Doyle v Houston (2025): Trespass Injunctions ex debito justitiae Against Former Home-Owners After Execution

Introduction

In Doyle v Houston ([2025] IEHC 373) Mr Justice Kennedy delivered what is likely to become a key authority on (1) the status of a former homeowner who re-enters a property after the County Sheriff has lawfully executed a possession order, and (2) the circumstances in which the High Court will grant a prohibitory injunction for trespass without embarking on a full balance-of-justice analysis. The decision also addresses a raft of ancillary themes: attempts to relitigate final orders, the scope of EU and ECHR defences, requests for cross-examination at interlocutory stage, and the application of Isaac Wunder principles to persistent litigants.

Parties

• Plaintiff: Wendy Doyle, solicitor and judgment creditor.
• Defendant: Eugenie Houston, barrister and judgment debtor, in occupation of the property.
• Property: 258 Morell Dale, Naas, Co. Kildare (“the Property”).

Key Issues

1. Whether, once the Sheriff has executed a FiFa and delivered possession to the creditor, the debtor who re-enters becomes a trespasser.
2. If so, whether the Court should grant an interlocutory injunction restraining the debtor’s continued occupation without undertaking a full Campus Oil/balance-of-convenience review.
3. Whether EU‐law, ECHR or constitutional arguments undermine the validity of the prior orders or justify self-help re-entry.
4. Whether alleged “lack of standing” of a judgment-creditor who has merged her practice affects enforcement rights.
5. Procedural points: entitlement to cross-examine, to file late affidavits, and to seek a CJEU reference.

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court granted Ms Doyle the injunction sought, holding that:

• After lawful execution of the FiFa on 24 July 2024 the plaintiff was in both legal and factual possession.
• Ms Houston’s re-entry that evening rendered her a trespasser; continuing occupation is a continuing tort.
• Where trespass is established and the defendant adduces no prima facie right to remain, an injunction issues ex debito justitiae—no extensive balance-of-justice analysis is required.
• The defendant’s EU, ECHR and constitutional submissions had either already been ventilated and rejected in previous litigation or were irrelevant collateral attacks on final orders.
• No material conflict of fact existed; therefore cross-examination, further affidavits, or a CJEU reference were refused.
• A short stay to 18 July 2025 was allowed solely to permit the defendant to seek interim relief in the Court of Appeal.
• Costs awarded to the plaintiff on a legal-practitioner-and-client basis.

Detailed Analysis

1  Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Merck Sharp & Dohme v Clonmel [2020] 2 IR 1 – restated the modern three-stage test for interlocutory injunctions. Kennedy J accepted but emphasised that Merck principles may be curtailed where trespass is clear.
• Havbell DAC v Dias [2018] IEHC 175; Kavanagh v Lynch [2011] IEHC 348; Ferris v Meagher [2013] IEHC 380 – together establish that an injunction restraining clear trespass may issue without the Campus Oil balancing exercise. Kennedy J follows this line.
• AIB plc v Diamond [2012] 3 IR 549 – explains why damages are normally inadequate where proprietary rights are infringed. Cited to reinforce the grant of injunctive relief.
• Start Mortgages DAC v Rogers [2021] IEHC 691 (“Rogers”) – closest factual analogue: borrowers broke back in after execution. Butler J characterised the injunction as prohibitory; Kennedy J applies the same reasoning outside the mortgage context.
• Carlisle Mortgages v Costello [2018] IECA 334; McGann [2019] IEHC 667 – relied on in Rogers; used here to show that execution exhausts the underlying possession order and any subsequent occupation is trespass.
• Clare CoCo v McDonagh [2022] 2 IR 122 & ECtHR Rousk v Sweden (2013) – invoked by the Court to demonstrate proportionality review where a family home is at stake. Distinguished because plaintiff is a private party, execution complete, and extensive procedural safeguards had already operated.

