the accused to be tried fairly, promptly and with finality are not subordinate to systemic or infrastructural imperfections. Where the justice system repeatedly fails to deliver a functioning trial environment, the District Court not only may, but sometimes must, exercise its power to bring proceedings to an end.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: High Court of Ireland

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