2  Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Finality of Orders & Collateral Attack The Well Charging Order (2019), Vacant Possession Order (2022) and dismissal of appeals render the defendant’s title res judicata. Re-arguing validity at enforcement stage amounts to an impermissible collateral attack.
2. Status After Execution Once the Sheriff handed over the Property under the FiFa, lawful possession vested in the plaintiff; any subsequent entry by the defendant is unlawful trespass (applying Rogers and Carlisle).
3. Nature of Relief The injunction is prohibitory: it restrains ongoing trespass rather than compelling a positive act. Therefore the ordinary “fair question to be tried” threshold suffices, although Kennedy J found the plaintiff met even the higher “strong case” standard.
4. No Need for Balance-of-Justice Analysis Following Havbell and Kavanagh, where trespass is plain and no bona-fide competing right is shown, the Court may grant relief ex debito justitiae; damages are inadequate, and delay would perpetuate wrongdoing.
5. Damages & Undertaking Plaintiff’s undertaking as to damages accepted; defendant, already indebted, offered none, reinforcing inadequacy of damages as a remedy for the plaintiff.
6. EU / ECHR / Constitutional Arguments Kennedy J acknowledged the primacy of EU law and Convention rights but held that national procedural autonomy, finalisation of appeals, and absence of genuine legal uncertainty neutralised those defences. The Good Friday Agreement reference was found irrelevant.
7. Standing Despite Law-Firm Merger Costs orders were in Ms Doyle’s personal favour; absent proof of assignment, merger of practices does not divest enforcement rights (aligned with Court of Appeal dicta in 2020).
8. Procedural Applications Requests for adjournment, cross-examination, fresh affidavits and a preliminary reference were rejected as (i) tardy, (ii) unsupported by material conflict of fact, and (iii) unnecessary to decide the case.

3  Impact of the Judgment

• Clarifies Post-Execution Rights – Confirms that Rogers principles apply beyond mortgage contexts: any party who lawfully obtains possession (e.g. judgment creditor after FiFa) is entitled to summary protection; self-help re-entry creates trespass.
• Streamlines Injunction Practice – Reinforces that courts may dispense with the full Campus Oil analysis in plain trespass situations, accelerating relief for property owners.
• Limits on EU/ECHR Deployments – Provides a roadmap for dealing with repetitive, broad-brush invocations of EU or Convention rights when final domestic orders exist; highlights national procedural autonomy.
• Guidance on Cross-Examination Requests – Restates that cross-examination will only be ordered where a material factual dispute is identified in advance and proper procedural steps are taken.
• Encourages Efficient Case Management – Decision shows the Court’s readiness to manage serial litigation, drawing on Isaac Wunder orders and cost sanctions.
• Practical Enforcement – Signals to practitioners, Sheriffs and An Garda Síochána that post-execution trespass will be swiftly injuncted and that short interim stays may be the exception not the rule.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Judgment Mortgage

A lien registered against real property to secure payment of a court-awarded debt.

Well Charging Order

A High Court declaration that a judgment mortgage is properly charged on specified land and, if unpaid, the land may be sold.

FiFa (Writ of fieri facias)

A writ directing the Sheriff to seize and realise property to satisfy a judgment.

Ex debito justitiae

“As of the debt of justice”: relief that issues automatically, as a matter of right, once conditions are met.

Prohibitory vs. Mandatory Injunction

Prohibitory restrains a party from continuing unlawful conduct (e.g. trespass); mandatory compels a positive act (e.g. hand over keys).

Balance of Convenience / Campus Oil Test

Standard Irish approach to interlocutory injunctions—assesses adequacy of damages, fair question, and risk of injustice. Can be bypassed where a clear property right is infringed.

Isaac Wunder Order

An order restraining a vexatious litigant from initiating new proceedings without court leave.

Conclusion

Doyle v Houston crystallises the law at the intersection of enforcement practice and homeowner protections. Once execution has lawfully transferred possession, the former owner’s occupation constitutes trespass; the Court will grant a prohibitory injunction almost as of right, untroubled by broader balancing once no tenable competing title is advanced. The decision bolsters certainty for judgment creditors, offers practical guidance on handling procedural manoeuvres, and reinforces judicial intolerance for collateral attacks on final orders. Future litigants invoking EU or Convention rights post-execution will need to show concrete procedural deficits, not merely repeat abstract principles. Practitioners should note the Court’s willingness to award solicitor-client costs and its expectation that all procedural objections be raised promptly and with supporting evidence. Overall, the ruling promotes finality, respects property rights, and streamlines the remedy for ongoing trespass following execution, setting a clear precedent for comparable disputes.